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Dissertation supervised by Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, Ph.D. 
 This dissertation names the phenomenon of Moral Injury (MI) as a pressing 
moral, theological and ecclesiological issue.  With an eye toward support to veterans and 
their families, this dissertation situates MI within the field of disability studies, in 
particular, the work of Deborah Creamer’s “limit model” of disability and then, with a 
theological turn, offers a helpful corrective to Creamer’s model by probing Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s view of “limit” (German: grenze) and offering a “crucial limit model of 
disability” as a response.  To accomplish this task, first, I review the development of MI 
as a category and differentiate MI from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). I 
identify psychiatric and psychological themes developed by scholars such as Jonathan 
Shay, Brett Litz, William Nash, Everett Worthington and Diane Langberg.  In addition, I 
outline key theological themes developed in the scholarship of Rita Nakashima Brock, 
  v
Gabriela Lettini, Robert Meagher, Warren Kinghorn and Brian S. Powers. Second, I 
situate MI in the world of disability studies through the notion of finitude while at the 
same time acknowledging the confines for MI in current models of disability: the medical 
model and the social model. Creamer offers a helpful alternative in her “limit model” 
however, weaknesses in her constructive model necessitate revision.  Third, I propose 
Bonhoeffer as a helpful conversation partner to bolster Creamer’s account of “limit” by 
using themes he develops in Creation and Fall regarding the limits of humanity, theology 
and Christology that speak to human finitude.  In response to those limits, Bonhoeffer 
proposes a mode for the flourishing of human life by means of “the orders of 
preservation” and later, his “mandates of creation” providing both parameters and 
restrictions for moral agency.   These will be assessed with an eye to how life might be 
structured for veterans returning from war with their moral code eroded.  Fourth, this 
study will conclude with implications of a revised limit model for veterans with MI – for 
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THE VETERANS’ CREED 
 
 
I am [former rank] [first and last name],  
 
A veteran of the United States [branch of service], 
 
As one of my nation’s fittest and finest, I answered my nation’s call to duty. 
 
I mastered the weapons of war and became expert in defense and security – and I make 
no apology for my skills. 
 
I am a warrior and have seen and done things that many may not understand. 
 
I have proudly served my country with honor and dignity. 
 
I am one in fifteen – a seven-percenter – a member of a team spanning the nation – 
veteran brothers and sisters, bonded by our common values and experiences. 
 
I now stand ready to serve my veteran teammates. 
 
I will help them face and conquer their enemies, including the demons from within. 
 
I will never abandon an injured veteran teammate. 
 
If they need support – I will carry them. If I cannot carry them – I will call for help. 
 
When I struggle with my own pain, my veteran teammates will support me; and I will 
reach out of the darkness and grasp their helping hands. 
 
I will never quit. 
 
I will never give up. 
 
I will never accept defeat. 
 
I am… a United States veteran. 
 
 









A true war story is never moral. 
- Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried
  1
Chapter 1 
Moral Injury: The Signature Wound of a Generation 
 
I am [former rank] [first and last name], 
A veteran of the United States [branch of service], 
As one of my nation’s fittest and finest, I answered my nation’s call to duty. 
 
- The Veterans’ Creed1 
 
1.1 Introduction: Statement of the Problem and Preliminary Hypothesis 
The lament of Jeremiah, “they have treated the wound of my people carelessly” 
(Jeremiah 6:14, NRSV)2 reverberates today as United States veterans return home from a 
decade of war, ridden by PTSD and moral injury, only to discover lethargy and 
complacency in societal response.  The seriousness of soldiers’ wounds, to body and 
spirit alike, demand ethical, social and theological responsibility.  Failure to address the 
seriousness of these wounds results in distress, depression and even suicide for the 
soldier. Statistics may describe a portion of the reality; however, statistics cannot measure 
suffering.  The suffering of soldiers and the repercussive suffering in the wider circles of 
their lives (family, work, faith, civic responsibility) is difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess.  The emerging interdisciplinary field of moral injury describes a wound created by 
social suffering and moral distrust where a soldier’s sense of what is morally right is 
compromised.  Current research reveals a differing presentation of symptoms for moral 
                                                 
1 Written by Judge John C. Reed, III, The Veterans’ Creed is key to his work with veterans in the Mercer 
County Veterans Court.  See:  Sandy Scarmack, “Their own court helping veterans going through criminal 
justice system,” The Sharon Herald, February 17, 2015, www.sharonherald.com/news/local_news/their-
own-cour-helping-veterans-going-through-criminal-justice-system/article (Accessed October 14, 2016). 
2 Jeremiah 6:14 (NRSV). Jeremiah 6 is a difficult text of judgment foretelling a time when God will purge 
Jerusalem and then begin anew with a few who remain and are righteous.  In verse 14, God speaks in 
judgment of people whose falsity keeps them from God. Their inability to attend to the wounds of the 
surrounding community is a part of that judgment, as well as their proclamation of ‘peace’ when no peace 
yet exists. 
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injury other than Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).3  Scholars formally recognized 
PTSD as a critical diagnosis in 1980 after years of response to varying types of war 
neuroses.4  In 2009, a group of scholars led by Psychiatrist Brett Litz introduced the 
terminology ‘Moral Injury’ to describe a different category of symptoms related to moral 
formation, moral emotions, moral response to crisis, and the disabling effect of shame 
when there is an inability to contextualize events that occurred.5 Litz and his team make 
clear through their literature review, clinical research and analytical assessment: 
We are doing a disservice to our service members and veterans if we fail to 
conceptualize and address the lasting psychological, biological, spiritual, 
behavioral, and social impact of perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing 
witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations, that is, 
moral injury.6 
 
The loss of a meaningful and moral worldview creates a shattering of moral identity both 
within the soldier and beyond the solider to the outside world. Moral injury may be 
situated, therefore, within the larger field of trauma studies and can be considered a 
paradigmatic example of the manifestation of moral trauma within an individual.  While 
the precise contours of the newer field of moral injury are under discussion, what is clear 
is that moral injury has a disabling effect on the soldier and their surrounding circles.  
And yet, moral injury as a particular form of disability has not been studied nor 
                                                 
3 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Why distinguishing a moral injury from PTSD is important,” Stars and Stripes, 
March 9, 2015, https://www.stripes.com/opinion/why-distinguishing-a-moral-injury-from-ptsd-is-
important-1.333520#.WNwIzxSjxEc  (Accessed March 30, 2017). Please note, a more comprehensive 
comparison of PTSD and Moral Injury and their unique characteristics will be discussed in Chapter Two.   
4 Matthew J. Friedman, Paula P. Schnurr and Annmarie McDonagh-Coyle, “Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in the Military Veteran,” Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 17:2 (June, 1994): 265.   
5 Brett Litz, Nathan Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva, and Shira 
Maguen “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy,” 
Clinical Psychology Review, 29 (2009): 696.  The importance of this paper in the academic discourse on 
moral injury will be discussed more fully in Chapter Two. 
6 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 697. 
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addressed.  The field of disability studies7 has asked, wrestled and responded to many of 
the questions raised by moral injury. 
Responding well to the particular problem of moral injury requires a robust 
description of the contours of the presenting injury both within the veteran’s inner being 
and beyond the veteran as that injury affects his or her relationship with the world. The 
complications arising from the experience of moral transgression and the inability to 
“contextualize”8 the experience creates a disruption between self and world. This conflict 
between one’s moral center and “morally challenging experiences”9 creates a clash of 
value systems that carry the potential for “long-lasting pscyho-bio-social impairment.”10 
The terminology Litz and his team use to describe the potential impairment reveal the 
possible impact between the self within and the world beyond. 
How then do we address the seriousness of this moral injury avoiding the 
carelessness the prophet Jeremiah laments?   Given the clinical scholarship based on the 
presenting symptoms, a first response might be to medicalize the moral injury and treat it 
as pathology to be healed.  However, describing that injury only as a wound to be 
medically treated carries several dilemmas: moral injury becomes a problem to be solved, 
patients with visible injuries receive prioritized care, medical treatment is unable to 
                                                 
7 Scholars in the field of disability studies utilize a variety of titles for “disability” to capture nuances of 
personal narrative, embodied conditions, social construction, historical and political implications, and 
cultured difference.  Some of these titles include “dis/ability studies,” “ability studies,” “(dis)-ability 
studies,” “crip studies,” and “disability studies.”  See for example:  Linda J. Rogers and Beth Blue 
Swadener, eds., Semiotics and Dis/ability: Interrogating Categories of Difference (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2001); René R. Gadacz, Re-thinking Dis-ability: New Structures, New 
Relationships (Edmonton, Alb.: University of Alberta Press, 1994); and Dan Goodley, Dis/ability Studies: 
Theorising disablism and ableism (London: Routledge Press, 2014); and also, Robert McRuer, Crip 
Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (New York: NYU Press, 2006).  For the purposes of 
this dissertation, I am using the largest spectrum of the term “disability studies” as a starting point for 
cross-disciplinary conversation with moral injury. 
8 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. 
9 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. 
10 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. 
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plumb the depths of moral emotions, and the issue of moral injury is depoliticized.  First, 
medicalization turns moral injury into a problem to be solved rather than a person in need 
of wholistic healing of body, mind and spirit.  Veteran Tyler Boudreau explains, soldiers 
turn “automatically into mental patients instead of wounded souls.”11 Second, some 
might argue that medicalizing moral injury will place the wounded solider with the 
invisible wounds of war at a disadvantage to others whose wounds are more noticeable. 
Theologian Robert Meagher explains, “Those who come back without a scar – silent, 
hollowed out, shadowed, and overlooked until they take their agony out on themselves or 
others – rarely find recognition, much less healing.”12 Third, when that invisible wound is 
observed, many consider treatment of the injury as simple as a medical solution to be 
assessed, diagnosed and treated therein neglecting the depth of the injury within the 
veteran’s moral emotions. The inner experience of shame and guilt and their outward 
manifestations of “anger and decreased empathy”13 are difficult to assess and treat solely 
within a medicalized environment.  Finally, a medical diagnosis has the potential to 
confine the moral injury to the soldier alone rather than considering the greater societal 
context.  Veteran Tyler Boundreau explains, “A diagnosis has a tendency to depoliticize a 
veteran’s disquietude and turn it into a mental disorder.”14 
If medical assessment alone is not enough to treat moral injury, is it possible that 
a social analysis could help restore the wound? Certainly this is a step veteran Tyler 
                                                 
11 Tyler Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” The Massachusetts Review, 52:3/4 (2011): 749. 
12 Robert Emmet Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2014), 1. 
13 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
14 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 750. 
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Boudreau argues for when he implies re-politicization over and against the tendency to 
depoliticize.  He makes clear: 
What’s most useful about the term “moral injury” is that it takes the problem out 
of the hands of the mental health profession and the military and attempts to 
place it where it belongs – in society, in the community, and in the family – 
precisely where moral questions should be posed and wrangled with.  It 
transforms “patients” back into citizens, and “diagnoses” into dialogue.15 
  
Describing moral injury only as a wound to be medically treated, neglects the societal 
entanglement that creates moral injury. Moral injury is not simply a “psycho-bio” 
condition, but also a “social” one.16  Litz and his team of scholars recognized the medical 
(psychological/biological) component as well as the socio-political dimension (social) 
that has qualities of both physical impairment as well as societal disabling.17 The move 
toward a more ‘social’ analysis of moral injury initiates substantive conversation.  When 
soldiers become “citizens” and not just patients, when moral injury becomes re-
politicized, and when we move beyond therapeutic-medical-reductionism toward a more 
complex social analysis, it is then possible to: invite criticism of the Just War tradition,18 
                                                 
15 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 750. 
16 See:  Jeffrey P. Bishop, “Biopsychosociospiritual Medicine and Other Political Schemes” Christian 
Bioethics, 15:3 (2009): 254–276.  Bishop argues that societal structures create unjust effects on human 
being through biopsychosociospiritual structures that cause harm and malfeasance (273).  
17 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. 
18 See for example: Tobias Winright, Can War Be Just in the 21st Century, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2015) and also Robert Emmet Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War (Eugene, 
OR: Cascade Books, 2014).   And also, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Cian O’Driscoll, and John Williams, eds., 
Just War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).  To 
be clear, the long tradition of “just war theory” originating with Augustine is outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  However it should be noted the multiple and complex ways in which wars can be unjust 
whether the originating propulsion to war is unjust (jus ad bellum) and the mechanisms through which the 
war is carried out (jus in bello).  Just war tradition considers the following regarding the jus ad bellum 
criteria: just cause, right authority, right intent and last resort.  The just war tradition considers the 
following regarding the jus in bello criteria:  proportionality, double-effect and discrimination.  In addition, 
recent scholarship considers a third realm regarding jus post bellum exploring the ethics of justice and 
restoration after the conclusion of a conflict.  See for example: Eric Patterson, ed., Ethics beyond War’s 
End (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012). 
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probe the complexity of the soldiers’ “contextual realities”,19 de-clinicize the injury as 
solely cognitive,20 and re-conceptualize healing as social rehabilitation rather than a 
solely individualized event.21  The cumulative effect of these positive elements of a social 
analysis is that “It pulls moral transgressions that are not necessarily traumatic out of the 
mental health profession and into society, into the living room, and makes these notorious 
‘invisible wounds’ all our problems, not just the problems of the VA.”22  In other words, 
moving the responsibility of moral injury from the shoulders of veterans to the shoulders 
of society redistributes personal guilt to be shared across society.23  
Despite these benefits and the soul-searching societal conversation they invite, 
describing moral injury solely through a social analysis carries its own restrictions. A 
social analysis, while it complicates the dynamics of politics, power and possible 
oppression at play in an assessment of moral injury, neglects several key factors such as: 
the profundity of moral emotions such as anxiety, shame, fear and guilt,24 the alterations 
in identity due to those “global evaluations of the self,”25 the inability to assess the 
fluidity of moral injury across varying contexts (ie. a veteran may experience the 
complications of moral injury within a church or household, but not suffer the same 
distress within a cadre of military veterans), the questions of agency (ie. is the moral 
agent free to act or caught within a complex and/or unjust system) and finally, the 
                                                 
19 Tobias Winright and E. Ann Jeschke, “Combat and Confession: Just War and Moral Injury” in Can War 
Be Just in the 21st Century, ed. Tobias Winright (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2015), 175. 
20 Winright and Jeschke, “Combat and Confession,” 174. 
21 Winright and Jeschke, “Combat and Confession,” 184. 
22 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 754. 
23 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 753. 
24 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
25 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699.  Here, Litz draws on the work of Helen B. 
Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York, NY: International Universities Press, 1971), 30.  Lewis 
speaks of a global evaluation of self: “I did this thing” which is a different moral emotion and process than 
guilt which focus on the action done: “I did this thing.” 
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ambiguity of moral injury. Moral injury isn’t always a moment of combat but what Tyler 
Boudreau describes as “…dull.  It’s going to be a man with a shovel or a farmhouse 
search.  It’s going to be a hug.”26 Boudreau uses this description to show the complexity 
of agency within distorted power systems leading to ambiguity in what might appear 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in any given situation.  In addition, a social analysis neglects certain 
nuances of responsibility.  In some instances, a veteran needs the burden of responsibility 
broadened from her shoulders to bear the enormous complexity and ambiguity of a moral 
crisis in which she finds herself.  In other instances, a veteran needs to claim as their own 
certain moral actions and seek atonement rather than accepting the passivity of a broader 
societal spectacle.27  A social analysis acknowledges the complicity and complexity of 
institutional sin and its potential to wreak havoc on individual bodies creating what 
Sharon V. Betcher deems “social flesh”28 that goes beyond medical diagnosis or 
treatment.  However, the profundity, identity, fluidity, ambiguity, complexity, 
responsibility and passivity are not fully accounted for within a social assessment. Even 
taking the step toward a social diagnosis of the wound, as helpful as naming that reality 
is, can still prevent this particular wound of moral injury from being fully understood.   
 
1.2 Moral Injury and Disability 
                                                 
26 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 754. 
27 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 753. 
28 For more on the concept of the “assemblage” of “social flesh” see Sharon V. Betcher, “Of Disability and 
the Garden State,” Religious Studies News, (March, 2013).   
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Drawing moral injury alongside the field of disability studies29 is provocative for 
two reasons.  First, ‘disability’ is often a liability in military culture – not simply the 
diagnosis, but the very word and its implications.  Second, the field of disability has 
wrestled with questions akin to those being asked by scholars of moral injury regarding 
the medical and social components of disability.  While “medical” and “social” models of 
disability are helpful for naming particular realities those with disabilities face, the 
medical model does not incorporate the power at play within the social construction of 
disability.  And, the social model of disability cannot fully describe the “fluidity”30 
through which certain disabilities present or recede in varying social contexts. The social 
model understands disability as contextual within a particular world, but consider, for 
example, whether a person would be considered deaf within a deaf community.  In 
response to this critical issue of “fluidity” across social contexts in disability studies, 
Deborah Creamer suggests the need for an alternative model to compensate for the 
inadequacy of these two standard models and allow: greater fluidity across social 
contexts, deeper questions regarding the human condition, as well as broader exploration 
of theodicy. 
Creamer’s work critiques the medical and social models of disability and 
develops a proposal for a “limit model of disability.”31  Just as the social model builds 
upon and expands the medical model of disability, the limit model advances the social 
model to demonstrate how the disabling that occurs within certain worlds generates 
                                                 
29 For further introduction to the discipline, see key texts: Lennard J. Davis, ed., The Disability Studies 
Reader (New York: Routledge, 1997).  And also: Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, eds., Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities (New York: Modern 
Language Association of America, 2002). 
30 Deborah Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 93. 
31 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31. 
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certain questions relating to God, self and humanity.32  To be clear, Creamer does not 
abandon the two alternate models in full; instead, she acknowledges their strengths and 
weaknesses and takes additional steps forward. Creamer’s work invigorates study of 
disability by acknowledging the unavoidable limits of human embodiment, demonstrating 
how confrontation with limits invites questions, and naming the equalizing power of this 
assertion for all humanity.  Creamer’s work is important because it addresses the real 
“limits” that studies in disability probe and pursuits in theological method quickly meet.  
Creamer critiques “static” conceptions of disability where people are seen “either” 
disabled “or” not.33  Instead, disability for Creamer is “fluid” depending in part on 
functionality across various contexts.  Because of this fluidity there is “ambiguity in 
perception” therefore people cannot be easily categorized.34 Identity, Creamer argues, has 
a complexity greater than the current medical and minority (social) models engage.35  A 
“limit” in Creamer’s assessment is any place where a person moves from ability to a 
disability. She explains: 
From the limits perspective, sin might now be redefined as an inappropriate 
attitude toward limits as we both exaggerate and also reject our own limits and 
the limits of others.  Disability might be understood as limits that are not 
accommodated by the environment.  Rather than minimizing the experiences of 
disability, this perspective allows us to identify areas where our limits become 
disabling due to physical or social barriers, relocating sinfulness.  It also 
identifies prejudices we hold about limits – that is, how we see some limits as 
“natural” (we cannot fly) and others as “defective” (I cannot run) – and offers an 
opportunity for a critical reexamination of such views.  Moving away from such 
prejudices, we might instead explore the relationship between limits and 
creativity, or wonder what the existence of limits tells us about the nature of 
                                                 
32 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31-33. 
33 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31. 
34 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 6. 
35 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 7. To be clear, Creamer uses the term “minority model” as 
an alternative to the “social model” of disability.  Her reason for this choice is to demonstrate the 
oppression that occurs when a larger social group deems who is in the majority and the minority (25-26). 
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humanity.  Through this new lens, questions may also be raised about images 
and understandings of God.36 
 
Limits, then, create a space for the varied spectrum of “embodied experience”37 rather 
than simplistic measures of “either/or”38 that can minimize disability benefits, prevent 
treatment and affect social perceptions.  Acknowledging limits creates an equalizing 
measure of human experience, where all people at various moments in time and in 
diverse contexts encounter limits.39  When that limit is encountered and a moment of 
recognition regarding changing ability or agency occurs therein is the experience of 
disability.40   
For Creamer, this sense of “limit” is an integral part of being human, not simply 
for those who currently experience a disabling condition.  Her understanding of “limit” is 
overwhelmingly positive:  limits are unsurprising,41 limits are intrinsic to existence,42 and 
limits are good – not evil.43 In developing this position, Creamer erases some of the 
negativity associated with limits and disablement and expands “limit” to suggest a 
                                                 
36 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 33. 
37 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31.  An important reference regarding limits, embodiment 
and human vulnerability is: Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need 
the Virtues (Chicago, IL: Open Court Press, 2001).  For MacIntyre, the notion of limit is an inherently 
human thing and an inevitable part of human existence. This book is a response by MacIntyre, to criticisms 
from After Virtue, claims that our “embodied dependencies” are a singular, definitive characteristic of what 
it means to be human.  Due to these embodied dependencies, there is the need for virtuous dispositions.  
Two questions guide his work:  Why must humans look to other intelligent animal species to see what is 
important in the life we share?  And, why is vulnerability and dependency important for moral philosophy?  
In After Virtue, MacIntyre tried to distance his argument from biology.  Here, he links the two.  Virtue must 
begin with an understanding of our “initial animal condition” (p. x).  A re-reading of Aquinas, even one of 
Aquinas’ prayers, led MacIntyre to a deeper understanding of our animal condition, vulnerability and 
dependence that stands, in MacIntyre’s opion to the megalopsychos of Aristotle.   
38 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31. 
39 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31. 
40 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 33. 
41 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 94. 
42 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 95. 
43 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 96. 
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particular theological anthropology that touches all humanity.44  She uses the “limit-ness” 
of human experience to offer a third way beyond the operative “medical” and what she 
calls social “minority” models of disability. For Creamer, the “medical” model of 
disability misses the larger social implications of societal constructions that have 
implications for power, prejudice, oppression and socio-political stigmatization.45  The 
social “minority” model of disability functions to address these implications and offers a 
clear socio-political depiction of the way society fails to meet the physical and vocational 
needs of disabled persons.  Creamer’s articulation of “limit-ness” as a model for both 
disability and theology clarifies the bias in both the medical and social models that 
presume “normal” bodies as the standard.  A “limit” model creates a space for what 
Creamer calls a “threshold”46 where one might experience distinct levels of ability and/or 
disability in varying contexts. In addition, a limit model reveals a fundamental aspect of 
human experience whereby encountering varying thresholds raises deep questions 
regarding human beings before God.47  To summarize Creamer, an important clarifying 
note is necessary.  Creamer’s “limit model of disability” might better be understood first 
and foremost as a “contextual model of disability” (differing from the all-pervading 
“social model”, in order to provide for changes in agency and ability across varying 
social contexts for which the standard “social model” does not account).  Then, emerging 
from that “contextual model of disability” is the ongoing encounter with limits:  my 
agency is limited in this context and my abilities are limited in this context.  Those 
                                                 
44 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 32. 
45 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 27. 
46 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31. 
47 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 33. 
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encounters, then, raise questions – as those limits are reached – regarding the limits of 
God, my self, and those around me. 
Creamer’s model serves as an important first step in describing the particular kind 
of disabling experience moral injury constitutes that have heretofore gone unrecognized. 
Before proceeding, it is vitally important to acknowledge the risk of drawing moral injury 
into conversation with the area of disability studies.  Veteran and author Tyler Boudreau 
makes very clear his perspective: “Moral injuries are not about benefits or blame.  
They’re not about treatment or medications.  They’re not about disability.”48  In fact, 
veterans react quite strongly to the stigmatizing label of “disability” and its implications 
for being a part of a special needs population even though, ironically, a disability label 
might provide future benefits to the morally wounded soldier.49 Psychologist Jonathan 
Shay was one of the first to advocate for articulating the ‘disabling’ effects of moral 
injuries’ wounds, “When the injury invades character, and the capacity for social trust is 
destroyed, all possibility of a flourishing human life is lost.”50  The language of disability, 
for a veteran, can sound overly medicalized thereby creating an assymetrical power 
dynamic where a dependent ‘victim’ is in need of a more powerful person who may offer 
strategies for healing the impairment.  Or, the language of disability, for a veteran, can 
sound overly socialized because a diagnosis carries socio-political stigmatization.  As 
much as the language is loaded for veterans that is precisely the point and the burden 
shared by scholars of disability.  Creamer’s determination to claim the language of 
                                                 
48 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 754. 
49 Linda Bilmes, 'Soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: The long term costs of providing veterans 
medical care and disability benefits', Faculty Research Working Paper Series (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Kennedy School of Government, 2007), 
https://www.clark.wa.gov/sites/default/files/ReturningSoldiers.pdf (Accessed September 15, 2017).  
50 Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming (New York, NY: 
Scribner Publishing, 2003), 150-151. 
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“limit” is to address these very issues.  Tyler Boudreau, though arguing against disability, 
yields toward the argument Creamer is making when he writes, “When we talk about 
moral injuries, we seek a deeper understanding of our humanity.”51 Creamer addresses 
“limits” because our encounter with limits and our threshold of ability or disability in 
their presence raises the deepest of questions regarding our shared humanity.   
  However, there are inadequacies in Creamer’s assessment. Limits, for Creamer, 
are positive: she describes limits as unsurprising, intrinsic and good. This is not unlike the 
veteran or scholar who advocates the strength of moral injury as the retention and 
awareness of morality.  Even a moral injury maintains a remnant of decency and hope in 
the moral goodness and moral codes operative within a broken world.  However, 
comprehending the depth of a veteran’s moral injury requires journeying to a level 
beyond Creamer’s “unsurprising, intrinsic and good” to the complexity of the moral 
emotions of anger, wrath, shame and lament.  In order to create a greater space for those 
moral emotions within Creamer’s model, this dissertation recovers Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 
view of limits (German: grenze) in Creation and Fall as a necessary refinement to 
Creamer’s “limit model.”  While Creamer moves from the “contextual” to the theological 
by examining first the changes in agency across varying contexts, and then, asking 
theological questions regarding the limits encountered; Bonhoeffer does the reverse.  
Bonhoeffer pursues the exegesis of a Biblical text, Genesis, to ponder the theological and 
anthropological reasons for the existence of limits.   Then, he takes that exegetical 
analysis toward a practical application across contexts as he suggests “the orders of 
preservation” as a way of maintaining agency and ability across social contexts even 
                                                 
51 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 754. 
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when limits are encountered. The retrieval of Bonhoeffer’s pastoral and practical 
response to limits will better facilitate an adequate description of moral injury and 
thereby create a space for a deepened response to the moral emotions and the moral 
demands evidenced in this injury.   
Particularly important for refinement within Creamer’s model is the complexity of 
“limit” when affected by both individual and institutional sin.  Creamer’s account 
recognizes the limit of human finitude; Bonhoeffer’s theology in conversation with 
Creamer will develop the implications of finitude and shame in the face of limits.  
Responding well to the moral injury of veterans, as ethicists, theologians and civilians, 
requires better understanding the transgression of moral limits a veteran experiences and 
the subsequent shame and soul-shattering repercussions of this injury.  Responding well 
means medical treatment, when necessary, and social accountability beyond latent 
acceptance, but also an identification of human limits and divine limitations within a 
crisis of moral authority across fluid moral worlds.  Responding well requires the church 
to consider the theological resources available to address this moral wound, to make 
those resources available to those in need, and to deepen the space for suffering within 
those resources when necessary. 
 
1.3 Toward Cross-Disciplinary Scholarship for Moral Injury 
Defending this thesis, requires three key steps:  first, a thick description of moral 
injury and its history will be presented drawing on the work of psychiatrist Jonathan 
Shay, psychologists Brett Litz, William Nash and Everett Worthington, as well as 
theologians Rita Nakashima Brock, Gabriella Lettini, William Kinghorn, Robert Meagher 
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and Brian S. Powers.  Critical to the history and definition of moral injury is 
distinguishing the presenting characteristics of moral injury as significantly different 
from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). After reviewing the historical development, 
noting several key themes in the scholarship is necessary to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the field.  Within this developing field key themes echo questions scholars 
address and wrestle with in the world of disability: the predicament of physical 
experience and the heightened tendency toward medicalization of the predicament rather 
than grappling with a greater sense of embodiment, the problem of societal complacency 
in understanding the experience and moral grief of veterans, and the limits of theological 
reflection across fluid social contexts regarding questions of war and its aftermath. These 
lingering themes and concerns are important to address because they reverberate with 
medical, social and theological themes regarding the limits of questions raised in the field 
of disability. 
Second, situating moral injury within the field of disability studies is critical for 
naming the particular disabling implications of moral injury on the veteran and within the 
veteran’s context. The study of disability necessitates reflection on various forms of 
embodiment and how bodies are accepted or rejected within varying social contexts. 
Creamer’s rejection of “either/or” claims of disability toward a more equalizing and fluid 
model of disability are key to her presentation of a “limit model” of disability.  
Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of her model will then demonstrate both the 
promise of her model as well as the need for further refinement.   
Third, drawing on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s depiction of limits within his accounts of 
creation, sin and redemption will deepen and further define Creamer’s limit model 
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creating a space to assess moral injury that goes beyond physicality and sociality.  The 
assertions Bonhoeffer makes regarding limits create the space for a particular theological 
response when a moral world is transgressed.  Bonhoeffer proposes “the orders of 
preservation” as the particular location in which Christology intersects his theological 
anthropology.  An analysis Bonhoeffer’s “orders of preservation” will then allow the 
reader to understand how a moral world can then be rebuilt, through Bonhoeffer’s 
mandates of creation, to attend to the spheres of life of church, family, culture and 
government building on what Christ has preserved in the face of fluid and changing 
limits. This dissertation will conclude by determining the implications of a limit model of 
disability for veterans experiencing moral injury.  Strengths and weaknesses of a 
“revised” limit model will be explored along with its implications for soldier, society and 
spiritual life within the church.  
Characterizing moral injury as a transgression52 of limits provides a helpful 
resource for moving beyond restrictive views of moral injury as a wound that can be 
treated medically through particular treatment, or as a socially inflicted lesion from the 
collapse of a particular moral world.  Instead, a robust description of limits initiated by a 
conversation with the disability theology of Deborah Creamer and strengthened by the 
theological anthropology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer can help moral injury in our veterans be 
tended to in a socially serious and theologically astute manner.  As the contours of moral 
injury and its ramifications for veterans continue to be nuanced, a keen definition of what 
moral injury precisely is will deeply affect our understanding.  Even more so, drawing on 
                                                 
52 It should be noted that Litz, et. al, first used the language of “transgression” in their 2009 study.  See, for 
example: “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696.   
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the work of disability studies and its transformative work in the body politic53 will assist 
those in the field of moral injury provide liberating advocacy and integrity for those in 
crisis.   
 Veteran war reporter and author, David Wood calls moral injury “the signature 
wound of this generation.”54  And yet, because of the shame and guilt intrinsic to moral 
injury, calculating its reach across veterans55 is difficult even when the human cost of its 
effects are “incalculable.”56  “Incalculable” is a helpful descriptor for considering the 
impact on soldiers and society of moral injury for several reasons.  First, recent statistics 
depict a pressing need: of the 30,000 suicides that occur in the United States each year, 1 
in 5 of these suicides is a veteran.57 While there is much debate over certain statistics and 
how they are calculated, what is most clear is the cry of individuals for help.58  Second, 
moral injury is not necessarily immediately present upon return from war.  Veteran Karl 
Marlantes describes in his reflection, “What It Is Like to Go To War,” a period of being 
‘fine’ for ten years after Vietnam before he questioned his moral code and its 
reverberating effect on his life.59 Because of the delayed reaction, reliable statistics 
                                                 
53 See for example: Nirmala Erevelles, Disability and Difference in Global Contexts: Enabling a 
Transformative Body Politic (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2011) and also Paul K. Longmore, Paul K. and 
Lauri Umansky, eds. The New Disability History: American Perspectives (New York, NY: New York 
University Press, 2001). 
54 David Wood, “The Grunts: Damned if they Kill, Damned if they Don’t,” Huffington Post (March 18, 
2014), http://projects.huffingtonpost.com/moral-injury/the-grunts (Accessed February 4, 2016). 
55 For current discussion regarding number of suicides a day, see: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/02/04/the-missing-context-behind-a-widely-
cited-statistic-that-there-are-22-veteran-suicides-a-day/ (Accessed February 4, 2016). 
56 Editorial, “Healing Moral Wounds,” America: The National Catholic Review (April 14, 2014), 
www.americamagazine.org/issue/healing-moral-wounds (Accessed February 24, 2016). 
57 Kimberly Hefling, “Suicide is Rising among Young Male War Veterans,” Stars and Stripes (Jan. 12, 
2010),   
https://extranet.dhss.alaska.gov/sites/stopsuicide/News/Suicide%20is%20rising%20among%20young%20
male%20war%20veterans.pdf (Accessed March 16, 2015). 
58 Hefling, “Suicide is Rising among Young Male War Veterans”. 
59 Karl Marlantes, What It Is Like to Go to War (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011), 49-50. 
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regarding particular generations of veterans and the wars they fought in are difficult to 
obtain. Third, it is impossible to calculate the human cost of moral injury on marriages, 
parenting, extended familial relationships, friendships, the work force and ongoing 
societal impact across generational lines over time. Psychiatrists David Berle and 
Zachary Steele studied the psychological effects of returning from war on family systems 
by measuring changes in relationships, roles, responsibilities within the family, the 
rearing of children and issues of anger and violence.  In all areas, they found substantive 
distress and difficulty in finding both proactive and reactive help to assist the family 
dynamics.60  Fourth, the possibility of moral injury affecting journalists, contractors and 
other civilians privy to war zone contexts will even further exacerbate the impossibility 
of assessing human cost and obtaining adequate statistics.  Former Journalist Chris 
Hedges, for example, speaks to the trauma he experienced over twenty years while 
covering wars in Latin America, the Middle East and the Balkans, when he explains:   
It so upends the moral and physical universe that when you step outside the war 
zone you just cannot relate, you cannot function… I did it for 20 years and what 
happens when you cannot extract yourself from it is early death, whether that is 
through drinking, substance abuse, or a heart attack.61 
 
In addition, statistics regarding Moral Injury do not include repercussions on individuals 
outside the armed forces affected by warzone suffering, perhaps including Moral Injury.  
Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, Edward Wasserman reminds:  
                                                 
60 David Berle and Zachary Steel, “Families of returned defense force personnel: a changing landscape of 
challenges,” Australasian Psychiatry 23:4 (June 23, 2015), 399.  
61 David Gutnick, “Ex-correspondent Chris Hedges on covering war, dealing with PTSD,” CBC News 
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ex-correspondent-chris-hedges-on-covering-war-dealing-
with-ptsd-1.2947101 (Accessed March 30, 2017). 
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While the coverage of veterans is a major improvement in the media’s 
approach from what it was in the late ‘60s and ‘70s, it has come alongside the 
virtual disappearance from coverage of civilian suffering.62 
 
Perhaps this incalculability, in all its fuzziness, void and shame is what makes it so 
difficult for churches to provide pastoral, theological and liturgical support to veterans 
and their families.  The National Congregation Survey, completed in 2012, is a 
comprehensive study of 1300 American religious institutions including mosques, 
synagogues and churches assessing their individual and collective impact.  Question #465 
of the National Congregation’s Survey reveals the neglect of religious institutions in 
responding to veterans and their families.  The question asks, “Within the past twelve 
months have there been any groups or meetings or classes or events specifically focused 
on the following purposes or activities?  Support for veterans and their families?”  Of 
1330 congregations analyzed, 967 churches said ‘no’ with a percentage ranking 72.7% of 
the nation’s churches failing to respond to this pressing need. Of those interviewed, 
27.3% or 363 institutions (of the 1300) offered support.63 For churches to meet their 
neighbor in need, adequate theological and pastoral support is critical to implementation 
of initiatives and facilitation of group support, for the ultimate resurrection of despairing 
spirits.  Given that 2.7 million Americans have been deployed since 2001,64 theologians 
and ethicists must address the spiritual and moral needs even when the task seems 
incalculable. 
                                                 
62 Edward Wasserman, “Coverage of ‘moral injury’ among U.S. vets masks disregard of civilian 
war  suffering,” Unsocial Media, (Jan. 6, 2014), https://ewasserman.com/2014/01/06/coverage-of-moral-
injury-among-u-s-vets-masks-disregard-of-civilian-war-suffering/ (Accessed March 30, 2017). 
63 National Congregations Study Cumulative Data Set (1998, 2006-2007, 2012).  The discouraging 
response to this question labeled “VETSUPPT” is even more chilling when viewed as a pie chart wherein 
three-quarters of the circle depicts the absence of response from religious institutions.   
64 “Costs of War,” Watson Institute International and Public Affairs of Brown University, 
http://costsofwar.org/article/us-veterans-and-military-families (Accessed February 23, 2016). 
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 As noted above, it is my intention in this dissertation to construct a revised and 
deepened “limit model” of disability that can provide helpful pastoral resources and 
theological nuance to the individual veteran in distress due to moral injury.  Drawing 
moral injury into the field of disability studies is not intended to “disable” the veteran, but 
to better enable those persons who have experienced moral injury to articulate the limit 
reached in the soldier’s psyche that surpasses bodily injury and societal neglect to better 
determine the help they need and deserve.  Even more so, drawing moral injury into the 
field of disability helps to create a deeper conversation regarding the precise nature of 
what moral injury is and its consequences for how we understand human agency and 
subjectivity and to provide an appropriate response to assist the person in need.  In 
addition, considering moral injury in relation to broader reflection on human limitations 
and finitude provides a foundation for recognizing how anthropological, theological, and 
Christological convictions can inform our understanding of this complex moral 
experience. 
1.4 Methodology of the Study 
Given the pressing needs surrounding veterans struggling with moral injury, 
psychologists Brett Litz and Shira Maguen encourage a cross-disciplinary conversation 
regarding moral injury in a journal article entitled “Moral Injury and Veterans of War” in 
the PTSD Research Quarterly driven by their highly esteemed clinical and scholarly 
work with veterans in Boston and San Francisco.  Litz argues that more work is needed to 
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address the “many unanswered questions that need further development”65 and to work 
across disciplines to mobilize and capitalize on various disciplines to respond to the many 
layers of human and societal need.  Collaboration is needed “across disciplines that 
integrate leaders from faith-based and spiritual communities, as well as other 
communities from which individuals seek support.”66 In light of that challenge, this 
dissertation intentionally engages literature in the fields of moral injury, theology and 
disability studies. The methodology needed to accomplish this task is fourfold.   
The first step is to create a working definition of moral injury by examining 
scholarship from a range of disciplines (Psychology, Psychiatry, Disability Studies, 
Theology) surrounding moral injury to determine a working definition of moral injury 
and its presenting characteristics.  While Litz and his team of scholars do not specify the 
range of disciplines to be included, the paper clearly specifies the field of Theology as a 
helpful resource.67  In addition, it should be noted Litz and his team consider cross-
disciplinary work essential both for research as well as for long-term recovery.68 Cross-
disciplinary work such as this both allows an illumination of new areas of understanding 
across disciplines and also challenges each discipline to consider where its breadth of 
scholarship has not yet touched on particular issues. This interdisciplinary conversation 
can then acknowledge the shadows of neglect, name the strengths of particular accounts, 
and discover structures that aid restoration.  A keen eye will be focused to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of theological scholarship in moral injury.   
                                                 
65 Maguen, Shira and Brett Litz.  “Moral Injury and Veterans of War” PTSD Research Quarterly 23, no. 1 
(2012): 3. 
66 Maguen and Litz, “Moral Injury and Veterans of War,” 2. 
67 Maguen and Litz, “Moral Injury and Veterans of War,” 2-3. 
68 Maguen and Litz, “Moral Injury and Veterans of War,” 2-3. 
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The second step in the working methodology of this paper is to draw alongside 
the discourse on moral injury contemporary understandings of disability, particularly 
from a theological perspective.  Doing so will require a critical assessment of historical 
reflection on disability in the field of theology, including the work of Augustine, 
Aquinas, Calvin, Kierkegaard and Luther.  Then, engagement with current models of 
disability informed by scholars such as Eiesland, Yong, Reynolds, Haslam, Betcher and 
Garland-Thomson will allow an assessment of critical themes and neglected areas.  Much 
work in the theology of disability has been particularly informed by liberation theologies 
of disability.69  While a liberatory method is not the central thesis of this project, my 
working methodology will rely on scholars like Jennie Weiss Block,70 Nancy Eiesland 
and Sharon V. Betcher who have used this method to successfully nuance new 
conceptions of disability when past perceptions have proved to be anything but liberating.  
Of particular interest to this study is the current project of Deborah Creamer who 
proposes a “limit model of disability” as an alternative to prevailing medical and social 
(which she calls “minority”) models of disability.71 The key step in this methodological 
move is to have a robust conversation between the fields of disability studies and moral 
injury with the aim of more successfully naming and defining exactly what moral injury 
is and, in particular, to understand its disabling effects on the injured veteran.  Looking 
keenly at Deborah Creamer’s model will help us to better analyze the way in which moral 
                                                 
69 Nancy L. Eiesland’s The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability marks three key 
factors for a liberatory model: engagement with the lived experience of those who are disabled, analysis of 
social theory regarding disability as a lens through which to assess the institution of the church, and what 
Eiesland deems “the proclamation of emancipatory transformation.”  See Eiesland, The Disabled God, 22. 
70 Block’s “theology of access” is a liberatory model intended to help secure the rights of the disabled 
community within the church.  The liberatory model reveals for Block an “accessible God.”  See: Jennie 
Weiss Block, Copious Hosting: A Theology of Access for People with Disabilities, (New York, NY: 
Continuum International Publishing, 2002), 122-123. 
71 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 25-26. 
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injury is partly constituted by a transgression of limits that occurs within a moral code.  
Developing her analysis will prove to be a helpful step forward for drawing moral injury 
into the realm of disability, but there will prove to be inherent inadequacies in her model 
that will need to be addressed.  While Creamer suggests limits are natural, intrinsic and 
good,72 nuancing the depth of response and reaction to those limits will be an important 
step for creating emotional and moral space for the wounded solider to then engage a 
conversation regarding limits.73  Essential to understanding Creamer is to comprehend 
her “limit model of disability” as more akin to a “contextual model of disability” where, 
within those varying contexts different levels of agency and ability are experienced.  As 
the “limits” of those contexts are encountered, questions are raised regarding God, self 
and other by the agent experiencing the disabling limits.   
The third methodological step important to this project will be to resource, assess 
and draw into conversation the biblical theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer who engages an 
extensive conversation on limits in his work Creation and Fall.  The historical and 
critical retrieval of his work requires an eye to the nuances of the German language, the 
context of the theological discussion at the time that necessitated his reflections, and the 
dogmatic theological method central to his work that conceives Scripture as a key place 
of divine revelation.  In addition, Bonhoeffer’s conceptualization of limit gives rise to a 
Christological account as well as a theological anthropology and divine theology.  
Particular care will be taken to compare and contrast Creamer and Bonhoeffer in these 
areas with attention paid to the Christological emphasis Bonhoeffer suggests creating a 
                                                 
72 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 94-95. 
73 Current scholarship in disability studies and theology is quite interested in Creamer’s model.  As the 
dissertation develops, care will be taken to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Creamer’s model given 
current scholarly conversation and to add further dimensions and nuances that current scholarship attests. 
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threefold schema for anthropology, theology and Christology in the face of limits.  This 
historical review is essential to understanding Bonhoeffer’s development of the human 
person in the face of limits.  These implications will then be drawn into conversation with 
Creamer’s disability theology of limit and its implications for moral injury.   
The final methodological step in this project will be to allow the conversation 
across these three areas to construct a new model of disability, “the crucial limit model,” 
that takes into account Bonhoeffer’s resources for deepening Creamer’s model.  The new 
model will inform possibilities for our understanding of moral injury, its psychological 
and theological treatment, a theological assessment of the issues, and possibilities for 
societal engagement of moral limits and their implications.  At stake in this conversation 
are the demands for practical and pastoral theology that the theological nuances will 
construe.   This four-fold methodology provides an overarching schema thereby allowing 
critical reflection on moral injury and the very real limits veterans face in the midst of 
particular moral contexts and their presenting crises.  This cross-disciplinary conversation 
will contribute to a deeper understanding of what moral injury is and how it must be both 
respected and addressed within our society and among our churches. Jonathan Shay 
reminds us moral injury affects character that in turn affects social trust.  Societal care for 
moral injury will attend to the injury, the injured character, and the injured social trust. 
1.5 Overview of the Chapters  
 To accomplish the task outlined above, Chapter two will provide an overview of 
the emergence of the field of moral injury engaging contemporary scholarship from the 
fields of Psychology and Theology.  Key to defining moral injury well is distinguishing 
moral injury from PTSD, so lingering on the distinctions between the two will be a 
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necessary step at this stage.  Specific themes and concerns within the field of moral injury 
will be analyzed with links hinted at here for their helpful dialogue with disability 
particularly themes related to medicalization and socialization.  Moral injury will be 
presented here as a problem of “limits” within a moral world that have an anthropological 
and theological dimension. 
 Chapter three will draw moral injury into conversation with the field of disability 
studies by first overviewing historical Christian models of disability.  Current models of 
disability will then be assessed including the work of Nancy Eiesland, Amos Yong, 
Molly Haslam and Sharon Betcher. Three possibilities exist for drawing moral injury and 
disability into conversation together: defining moral injury as a disability, using the 
framework of disability for moral injury, or drawing the two together through the 
theological engagement of finitude.  This chapter will conclude with an examination of 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s account of finitude for disability. 
 In chapter four, dominant models in the field of disability including the medical 
and social models will be presented and analyzed alongside their implications for moral 
injury.  A third model of disability, the “limit model” proposed by Deborah Creamer, will 
be addressed in more depth more thoroughly addressing the strengths and weaknesses of 
her model.   
The analysis and assessment of those models provides a starting point for chapter 
five that explores Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Creation and Fall as a resource for building on, 
adapting and expanding Creamer’s model to address particular limitations within her 
construct. While Creamer begins with varying contexts and the disabling limits 
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potentially experienced across those contexts and then raises questions about the 
experience of those limits; Bonhoeffer does the reverse.  Bonhoeffer begins with a 
theological analysis of “limit” based on his exegesis of the Biblical text of Genesis and 
the questions those limits raise regarding a theological anthropology and agency, and 
then he moves later in his theological work to describe the effect of those limits across 
varying contexts and the potential for functioning in the midst of those limits. While this 
reversal is important, to compare and contrast their work, an additional benefit 
Bonhoeffer brings to the conversation is the notion of shame.  He, thereby, creates a more 
robust exploration of human emotion in the face of limit over and above the sense of 
“goodness” Creamer’s model names. Bonhoeffer’s view of limit will be presented by 
situating his view of limit within Protestant thought on limits as both a result of human 
sin and human finitude.  The unique contributions Bonhoeffer makes to these ongoing 
conversations will be highlighted. While Creamer proposes implications of “limits” for 
anthropology and theology, Bonhoeffer does as well but adds a Christological component 
to limits. Here it will be made clear the precise claims Bonhoeffer makes regarding limits 
as well as depicting become the foundation for his Christological formation regarding his 
concept of the orders of preservation.  Care will be taken to contextualize how these 
orders of preservation build on his view of limits and how they were a response to a 
robust theological and societal conversation in his time.  Finally, attention will be given 
to how Bonhoeffer’s later work on the mandates of creation builds on his limit model and 
the orders of preservation to create structures across the varying contexts of church, 
marriage, family, culture and government for an individual to thrive. 
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 Chapter six will offer a construction of this crucial limit model of disability.  
Strengths and weaknesses of this revised model will be analyzed.  Care will be taken in 
this chapter to show the benefits of the limit model that transcend the medical and social 
models, while at the same time, understanding keenly the ongoing issues that will need to 
be refined within the limit model to better name, evaluate and support moral injury.  
Chapter seven will engage an application of the crucial limit model of disability 
through Jon Paul Lederach’s conception of the moral imagination.  Using the contexts of 
a county Veterans’ court and Brian Doerries’ “theatre of war” project, we will explore the 
possibility of engaging the crucial limit with moral imagination for individual soldiers 
and societal institutions.  We will conclude with an assessment of future work to be done 
in the areas of theology, moral injury and disability, as well as in further cross-discipline 
conversations as encouraged by Brett Litz, to build on the crucial limit model of 
disability.   
 The Veterans’ Creed begins: I am [former rank] [first and last name], A veteran 
of the United States [branch of service], As one of my nation’s fittest and finest, I 
answered my nation’s call to duty.74 The aim of this dissertation, in drawing moral injury 
into conversation with the field of disability and theology, is not intended to ‘dis-able’ or 
stigmatize any soldier or veteran.  Instead, the hope is to enable soldiers and societies 
alike to have a deeper conversation about human limits before God in a broken and 
complex world with the hope of preserving our “fittest and finest” and allowing the 
potential for human flourishing to unfold even after great trauma and suffering have been 
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endured.  This work is essential, as one young veteran of two wars, now a senior at 
Georgetown University, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, explains: “It is our job, as a country, to 
understand what broken means.”75 
  
                                                 




Moral Injury: Psychological and Theological Perspectives 
 
I mastered the weapons of war and became expert in defense and security  
– and I make no apology for my skills. 
I am a warrior and have seen and done things that many may not understand. 
I have proudly served my country with honor and dignity. 
I am one in fifteen – a seven-percenter – a member of a team spanning the nation – 
veteran brothers and sisters, bonded by our common values and experiences. 
 
-The Veterans’ Creed76 
 
 
2.1 Emergence of the Field of Moral Injury 
  
 Shell shock.  War neurosis.77  Soldier’s Heart.  Insanity.  Nostalgia.  Irritable 
Syndrome. Battle Fatigue.  Combat Stress Reaction. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.  
Combat Veteranitis.78 Psychiatrists, journalists, pastors and family members have 
strained to name symptoms presented upon return home from war.  All attempts to 
diagnose and treat the range of behaviors resulting from the pressures and crises 
encountered in the arena of war fail to encapsulate the damage inflicted on body, mind 
and spirit.  Historian Ben Shephard documents the struggle to name and define varying 
neuroses in his 2003 account A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the 
Twentieth Century.79 Drawing upon accounts recorded in diaries, official records, 
doctor’s reports, journals, medical papers, conversations with soldiers, and newspaper 
articles, Shephard explores the relationship between professional psychiatrists and  
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soldiers since World War I through the Gulf War culminating in his assessment that 
treatment beyond current ‘medical’ options are needed that would more systemically 
address the trauma endured by the individual soldier.80 His account acknowledges the 
difficult relationship between the landscapes of deployment and home; mortal combat 
and morale,81 coping mechanisms and presenting symptoms;82 readiness for war and 
recovery in its aftermath; repression of grief and its expression,83 perception of well being 
and the daily struggle to cope.84  Shephard states his goal clearly:  “There is a compelling 
reason to take a much wider look at what has happened in the past: we are making a mess 
of this problem today and need to learn the lesson that, in treating the aftermath of war, 
good intentions are not enough.”85 Even in Shephard’s robust account of the history of 
“shell-shock”86 and critical account of societal response87, Shephard’s twenty-first 
century publication fails to name “moral injury” as a presenting category of symptoms. 
 While these studies recognize a depth and complexity of veterans following a 
war, “moral injury” is a complex and relatively new term that describes a particular set of 
symptoms.  We will see how scholars and psychologists strive to define the contours of 
the presenting indicators as well as to define the boundaries within which Moral Injury 
can best be described.  Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, Psychologists Brett Litz, William 
Nash, Everett L. Worthington and Diane Langberg and theologians Rita Nakashima 
Brock, Gabriella Lettini, Warren Kinghorn, Robert Meagher and Brian S. Powers agree 
                                                 
80 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 396. 
81 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 38. 
82 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 355. 
83 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 19. 
84 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 19. 
85 Shephard, A War of Nerves, xxi. 
86 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 1-3. 
87 Shephard, A War of Nerves, 385-396. 
  31
regarding many of the major dimensions of moral injury but will offer subtleties 
concerning the nuances of moral agency, critical repercussions and healing response.  
Their differences are not cause for concern, but an invitation to think specifically 
regarding the interplay of agent, event, moral code and aftermath of the presenting injury.   
For the purpose of understanding notable developments in the history of identifying 
moral injury, it will be helpful here to note briefly key figures and dates before they are 
discussed more fully later in the chapter.  Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay developed essential 
themes for the conceptualization of ‘moral injury’ during his twenty-year tenure in 
Boston working for the Veterans Improvement Program (VIP) as a psychiatrist for the 
US Department of Veterans Affairs.88 To be clear, however, Shay did not ‘name’ moral 
injury; he provided the themes but not the terminology. In 1991, Shay discussed “the 
betrayal of what is right” as a component of PTSD in an article entitled “Learning about 
Combat Stress from Homer’s Illiad” in The Journal of Traumatic Stress.  This article 
described a decade’s worth of work at the Boston Clinic with veterans from Vietnam.  
Three years later, Shay developed this article to a full book: Achilles in Vietnam.  When 
these were written, Shay understood a moral component (“the betrayal of what was 
right”) to what was then diagnosed as PTSD: 
Vietnam Veterans with severe PTSD often report the following combat 
experiences: a leader's betrayal of "what's right," blunted responsiveness to any 
emotional, social, or ethical claims outside a tiny circle of combat-proven 
comrades, grief and guilt for death(s) in this circle, lust for revenge, renunciation 
of ever returning home, seeing one's self as already dead, berserking, 
dishonoring the enemy, and loss of humanity.89 
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While Shay did not coin the term immediately in his either the 1991 article in The 
Journal for Traumatic Stress nor the 1994 book Achilles in Vietnam, scholars credit his 
clinical and academic work as introducing the moral component to symptoms initially 
described as PTSD and then later named by other scholars as Moral Injury.  For Shay, 
moral injury is something that happens ‘passively’ to a soldier while a person in authority 
over them commits an act that is a ‘betrayal of what is right.’90  Shay sees this kind of 
injury, resultant of a failed moral relationship between a leader and his troops.  Shay sees 
these themes developed in both of the ancient texts the Illiad and the Odyssey and uses 
them to discuss contemporary wartime issues.91 
After Shay, it is psychologist Brett Litz and his team of scholars including Nathan 
Stein, Eileen Delaney, Leslie Lebowitz, William P. Nash, Caroline Silva and Shira 
Maguen, who are credited with the terminology of ‘moral injury.’92  Their 2009 paper 
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Yes, Moral Injury is a needed category.  No, the working definition is inadequate.  And no, Moral Injury 
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a name to describe the presenting symptoms.  However, thirty-five percent disagreed saying, “No” and 
determining the two words to be inadequate.92 Within that thirty-five percent, there was a split between 
those who wanted to eliminate the word “moral” while keeping “injury”, and those who wanted to 
eliminate “injury” while keeping the word “moral.”  For those in the first group, alternative names included 
“Spiritual Injury, Emotional Injury, Personal Values Injury and Life Values Injury.” Those in the second 
group preferred to describe the presenting symptoms as “Moral Trauma, Moral Wounds and Moral 
Disruption.” Clearly, we can see here the straining of language to adequately describe the depth of despair 
and destruction encountered by the soldier and witnessed by their therapeutic and pastoral help.  See for 
example the work of Camillo Mac Bica who suggests “PEM Injuries” to describe the “Psychological, 
Emotional and Moral Injuries of War” in his book Beyond PTSD: The Moral Casualties of War”  (New 
York, NY: Gnosis Press, 2016).  If the phenomenon of Moral ‘Injury’ is greater than a physical injury to 
the body, does the language of “injury” do justice to the depth of despair inherent within the spirit of the 
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entitled,  “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A Preliminary Model and 
Intervention Strategy” in the Clinical Psychology Review 93 is viewed as an influential 
early study on moral injury that served to broadly introduce the terminology and invite 
further research across disciplines.  In their view, moral injury results from the 
perpetration of a morally injurious event by the individual himself, rather than 
victimization as a bystander to a person in higher authority.94 
Their article, seen as a seminal moment in the field, accomplishes two things.  
First, the scholars name “morality” as a component to mental health and the risks of war 
that had heretofore overall gone unnoticed in the studies of mental health, veterans and 
presenting psychosocial symptoms; a noticeable absence of attention.95   Second, their 
clinical assessment both assimilates and academically presents the beginning threads of 
scholarship and clinical work noticing the presence of morality as a potential place of 
injury. For example, they drew on a paper entitled “When They Come Home: 
Posttraumatic Stress, Moral Injury, and Spiritual Consequences” by Health Science 
Specialist Kent D. Drescher and professor of Psychology David Foy published in 2008 in 
Reflective Practice: Formation and Supervision in Ministry identifies ‘moral injury’ as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
one who is morally injured and the need for society to grieve those wounds? If the phenomenon of ‘Moral’ 
Injury is greater than a soldier’s morality, does the language of “morality” do justice to the depth of 
complexity involving social complacency, stressed morality and theological struggle?  The language of 
injury carries with it the potential for a balm, a medication, a technological aid, or a bandage that can 
contain the trauma and aim toward healing; what happens when that is not possible?  The language of 
morality carries with it the potential for a return to the center, a moral code; what happens when that is not 
possible?  The inadequacy of the language, attested to in Ken Drescher’s study, is a modest indication of 
the inadequacy of our ability to understand the depth, despair, shame and inability to function that a 
morally injured veteran experiences and that can only be spoken of with language that is theological. 
93 Litz, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans,” 695-706. 
94 Shay, “Moral Injury,” 184. 
95 For example, see: C. W. Hoge and others, “Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health 
Problems and Barriers to Care,” New England Journal of Medicine 351:1 (2004): 13-22.  As well as: 
Matthew J. Friedman, “Acknowledging the Psychiatric Cost of War” The New England Journal of 
Medicine 352:1 (2004): 75-77.  Both of these articles acknowledge the tremendous psychiatric costs of war, 
but do not venture into the realm of morality to describe the presenting injuries. 
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entity of its own other than PTSD that can have profound physical and social 
consequences.  Just after the release of Litz’s introduction of moral injury as a 
preliminary model, Theologian Rita Nakashima Brock convened a “Truth Commission 
on Conscience in War”96 at the Riverside Church in New York City in the Spring of 2010 
to address her assessment of the pressing societal need for truth in wartime across varying 
parties and to preserve moral conscience within the military. 
Each of their attempts could well fit within the American Academy of Religion’s 
2016 Call for Papers to address and explore what has become a new and pressing need: 
“Moral Injury is an emerging concept which attempts to engage the impact of making 
difficult moral choices under extreme conditions, experiencing morally anguishing events 
or duties, witnessing immoral acts, or behaving in ways that profoundly challenge moral 
conscience and identity and the values that support them.”97 Given this sweeping 
definition, several questions readily emerge.  How does societal complacency affect 
soldiers and their moral worlds?  What is the role of religious institutions in critiquing the 
systems of war while supporting soldiers in their humanity?  Do we as a society err too 
easily in responding with militarization rather than seeking alternative routes for 
addressing conflicts?  What support systems are in place for combatants who have 
returned to society? What structures of support are effective for upholding soldiers and 
their families in the long journey home to normalcy?  While the intricacies of these 
questions and their answers are beyond the full sweep of this dissertation, we can see in 
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the claiming of these questions the intricacies of both morality and injury.  How is 
morality shaped prior to war, during war, and upon return home from war when a 
complacent society questions the morality of a soldier faced with situations beyond their 
comprehension?  What dynamics are at play in creating particular injuries:  societal 
complacency, church teaching, the crisis of war, the judgment of outsiders?  With the 
hope of highlighting the exponential intricacies, scholars at the American Academy of 
Religion explain further, “Moral Injury is a wound of moral subjectivity within a social 
context.”98 As difficult as it is to describe the “what” and the “how” of Moral Injury, the 
pressing concern is the “who,” the moral subject.  Psychiatrist Brett Litz explains, “An 
individual with Moral Injury may begin to view him or herself as immoral, irredeemable, 
and un-reparable.” 99  Litz recognized the shame within deeply affected the world beyond.  
 The emergence of moral injury as a field of study with clinical significance and 
cross-disciplinary implications invites further exploration.  To accomplish this it is 
necessary to examine the scholarship of moral injury in both the fields of Psychology and 
Theology to comprehend how clinicians and theologians understand and respond to 
moral injury.  Once that framework is presented, themes from both fields will be 
extracted in order to explore physiological, sociological and theological concerns and 
their implications for scholarship and response. A closer consideration of these themes, in 
turn, allows us to see what is missing in the scholarship, what is needed in the field, and 
what actions might forward societal response to our wounded veterans.  This chapter thus 
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underscores the need for the present study that aims to bring moral injury into 
conversation with disability, through the scholarship of Deborah Creamer and the 
scholarship of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in order to develop a ‘revised limit model of 
disability’ for moral injury.  
 
2.2 Scholarship: Psychiatry and Psychology on Moral Injury 
 Prior to his introduction of the thematic issues of moral injury (Shay) and the 
formal introduction of the terminology by Litz and his team of scholars in 2009, scholars 
such as Psychiatrist Matthew J. Friedman recognized and sought to respond to “Post-
Vietnam Syndrome”100 as a distinctive form of PTSD.  His work may be viewed as an 
early form and foundation of contemporary conceptions of moral injury. In his work on 
PTSD (prior to the formation of moral injury), Friedman advocated an assessment of the 
psychiatric expense of war, praising efforts such as the National Vietnam Veteran’s 
Readjustment Study completed and published in 1988 for its “rigorous evaluation.”101 
Friedman is well aware of the difficulty that statistics, stigmatization and zooming in on 
specific moments of time pose for studies such as these.  First, statistics struggle to 
measure the difference and the effects of current presentations, historic episodes, and/or 
lifetime manifestations102 of a psychiatric illness like PTSD.  Second, veterans struggle 
beneath the stigmatizing consequences of self-profession of a psychiatric illness 
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considering the “Scarlet P” effect of a diagnosis.103  Friedman determines the more likely 
a person is to have a mental health diagnosis, the more likely that person is to have a 
distorted view of the possibility of stigmatization.104 Soldiers perceive they will be 
viewed as “a failure, a weakness, and as evidence of an innate deficiency of the right 
stuff.”105  Third, statistics fail to take into account in a significant way the variables of 
“emotional sustenance,”106 variances in structures of social support for each soldier, and 
stressors that can be either circumstantial or complex and long-standing.107 In keeping 
with Friedman’s advocacy for reduced stigmatization, this dissertation will argue that 
reduced stigmatization is a central goal for scholars in the field of disability studies and a 
constructive resource for returning veterans.  
 Friedman’s work precedes overt discussion of moral injury; however, his pursuit 
is prelude to the discussion that follows.  The notion of moral injury emerges from 
Jonathan Shay’s work at that Boston Clinic over two decades with veterans and his 
scholarly engagement with the ancient texts of The Iliad and The Odyssey to explore the 
questions and themes that arose during critical work with his clients.  In this section, we 
will overview the work of Shay, as well as, Kent Drescher, Brett Litz, William Nash, 
Everett Worthington and Diane Langberg to understand their definitions of moral injury, 
the context of their study, nuances and themes in their scholarship, and their suggestions 
for healing and repair once moral injury is recognized. 
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The definition of Moral Injury offered by the scholars carried the intent to 
“stimulate a dialogue”108 and so it did.  They defined moral injury as “Perpetrating, 
failing to prevent, bearing witness to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held 
moral beliefs and expectations.”109  The dialogue that definition initiated was a 
conversation with Jonathan Shay who necessitated a “person in authority”110 as the one 
who violated the moral code while an innocent soldier stood by his side.  Litz and his 
team preferred a broader, and some would argue a less “political” definition of moral 
injury. Litz credits the early work of Psychiatrist M.J. Friedman for describing a “post-
Vietnam syndrome”111 characterized by moral conflict and guilt to begin the 
categorization of moral injury. The clinical prevalence of moral injury today can be 
attributed to the complex interplay between: lengthy wars requiring long and multiple 
deployments, the unconventional tactics utilized on both sides, the ambiguity of the 
enemy, the incapacitation of prudent actions and moral judgment amid unusual wartime 
strategies, all perhaps exacerbated by ongoing familial and situational stress on the life of 
the soldier.112 Litz and his team of researchers continue to advocate for DSM, APA and 
even the Pentagon’s recognition of moral injury because of the “longstanding pyscho-
bio-social impairment”113 on the soldier and reverberating effects on their family systems 
and workplaces. The subsequent moral injury when either an act of commission or an act 
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of omission transpires in a highly charged scene results then in an “inability to 
contextualize”114 the occurrence within existing moral frameworks.  In this particular 
study, Litz et al. have focused on “acts of commission”115 highlighting the performance 
of atrocities and killing, rather than attending to instances of omission wherein the soldier 
bears witness to either the morally inept actions of others or perpetrations of cruelty and 
human suffering that they are unable to respond to in the instance.  This is important to 
note, in light of Shay’s definition of moral injury, as necessitating a moral authority 
outside one’s self who fails.  Rather than emphasizing Shay’s definition, Litz and his 
team are less interested with the impact of authority and focus more on the actions of a 
soldier and the possibility a soldier might become morally injured by the actions of his or 
her peers.  For Shay, authority matters.  For Litz, personal agency is key. 
2.2.1 Review of Key Authors  
2.2.1.1  Jonathan Shay 
Since his 1994 publication of Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the 
Undoing of Character, psychologist Jonathan Shay continues to be a key voice in the 
field of Moral Injury.  Shay utilizes the Homeric epic The Illiad to illumine issues related 
to combat trauma, rage and the berserk state by reexamining the ancient narrative in light 
of Vietnam.116  While ‘moral injury’ as such is yet unnamed in Shay’s work at this stage 
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in 1994, his insights begin to reveal a distinction between moral injury and PTSD.  
Twenty years later in an article entitled simply “Moral Injury,” Shay made clear the 
distinction that he knew by instinct in Achilles but had not fully articulated.   
Jonathan Shay defines moral injury as: “a betrayal of what is right by a person in 
authority in a high stakes situation.”117  Shay’s definition of moral injury requires a 
person in authority to fail morally, deeply affecting the moral worldview of the soldier 
underneath the moral agent’s leadership; this then is not simply a failure in one’s own 
moral code. For Shay, moral injury is constituted by three key elements:  the betrayal of 
“what is right”, the failure in morality of a respected authority, and the existence of a high 
stakes situation.118 This triptych depicts three scenes: first, the landscape of a moral code; 
second, a person in authority who fails morally; third, the greater context of a high stakes 
environment. The presence of each of these components in that triptych is vital and 
necessary to Shay’s definition and each, together, contributes to the overriding despair, 
potential for suicide and possibility of interpersonal violence that occurs within moral 
injury and can be even more damaging than repercussions of PTSD.119 The difference 
between PTSD and moral injury in Shay’s definition can be distinguished by the presence 
of those three components in that painting (moral code, moral authority, morally complex 
high stakes situation).  It is interesting to note one nuance Shay hints at regarding the 
failure of moral authority.  In his work with the Homeric texts, Shay sees elements of 
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leadership in the Homeric military that United States military culture would ascribe to the 
greater fiduciary of the state rather than an individual leader.120 
Shay’s wisdom and experience in this area is extensive. He worked as the sole 
psychiatrist at a Boston VA Clinic for over twenty years.  After his work with Achilles in 
Vietnam, the MacArthur Genius Foundation awarded him a grant for his ongoing 
initiatives and success.  Even more so, Shay continues to advocate for policy changes, 
better practices and shifts in institutional culture to better address the weaknesses he sees 
in the field of moral injury regarding the need of military leadership to be “expert, ethical 
and properly supported.”121  Ultimately, Shay’s voice and perspective remain optimistic 
regarding the potential for recovery in those who have been morally injured.  A triad of 
steps are suggested by Shay for ongoing clinical work to make progress with both 
soldiers and the greater society:  recognize the need, empower the victim and create 
supportive clinical teams adept at handling the potential transference and 
countertransference that can occur within a therapy setting.122 As a physician, Shay’s 
concern is for the clinical diagnosis, care, treatment and recovery of the wounded soldier; 
however, it should be noted that religious care both through theological reflection and/or 
liturgical practices are not suggested by Shay as elements essential to recovery.  
 
2.2.1.2  Kent D. Drescher and David W. Foy 
 Psychologists Drescher and Foy published one of the first non-clinical studies on 
the topic of moral injury in 2008.  They define moral injury as: 
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Disruption in an individual’s confidence and expectations about their own or 
others’ motivation or capacity to behave in a just and ethical manner brought 
about by bearing witness to perceived immoral acts, failure to stop such actions, 
or perpetration of immoral acts, in particular actions that are inhumane, cruel, 
depraved, or violent, bringing about pain and suffering of others or their 
death.123 
 
The loss that occurs for a veteran with moral injury, according to Drescher and Foy, is a 
“disruption in moral directedness and moral expectancies.”124 These inward 
repercussions move from “a stressor” to “a disorder” when there becomes a noticeable 
change in life’s functioning and flourishing for the individual soldier, manifesting in 
significant outward consequences.125   Drescher and Foy understand both the physical 
and emotional stressors of war.  In addition, they elaborate on the traumatic stressors that 
may occur through natural, unintentional or intentional means.  In their clinical practice 
they have seen the noticeable effects of PTSD: re-experiencing past traumatic events, the 
presence of avoidance techniques to prevent that re-experience and the tendency toward 
hyper-arousal.126 However, they note seven characteristics in veterans beyond those three 
characteristics of PTSD that indicate a need to describe Veterans’ clinical experience in 
terms of Moral Injury rather than PTSD.  These include:  differences in ethical standards 
that previously existed, effects on spirituality and views of God, shame and its aftermath 
of alienating behaviors, pervasive unhappiness and unease, reduced levels of trust in 
individuals and institutions, behaviors that escalate, and poor care for one’s self with the 
potential to harm.127 In the face of trauma, soldiers with PTSD and moral injury often 
                                                 
123 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home: Posttraumatic Stress, Moral Injury, and Spiritual 
Consequences for Veterans,” Reflective Practice: Formation and Supervision in Ministry 28 (2008): 91-92. 
124 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 92. 
125 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 87. 
126 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 88. 
127 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 92. 
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manifest “negative religious coping”128 even though there are a few veterans who 
occasionally seek spiritual means for growth, recovery and meaning making after war.129   
 In order to equip clergy, military chaplains and clinicians with resources for this 
newly attributed category of moral injury, Drescher and Foy draw on standards of 
response130 utilized by relief workers in the aftermath of disasters to help those tasked 
with responding to veterans who might have moral injury.  These skills include:  
providing resources to reduce ‘arousal’ from possible stressors, increasing circles of 
support and decreasing isolating tendencies, encouraging enjoyment in pleasurable 
activities that are healthy, addressing and re-directing beliefs that have become warped 
by trauma and its aftermath, working to rebuild the “moral compass”131 of the veteran, 
and finally, reducing the severity of re-experiencing symptoms by teaching cognitive and 
behavioral coping strategies.132 Shay, in contrast, offers less of a systematic response and 
more of an existential one questioning if recovery is even possible.133  The best treatment, 
according to Shay, is one that begins with the soldiers’ own self care with the first step of 
establishing “safety, sobriety and self-care.”134 The steps that follow are not a cathartic 
release of all held within, but instead, the slow construction of a personal narrative.135  
                                                 
128 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 94. 
129 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 93. 
130 See, for example, the psychological first aid techniques employed by: M. Brymer and others, 
Psychological First Aid: Field Operations Guide, 2nd ed. (Rockville, MD: National Child Traumatic Stress 
Network and National Center for PTSD, 2006). 
131 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 99. 
132 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 97-99. 
133 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 184. 
134 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 187. 
135 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 187. Shay is quite clear regarding the problematic nature of catharsis.  He 
cites Judith Herman who writes, “The patient may imagine a kind of sadomasochistic orgy, in which [he or] 
she will scream, cry, vomit, bleed, die, and be reborn cleansed of the trauma.” See: Judith Lewis Herman, 
Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence from Domestic Abuse to Political Terror (New York, 
Basic Books, 1992), 172.  Shay continues to make clear the long slow process of constructing a personal 
narrative as more akin to running a marathon. 
  44
The personal narrative aims to rebuild the ruins of character and the shattered136 
fragmentation of consciousness.137 The personal narrative must, in order to heal, find a 
trusting community of listeners138 who listen, refrain from judgment, and respond with 
emotion.139 And who then bear witness on behalf of the soldiers as they continue to 
“hear, believe and retell”140 so that the soldier’s personal narrative shapes the beginning 
of a sociopolitical movement.141 That sociopolitical movement challenges an adult’s 
everyday sense of safety.  “What is right”142 is questioned by the listening audience. The 
language Shay relies on here draws from Homer’s use of themis as the normal 
expectation of what is societally right and Nussbaum’s use of  “the fragility of goodness” 
to describe the “cloak of safety”143 adults take for granted in daily functioning.144 The 
sociopolitical effect of the soldier’s narrative is to remove that cloak of safety inviting 
discomfort and a greater “communalization of the trauma.”145 The difference between 
Shay and the work of Drescher and Foy is the divide between the veterans’ personal work 
and the practice of the psychotherapist.  Shay places a mantle upon the shoulders of 
                                                 
136 For further insights on the shattering implications of trauma see: Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Shattered 
Assumptions: Towars a New Psychology of Trauma (New York, NY: The Free Press, 2002). 
137 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 188. 
138 Shay points out the possibility of instrumentalizing trauma narratives as “reader assurance” by 
highlighting the work of Lawrence L. Langer who critique the genre of trauma narratives.  See: Lawrence 
L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). 
139 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 189. 
140 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 193.  Shay continues to draw here on Judith Herman’s Trauma and Recovery, 
7-32. 
141 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 193. 
142 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 193. 
143 The language of “the cloak of safety” will take on new meaning as we explore language used by 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer in his exposition of Creation and Fall in chapter five. 
144 See: Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), 417.    
145 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 194.  This will become of interest and importance in chapter six as we 
explore Brian Doerries’Theatre of War and his use of ancient Greek tragedies in contemporary settings to 
accomplish this task. 
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veterans to secure their own safety and self-care, while Drescher and Foy see that as the 
primary work of the therapist. 
 Drescher and Foy pave the way for what will become the substantive clinical 
study published in 2009 by Brett Litz and his team of scholars.  Drescher and Foy are 
helpful in deepening the connection, that Shay begins, between the fields of moral injury 
and trauma studies, providing early distinctions between PTSD and moral injury, noticing 
dynamics at play in the provision of spiritual care for soldiers disenfranchised with 
classical conceptualizations of God, and considering the potential of “memory” as a 
possibly redemptive source for healing.146  Drescher and Foy conclude their paper with 
the provocative naming of memory as a potential source for healing by drawing on the 
work of theologian Miroslav Volf.  By way of his work,147 they consider the potential of 
memory to be either destructive causing further damage or constructive and aiding 
redemption.148 Their connection to memory poses an interesting question regarding what 
bodily functions moral injury most disables.  Is moral injury a psychiatric injury?  An 
injury to the core of morality, and if so, where does morality reside – in body, mind or 
spirit?  Or is moral injury a wound to the memory?  Determining the location and 
manifestation of this wound will be key to diagnosing and treating moral injury, as well 
as to understanding its ‘disabling’ effects. 
 
                                                 
146 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 100. 
147 See for example:  Miroslav Volf, “Love’s Memory: Redemptive Remembering,” in 2002 Princeton 
Lecture on Youth, Church and Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2002). Volf argues 
for a construct of “redemptive” rather than destructive remembering.  For Volf, memory is linked to 
conflict and reconciliation and can lead either to obstacles and bitterness or to justice and hope.  A 
redemptive memory is linked the biblical narratives of Exodus and the cross, both of which are shaped by 
restorative memories. 
148 Drescher and Foy, “When They Come Home,” 100. 
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2.2.1.3  Brett T. Litz 
Professor of Clinical Psychology at Boston University and clinician for the 
Veteran’s Affairs Healthcare System in Boston, Brett Litz continues to be both prolific 
and on the prophetic edge of research and response to Moral Injury. With over 300 
publications in academic journals and three books in the field, Litz was on the cutting 
edge of recognizing and defining moral injury and remains influential in shaping 
response to the crisis within military culture today. He has worked with many key 
scholars and clinicians in the field including Kent D. Drescher, David Foy, and William 
P. Nash.  In 2009, he chaired the team of scholars that published an early article on Moral 
Injury entitled, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and 
intervention strategy” in The Clinical Psychology Review.  Most recently, in 2015, Litz 
published a book length strategic practicum for clinical response to soldiers returning 
from war entitled Adaptive Disclosure: A New Treatment for Military Trauma, Loss and 
Moral Injury along with scholars Leslie Lebowitz, Matt J. Gray and William P. Nash 
where moral injury is one of a triad of crises that must be addressed upon a soldier’s 
return home including: the governing fear of life-threatening events, the grief and loss of 
other’s lives lost, and the guilt and shame of moral injury.149 
The operational definition, for Litz and his colleagues is that “morals” are “the 
personal and shared familial, cultural, societal, and legal rules for social behavior, either 
tacit or explicit…fundamental assumptions about how things should work and how one 
                                                 
149Matt J. Gray, Yonit Schorr, William Nash, Leslie Lebowitz, Amy Amidon, Amy Lansing, Melissa 
Maglione, Ariel J. Lange, Brett T. Litz, “Adaptive Disclosure: An Open Trial of a Novel Exposure-Based 
Intervention for Service Members With Combat-Related Psychological Stress Injuries” Behavior Therapy 
43:2  (June 2012):  414. 
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should behave in the world.”150 Difficult emotions such as guilt or regret, shame or 
embarrassment, even cynicism and despair, are markers.  While moral injury creates an 
“inability to contextualize;” the injury does not shield the veteran from conflicting moral 
emotions.  These moral emotions invite the individual to probe their moral code.151  Guilt 
and shame are the operative emotions within moral injury; however, Litz argues here that 
shame is the more devastating consequence of moral injury. Guilt often prompts “the 
making of amends”152 and carries less risk for behaviors that are anti-social.  Shame, on 
the other hand, has the tendency to draw the individual into an inward spiral fueled by 
“global evaluations of the self”153 as well as causing increased isolation due to “toxic 
interpersonal difficulties.”154 
The moral emotions of guilt155 and shame are an area, according to Litz, that 
could use further research.  He notes the attention of psychologists to the most life-
threatening of injuries,156 rather than to lingering emotions such as guilt and shame.  
Litz’s account of guilt and shame is better understood through considering the way in 
which it coincides and differs from Paul Ricœur’s work on these emotions. For example, 
in The Symbolism of Evil Ricœur aims to understand “moral evil” by suggesting a 
                                                 
150 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
151 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
152 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699 
153 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
154 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
155 For a scholarly overview of guilt from a variety of perspectives see: Herant Katchadourian, Guilt: The 
Bite of Conscience (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).  Katchadourian claims “Guilt is 
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156 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. 
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threefold pattern of experience: defilement, sin and guilt.157  Defilement, for Ricœur, is a 
pre-ethical stance where one feels defiled, dirty and discouraged by the crossing of a 
certain taboo.  That taboo is beyond rationality and requires a ritualized act to purify the 
symbolic stain gained in its transgression.158  The experience of defilement creates a 
palpable terror within the recipient that does not differentiate between the ethical (moral 
code transgressed) and the physical (changed bodies due to natural causes.)159  Standing 
between defilement (an external category for Ricœur) and guilt (an internal one), is the 
category of sin that places a human being before God160 with both an external and an 
internal trajectory.  Sin bears a twofold repercussion: first, sin severs and disconnects an 
agent from something of importance.  Ricœur calls this the “negativity” of sin.161  
Second, sin carries a “positive” repercussion when it serves to remind the agent of 
something of consequence that is still there.162  Finally, there is guilt.  Ricœur tends to 
place the actual moral transgression within the category of sin; while guilt is the inward 
subjective experience of that transgression. 163 Guilt can lead to a sense of scrupulousness 
that is institutionally paralyzing, personally isolating, and ultimately a stumbling 
block.164.  For Ricœur, guilt leads toward a binding paradox when one recognizes, like 
the Apostle Paul, the inability to stop sinning while also becoming aware of one’s 
culpability. This leaves the agent at an impasse.165 For Litz, guilt is less of an “impasse” 
                                                 
157 Paul Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1967), 
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and much more of a “motivating”166 emotion that doesn’t paralyze but instead offers a 
passageway to something new. The experience of guilt, for Litz, motivates a person to 
make amends, engage in less risky behavior, and to review and assess specific past acts.  
For Litz, guilt is a “motivating” emotion and shame, in contrast, causes paralysis, 
withdrawal, self-harm and avoidance.167 The notion that guilt can function positively is 
thus intriguing, and an advantage of Litz’s conceptualization rather than Ricœur’s. 
The intervention strategy offered in response to this preliminary model of moral 
injury, with its focus on shame, is an eight-step process.  Given Litz’s recognition that 
guilt motivates, while shame stagnates, one can appreciate his attempt to motivate the 
veteran experiencing shame to do the following steps including:  connection (strong 
therapeutic relationship),168 preparation of the patient for difficult therapeutic content,169 
consideration of exposure time recognizing the pain of addressing harmful 
experiences,170 “examination and integration”171 of key events in a veteran’s narrative, 
conversation with a “benevolent moral authority,”172 “reparation and forgiveness,”173 
reconnection with individuals and institutions,174 and finally, vision for the road ahead.175 
In this eightfold schema, Litz explores the possibility of a spiritual path once therapy has 
ended that might open up a transcendent dimension to a veteran’s life experience.  For 
Litz, spirituality is “an individual’s understanding of, experience with, and connection to 
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that which transcends the self.”176  Transcendence, then, is “not being defined by the 
[morally injurious] experience, and correcting the wounds by not succumbing or being 
that construction of the self through subsequent mindful and purposeful existence moving 
forward.”177  The success of intervention depends on the possibility of a veteran’s ability 
to navigate the difficult moral emotions of a morally injurious experience and integrate 
them into a new construct of self who is able to “contextualize, justify and accommodate 
acts”178 within a redefined moral framework. 
Litz clearly outlines basic concepts, assumptions, treatment and pressing needs in 
the field. Concepts at play in this discussion are themes of morality, moral behavior in 
times of distress, the emotions of guilt and shame, and the complicated relationship 
between self-condemnation and self-forgiveness.179  Shame and its aftermath appear in 
this study to have a more damaging and longer-lasting effect then guilt alone and its 
precisely this difficult to diagnose and treat emotion that invites the salutogenic treatment 
Litz aspires to in his work.  Medical sociologist Aaron Antonovsky advocated 
salutogenesis as a course of treatment committed to understanding the dynamics that 
contribute to the rebuilding of health rather than focusing research solely on the root 
causes of a disease.  Treatment, for Litz, will then build on that health to foster “equally 
intense real-time encounters with a countervailing experience.”180  Reaching that 
experiential encounter will only be possible through an eight-fold treatment plan:  foster 
connection, prepare and educate, determine a modified exposure component to the 
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treatment, examine and integrate, encourage dialogue with a benevolent moral authority, 
seek restoration and forgiveness, foster reconnection, and plan adequately for the long 
term commitment to health and restoration.181  Assumed within this treatment plan is that 
moral injury acknowledges an “intact moral code”182 that has been transgressed through 
an experience of profound dissonance.  To proceed, Litz et al. advocate for the 
development of a psychosometric scale to better assess and diagnose moral injury, an 
epidemiological and salutogenic response, and most importantly, additional controlled 
trials to intervene on behalf of soldiers struggling with moral injury to be studied and 
assessed so further research can be shared.183 
Having presented the need for a psychometric scale that can be used clinically for 
the diagnosis and response to Moral Injury, Litz joins a team of scholars led by William 
P. Nash who create a Moral Injury Events Scale (MIES) that allows psychometric 
evaluation.  The scale developed by the scholars is intricately linked to the definition of 
Moral Injury initially presented by Litz: “Perpetrating, failing to prevent, bearing witness 
to, or learning about acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.”184 
Eleven questions are ranked on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree) with 
nine of the questions probing violations of belief systems and two of the questions 
exploring perceptions of trust.185  Questions include such moral inquiry by asking “I saw 
                                                 
181 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 702-704. 
182 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 701. 
183 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 705. 
184 Nash, William P.; Teresa L Marino Carper; Mary Alice Mills; Teresa Au; Abigail Goldsmith; Brett T 
Litz, “Psychometric Evaluation of the Moral Injury Events Scale,” Military Medicine 178:6 (June 2013): 
647. 
185 Nash, “Psychometric Evaluation of the Moral Injury Events Scale,” 647. The authors acknowledge the 
difficulty of discussing moral injury for fear of attributing blame or judgment and cautions therapists and 
pastors accordingly.  In addition, they make clear further work is needed. 
  52
things that were morally wrong” and “I violated my own morals by failing to do 
something I should have done.”186  It is interesting to note that while Litz’s definition of 
Moral Injury does not necessitate the injury being caused by a person in authority, as 
Shay does, this study still includes these kinds of questions in the psychometric scale by 
prompting response to these kinds of questions: “I feel betrayed by leaders who I once 
trusted”, “I feel betrayed by fellow service members who I once trusted”, “I feel betrayed 
by others outside the U.S. military who I once trusted” and “I trust my leaders and fellow 
service members to always live up to their core values.”187 Even though scholars 
presented the MIES index as a preliminary possibility, early results proved valuable and 
worthy of note.  For example, soldiers with a higher MIES score also had concomitant 
higher scores on anxiety and depression scaled while also scoring lower on scales that 
measure social support and positive affect.188 
Litz’s work culminates in a recent book length publication entitled Adaptive 
Disclosure: A New Treatment for Military Trauma, Loss and Moral Injury published in 
2015 that addresses a triad of concerns for returning soldiers: trauma, grief and morality.  
Litz suggests the military culture does a solid job in responding to “life threatening 
experiences” that can evoke trauma and fear, but needs to do a significantly better job in 
addressing grief and moral injury.189 Key elements of a bettered response would include 
attention to brevity (acknowledging the real time constraints of soldiers and their 
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families)190, complexity (acknowledging the depth and number of elements involved)191, 
the phenomenology of trauma in wartime192, the problematic language of injury (veterans 
shy away from medicalizing language like “treatment”193 and finally, the capacity to 
contextualize, integrate and “adapt” traumatic wartime experience into one’s life 
narrative.194 One can see in Litz’s approach in 2015 retains components of the 
intervention strategy proposed in 2009, but offers them in a streamlined fashion with the 
eight-steps condensed into a more workable timeline based on a soldier’s commitments 
and realistic possibilities for clinical treatment.  Litz’s expertise in military trauma, early 
intervention and mental health across the lifespan of a veteran clearly add to the depth 
and extent of scholarship in Moral Injury.   
2.2.1.4  Worthington and Langberg 
Professor of Psychology Everett L. Worthington and Diane Langberg, a private 
clinician, provide an assessment of self-condemnation as a presenting factor in moral 
injury and its concomitant cry for self-forgiveness in their 2012 article “Religious 
Considerations and Self-Forgiveness in Treating Complex Trauma and Moral Injury in 
Present and Former Soldiers” published in The Journal of Psychology and Theology. We 
see here in their work a desire to attend seriously to a framework of spirituality from a 
Psychological perspective with a focus on self-forgiveness. Their definition of forgiving 
the self as “a coping strategy for stresses arising from self-condemnation”195 implicitly 
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begs the theologian to join the conversation with psychologists to create a more robust 
space in which theologies of forgiveness, reconciliation and atonement might engage the 
conversation within Moral Injury.196  Self-condemnation arises in a failure to meet one’s 
own expectations for morality in a given situation and as a stress emerging from a 
perceived wrongdoing.197 The authors outline a helpful description of what does not 
constitute self-forgiveness in the face of moral injury: 
It is easier to tell what self-forgiveness is not than what it is.  It is not letting 
oneself off the hook irresponsibly, accepting oneself and moving on with life, 
finding someone to blame such as one’s parents, spouse, commanding officer, 
the President, Osama bin Laden, God, or life.198                                                                    
 
To counterbalance the definition constituted in absentia, the authors then suggest two 
kinds of self-forgiveness:  decisional self-forgiveness and emotional self-forgiveness. The 
definitions of these are worth lingering on in full: 
 
“Decisional self-forgiveness is making a decision to act toward yourself without 
malice, self-blame, and self-condemnation and to treat oneself as having at least 
equal worth as do others.  Emotional self-forgiveness is the emotional 
replacement of unforgiving emotions toward the self with positive emotions 
toward the self like self-empathy, self-sympathy, self-compassion, and self-
love.199 
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Forthcoming are two works from Worthington that will develop a theology for self-
forgiveness that will address the simultaneous injuries of God, others and self by 
describing the merciful moral repair that occurs by God’s grace and initiative working in 
conjunction with the sacrificial love of Christ, whereby creating social repair between 
societal neighbors and psychological repair for one’s self.200   
 Together the scholars suggest a six-step plan to facilitate self-forgiveness201 by 
doing the following steps:  “receive God’s forgiveness, repair relationships,202 rethink 
ruminations, REACH emotional self-forgiveness, rebuild self-acceptance and resolve to 
live virtuously.”203 Within this schema, “REACH” stands for: “Recall the hurt without 
blame, Emotional replacement, Commit publicly to the forgiveness experience, Hold on 
to forgiveness when doubts arise.”204  Both of these schematics occur with keen attention 
to the present reality – that is “deal with oneself” – by “dealing with one’s past” and 
“dealing with one’s future.”205  As simple as this may sound to ‘orient’ one’s self within 
the past, present and future, those who have worked with moral injury make clear that a 
feature of its impairment is the rupturing of time and history.206 A true sense of 
disorientation happens by the severing of the individual from a future that might induce 
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hope because of a past that keeps presenting and re-presenting itself creating a 
recapitulation of the past traumatic moral event.   
Repairing a “right relationship to God”207 is essential to the moral repair they 
envision in attending to a condemned self.  One must wonder though, if a conversation 
with Protestant theology might aid their work. In suggesting “the person must make a 
commitment to live as virtuously as possible so that a repetition of the failure does not 
occur;”208 their suggestion could be perceived at first glance as an invitation to works 
righteousness, rather than a theology of grace.  We will see in our exploration of 
Bonhoeffer in chapter five an invitation to the responsible action of a moral agent.  That 
responsibility is held within the framework of two key elements: first, reality is complex 
and living responsibility is always bound with complications, and second, the cost of 
discipleship in response to God’s grace is living virtuously and faithfully in return.  
Worthington and Langberg could deepen their theological reflection with conversations 
in Catholic and Protestant theology to provide complexity to the positive psychology they 
espouse.  For example, they write, “In positive psychology, the commitment to virtue for 
self and others is called eudaimonia…. Expression of those virtues is encouraged to build 
positive families, workplaces and communities.”209 Bonhoeffer will offer a model for 
living, different than the virtues, which will build on Catholic models of natural law and 
                                                 
207 Worthington and Langberg, “Religious Considerations and Self-Forgiveness,” 284 
208 Worthington and Langberg, “Religious Considerations and Self-Forgiveness,” 284. 
209 Worthington and Langberg, “Religious Considerations and Self-Forgiveness,” 284. In suggesting 
eudaimonia, Worthington and Langberg are following in the tradition of Aristotelian eudaimonism. 
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Protestant models of grace and the divine command as he focuses on the orders of 
preservation and the mandates of creation.210  
Worthington and Langberg are to be heralded for their work that begins to bridge 
the fields of Psychology and Theology and deepens the conversation regarding self-
condemnation, trauma, and self-forgiveness.  Though a singular publication, this article is 
worthy of note here, for the conversation it invites.  Worthington is considered a leading 
researcher, not in the area of Veteran’s affairs, but in the psychology of forgiveness.211  
The REACH model he and Langberg propose has proved helpful for other victims of 
trauma including addiction and abuse; its proposal here is for helpful impact on soldiers 
who have experienced warzone trauma.  Because Moral Injury is nascent with less than a 
decade of serious scholarship, this article serves to extend the conversation even though 
its scope is limited. 
 
2.2.2 Critical Analysis of Psychological Discourse 
 As we see the progression of Moral Injury from a presenting category of 
symptoms differentiated from PTSD to a substantive diagnosis, three strands of inquiry 
demand further analysis. These include questions related to morality, injury and 
                                                 
210 In her work, The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics: A Study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ethics in Relation to 
Virtue Ethics, Jennifer Moberly argues for a “virtue-ethical” reading of Bonhoeffer.  She believes 
Bonhoeffer would not have described himself as a virtue ethicist, nor have a particularly positive reading of 
accounts of virtue.  She sees Bonhoeffer as a theologian who attends to “virtue-ethical concerns” while 
maintaining the primacy of grace and attending to a socio-political framework of the real that is 
significantly different than traditional eudaemonistic frameworks she sees as affirming “self-love” rather 
than love of the other in concrete situations.  Jennifer Moberly, The Virtue of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, (Eugene, 
OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2013), 232. 
211 Worthington and Langberg recognize “self-forgiveness” as a missing element in the literature of 
forgiveness.  They note a study by:  Fehr, R., Gelfand, M. J., & Nag, M., “The road to forgiveness: A meta-
analytic synthesis of its situational and dispositional correlates,” Psychological Bulletin, 136:5, (2010): 
894-914 that reveals the lack of self-forgiveness in the literature. Worthington and Langberg contend that 
self-forgiveness is a skill that can be taught in both secular and religious settings. 
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disability.  The review of the Psychological literature reveals a need to attend more 
deeply to the concept of morality, to avoid taking the word “injury” for granted but offer 
instead a foundation for the concept that builds on a clear account of morality, and to 
better situate moral injury as a certain form of disability within the field of disability 
studies in order to distinguish the disabling effects of a morally injured agent. The 
following section will attend to these questions. 
 
2.2.2.1 The Problem of Morality 
First, a critical review of sources raises questions about whether suitable depth 
has been given to the conceptualization of morality.212  Moral Injury became its own 
diagnosis apart from PTSD as psychologists became aware of an injured morality, a 
deeper more abstract dimension, than the presenting physicality of PTSD and its 
recurring symptoms, notably fear.  While this distinction is clear, there has not been 
sufficient analysis regarding how morality is constructed, sustained, disabled, and then 
reordered within the psychological literature on moral injury.213  Shay relies on 
                                                 
212 It is worthy of note here, perhaps with some irony, that Jonathan Shay quotes Tim O’Brien’s The Things 
They Carried in Shay’s chapter on “Healing and Tragedy” by saying, “A true war story is never moral.  It 
does not instruct, nor encourage virtue, nor suggest models of proper human behavior, nor restrain men 
from doing the things men have always done.  If a story seems moral, do not believe it.  If at the end of a 
war story you feel uplifted, or if you feel that some small bit of rectitude has been salvaged from the larger 
waste, then you have been made the victim of a very old and terrible lie. There is no rectitude whatsoever.  
There is no virtue.”  See: Tim O’Brien, The Things They Carried (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), 76-
77. 
213 Consider, for example, the work of Charles R. Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian 
Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Press, 2002).  Author Pinches describes a problem in 
ethics wherein theory can too often neglect both the agent and the context.  He reviews three theories: 
action theory, principle monism and proportionalism and illumines how each of these value theory over 
agent and context: action theory focuses on the actions themselves detached from the wider context (11-
33); principle monism shifts from the particularized action toward the larger universal principle, and yet, 
forgets the agent and the context (34-58); and proportionalism relies on a consideration of weighing the 
good against the bad achieved by an action (59-86).  At stake here is a twofold loss:  neglect of the agent 
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Nussbaum’s account of moral luck, and in turn Aristotle’s response to the Stoics, to make 
sense of the effects of “betrayal” on an otherwise “good person.” Litz explores moral 
emotions, but neglects deeper work on moral choices, and particularly moral choices 
amid complex contexts.  Litz’s focus is on the aftermath of morality, shame and guilt, 
rather than the preceding factors.  In this section we will analyze Shay and Litz’s 
explanations and assess their weaknesses.  This will lead us to the problem of “injury” 
and how a robust concept of morality can better describe what precisely is injured, and 
how. 
 In his prophetic article “Learning about Combat Stress from Homer’s Iliad” 
published in 1991, Shay has not yet distinguished Moral Injury from PTSD and thereby 
including within the diagnosis of PTSD injuries that can be both moral and 
philosophical.214 The Iliad describes what Shay deems “a moral disintegration”215 of 
Achilles who, as the story began, had a “broad moral horizon”216 but after a series of 
events including the swiping of a medal of honor from Achilles by Agamemon finds that 
morality shattered and fixated toward “a single point of revenge.”217  The combat stress 
that crumbles Achilles moral code is what Shay calls “the betrayal of ‘what’s right’.”218 
While Shay does not outline a definitive definition of morality, he does strain to find a 
word outside of The Iliad’s original language to describe what has been lost.  “What’s 
right”, for Shay, encompasses “normative expectations, convention, moral order, that 
                                                                                                                                                 
and extraction from the context (182).  A thorough review of moral injury requires ethical theories that 
attend justly to both.   
214 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 563. 
215 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 575. 
216 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 576. 
217 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 576. 
218 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 562. 
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which is fitting, ethics, commonly understood social values.”219  Even Homer, it appears, 
speaks about morality and a moral code through relationships rather than rigorous 
definitions or abstract concepts.  So, Shay reaches beyond the Homeric language, to 
ethicist Martha Nussbaum’s use of the word nomos220 which points to laws and customs 
that exist between authorities and citizens constituting obligations and rights that should 
normally be followed.221  Shay postulates three consequences that occur when nomos is 
threatened.  First, a shattered nomos leads to the inability to act with virtue since morality 
has been subjected to vulnerability, and perhaps even been crushed.222  For Shay, this is 
an important point for combat veterans, which is all too often neglected in their after 
care.223  Further study should explore what Shay implies in this statement regarding the 
link between morality and virtue.224  Second, Shay laments the lack of options for 
reconstruction when nomos has been lost. It is to this end that Shay has devoted his career 
and service.225 And third, Shay describes the spirits of soldiers who are “numb, incapable 
of pleasure, tortured by a pervasive sense of taint.”226 
                                                 
219 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 563. 
220 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 403.  
221 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 403. Nussbaum relies on Euripides’ Hecuba to unpack the 
fragility of nomos.  After presenting Hecuba’s view of nomos as stable within a society and the very 
structure of our internal being because of their “incorruptibility” Nussbaum proceeds to recognize Hecuba’s 
fragility and vulnerability.  Upheaval, within a society, can upset nomos and cause instability institutionally 
and individually. 
222 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 577. 
223 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 578. 
224 “Virtue” is an undefined concept by Shay in this article on Homer’s Illiad.  In Achilles in Vietnam Shay 
offers further development regarding his notion of virtue when h explains the loss of human virtue in 
veterans who have reached the “berserk” state leading them to be “like gods.” Virtue and values are lost in 
this state.  Shay makes an interesting analysis when he explains that virtues such as generosity and courage 
are “meaningless to a god.”  Virtues, for Shay, are related to mortality not from “being God.” See: 85-86. 
225 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 574.  To be clear, Shay implies this lament 
in this section when he outlines the consequences for a soldier of dehumanizing the enemy. 
226 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer’s Iliad,” 574. Interesting to note how Shay’s three 
descriptions parallel Ricœur’s in reverse:  defilement (tortured by a pervasive sense of taint), sin (incapable 
of pleasure – remember, Ricœur’s description of sin as being a negative state where one is cut off, as well 
 
  61
 Again, in his 1994 Achilles in Vietnam, Shay dives into a brief foray with morality 
appearing to be satisfied with Nussbaum’s account of moral luck.  Moral luck is a 
concept, dating back to Aristotle, that Nussbaum finds helpful to describe the effect of 
situations beyond our control on the character of a “good person.” For Shay, moral luck 
is connected with the situation of betrayal outside of our control by a moral authority.  
For Aristotle, moral luck is helpful for distinguishing between notions of justice and 
morality when a moral agent finds herself in a context outside of her control, where 
“involuntary” factors affect one’s moral agency.227 He explains,  
It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a.) under 
compulsion or (b.) through ignorance; and that (a.) an act is compulsory when 
its origin is from without, being of such a nature that the agent, who is really 
passive, contributes nothing to it: for example, when a ship’s captain is carried 
somewhere by stress of weather, or by people who have him in their power.228 
 
Aristotle engaged in a hearty debate with Stoic Philosophers, for example Epictetus 
regarding whether or not virtue was sufficient for happiness.  Aristotle argued no, since 
virtue can be subjected to moral luck and involuntary situations.  Epictetus argued yes, 
since he believed the wise person could be immune to misfortune by staying calm in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
as a positive state where one remembers the good, i.e. pleasure), and guilt (numb – again, Ricœur describes 
guilt as an impasse). 
227 While Aristotle distinguishes between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary contexts where luck 
and morality might intersect, other ethicists make different distinctions. For example, some might consider 
the distinction between “constitutive luck” (that which constitutes a person’s natural character by genes, 
dispositions, gifts and birth), “developmental luck” (that which develops a person’s character through 
mentors, teachers, opportunities, habits, and/or lack thereof), and “resultant luck” (that luck we have as a 
result of our actions over time.).  See, for example: Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979) particularly, chapter three on moral luck. 
228 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. By Harris Rackham (London, UK: Wordsworth, 1996): 
1110a,2-4. Aristotle distinguishes between “voluntary,” “involuntary,” and “non-voluntary” moral 
circumstances.  In response, there are three types of choices:  deliberate choice, deliberation and wishful 
thinking.  The person who is virtuous makes deliberate choices to choose between the extremes and find 
the mean.  While the courageous person may fear, they exhibit a confidence in directing their fear toward 
the sake of the kalos (beautiful).  Herein, that person finds the mean between cowardice and rashness.  See 
also: Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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midst of the turmoil.229 We will return to this conversation in the debate to follow as we 
explore Martha Nussbaum’s conceptualization of moral luck in her work The Fragility of 
Goodness. 
 Shay is drawn to Aristotle and Nussbaum’s conception of “moral luck” rather 
than the Stoics.230 He makes clear,  “Greek tragic poets confront us with a harrowing 
dimension of social existence.”231  That haunting dimension is the possibility of “social 
betrayal”232 that can destabilize human character, societal conventions233, and have 
catastrophic consequences for “human relatedness.”234  Subjected to such betrayal, the 
veteran according to Shay does not exhibit calm in the misfortune, but may go berserk in 
the face of “catastrophic moral luck”235 that can occur within war zones.  Nussbaum’s 
exploration of moral luck seems concerned ultimately with this question:  Can an 
interaction with a situation of bad moral luck devastate and cause the demise of an 
                                                 
229 It is worthy of note here that Vietnam veteran James Stockdale, imprisoned for four years in North 
Vietnam as a prisoner of war, held close to Stoic philosophy to persevere.  He details this in his 
autobiography:  James Stockdale, Courage under Fire: Testing Epictetus’s Doctrines in a Laboratory of 
Human Behavior (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1993).  This book is a collection of essays given as The 
Hoover Lectures on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University.  In this he relied first and foremost 
on a basic teaching of Epictetus to his students that you can never be “victim” to another, a person can only 
a be a “victim” to himself. Marcus Aurelius taught this as well:  “Take away the complaint, ‘I have been 
harmed.’ And the harm is taken away.”  Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Book 4.7.  From The Thoughts of 
the Emperor M. Aurelius Antonius, trans. George Long in 1862 (Oxford, UK: Benediction Classics, 2012). 
230 Elizabeth Agnew Cochran offers a helpful analysis of early Stoics versus Roman Stoics in her work, 
“Faith, Love and Stoic Assent: Reconsidering Virtue in the Protestant Tradition” Journal of Moral 
Theology 3:1 (2014): 199-227. Here, she distinguishes between Aristotles’ view of the virtues as “a 
multiplicity of interconnected moral qualities” versus the Socratic and Stoic view of virtue as unified, and 
able to be pursued through phroenesis.  However, she distinguishes a separate strand of Stoicism, affiliated 
with the Romans, wherein virtue is an “assent”, much like the Protestant view.  Nussbaum’s ethic stands 
more in keeping with the Roman view of Stoic assent. 
231 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 30. 
232 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 31. 
233 “Convention”, in Homeric language, is themis. 
234 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York, NY: 
Scribner, 1994): 31. 
235 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 31. 
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otherwise good person?236  Morality then creates a link between a person of character and 
their actions and repercussions.  Shay explains,  
Prior to Agamemnon’s betrayal of “what’s right” and the death of Patroklos, 
Achilles possessed a highly developed social morality.  This was reflected in his 
care for the welfare of other Greek soldiers, respect for enemies living and dead, 
and a reluctance to killy prisoners.  Achilles’ moral unluckiness, his tragedy, 
was that events – simply what happened – created the desire to do things that he 
himself regarded as bad.237 
 
Eliciting from Shay’s discussion here on “Moral Luck”,238 one can deduce these 
affirmations regarding morality:  morality is formed by societal conventionality and 
stability, ie. themis;  positive interactions with themis create a steadiness of character that 
produces positive and wise actions; negative interactions with themis, particularly in the 
form of bad moral luck, destabilize the individual, their choices, their relationships and 
their sense of stability within a given society.  MacIntyre criticizes Aristotle for such an 
account that does not take interest in the historicity and contextuality of a given situation 
and instead focuses on abstract conceptions.239 
                                                 
236 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 31. 
237 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 31. 
238 For contemporary scholarship on moral luck, see: Neil Levy, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free 
Will and Responsibility (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); Robert J. Hartman In Defense of 
Moral Luck: Why luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness (New York, NY: Routledge 
Press, 2017); and also Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2005).  In chapter one, she struggles with the “agent regret” that can occur 
damaging self and virtue in the fight against oppression.  She calls this “regretting the self one is.”  Here, 
the virtuous agent must struggle in response to bad “moral luck” and this may take the form of either anger 
or “agent-regret.”  In chapter two, she wrestles with the question of moral damage and its affect on human 
flourishing.  How does a virtuous agent “carry on” when there are clear boundaries of possible morals and 
the inability to flourish within a particular system? For Tessman, systems of oppression and injustice are of 
particular importance as one considers the possibility of virtue amid the need for liberation.  
239 See: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue.  MacIntyre criticizes Aristotle here for his “ahistorical character 
of his understanding of human nature.”  And adds three additional criticisms:  First, Aristotle’s teleology 
presupposes a refutation of metaphysical biology.  Second, his framework assumes the polis without a 
critical and distanced eye.  Third, Aristotle is not particularly interested in looking at conflicts, which might 
be the very crucible in which the virtues are learned (162-164). It should be noted that in later editions of 
After Virtue, MacIntyre backtracks on these critiques.  See for example the introduction to the 3rd edition of 
After Virtue. 
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In her work The Fragility of Goodness, Martha Nussbaum provides a 
comprehensive study on Greek interpretations of “moral luck” questioning whether a 
person’s character is dependent upon circumstances that surround them, or solely 
independent. This exploration of vulnerability, to a world of factors beyond one’s own 
control, is essential for considering morality, injury and potential disability.  Greek 
tragedies allow deep exploration into that vulnerability and the complexity of human 
suffering in a tragic world and their counterpoint story to human self-sufficiency.  
Through these tragedies the Greek tradition asked compelling questions of human agency 
and contingency amid “moral luck.”240 Unlike Plato, who maintained indifference 
between moral luck and character, Aristotle and other Greek poets engaged a hearty 
dialogue on the porous relationship between the two.241 Nussbaum’s probing scope of 
moral luck, ethics and the potential for eudaimonia are critical for understanding human 
agency and contingency, but even more so, the Greeks’ pursuit of reason led them to the 
“limits of reason.”242  She explains,  
We must ask…how it works to order a life… The Greeks characteristically, and 
appropriately, link these ethical questions very closely to questions about the 
procedures, capabilities, and limits of reason.  For it is their instinct that some 
projects for self-sufficient living are questionable because they ask us to go 
beyond the cognitive limits of the human being, and, on the other hand, that 
many attempts to venture, in metaphysical or scientific reasoning, beyond our 
human limits are inspired by questionable ethical motives having to do with 
closedness, safety and power.243 
 
                                                 
240 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 4. 
241 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 20. Plato and the Stoics believe the good life could be achieved 
even in the face of bad moral luck.  Aristotle disagreed and understood the vulnerability between the two 
based on moral luck and circumstance.  Some criticize Nussbaum for this view, believing she was too 
heavily influenced by Bernard Williams’ view of Aristotle from his work Moral Luck (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
242 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 8. 
243 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 8. 
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These limits are confronted in a myriad of ways, described here as the limit of knowledge 
and reason.  These limits of reason are reached amid all the contingencies of life for 
example, when love, courage, and virtue set forth in the world with “a stance of openness 
towards the world and its possibilities”244 but then meet vulnerability and betrayal.  
Limits, in some sense, are part of the very character of love, courage, virtue and morality.  
For Nussbaum, the fragility of goodness is a robust acknowledgement of the power of 
moral luck to override character and its aim for eudaimonia, the good, flourishing life.  
 Within the body of scholarship on Psychology and Moral Injury presented by 
Shay, Litz, Drescher, Worthington and Langberg, it is Litz’s ground-breaking 2009 
article, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and 
intervention strategy” that best presents a framework for defining morality.  Litz offers 
several paragraphs on morality as he and his team lay out basic concepts building his 
argument regarding moral injury, moral repair and the need for strategies of intervention 
beginning with the definition:   
Morals are defined as the personal and shared familial, cultural, societal, and 
legal rules for social behavior, either tacit or explicit. Morals are fundamental 
assumptions about how things should work and how one should behave in the 
world.245 
 
Drawing on Kohlberg, Freud, Eisenberg and Miller, Litz and his team argue that morality 
is a key aspect of human development where primitive drives are transformed toward 
pro-social behavior. Persons in the trajectory of a human’s development have the 
possibility of shaping moral development through positive teaching and modeling as well 
                                                 
244 Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 339. 
245 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
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as through punishment when norms are transgressed.246 Litz explores the nuances of 
“moral emotions” such as the negative emotions of embarrassment, shame and guilt as 
well as the positive emotions of pride and gratitude.247 When those negative moral 
emotions are at play, they reveal a moral code that still remains intact despite the trauma 
it has experienced.  In response to those emotions, the task of the therapist is not to 
excuse, deny or accommodate what has transpired within the morally injurious event.248  
Instead, Litz and his team argue for a “new synthesis” that expands the view of morality 
for one’s self249 and one’s world within the complex context of that event.250 
While Litz aims to offer a constructive framework in which to contemplate 
morality as a polyvalent term with many nuances and implications, other scholars too 
easily assume a predetermined definition of morality.251  This assumption creates a 
myriad of problems. First, without a working definition of morality, as well as 
                                                 
246 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
247 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
248 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 703. Ethicist John M. Doris offers an interesting 
counterpoint to the language of character in his work Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior.  
Doris claims virtue theory makes unsustainable claims about human behavior in light of real life situations.  
He argues for a situationist view of human behavior that takes into account varying contexts.  For example, 
he approves of the language of “local traits” in particular contexts rather than “robust traits” shaping a life 
of virtue (115).  He gives an example of “Henry” who is truthful in certain contexts, but not always in 
others.  Virtue requires “dispositional consistency” that is not always possible in real life situations (24-25). 
See: John M. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
249 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 703. Consider, for example, the work of Christian 
B. Miller who offers an account of “mixed trait” moral character wherein a person might have positive 
moral actions in some situations (so, those are not perfect, but they are not vices) and negative moral 
actions in other situations (given the situation, the negative action might not be completely immoral, but it 
still is not a virtue.)  Christian B. Miller, Character and Moral Psychology (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 37-61.   
250 Again, see John M. Doris and his situationist rather than globalist view taking into account varying 
contexts. 
251 Consider for example the excellent scholarship of Nash and Litz in their 2013 article, “Moral Injury: A 
Mechanism for War-Related Psychological Trauma in Military Family Members” wherein morality is only 
defined in absentia as something that can be lost (369), rather than a proactive definition of how it is 
constructed. 
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elaborating distinct nuances, morality becomes an abstract and assumed term leaving its 
implication to the hearer’s discretion. Standards for determining moral choices may need 
to be revisited in light of changing war codes in the twenty-first century. Second, implicit 
in the readings is the knowledge that military codes allow moral choices otherwise 
unacceptable in other social settings.  Thereby, morality is constituted by certain choices 
and behaviors varying across social spheres.252  How then does one determine what 
crosses the immoral line within a military code of ethics? While it is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to assess military codes of ethics, what is worthy of note is the shifting 
boundaries of morality across social contexts and then back again.253 
 In the literature review of psychology and psychiatry, we see two areas of focus: 
first, Jonathan Shay’s account of betrayal and how moral luck can factor into the moral 
injury of a person with good character; and second, Brett Litz’s summary of moral 
emotions, particularly guilt and shame, following the consequential act that can create 
either a pathway (through guilt) or an impasse (through shame).  Further work on moral 
injury must question whether both accounts are sufficient to describe the injury at hand. 
Morality, then, is clearly both a critical theme as well as a lingering key question.  How 
are we to understand ‘injury’ – that is, what is injured and how it might be repaired – if 
morality is still yet undefined and unsupported in a substantive way by scholarship other 
                                                 
252 Drescher and a team of scholars make explicit what is otherwise implied by many in their article, “An 
Exploration of the Viability and Usefulness of the Construct of Moral Injury in War Veterans” in saying:  
“During war, service members are at times required (e.g., for survival, to accomplish a mission objective) 
to perform acts that would be illegal in most other contexts (i.e., killing).” (p. 8) And then implying, 
soldiers must then shift from one context, with its own moral codes, to another context with its own moral 
conventions. 
253 Martin Luther explored questions such as these in his understanding of vocation, allowing some choices 
to be made in certain roles that were unacceptable in other spheres of life.  He described these as “the 
orders of creation” and believed their shape to be formed by natural law.  See, for example: Paul Athaus, 
The Ethics of Martin Luther (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1972) and Werner Elert, The Christian Ethos 
(Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1957). 
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than Shay’s reference of Nussbaum (nomos and moral luck) and Litz’s brief mention of 
Kohlberg and Freud?   
 
2.2.2.2  The problem of Injury 
The second obvious but essential critical theme is that of ‘injury’.254 The Latin 
etymology of the word “injury” denotes a negation “in-“ of that which is right “jur/jus.” 
Thereby Shay in his 1991 prophetic article elaborating on a moral dimension to PTSD by 
describing the injuries to a veteran inflicted by “the betrayal of ‘what’s right’” pointed 
quietly to the etymology of “injury” even before it was deemed distinct from PTSD.  His 
account then, in a sense, conflates morality and injury into that phrase so crucial to his 
scholarship: “the betrayal of ‘what’s right’”.  What is injured, for Shay, is that 
constellation of nomos (societal convention) that is brought to the test when confronted 
with an authority and a moral agent within a crisis situation. 
 The element of betrayal by a person in authority, as has been made clear, is 
critical for Shay but not for Litz.  The problem with simplifying the disagreement 
between these two strands of scholarship into a betrayal by an authority (Shay) versus a 
betrayal by an individually acting moral agent (Litz) is that it neglects the greater scope 
of the crisis situation.  Neither Shay nor Litz delineate societal complacency and social 
complexity into their sphere of definition for the extreme conditions at play in the crisis 
situation.  Both the person in authority and the individual moral agent are not acting 
alone, but within a greater script and scope that they cannot control nor change.  Too 
                                                 
254 Stoic philosophers, such as Marcus Aurelius, had a very matter of fact attitude toward an injury. 
Aurelius said: "Reject your sense of injury and the injury itself disappears." Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 
trans. by Meric Causubon, Book IV, paragraph 7 (1906).  An alternative translation reads: “If not man shall 
think himself wronged, then is there no more any such thing as wrong.” 
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much of an emphasis on the debate between who caused the injury – the authority or the 
agent – neglects the critical question of society’s role in causing morally injurious 
wounds.  Catholic Social Thought acknowledges the reality of social sin and its systemic 
and exponential effect on individual realities.  In The Compendium of the Social Doctrine 
of the Church, written in 2004, it states: 
 
The consequences of sin perpetuate the structures of sin.  These are rooted in 
personal sin and therefore, are always connected to concrete acts of the 
individuals who commit them, consolidate them and make it difficult to remove 
them.  It is thus that they grow stronger, spread and become sources of other 
sins, conditioning human conduct.  There are obstacles and conditioning that go 
well beyond the actions and brief life span of the individual and interfere also in 
the process of development of peoples.255 
 
Jonathan Shay, in agreement with such sentiment, would argue that social sin prevents 
the hearing of trauma narratives.256 It is ironic that society injures but then cannot bear 
witness to the trauma that injury produces and instead works as a whole to “deflect, deny 
and forget.”257 
Injuries, that negation of what is right, have a locus of causation (authority, agent, 
larger societal activity) as well as a locus of infliction.  Some agent causes a negation of 
what is right that has an effect of marking, changing, afflicting, disturbing, negating what 
had otherwise been deemed whole.  When Litz, et al., discuss the effect of that causation 
                                                 
255 Catholic Church. 2005. Compendium of the social doctrine of the Church. Ottawa: Canadian Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, 119. This is the kind of systemic oppression to which Lisa Tessman addresses the 
question of virtue in her work Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles.  See also:  Derek 
R. Nelson, What’s Wrong with Sin: Sin in Individual and Social Perspective from Schleiermacher to 
Theologies of Liberation (New York, NY: T&T Clark, 2009); and also Stephen G. Ray, Jr., Do No Harm: 
Social Sin and Christian Responsibility (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 2003).  Later we will see an 
account of Bonhoeffer who wrestles with personal responsibility in light of social sin. For example, he 
understands the vocation of a physician who is called not only to heal the sick, but also to work toward 
healing of the greater societal wound that caused the illness. 
256 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 194. 
257 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 194. 
  70
upon an infliction, they pose the question for the soldier asking, “Are they at risk for 
developing long-lasting psycho-bio-social impairment?”258 Implied within this question is 
an assumption regarding the locus of the infliction.  The injury, for Litz, has 
psychological dimensions, biological dimensions and social dimensions.  It should be 
noted that this turn of phrase does not include, but certainly assumes, moral impairment.  
And, it could be argued that a fifth dimension existential be included within the locus of 
impairment given Litz’s belief that part of the effect of a moral injury is the damaging 
effect upon the individual’s life narrative.  This discussion, regarding the locus of the 
infliction, is critical for moving forward toward healing and begins to draw us into the 
conversation that disability scholars have engaged.  Is the infliction located within the 
body, a medical injury?  Is the infliction located within the social body, A social injury?  
Is the infliction located within the body of something more transcendent drawing us into 
the limits of human perception and understanding, perhaps even, the body of God?259  
Jonathan Shay makes clear the difficulty in locating the injury as well as the 
critical necessity for treatment in understanding the injuries’ location when he writes: 
For mental health professionals the Achilles story —betrayal of "what's right," 
shrinkage of the moral and social horizon, grief and guilt for the death of a 
special comrade, renunciation of ever returning home, seeing one's self as 
already dead, berserking, dishonoring the enemy— is not a bad injury check-list 
when developing a Veteran's combat history over time.260 
 
In other words, the healer must look beyond the obvious injuries toward something 
deeper and perhaps more ambiguous.  For Shay, what is the ultimate injury greater than 
                                                 
258 Litz, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans,” 696. 
259 Deborah Creamer uses the language of “the body of God” in her work on a limit model of disability by 
drawing on the scholarship of Sallie McFague’s The Body of God: An Ecological Theology.  Her work will 
be discussed more fully in Chapter Three. 
260 Shay, “Learning About Combat Stress from Homer's Iliad,” 577-578. 
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the obvious checklist of injuries, is the paralysis that can occur when a veteran is unable 
to tell, own and integrate their story of that “betrayal of ‘what’s right’” into their sense of 
self.261   
 The lack of a story and its coherence within an expanded sense of self and world 
is the ultimate injury, one that is ultimately existential demanding an expansion of Litz’s 
“psycho-bio-social” locus of the injury into a larger “psycho-bio-social-moral-existential” 
location for what is injured. Such an expansion enlarges the injury from the soldier’s 
body alone to the societal body, and, from the societal body to the body of God and the 
limits of human understanding.  In later chapters, attention to Warren Kinghorn’s work 
on moral injury and Stanley Hauerwas’ scholarship in disability will reiterate the need for 
narrative that is larger than a singular person and held together within the context of a 
larger story-formed community. 
 
2.2.2.3 The Problem of Disability 
 The third critical theme to be explored after an analysis of morality and injury is 
the relationship between moral injury and disability.  Friedman describes a “Scarlet P” 262 
effect of a mental health diagnosis263 and so we can begin to imagine the stigmatizing 
                                                 
261 In addition, Shay is critical about the language and paradigm of modern medicine.  He writes, “Certain 
dramatic successes of modern medicine have come to seem like paradigms for real healing…(they) share a 
certain story line: The problem is identified (diagnosis); a treatment is administered (therapy); the patient 
returns to his prior (life)…without impairment.” Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 185-186. 
262 Friedman, “Acknowledging the Psychiatric Cost of War,” 77. 
263 See, for example, the study by Jack Tsai, Natalie P. Mota, and Robert H. Pietrzak, “U.S. Female 
Veterans Who Do and Do Not Rely on VA Health Care: Needs and Barriers to Mental Health Treatment,” 
in Psychiatric Services Journal 66:11 (November 01, 2015): 1200-1206.  The authors begin with a 
hypothesis that women veterans would have less stigmatization of mental health services since men often 
carry gendered traits of self-reliance and views of masculinity that affect the ability to request help.  They 
found women to experience similar levels of stigmatization regarding health care for various disabling 
psychiatric conditions.  See also:  Lorber W, Garcia HA, “Not supposed to feel this: traditional masculinity 
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fear of a “Scarlet D” effect of a disability given the potential “psycho-bio-social-moral-
existential” injuries at play in a morally injured veteran.264  Some might argue, in hopeful 
protection of veterans from that stigmatization, that moral injury is not a disability but a 
normal response to extremity and the presentation of an intact, though damaged, moral 
code.  But when, one must ask, does the crisis of moral authority have ramifications to 
the point of disabling for the veteran’s interiority, intimate relations, and institutional 
life?  While the issue of a veterans’ disabling, or not, by moral injury may be both 
political and controversial, as this study proceeds, it is my argument that the scholarship 
on disability is absolutely essential to the questions being asked in the field of moral 
injury.  These are questions related to impairment, medicalization, unjust social 
structures, liberation from those systems, and the acknowledgment of limits and the 
existential questions they raise about human life and finitude.  In chapter three, we will 
bring moral injury into conversation with the field of disability offering possible insights 
to both fields while also clearing outlining possible risks in so doing. 
 
2.3 Scholarship: Theology and Moral Injury 
If we are to have more than the “good intentions”265 to which Shephard alludes 
then we must reflect on the interplay between the human condition, social conventions, 
moral formation and their vulnerability and fallibility in the face of power and crisis 
                                                                                                                                                 
in psychotherapy with male veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq,” Psychotherapy 47:3 (Sept. 
2010): 296–305, and Garcia HA, Finley EP, Lorber W, et al, “A preliminary study of the association 
between traditional masculine behavioral norms and PTSD symptoms in Iraq and Afghanistan veterans,” 
Psychology of Men and Masculinity 12:1 (2011): 55–63.   
264 See, for example, the scale designed by:  Britt TW, Greene-Shortridge TM, Brink S, et al: “Perceived 
stigma and barriers to care for psychological treatment: implications for reactions to stressors in different 
contexts,” Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 27 (2008):317–335. 
265 Shephard, A War of Nerves, xxi. 
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situations.  Understanding that interplay necessitates a broader framework for 
comprehending and assessing morality, a deeper probe for analyzing injury by assessing 
its causation and infliction, and a higher call to decrease stigmatization by searching the 
scholarship of disability.  Given these three critical themes in the scholarship on 
Psychology and Moral Injury, it is now worthy of note to assess the scholarship from the 
perspective of Theology and Moral Injury by looking to the work of Brock, Lettini, 
Kinghorn, Meagher and Powers.  Rita Nakashima Brock makes clear the need to draw 
Moral Injury into the realm of Theology in her book Soul Repair: Recovering from Moral 
Injury after War when she states, moral injury is concerned with “souls in anguish, not a 
psychological disorder.”266   
  
2.3.1 Review of Key Scholars  
2.3.1.1  Rita Nakashima Brock  
In the field of moral injury, Rita Nakashima Brock may be credited with being 
deliberate about the relationship between moral injury and Christian faith, theology and 
ethics.  Brock, former Professor of Theology and Culture at Brite Divinity School, has 
awakened theologians, pastors, lay leaders and religious scholars to the pressing issue. 
Brock makes clear, “To be morally injured requires a healthy brain that can experience 
empathy, create a coherent memory narrative, understand moral reasoning and evaluate 
behavior.”267  Brock’s work champions the testimony of countless veterans from 
                                                 
266 Brock, Soul Repair, 51.   
267 Rita Nakashima Brock “Moral Injury: The Crucial Missing Piece in Understanding Soldier Suicides,” 
Huffington Post, 07/23/2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rita-nakashima-brock-ph-d/moral-injury-the-
crucial-missing-piece-in-understanding-soldier suicides_b_1686674.html (Accessed February 3, 2016). 
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Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, war reporters, psychiatrists, parents and family members 
to rally support for those struggling.  To best understand their work it is important to 
contextualize the development of the “Soul Repair Center” at the Brite Divinity School in 
Fort Worth, Texas and the accompanying book Soul Repair which documents the 
testimony and theological struggle of the soldiers with whom they have worked.  Then, 
further influential works of Brock will be explored as well as the trajectory of future 
endeavors.  To be clear, Rita Nakashima Brock is the scholar at the center of this 
discussion; however, she pairs with key partners including Gabrielle Lettini, Professor of 
Theological Ethics and Studies in Public Ministry at the Graduate Theological Union, as 
well as Colonel Herman Keizer, the founding co-director of the Soul Repair Center. 
The collective work of Brock, Lettini and Keizer calls the attention of 
theologians, churches and culture to the burgeoning need of returning soldiers who in the 
desolation of war have questioned God, self and neighbor in struggling with religious 
structures, second-guessing their own humanity, and questioning the undergirding moral 
codes of a civilized world.  Their work with The Soul Repair Center of Brite Divinity 
School to offer education, research and support in the field of Moral Injury began in the 
winter of 2008 after viewing the Emmy nominated film “Soldiers of Conscience.”  Brock 
and others address how religious communities might offer strength, guidance, 
discernment and repair to soldiers wrestling with religious issues before, during and after 
war.268 Brock began to explore in coursework and with graduate students the presence 
                                                 
268 https://www.brite.edu/programs/soul-repair/about_soul_repair/our-history/ (Accessed November 15, 
2017). 
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and relevance of Truth Commissions at various points in history.269  Within two years of 
the initial viewing of that movie, Brock and a team committed to the cause offered the 
first “Truth Commission on Conscience in War” (TCCW) on March 21, 2010 at the 
Riverside Church in New York City. Here, veterans shared testimony regarding their 
actions in the warzone and the emotional aftermath that followed.270 This event coincided 
with the publication of Litz, et. al, provocative essay in 2009 “Moral injury and moral 
repair in war veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy” which added to 
the interest and relevance of the event.   Along with Litz, Brock became a central figure 
in the emerging movement that championed the needs of soldiers and urged an 
appropriate societal response.   
The irony surrounding their clarion call is, as Brock notes, that our culture should 
know the human impact of war and its potential for moral injury because war stories and 
its aftermath are as old as the Illiad and Bhagavad-Gita, as close as our Bibles in the 
Hebrew Psalms, and played on our movie screens and captured in novels like Full Metal 
Jacket, American Sniper, The Hurt Locker and Catch-22.271 In fact, it was seeing the 
2007 documentary Soldiers of Conscience that crystallized in the two scholars the need to 
                                                 
269 See for example:  Anna Florke Scheid, “Under the Palaver Tree: Community Ethics for Truth-Telling 
and Reconciliation” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 31:1 (2011): 17-36.  Scheid calls for a return 
to “the palaver practice” (31) when traditional structures of justice are no longer operative or trustworthy.  
And also, Patricia Β. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge Press, 2012).  In this work Hayner studies 40 global truth 
commissions to evaluate the legacy and effectiveness of truth telling and reconciliation for moving forward 
during times of transitions.  To be clear, Hayner does not study “The Truth Commission on Conscience in 
War”, possibly because it does not fit her model of national healing after a time of civil war.  However, 
Brock’s Truth Commission offers a fascinating counterpoint for study in sharing truth, seeking 
reconciliation, assessing impact, and acknowledging the responsibility of the state to seek the truth after a 
time of war, even if the war was not within its own bounds. 
270 Darlene Fozard Weaver, in her book, The Acting Person and Christian Moral Life (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2011) highlights in chapter five the importance of “naming moral actions” as 
a moment of “truthfulness before God” (144-145).  Truthfulness, in a Christian context, must name the 
individual action, but also must name that action within the greater schema of creation, fall and redemption. 
271 Rita Nakashima Brock, Soul Repair, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2013), xiv. 
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respond from their disciplines and create a Truth Commission on Conscience in War 
where fourteen testifiers, seventy-five truth commissioners and over five hundred 
laypeople gathered at Riverside Church in New York City gathered on March 21, 2010 to 
hear four hours of testimony regarding conscience and its complexities in wartime.  The 
following day, the commissioners and testifiers gathered to create an agenda of next steps 
that resulted in the formation of the “Soul Repair Center” at Brite Divinity School in Fort 
Worth, Texas.  In addition, several statements were released including this one addressed 
to the clergy: 
To Religious and Community Leaders:  In working with members of the Armed 
Forces and veterans, religious and community leaders must educate themselves 
and their members about the consequences of the physical and psychological 
wounds of war and the needs of those who struggle with lingering wounds. They 
must learn to listen to veterans about how to reintegrate them into their 
communities while not falsely valorizing or demonizing them or leaving them to 
suffer invisibly and in silence. They must, especially, educate themselves and 
their communities in how they can support those who suffer moral injury.272   
This clarion call to clergy and community members is still waiting to be fully heeded. 
The question remains: what theological framework can encapsulate reflection and 
practice?  The Garden of Eden is a metaphor central to Brock and Lettini’s work in Soul 
Repair: Recovering from Moral Injury After War.  Veteran Kevin Benderman first 
provides the image central to the book in an introductory reflection: 
[I found out] we were in the area of Iraq that was supposed to the Garden of 
Eden, the cradle of civilization where mankind began.  I had to ask myself, 
“Why am I carrying around an M16 in the Garden of Eden?”273 
                                                 
272 http://brite.edu/academics/programs/soul-repair/whoweare/#staff (Accessed November 15, 2017). 
273 Kevin Benderman quoted in documentary Soldiers of Conscience. By Gary Weimberg and Catherine 
Ryan. United States, 2007.  See: Brock, Soul Repair, vii. 
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Lettini and Brock return to the image of the garden at the end of their book, 274 after 
presenting and reflecting on the witness and testimony of four soldiers’ recruitment, 
deployment, moral injury and initiatives for soul repair. Given Lettini and Brock’s 
theological background, one might expect a stronger theological foundation to their 
scholarship here.  However, their clear concern is rallying public understanding and 
advocacy in support of soldiers in crisis.  To that end, the structure and testimony of this 
book serve to open the dialogue they envision rather than provide lengthy theological 
reflection.  Their concluding reflection on the garden highlights the presence in Genesis 
3:24 of the “He drove out the man; and at the east of the garden of Eden he placed the 
cherubim, and a sword flaming and turning to guard the way to the tree of life.275  The 
presence of this fiery angel276 is the opportunity that awaits veterans willing to engage the 
moral struggle upon return from battle.  The key themes from the Garden of Eden story 
linger in light of this angel: dangers of good and evil exist in the garden, clear boundaries 
were stated to protect that knowledge, and in light of the serpent the morality test failed.  
The angel appears to prohibit a return, so it seems, to that original state.  Beyond the gate, 
the authors note, “are fratricide, war, empire, slavery, misogyny, and myriad forms of 
oppression.”277 Moral injury then stands before, “our moral conscience [which] takes up 
that fierce flaming sword and guards what is left of our moral identity.  To reenter the 
Garden, humanity must face that fierce angel.  Unless the struggle is attempted, there is 
                                                 
274 Brock, Soul Repair, 127. 
275 Genesis 3:24, New Revised Standard Version.  All subsequent quotations will be NRSV unless further 
noted. 
276 Brock, Soul Repair, 126.  Dietrich Bonhoeffer will draw on this image in Creation and Fall in the 
chapter “Tree of Life.”  Bonhoeffer uses the image to describe the problematic limitlessness of sin which 
Adam now encounters within the world.  
277 Brock, Soul Repair, 127. 
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no way back and no way to know what remains in the garden behind the gate.”278 The 
authors’ make clear at this juncture that the healing journey of the wounded soldier is not 
the soldier’s alone.  Their clarification is worth taking full note: 
The attempt to regain entry requires accepting responsibility for what we have 
done, but doing so may cost people their lives if they have to go back alone.  
Societies that launch wars, believing that weapons of death and destruction are 
noble, good, and lifesaving, or that wars are holy, do so dishonestly, without 
wisdom or the capacity to take moral responsibility for the harm they do, not 
just to their enemies, but to all they send into the maws of killing.  We should 
not expect those who return to have to face that angel alone.279 
Brock and Lettini’s honorable work in placing the moral load of this injury on the 
shoulders of the social body and not just the soldier’s should be noted and applauded. At 
the same time, the concerns they introduce invite further theological engagement, and this 
dissertation will take an important step forward in that conversation by addressing human 
limit.   
 Brock devotes her scholarship and the stewardship of her time to practical efforts 
such as The Truth Commission on Conscience in War, the efforts of the Soul Repair 
Center, and new initiatives such as advanced training seminars on Moral Injury, 
Community and collective healing.280  Prior to her 2013 book Soul Repair, Brock was a 
prolific author of theological works including Casting Stones: Prostitution and 
Liberation in Asia and the United States (1996), Proverbs of Ashes: Violence, 
Redemptive Suffering, and the Search for What Saves Us (2002), Journeys by Heart: A 
Christology of Erotic Power (2008), Saving Paradise: How Christianity Traded Love of 
                                                 
278 Brock, Soul Repair, 127. 
279 Brock, Soul Repair, 126-127. 
280 https://www.voa.org/seminar .  (Accessed November 15, 2017). 
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This World for Crucifixion and Empire (2009), and Saving Paradise: Recovering 
Christianity's Forgotten Love for this Earth (2012). Brock’s scholarship continues to 
hone in even more fully on the topic of moral injury.  We see the beginning of this 
chapter in her scholarly life with the 2012 publication of an essay, “Moral Injury: The 
Crucial Missing Piece in Understanding Soldier Suicides.”  In 2013, she presented her 
findings to a gathering of religious chaplains at Montreat Conference Center in a highly 
acclaimed slide show and presentation.281  In 2015, after Op-Ed contributor David Brooks 
of The New York Times wrote “The Moral Injury” wherein he conflated PTSD with 
Moral Injury282, Brock quickly responded with a clarifying statement.283  A pinnacle 
moment occurred for gaining recognition in the field of moral injury when Rita 
Nakashima Brock and a team of scholars, psychiatrists, theologians and even thespians, 
were invited to host a week-long lecture series at the Chautauqua Institution in the 
summer of 2016.284  In 2017, Brock resigned from her positions at Brite Divinity School 
in Theology and as co-director of the Soul Repair Center to begin work as the Moral 
Injury and Recovery Program Developer for the Volunteers of America a position in 
which she works more exclusively with matters of moral injury. Also in 2017, Brock 
introduced a fuller description of her vision for the community’s role in healing from 
moral injury with a second essay, “Sophie’s Choice: Why Healing from Moral Injury Is a 
Community Process.”  In September of 2017, in conjunction with The Braxton Institute 
this work will continue in Princeton, New Jersey as a team of scholars, therapists and 
                                                 
281 http://pccmp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Moral-Injury-and-Soul-Repair-Chaplains-Montreat.pdf  
(Accessed November 15, 2017). 
282 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/opinion/david-brooks-the-moral-injury.html  
(Accessed November 15, 2017). 
283 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/opinion/helping-to-heal-the-trauma-of-war.html  
(Accessed November 15, 2017). 
284 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4O0WPGYykc  (Accessed November 15, 2017). 
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community practitioners are trained in a communal restorative process.  Just released is a 
compendium of moral injury in sacred texts which Brock contributed to alongside Joseph 
McDonald entitled Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts (Studies in Religion and 
Theology) published in May, 2017.  In this work, Brock writes the foreword for 
McDonald and a team of scholars who wrestle with moral injury in the sacred texts of 
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and even mainstream American Civil Religion 
and then ask whether these texts continue to perpetuate trauma or offer visions of 
restoration.  The conviction of the contributing authors is that moral injury is an emerging 
area of trauma studies, seen particularly in returning veterans, but not confined solely to 
the context of warfare.285   
Brock furthers the conversation regarding Moral Injury, in part, by doing justice 
to the self-evident themes of morality and injury. Her voice demands attention to the 
thread of morality that cannot be neglected when tending to soldiers’ returning to war.  
As noted above, consider the recent op-ed piece by David Brooks in The New York 
Times who in an attempt to call attention to Moral Injury apart from PTSD instead 
conflated the two by saying, “Most discussion about PTSD thus far has been about fear 
and the conquering of fear. But, over the past few years, more people have come to 
understand PTSD is also about exile — moral exile.”286   In response to this Op Ed essay, 
Rita Nakashima Brock wrote a letter to the editor that deserves full quotation here:  
David Brooks captures the anguish of post-traumatic stress disorder well.  But 
he does a disservice to those with PTSD when he tries to collapse it into moral 
                                                 
285 Joseph McDonald, ed. Moral Injury in Sacred Texts (London, UK: Jessica Kingsley Publishing, 2017).  
286 David Brooks, “The Moral Injury,” New York Times (February 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/17/opinion/david-brooks-the-moral-injury.html?_r=0  
(Accessed February 3, 2016).       
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injury.  Natural disasters are a major cause of PTSD, though rape is the cause 
most likely to provoke it.  Moral injury is a response of the ‘formerly’ moral 
agent to violating one’s own moral code.  It can be experienced without PTSD, 
and results in a loss of faith or meaning, shame, grief and isolation.  Committing 
an atrocity has the worst effect because it violates even the military moral code 
for soldiers, but just surviving when others do not can lead to profound guilt.  
Only one-fourth of Afghanistan and Iraq war veterans receive treatment for 
PTSD, but many more endure moral injury alone in a society oblivious to their 
suffering.  Mr. Brooks is right: Veterans require more from us than a thank-you, 
and we would be better people if we were willing to hear harrowing things and 
to offer a caring presence on their journey of rebuilding a moral identity.287   
 
According to Brock, good soldiers typically have a strong moral identity upon entering 
the military.  She claims, “most people capable of such a commitment also have empathy 
for others and deep moral values.”288 Her argument goes on to suggest that as those 
morally strong soldiers are then trained in the military there is an “absence of discussion 
about the moral impact of military training and its implementation in combat.”289  So 
good soldiers experience disconnects between competing moral worlds – their moral 
worlds before, during and after combat.  The impact of this disconnect, Brock argues, 
should be a consideration when exploring the rise of soldier suicides.  Her concern is that 
too much emphasis has been given to the “squishy statistics”290 of soldier suicides, at the 
real cost of understanding the contributing factors.  For Brock, a contributing factor is the 
neglect of moral discussion, even in the “spiritual fitness”291 components of military 
training. 
                                                 
287 Letter to the editor printed February 20, 2015. www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/opinion/helping-to-heal-
the-trauma-of-war.html  (Accessed September 30, 2016). 
288 Rita Nakashima Brock, “Moral Injury: The Crucial Missing Piece in Understanding Soldier Suicides,” 
Huffington Post, September 22, 2012, 
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289 Brock, “Moral Injury.” 
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 Brock is helpful in briefly laying out a process of moral formation where virtue, 
character, and the capacity for moral action become engrained in neural pathways292 
through community formation, mimicry and unfolding ethical identity across time.  This 
formation is shaped by everything from linguistic patterns of a given culture, to the 
narratives of religious traditions, to moral reasoning taught in various institutions 
(education, religious institutions, military formation).  Difficulties arise for the moral 
agent when there is a conflict between systems in the shifts from one moral world to 
another and back again.  Military training relies on tightening the neural pathway toward 
patterns of immediacy and programmed response to threat; however, those tightened 
neural patterns become unraveled upon return home and so repair is needed for the 
damaged neural patterns of moral formation.  Brock believes the repair process is not for 
the soldier alone, but should be a community process for forming new moral pathways 
since morality is never individual, but always a social process.293 
 The resultant injury, from that disabled morality, is multi-faceted.  Brock adds 
several dimensions to the analysis of that injury as she suggests the injury doesn’t just 
affect an individual, but is societal.294  Because of that a moral injury can have 
                                                 
292 Brock.  See: http://pccmp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Moral-Injury-and-Soul-Repair-Chaplains-
Montreat.pdf  (Accessed November 15, 2017). 
293 While Brock begins the work of connecting moral formation and repair to neural patterns in her 
presentation to the Chaplains at Montreat, further scholarship is needed. For recent scholarship on brain 
development and character see, for example:  James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense, (New York: The Free 
Press, 1993) and Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1994). And also, Ronal Lee Zigler, “The Formation and Transformation of Moral 
Impulse,” Journal of Moral Education 28:4 (1999): 445-457. 
294 For Brock, the societal dimension is both prior to the injury as social sin creates a space for moral injury 
to happen, as well as after the injury as reverberations continue from the soldier to society.  Conversation in 
social sin is a key contributor to a robust understanding of moral injury.  Consider, for example, African-
American theologian Stephen G. Ray who grounds an account of social sin in his book Do No Harm, we 
are “created by God, constituted by sin” in his reading of Reinhold Niebuhr.  Additional models for 
understanding and addressing social sin may be seen in Latin-American, Feminist and Asian theologies.  
See here, Derek R. Nelson What’ Wrong with Social Sin. When the Vatican recently released a new list of 
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repercussions across generations of an injured community.295  Healing from that injury 
requires, of course, the reconstruction of a moral identity, but that is not the work of the 
soldier alone.  Instead, it is the collective responsibility of the community to work 
together toward healing and the recovery of empathy,296 Brock makes clear:  “Moral 
injury recovery is a collective responsibility. When we individualize moral injury as a 
personal failure, we lose the nature of moral conscience as social,297 as what enables 
ethical relationships.”298   
Brock, acknowledging military culture and the shame associated with such labels, 
is reluctant to associate moral injury with “disability.”  However, Brock describes a 
“slow burn”299 component to moral injury as the injury kindles and then explodes.300 
While PTSD is damage to the amygdala and hippocampus in the limbic sphere of the 
brain resulting from a fear response to an outside threat, moral injury is not a brain injury.  
In fact, Brock argues that moral injury requires a healthy brain particularly in the 
prefrontal cortex where empathy and moral assessment occur.301  Brock cares about 
moral formation and understanding the thick narrative and societal systems that create 
                                                                                                                                                 
the “seven deadly sins” in 2008 the focus was on the social dimension of sin with this list:  polluting, 
genetic engineering, gathering riches, drug dealing, seeking and providing abortion, practicing pedophilia, 
and causing social injustice.  These differ substantially from the original list: gluttony, fornication, greed, 
pride, despair, wrath, vainglory and sloth. 
295 Rita Nakashima Brock, “Sophie’s Choice: Why Healing from Moral Injury Is a Community Process,” 
Huffington Post, May 19, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sophies-choice-why-healing-from-
moral-injury-is-a_us_591f5660e4b0b28a33f62c03 (Accessed September 16, 2017). 
296 Brock, “Sophie’s Choice.”  One example Brock provides, based on personal experience, is the 
internment of Japanese during World War II. 
297 Lisa Tessman’s Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles is worthy of note here. See 
also: Willie James Jennings The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2010). 
298 Brock, “Sophie’s Choice.” 
299 Brock, “Moral Injury.” 
300 A contributing factor to this “slow burn” onset of moral injury can simply be the process of aging.  
Brock explains in “Sophie’s Choice” that moral injury “can also surface late in a long life when mental 
capacities to control emotions and traumatic memories weaken.” 
301 Rita Nakashima Brock, “Moral Injury, Soul Repair After War, and the Civic Role of Religion,” 
Presentation at American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting 2013. 
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and guide ethical behavior.  Given Brock’s argument here, it will be important to address 
how moral injury is a particular kind of disability even though it differs from the 
disabling done by PTSD to the brain.302  As this dissertation proceeds to draw moral 
injury into the field of disability it is important to note how Brock’s account of morality 
as a social construct coincides with arguments in Disability scholarship concerning the 
need for a social model of Disability. 
Despite the excellent efforts of Rita Nakashima Brock, theologians were at first 
slow to respond to the cry for thinking theologically about moral injury even though this 
field invites reflection on many areas of theological concern: creation and fall, sin and 
salvation, moral agency in a fallen world, atonement and redemption, prayer and lament, 
confession and reconciliation, liturgical practices and the Sacraments.  The reasons for 
this neglect are uncertain, but at least four seem plausible. First, partly because of the 
conflation between PTSD and MI, as well as perhaps due to the terminology of “injury”, 
one possible reason for theological neglect is the medicalization of the problem.  Such 
thinking categorizes moral injury as a medical, rather than a theological, problem.  
Second, theological denominations struggle against each other and within their own ranks 
in conversation regarding the morality of war and peace.  Ecumenical work exploring 
twenty-first century concerns with Just War theory will be important for contextualizing 
moral injury within warfare and twenty-first century challenges.303 Third, given the 
                                                 
302 Cheryl Lawhorne-Scott and Don Philpott, Combat-Related Traumatic Brain Injury and PTSD: A 
Resource and Recovery Guide (Plymouth, UK: Government Institute Guides, 2010). 
303 For example, Anna Florke Scheid draws on an invitation from Catholic Archbishop of Chicago, Priest 
Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, who made the challenge for a “consistent ethic of life” in a lecture at Fordham 
University. Scheid responds to his request by suggesting Just War Theory must add to its usual demands “a 
consistent ethic of reconciliation.” Scheid argues this ethic of reconciliation can be conceptualized and 
realized at every stage: jus ante bellum, jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. See:  Joseph 
Cardinal Bernardin, “A Consistent Ethic of Life: An American-Catholic Dialogue” Counseling and Values 
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complexity of war and its aftermath, ecumenical work assessing societal rituals for return 
after war will be crucial.304  And finally, recent theological work addressing moral injury 
has been timely, but perhaps jumps from need to practice, without lingering in the 
theological space necessary to shape and define those particular practices.305  This 
criticism is made cautiously and with great respect for the theologians at hand that in 
seeing the magnitude of the issue, and the paucity of church response, 306 have offered 
steps forward through particular actions.  The desire for a robust and astute theology is to 
increase the capacity of the institutional church to better attend to the personal needs of 
each veteran and their family.  “I have a feeling of intense betrayal,” war veteran and 
divinity student Michael Yandell reveals, “and the betrayer and the betrayed are the same 
person:  my very self.”307   Yandell describes his experience of returning from war and 
dealing with the moral ramifications in terms of a landscape where “everything was laid 
flat.” 308   The task of theology is to reanimate that “flat” moral landscape by providing 
dimension, perspective, points of orientation and capabilities for faithfully navigating an 
asperous new moral world.  This is a significantly different problem than addressing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
29:1 (October, 1984): 6-14. And also: Anna Florke Scheid, “Just War Theory and Restorative Justice: 
Weaving a Consistent Ethic of Reconciliation” Journal of Moral Theology 5:2 (2016): 99-115.  And also, 
see:  Tobias Winright, Can War Be Just in the 21st Century, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2015) and also, 
Lisa S. Cahill, Love Your Enemies: Pacifism, Discipleship and Just War Theory (Minneapolis, MN: 
Augsburg Fortress Press, 1994). 
304 See, for example: Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, ed. Interfaith Just Peacemaking: Jewish, Christian, and 
Muslim Perspectives on the New Paradigm of Peace and War (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Co., 
2012). 
305 See, for example: Everett L. Worthington, “Religious Considerations and Self-Forgiveness in Treating 
Complex Trauma and Moral Injury in Present and Former Soldiers.” Journal of Psychology and Theology 
40 (Winter 2012): 274 – 288. And also, Zachary Moon, Coming Home: Ministry That Matters with 
Veterans and Military Families,  (Atlanta, GA: Chalice Press, 2015). 
306 National Congregations Study Cumulative Data Set (1998, 2006-2007, 2012). 
307 Michael Yandell, “The War Within:  A Veteran’s Moral Injury,” The Christian Century 132:1 (January 
7, 2015), 12-13.  For further reading on Yandell’s understanding of a divided self upon return from war, see 
his exegesis of the Gerasene Demoniac of Mark 5 in Joseph McDonald, ed. Moral Injury in Sacred Texts.  
Michael Yandell, “Do Not Torment Me: The Morally Injured Gerasene Demoniac,” Moral Injury in Sacred 
Texts (London, UK: Jessica Kingsley Publishing, 2017), 135-150. 
308 Yandell, “The War Within,” 13. 
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issues presented by PTSD: moral injury, instead, is a problem of disabled morality, 
human limits pressed to the extreme in crisis situations, and the spiritual dimensions 
provoked. 
 
2.3.1.2  Warren Kinghorn 
Warren Kinghorn, professor of psychiatry and pastoral theology at Duke University 
Divinity School, provides a theological account of moral injury with a desire to push 
beyond “unhelpfully limiting”309 psychological constructs of moral injury.  Kinghorn is 
grateful for the work of Shay, Litz and others for providing “critical analysis of the 
relationship between combat trauma and the moral agency of the acting soldier”310 that he 
believes the empirical literature neglected prior to the work of Shay and Litz partially due 
to the rise of PTSD as a diagnosis in 1980.311  Kinghorn argues Moral Injury needs a 
robust conversation with a Christian account of Moral Theology in order to “rescue moral 
injury from the medical model and the means-end logic of techne.”312 Moral injury, for 
Kinghorn, can not be subjected to, nor solved by, the technical arts of medicine. To 
                                                 
309  Kinghorn, Warren, “Combat Trauma and Moral Fragmentation: A Theological Account of Moral 
Injury,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 32, 2 (2012): 62. 
310 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 62. 
311 Kinghorn does acknowledge the work of two scholars Robert Jay Lifton (1973) and Sarah Haley (1974) 
with raising essential questions about moral agency and war.  See for example:  Robert Jay Lifton  Home 
from the War; Vietnam Veterans: Neither Victims nor Executioners   (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1973) and Sarah A. Haley, “When the Veteran Reports Atrocities: Specific Treatment Considerations of the 
Vietnam Veteran,” Archives of General Psychiatry 30 (1974): 191-196.       
312 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 57. Kinghorn’s respect for Litz’s use of the medical model is readily 
apparent, and yet, Kinghorn acknowledges the need to probe deeper from psychiatry toward moral theology 
because, “Psychological theories of moral injury such as that of Litz and colleagues can be insightful and 
clinically useful, but on their own terms they cannot treat moral injury as anything other than an immanent, 
psychological phenomenon involving not a fragmentation of a teleological whole but transgression of a 
soldier’s own internalized rules and assumptions.  Because their empirical suppositions do not allow them 
to pass moral judgment on these rules and assumptions or to speak directly about teleology, they are unable 
to distinguish between meaningful and non-meaningful moral suffering, so reduction of self-described 
suffering, measured empirically, becomes the primary goal of the clinical encounter,” 67. 
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accomplish this task, Kinghorn begins by outlining the ways in which the concept of 
human agency is helpful.313  Then, Kinghorn sets forth his argument for why a “medical 
model” is problematic for the discussion.314  Finally, he presents his case for why moral 
injury must be embedded within the embodied narrative of the Christian story and healed 
through community practices. 
With an eye toward locating a person within a larger story, Kinghorn begins with an 
account of human agency.  Later this grounding will prove helpful for two reasons: 
seeing the person and not the medical need, and, grounding that person in a larger 
narrative.  So, Kinghorn provides three arguments explaining why human agency proves 
helpful for diagnosing and tending to the trauma that has at its center an active self, rather 
than a passive situation solely inflicting the trauma.  First, an emphasis on the 
individual:315 the trauma has at its center an acting person who exhibits agency within the 
complexity of a larger social matrix.316  Second, the social: the complexity of that social 
matrix is all too often overlooked within the “sound-bite”317 conversations of American 
political consensus and conversation.  Within the greater reality at play, an individual is 
an “embodied, relational, responsible self”318 functioning within an eco-system greater 
than one’s self. And third, the martial: a discussion of human agency beckons Christian 
ethicists beyond abstract discussion of Just War toward the impact of war on individual’s 
lives and agency; here it must always be remembered the concrete impact of the war 
                                                 
313 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 62. 
314 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 64. 
315 To be clear, the italics here are mine to emphasize the points Kinghorn makes in these three areas. 
316 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 62. 
317 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 63. 
318 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 63. 
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becomes embodied within the person.319 Kinghorn describes a morally injured soldier as 
a “truthful sign of moral incoherence.”320  Clinical Psychology and their focus on agency, 
for Kinghorn, is a helpful prompt for Christian ethics.321  However, Kinghorn offers an 
“appreciative theological critique”322 by suggesting locating agency solely within a 
medical model is unhelpful and suggests the Christian narrative provides “a thicker 
contextual account of proper human ends.”323  
 Kinghorn suggests the medical model is unhelpful for several reasons.  First, a 
medical model tends to distance and disassociate the relationship between the diagnosed 
injury and “the experiencing self.”324  Second, a medical model can fall prey to the 
possibility of politicizing wounds.325 And third, the medical model is subject always to 
the problem of techne, that is, the logical fallacy that suffering can be tended to and 
amended by “the means-ends logic of technical rationality.”326  Kinghorn suggests a two-
fold problem: the inability to ‘judge’ moral norms and an absent teleology.  Both of these 
conditions keep moral injury within the realm of technology.327  
 Kinghorn’s assessment of the strengths of agency, his critique of the medical 
model and his longing for a teleology beyond technology are all aimed toward a new and 
                                                 
319 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 63. 
320 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 63. 
321 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 64. 
322 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 59. 
323 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 59. 
324 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 64. 
325 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 65. 
326 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 65. 
327 Kinghorn relies on the work of Joseph Dunne to define and explore technology. Dunne’s account 
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conceptualized in advance of the application.  See: Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough Ground: Practical 
Judgment and the Lure of ‘Technique' (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).  Kinghorn 
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NY: SUNY Press, 1997). 
  89
robust narrative that allows suffering to have a telos other than despair.328 For Kinghorn, 
technology has at its root the Aristotlean concept of techne where a particular application 
is utilized within a certain situation toward a particular end.  Assumed in this concept is 
that better techne must be gained when a situation can no longer be met by the existing 
technology.  Kinghorn criticizes medicalization in acknowledging that while responding 
to the pressing need with an eye toward the reduction of suffering, these technologies of 
psychotherapy and pharmaceuticals are utilized without considering alternatives beyond 
these means.329    Implied in Kinghorn’s response is a longing for theology, which is 
never used as an instrument of technology, but instead is entrusted to the spirit with the 
hope of reducing the suffering, but even more so, transforming the suffering toward a 
redemptive end.   
Kinghorn comes to the conclusion that the clinical disciplines are ultimately only 
partially equipped to address the pain of our injured veterans.  However, “Faith 
communities, unlike the clinical disciplines, are able to embrace thick and particular 
conceptions of human flourishing and human failing and are, thereby, equipped much 
more robustly than the clinical disciplines to facilitate the healing of morally injured 
veterans.”330  To accomplish this task, knowing the teleological end of importance for the 
individual veteran, will take an institutional commitment to soul search, purge and re-
                                                 
328 Alasdair MacIntyre argues to reclaim teleology in his critically acclaimed work After Virtue. See: 
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd edition (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame 
Press, 2007). The pre-modern era had a telos and all actions were judged against that teleological 
framework.  The modern world reacted to the “superstitions of teleology” (35) and separated the individual 
out from that framework allowing individuals then to make arbitrary and free decisions without a 
superseding paradigm.  Herein is “contingent arbitrariness” (33) in which the modern world is now trapped.  
The initiation of the modern self separated the individual from that teleological framework and thereby all 
of the above moral philosophers reject an ultimate telos and their projects then fail (61). 
329 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 67. 
330 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 71. 
  90
order.  Kinghorn makes clear churches must do three things to make this accommodation: 
first, “renounce the privilege of ignorance”331 about current wars and the military-
industrial complex that encourages them; second, “renounce generalizations” that protect 
institutions and individuals from complex discussions regarding topics not easily divided 
into “pro” and “anti”332; and third, once those have been renounced, turn to the full 
embrace of “the war-torn bodies among them” by hearing the lament of the soldier in 
their midst rather than the generalization in the media.333 Christian communities bear the 
possibility for Aristotle’s vision of the “right ordering” of humanity different than an 
ordering toward the alleviation of distress alone. While that may sound dismissive of our 
soldiers’ plight, Kinghorn aims for “desire of God and to God’s good creation”334 that 
alone can happen within a Christian narrative.  This ordering allows for the depth of 
patience amid suffering, confession alongside the reality of sin, and forgiveness in the 
face of guilt our veterans demand. 
Situating the veteran within a story where suffering is not the end but is instead a 
lament calls deeply our willingness to give up control in exchange for the desire for God 
and for the good creation God intended.335 Doing so creates the space for a particular 
habitus within the faith community.  Essential to that habitus is the patience of a Holy 
Saturday where lingering in the uncertain middle336 of suffering calls attention to the 
persistent intrusion of “death into life”337 and does not move too quickly to resurrection 
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335 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 68. 
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hope.  Resources are available within the Christian community not just for the worship of 
Easter, but for the lingering in lament through liturgy, prayer, scripture and worship.338   
Alongside patience, penitence is an essential component to what theology and 
worshiping communities can offer beyond psychotherapy.  Even within a just war 
framework, all actions that occur within war are “things to lament, not to celebrate.”339  
Kinghorn acknowledges historical frameworks wherein penitence was “to some degree 
communal, where war comrades would experience penitential requirements upon their 
return home and would be able to transition together, within the context of the larger 
community, into full liturgical and social participation in church and community.”340  
Even more so, there were particular points when a given community participated in active 
social reflection and “collective ownership of the wartime violence conducted in its 
name.”341  
Finally, the third element of liturgical space alongside patience and penitence are the 
embodied practices342 of a given community.343  Kinghorn advocates for a “non-
                                                 
338 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 68. 
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342 With his use of the word “practices” Kinghorn is drawing on Bernard Verkamp’s vision for soldiers 
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particular cultural contexts and the moral implications of that welcome home.  See: Bernard J. Verkamp, 
The Moral Treatment of Returning Warriors in Early Medieval and Modern Times (Scranton, PA: 
University of Scranton Press, 1993). 
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instrumental” invitation to the veteran, so the veteran does not become the focus but 
instead becomes assimilated into the “embedded context of Christian community”344 
participating then in its rich life of faith-shaped practices.  The inherent possibility within 
patience, penitence and practices points the solider beyond the alleviation of suffering 
toward a teleological greater good that Kinghorn argues may only come from within a 
faith community. 
Consideration of Kinghorn’s account raises several questions.  First, Kinghorn 
raises the critical question regarding the teleology of suffering.  Clearly, he is concerned 
with an over-reliance on technology aimed toward a particular end.345  The underlying 
question he invites the reader to struggle with is whether suffering is always a negative 
experience.  Suffering, perhaps, could offer a meaningful contribution to a flourishing life 
if allowed a telos of redemption.346 Second, in discussing the jus in bello paradox of 
moral injury, whether or not we can address moral injury without discussing war’s moral 
justifiability, Kinghorn writes that soldiers become visible “signs of the moral 
incoherence.”347  One wonders here about the almost sacramental tone of such language.  
                                                 
344 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 70. 
345 Kinghorn is not alone in offering this critique.  See, for example, others who share this concern:  
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347 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 63. 
  93
If sacraments are visible signs of God’s invisible love and grace,348 what would we deem 
the reverse when a beloved constituent of God’s creation becomes a visible sign of moral 
incoherence and societal injustice?  Kinghorn would do well to offer further exploration 
of the Protestant sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion, rather than penitence 
alone in this discussion.  In Baptism, our “flourishing” and our “failing” die and are 
raised again to new life through Jesus Christ.  In Holy Communion, the moral 
incoherence and societal injustice of our societal matrix is broken open and forgiveness is 
poured out again and again.349  If soldiers’ bodies have become an almost ‘anti-
sacramental’ sign, is it possible to imagine the fullness of our sacramental practices 
offering education, transformation and reversal?  Third, the scholarship of Bernard 
Verkamp350 indirectly notes the possibilities and implications of a modern day penitential 
practice, encouraged by Protestants and Catholics, and perhaps even, embraced by the 
larger society, for returning warriors. Kinghorn makes reference to Verkamp’s account of 
manuals and rituals outlining penitential demands that existed from 600 CE to 1200 CE.  
For example, Verkamp outlines instructions from Theodore of Tarsus for the solider to 
refrain for forty days from partaking of communion and even from attending church, and 
                                                 
348 Certainly there are distinctions between Roman Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox views on 
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then, easing back into these societal practices.351  St. Basil believed in an even lengthier 
time of absolution suggesting three years until the reception of Holy Communion.352 
What specific practices353 would be mandated today?354  Kinghorn notes by way of a 
footnote practices outlined in the Old Testament for practicing penitence355 such as the 
rites of purification, appropriation of booty, construction of monuments, ritual 
processions, and corporate laments.356   
And finally, the language of “medical model” and “social contexts” in Kinghorn’s 
account points toward the fruitfulness of a conversation between Kinghorn’s work and 
theological reflection on disability.  Kinghorn appreciates the language Shay uses to 
carve out the space needed to describe moral injury as a disability,  “when the injury 
invades character, and the capacity for social trust is destroyed, all possibility of a 
flourishing human life is lost.”357 Disability studies has wrestled with the same questions 
regarding the inadequacy of medicalization and the inability of a broader social matrix to 
fully encompass issues raised in disability.   
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353 A famous editorial in Christian Century following World War II pondered why “Penitence Absent form 
Wartime Prayers” and pleaded with the nation and her religious leaders to have humility in understanding 
the gravity of what all had been through.  “Penitence Absent From Wartime Prayers,” Christian Century 
62:16 (April 18, 1945): 485. 
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357 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 151.  To be clear, at this point Shay is writing in Achilles in Vietnam prior to 
his full description of moral injury that will be developed in his later work. 
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 “Souls in anguish”358 is the starting point, according to Rita Nakashima Brock, for 
drawing moral injury into the field of Theology.  Kinghorn, instead, looks to the end, the 
telos of human flourishing making meaning out of suffering within the context of a 
healing, penitential community.  As we turn to the work of Robert Emmet Meagher, we 
will engage his efforts to address the complexity of the landscape in between as he 
explores the question: how can moral injury exist if wars have passed the Just War 
criteria? While it is beyond the bounds of this study to fully assess and critique Just War 
theory, his account is essential for probing theological assumptions for moral injury. 
 
2.3.1.3  Robert Emmet Meagher 
In his book, Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and Just War, Theologian 
Robert Emmet Meagher questions the legacy, the legitimacy and the limits of Just War 
theory, particularly as it relates to questions of moral injury.  Meagher is both an 
academic and activist.  Killing from the Inside Out is a follow up to his 2006 work 
Herakles Gone Mad: Rethinking Heroism in an Age of Endless War.  Meager works 
directly with wounded veterans and participated in the highly acclaimed National Truth 
Commission on Conscience in War. Killing from the Inside Out is an exposition of 
Christianity’s complacency in suggesting the possibility of war “without” – “war without 
sin, war without criminality, war without guilt or shame.”359  The lie Christianity 
promised was war without losing one’s soul.360 Perhaps Meagher is too overstated in 
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suggesting Just War theory concludes there can be war without consequence,361 but he 
makes a compelling argument that moral injury is inevitable unless we reject Just War 
theory.  In so doing, Meagher makes a compelling argument that the philosophical and 
theological framework of Just War contributes in a significant way to the moral injuries 
of soldiers today in providing “moral” justifications for potentially immoral wars. To 
understand his work it is necessary to comprehend his conceptualization of moral injury 
and then consider a brief history of Just War Theory he reviews and then critiques. 
Meagher defines moral injury as “the violation, by oneself or another, of a 
personally embedded moral code or value resulting in deep injury to the psyche or 
soul.”362 This seemingly simple definition contains five elements that interact over time 
and space, particularly in moments of crisis and stress.  These components are:    
- an act (violation) 
- a person (either self or other) 
- a pre-existing state (moral code or value) 
- a change (result), and  
- an impairment (damage to the psyche or soul).  
As we continue to dig deeper into the phenomenon of moral injury, two things will 
become clear.  First, there is an interaction of these five elements over the course of a 
lifetime that is not by definition linear.  And second, scholars and soldiers alike will 
disagree on what constitutes the exact nature of each of these elements. 
                                                 
361 In their article “Growing Edges of Just War Theory: Jus ante bellum, jus post bellum, and Imperfect 
Justice,” Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright acknowledge the complexity and imperfections of Just 
War Theory in contemporary society.  They advocate notions of John Langan’s “Imperfect justice” and 
Paul Ramsey’s “Justified war” to adjust moral thinking and expectations in the face of war.  They present a 
four-fold schema outlining: a perfectly just war, an imperfectly just war, an unjust war, and a perfectly 
unjust war.  See:  Mark J. Allman and Tobias L. Winright, “Growing Edges of Just War Theory: Jus ante 
bellum, jus post bellum, and Imperfect Justice,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 32:2 (Fall/Winter 
2012): 173-191.  Also see: John Howard Yoder, When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking, 
2nd. Ed. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996); and: John Langan, SJ, “An Imperfectly Just War,” 
Commonweal 118:1 (June 1, 1991); and also: Paul Ramsey, War and The Christian Conscience How Shall 
Wars Be Conducted Justly? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1961.) 
362 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, xvi-xvii. 
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The complex interaction between these elements does not occur within a 
particular boundary, but can unfold over a lifetime as distance, space and conscience 
allow moments of reflection.  Meagher notes the reflection of Timothy Kudo who was 
unable to process actions that occurred during war because “We were simply too busy to 
worry about the morality of what we were doing.”363 In the essay, Kudo questions which 
is more difficult to endure upon return from war: “the ethical damage” or “the physical 
injuries we sustain.”364  For Meagher, the internalized ethical damage that has different 
contours than a physical injury is the impetus behind the name of his study “Killing from 
the inside out.”365   His fivefold schema assists in delineating the arenas of morality and 
the affective injuries all of which interplay within real limits. 
 While Meagher maintains the language of injury for the purposes of his argument,  
his fivefold schema furthers the conversation in suggesting the limits of human agency 
(actions), humanity itself (person), and morality (moral code) when limits are met in 
these three areas in a moment of critical change, a permanent consequence results.  The 
paradox at the heart of moral injury is that “injury” is realized because of a hyper 
“clarity” – an acute awareness within a critical moment of a limit.  Meagher explains, 
“Captain Kudo, far from succumbing to moral confusion, has come to a moral clarity.”366  
If that is the case, clarity has not been injured.  Instead, clarity reveals a limit reached and 
then transgressed. 
                                                 
363 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, xvii.  Meagher cites here Timothy Kudo “I Killed People in 
Afghanistan. Was I Right or Wrong?”  Washington Post, January 25, 2013.  
364 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, xvi. 
365 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, xiii. 
366 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, xviii. 
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 The second trajectory of Meagher’s book, Just War Theory, explores the history 
behind the tradition’s attempt to provide moral clarity prior to and during war.  Before 
exploring the impact of Augustine and Ambrose on crafting a theory of Just War, 
Meagher begins in Ancient Greece to explore the beginnings of the “Western way of 
war”367 through the ancient Greek epics of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey.368 Meagher’s 
purpose for exploring these epics is not simply to recount the stories, nor to draw on 
Homer’s account as someone who “understands,”369 but instead to explore the 
relationship between the rituals of sexuality and warfare.370  War, according to Meagher, 
is not unlike necrophilia371 and the dynamics of foreplay, erotic hunger, rape, raging 
desire, fury, climax, and longing again.372  Meagher explains the use of the Greek word 
meignumi which means “to join” or “to mingle.”  He writes meignumi was “used to 
denote both intercourse in battle and intercourse in bed.”  The Greek twins Hypnos 
(sleep) and Thanatos (death) followed both.373  Meagher’s chapter on Ancient Greece is a 
strange prelude for the Just War Theory to follow, but does raise interesting questions 
related to the moral injury he presents in the first chapter.  The ancient Greeks understood 
                                                 
367 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 16. 
368 Meagher’s use of Homer’s The Iliad is certainly an acknowledgment of the most quintessential war 
story ever told and its impact on warriors through the centuries to validate, lament and bear witness.  
However, Meagher’s particular take on Ancient Greece is to show the interconnectedness of love and war, 
violence and sexuality.  Meagher is bold in describing the pornographic elements of combat alongside a 
conception of war as necrophilia.  See: Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 16-33.  On the other hand, 
Shay draws on Homer’s character of Achilles in The Illiad to both structure the entirety of his argument as 
well a to depict what elements of warfare Homer omitted in his epic.  Shay draws on themes from Homer to 
structure his chapters on betrayal, the moral horizon, the grief of a lost comrade, guilt, wrongful 
substitution, the berserk state, and dishonoring the enemy.  All of these themes culminate as Shay explores 
the breaking point of moral existence and whether or not healing and recovery is possible.  See: Shay, 
Achilles in Vietnam.  
369 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 17. 
370 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 31. 
371 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 33. 
372 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 31. 
373 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 31. 
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sleep and/or death followed the fury of war, but what happens when the morally injured 
live in the disorienting twilight between the two? 
 Meagher also probes the Greek tragedies for insights into the relationship between 
human agency and responsibility374 drawing on excerpts from Oedipus the King and 
Christian Scriptures.  Meagher uses the example of Oedipus to question whether 
accountability is necessary if someone “sinned” without intentionality or knowledge.375  
Sophocles makes the claim that Oedipus is accountable for his actions, because the 
actions are what remain at the end for all to see.  Even if an action is unintentional or 
done without full knowledge, Oedipus and others are to be held to judgment.  The Greeks 
understood actions with grievous consequences as “pollution” (miasma) in need of 
“purification” (catharsis).376  Polluting crimes may be acts of commission, acts of 
omission (or done without full knowledge or intention) and also, what Meagher deems 
“metaphysical crimes” that can just “happen to you.”377  Meagher turns here from 
Ancient Greece and Rome378 to the early Christian scriptures to unpack the relationship 
                                                 
374 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 47. 
375 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 35.  Jonathan Shay addresses the story of Oedipus in a footnote to 
illuminate “the fatal conflict of two valid claims.” While spectators may be able to see other possibilities 
within a situation, the tragedy made real in the Greek poets is the moral impossibility of two tragic choices 
within a given conflict.  See:  Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 214n.9. 
376 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 42. 
377 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 41.  Here, Meagher appears to draw the plight of Vietnam Vets 
into the category of “metaphysical crimes” that just happen to you given the context into which you were 
drawn.  Much like Nussbaum’s category of “moral luck”, metaphysical crimes are unintentional and 
heavily dependent on context and situational circumstances. 
378 For a discussion of human agency, virtue and morality in Ancient Rome, see:  Jennifer Herdt, Putting on 
Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2008). Augustine’s 
thought that Pagan virtues were nothing but “splendid vices” led Herdt to the pursuit of the questions raised 
in this book regarding “putting on virtue” as being a vice in and of itself.  She notes well the irony in the 
tradition – that virtue seems to imply authenticity first and foremost.  But, if virtue is habitualized and 
learned over time, then certainly there are times when virtue is “put on” and practiced (25).  Herdt 
maintains an Augustinian conception of virtue while reworking his legacy around the splendid vices.  Herdt 
advocates here a view of humanity that is both truly fallen, as well as in the process of being redeemed in 
an ongoing fashion.  With this view, she believes habituation matters (25). The church has not, and will 
never, do that process perfectly.  However, we yield to that process and even more so, the redeeming grace 
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between agency and accountability described by Jesus in the Gospels.  Meagher argues 
these scriptural injunctions are difficult to “challenge”379 because of their foundational 
nature.  And yet, Meagher goes on to wonder about the impact of texts like Matthew 
15:17-20 where “pollution” that occurs through sinful acts are only able to be determined 
by God who alone sees the work of the hands as well as the intentions of the heart.380  
Meagher believes distinctions such as the questions of internal intent, even the act of 
forgiveness given by Jesus to his killers who said “they know not what they do”, become 
entry points for the development of Just War Theory since “all sin, even the murder of 
God, can be forgiven.”381  In this exploration of human agency and accountability, 
Meagher poses the question by asking if “purity of heart” is perhaps even more 
dangerous for the development of Just War Theory.382 
 Prior to the conversion of Constantine, Meagher makes the case that Christian 
pacifism383 was widely accepted given the nonviolent orientation of Jesus and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of God.  In so doing, we relinquish any control of our own and yield to the stark dependency we have on 
God alone.  At stake here for Herdt is the possibility of division, alongside hypocrisy, how do we go 
through the habitual process of “putting on virtue” while at the same time being ever newly transformed by 
the grace and mercy of God?  She advocates no division, but a singular mystery amid the ordinary 
processes of life.  In her chapter on Augustine, she is concerned with two aspects of his legacy.  First, the 
inner wrestling between Christian mimesis (that tries on virtue) alongside the problematic that creates for 
virtue and formation.  In addition, she wants to transform how the tradition has understood his disposition 
toward the splendid vices and retrieve them as possibilities for formation today (45-46).  For Herdt, 
Aristotle tries to make the distinction between virtue and hypocrisy by his acknowledgement of the inner 
motive of the person in trying to be good, rather than just appearing to be good.  Aquinas is helpful to her 
project in his acceptance, rather than rejection, of pagan virtues as possibilities for the good.  Also see: 
James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
Here, Wetzel seeks a deeper understanding of Augustine’s concept of the will, and God’s grace in response 
to that will, as a limit of virtue. Also see: Darlene Fozard Weaver, “Double Agents: Persons and Moral 
Change in Jennifer Herdt’s ‘Putting on Virtue’” Journal of Religious Ethics 41:4 (2013): 710-726. 
379 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 47. 
380 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 49. 
381 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 49. 
382 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 49. 
383 For example, see Origen, Contra Celsus, VIII 73.  Here, Origen argues that Christians do not go to 
battle, nor do they serve the emperor. Instead, they fight using different weapons “by raising a special army 
of piety through our petition to God.” 
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beatitude “Blessed are the peacemakers” (Matthew 5:9).384  Meagher suggests that 
pacifism was more supported through Christian scripture than the argument for clergy 
celibacy.  However both killing and sexuality were seen as “polluting” actions 
undesirable for the holiest Christian life.385  While there were movements prior to 
Constantine to legitimize Christian violence through proof-texting, the general consensus 
supported the pacifist nature of Jesus who discredited use of force.  Those who took the 
oath of military service to the Roman army repeated the words to the sacramentum 
swearing allegiance to the emperor.386  Christianity transforms the sacramentum from an 
oath made to the great “high priest of the Roman state religion”387 to the language of the 
holiest element of Christianity: the sacraments of Baptism and Communion where wholly 
other oaths and promises are made. 
 The conversion of Constantine and his subsequent profession of faith radically 
challenged all prior assertions, particularly those related to war and killing.  Meagher 
explains, “Until the fourth century a Christian empire was an oxymoron.  Now it was a 
challenge.  However unthinkable it was to imagine a Christian army, it was even more of 
a stretch to entertain the idea of a nonviolent empire.”388  How would theologians provide 
justification for killing in the name of the empire?  Meagher credits Ambrose of Milan 
and Augustine of Hippo with doing just that.  Ambrose extrapolated on the courage of 
                                                 
384 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 66.   
385 See for example: Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early 
Christianity (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988). Brown explores concerns in the early 
church related to sexuality, celibacy, virginity and how Christian views of the body shaped early society.  
Of interest to Meagher is Brown’s claim that human frailty shifts from death to sex and this has deep 
effects on how we understand Jesus, the early apostles, leaders in the church and the hierarchy between 
those who were celibate and those who were not. 
386 Meagher Killing from the Inside Out, 59.  Tertullian describes this in On Idolatry, 19.315. 
387 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 59. 
388 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 71. 
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Moses, Joshua and David who discovered strength in battle for justice.  For Ambrose, the 
dimension of “justice” proved decisive as to whether or not a battle proved disgraceful: 
“fortitude without justice is the source of wickedness.  For the stronger it is, the more 
ready it is to crush the weaker, whilst in matters of war one ought to see whether the war 
is just or unjust.”389 Wars fought for the justice of God and/or for the just defense of 
one’s civil life were proper and acceptable.  Both Ambrose and Augustine found liberal 
freedom in scriptural interpretation, far from literal readings, even when those 
interpretations appeared ridiculous.  Consider for example, Meagher urges, how 
Augustine’s exegesis of the famous Gospel text “turn the other cheek,”390 transformed 
these words, so now, “these precepts pertain rather to the inward disposition of the 
heart.”391  So, Augustine subjugates the physical demonstration of turning the other cheek 
to the internal disposition of peace and charity, even if the outward action is anything but 
charitable.  For Augustine, this exegetical move was made possible by both an exegetical 
approach to scripture that the spirit gives life, and the letter of the law kills, but also by 
his understanding of the brokenness of the world given its fallen state.392  Meagher argues 
a growing gulf between agency and accountability occurred as theologians sequestered 
“inward disposition” as a validation for committing heinous acts of war for the empire   
Even stranger than these exegetical moves, Meagher argues, is the belief of 
Augustine that “killing in war could be dispassionate, free of anger, hatred, range, 
                                                 
389 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 72.  See: Ambrose, Duties of the Clergy I.35.176 and I.41.211. 
390 Matthew 5:39, Luke 6:29. 
391 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 74.  Augustine, Letters (NPNF), 138.2.13.  
392 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 75. 
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revenge, and thrill.”393  Here are the roots of a war “without” consequence, a war without 
even the consequence of a wounded soul or a moral injury.  Both Ambrose and Augustine 
legitimized war, but only with the mandate of a sovereign authority.394 Meagher describes 
the church at this time as having “a pacifist lump in their throat”395 that allowed the 
institutional church to send their young men to war without subjecting their own selves to 
its horrors.  Christianity aided and abetted sending young men off with “a clear 
conscience” given the legitimizing moral authority of the governing power.396  Upon 
return, the pollution of war required penance, perhaps even the possibility of abstinence 
from the sacramentum of the church,397 even though the sacramentum of the military 
oath prevailed.   
 Medieval theologian Peter Abelard echoed Augustine and Ambrose in accepting 
inner disposition as primary over evil deeds.  Abelard argues, “God alone pays attention 
not so much to the deeds that are done as to the mind with which they are done [and] is 
truly thinking about the guilt in our intention.”398  The pinnacle of Medieval 
Christianity’s attitude toward war concludes with Thomas Aquinas who famously listed 
three conditions for war’s acceptance and overall justice:   
1. Declaration of war by a legitimate sovereign authority; 
2. For the sake of a just cause; 
                                                 
393 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 80. 
394 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 79. 
395 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 85. 
396 Meaghter, Killing from the Inside Out, 85. 
397 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 85. 
398 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 92.  Abelard, Ethical Writings, I.84. The passage continues: 
“Thus he is called the tester of the heart and the reins, and is said to see in darkness.  For where no one 
sees, there he sees most of all, because in punishing sin he doesn’t pay attention to the deed but to the mind, 
just as conversely we don’t pay attention to the mind that we don’t see but to the deed we know. 
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3. Always done with right intention – toward peace, punishing evil, and/or 
uplifting the good.399 
It is useful here to compare these three petitions for “authority”, “rightness” and the “high 
stakes” pursuit of peace and punishment of evil with Shay’s three petitions for the 
qualification of a moral injury:  “Betrayal of what is right by a person in authority in a 
high stakes situation.” In his acclaimed book Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and 
the Undoing of Character, Shay does not engage a conversation with either Just War 
Theory nor with Ambrose, Augustine, Abelard or Aquinas.  However, the language is 
strikingly similar.  Is Shay’s definition of moral injury a blatant or latent reminder of the 
power and perseverance of this long-standing legitimizing theory of war?  Meagher notes 
the the discrepancy between the presumption of just war theory and a concern for those 
who experience moral injury:  “with the Thomistic doctrine of just war in place, the 
church had little to say that was helpful to those who returned from a sanctioned war in 
moral pain.”400  And, with practices of penance in slowly growing disregard during the 
medieval period, public penance and the possibility of healing turns inward to “phantom 
pain”401 now invisible to others causing grief to remain that no longer has an outlet nor an 
end. 
 Meagher is clear in his assessment:  Just war must die.402  And, the church must 
do an “autopsy” to understand how the good news of the gospel became perverted 
through a legitimizing empire.  While Meagher notes solitary voices of dissent with a 
                                                 
399 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, Question 40. 
400 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 106. 
401 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 106. 
402 Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 129. 
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hope for a retrieval of pacifism, the systemic norm still avows Just War.403  Though the 
theory of Just War in its totality is one that Meagher would like to disarm, even more so, 
contemporary warfare in the age of machine guns and civilian arenas, no longer matches 
the rules of proportionality and fair play that Just War espouses.404  Because the church 
continues the lie of Just Warfare theory, soldiers, citizens and societies are prevented 
from entering the potential spiritual journey of the dark night of the soul to wrestle with 
warfare’s demons and corrupting pollution.405  Souls and societies instead languish 
without the spiritual resources necessary to engage the deepest questions of humanity, sin 
and Christian faith.  Meagher makes the bold claim that Just War must die and the pursuit 
of pacifism must be reignited, however, he does little to offer constructive discourse on 
healing from moral injury.  This neglect comes with a cost.  Meagher lays out well the 
interconnectedness between hyper-masculine sexuality, Just War and moral injury.  And 
he sets forth the complacency and interconnectedness of church and state in espousing 
criteria for war that are just, and even in the overlapping arenas of the sacramentum – 
those pledges to emperor in the court, and through Christ at the communion table.  
Because of these intersecting spheres of life – government, family, sexuality, work, 
military, personal faith, institutional church, and civic life – healing from moral injury 
requires more than the death of a theory, and even more so new life within every sphere 
of life that has been harmed by its legacy. 
2.3.1.4  Brian S. Powers 
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While Robert Meagher argues that the conceptualization of an “inward 
disposition” allowed soldiers in a Christian empire to go to war, Theologian and Veteran 
Brian S. Powers looks not within, but outward toward “disordered goods” as a cause of 
moral injury.406  Powers’ explanation of “disordered goods” is based on an Augustinian 
framework wherein the agency of humanity can be radically redirected by the powerful 
tug of external forces that can further distort our own values.  Moral injury then is 
relocated from a problem lodged within the soul of a soldier to a systemic societal 
problem. Powers critiques Shay and Litz for failing to name the “twisted and 
distorted…axiological universe of the military endeavor.”407  These larger forces distort 
the potency of human agency.  Powers understands examines agency in light of the 
Augustinian conception of “human willing;” human willing becomes morally injured 
when it becomes distorted by the outward tug of forces beyond its own will.  In so doing, 
Powers radically redefines moral injury beyond the conceptualizations of Shay, Litz and 
Meagher.  Powers contends that moral injury is “the realization that one’s moral 
orientation, to which one commits his or her willing, is aligned toward a ‘good’ that is 
ultimately false.”408 Such a definition introduces wholly new language and concepts 
involving orientation, the will, alignment and falsehood.  Instead of an inward hurt of a 
moral code, Powers’ definition redirects thinking toward “pursuit of distorted and 
poisoned moral goods.”409  Powers pushes us to consider social forces at play in moral 
                                                 
406 Brian S. Powers, ““Moral injury and original sin: The applicability of Augustinian moral psychology in 
light of combat trauma,” Theology Today 73(4): 325. 
407 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 326. 
408 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 327. 
409 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 327. 
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injury to comprehend the way in which moral injury is “socially constituted” not solely 
by a soldier’s actions, but by the larger “axiological universe”410 of social dynamics. 
To make the Augustinian viewpoint perfectly clear, Powers extrapolates the 
“moral autonomy”411 suggested by Pelagius that is wholly other than the enslavement to 
original sin presented by Augustine.  Original sin, foreign to Pelagius, exists congenitally 
for Augustine.412  Human will, the center point of agency, is not capable of a truly 
morally good choice because it is bound to sin. Augustine believed Pelagius too highly 
prioritized agency. Pelagius differs from Augustine in presuming that human agency is 
able to will the good, despite human tendencies toward sin.413  The will then, for 
Augustine, is not a place of fully free choice, but instead “a modality in which human 
agency takes place.”414 While Pelagius believed the will could overcome and act 
independently both on its own accord as well as outside of socially conditioning 
factors,415 Augustine argued otherwise.  Humans no longer have the ability to “will 
rightly”416 or to pursue “that which is truly good.”417  Instead, we tend to pursue “tribal 
                                                 
410 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 326. 
411 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 328. 
412 So true is this fact, that one reason Augustine believes in original sin is because of congenital 
deformities in children. For example see: Augustine, Contra Julianum, I.6.24, Contra Julianum opus 
Imperfectum, 1.39 and also, De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali, 2.20.22.   Regarding passing on sin 
congenitally through Adam, see: Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. 
Dyson (New York, NY: Cambridge Press, 1998), 13:3 
413 Pelagius writes, our capacity to make good and moral choices ‘‘makes the good part better by making it 
voluntary and independent, not bound by necessity but free to decide for itself.’’  See: Pelagius, ‘‘To 
Demetrias’’ in The Letters of Pelagius and His Followers, ed and trans by B. R. Rees (Rochester, NY: 
Boydell, 1991), 3.2. 
414 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 330. 
415 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 329. For a description of Pelagian views on sin see: Alistair 
McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (New York: Cambridge, 
2000), 170. 
416 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 328. 
417 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 328. 
  108
goods”418 based on a distortion of the social good that happens through original and 
institutional sin.419   
 Augustine paints a fascinating picture as he foretells Adam’s fall in the Garden of 
Eden with a description of celestial angels who run astray.  With their wills oriented 
toward “disordered goods” they dismiss the goodness of God and pursue their own “tribal 
goods.”420 Sin then, for Augustine, is both the responsibility of an individual whose will 
has gone astray, and also the collective responsibility of a larger matrix with the 
potentiality to distort perceptions of value and goodness.421  Powers draws on his military 
experience to describe the particular way in which individual willing is subjected to the 
larger system of military authority, wherein individual agency yields to a larger 
hierarchy.  Powers makes clear a subtle distinction between the “unraveling of agency” 
that occurs through trauma422 and the “co-opted willing” of military life.423 
 These shifts in orientation regarding the nature of moral injury as “co-opted 
willing” toward a systemic “disordered good” creates, according to Powers, three 
strategic benefits.  First, Powers argues this shift allows a more unified treatment of 
                                                 
418 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 328. 
419 Darlene Fozard Weaver offers a review of key recent works in religious ethics on individual and 
institutional sin in “How Sin Works: A Review Essay,” Journal of Religious Ethics 29:3 (2001): 473-501.  
Here, she notes the work of Andrew Sung Park, The Wounded Heart of God: The Asian Concept of Han 
and the Christian Doctrine of Sin (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1993).  Park contends that even a 
doctrine of sin, in and of itself, can be sinful because it ignores the concept of han which Park understands 
as suffering. For Park, the doctrine of sin can all too easily collapse acts of sin into the suffering of sin.  
420 For a fuller description of this in Augustine see:  Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. 
and trans. R.W. Dyson (New York, NY: Cambridge Press, 1998), 12.1.  Augustine’s original text states: 
“While some steadfastly continued in that which was the common good of all, namely, in God Himself, and 
in His eternity, truth and love; others, being enamored rather of their own power, as if they could be their 
own good, lapsed to this private good of their own.” 
421 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 330. 
422 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 335.  See also: Serene Jones, Trauma and Grace, 17-18.   
423 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 335.  See also: Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America, 47.   
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“acute and diffuse” moral injury.424  Second, Powers suggests this shift better understands 
codes of ethics within military life where there are “limited moral choices”425 rather than 
a broad array of possibilities.  A soldier’s moral choice is not unraveled, flattened or 
fragmented by their own choice, but by being co-opted within a larger system.426  Powers 
understands this betrayal of authority in a much broader, more institutional, sense than 
Shay’s personalization of betrayal.  Finally, Powers argues the binary nature of “good” 
and “bad” is removed by the shift, providing some necessary “breathing room” for the 
veteran to contemplate the matrix within which one had to make the moral choice.427  
Powers’ argument succeeds in balancing human responsibility as a willing personal agent 
alongside the matrix of limited choices and distorted goods within the military complex. 
 Applying Augustinian theology to moral injury provides several helpful conduits 
to explore.  Augustinian notions of original sin complicate clear and easy 
conceptualizations of ‘morality’ that can too easily pervade in public discourse.  
Acknowledging the larger matrices of systems and their tendency toward or against 
morality is helpful recourse in understanding the locus of an injury as larger than a 
veteran’s soul.  A consideration of “goodness” and the “goods” we pursue adds, perhaps, 
a sixth dimension to Meagher’s five-fold paradigm of moral injury that neglects a 
trajectory to outward goods. Powers’ inclusion of the pursuit of “distorted goods” adds a 
helpful nuance to previous definitions. 
2.3.2 Critical Analysis of the Theological Discourse 
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 Scholars, Pastors, Psychiatrists and Sociologists have certainly navigated the 
terrain of Moral injury laying out its dimensions, scope, repercussions and demands for 
treatment and support.  Within the depth and breadth of their thoughtful attention, key 
lines of argument emerge from the theological reflection that build and expand on themes 
presented in the concerns presented by the psychological scholarship.  Those themes of 
morality, injury and disability are revisited here with further critique. Before turning in 
the following chapter to models of disability and the work of Deborah Creamer, in this 
section I will highlight three concerns evidenced in the theological scholarship on Moral 
injury: the predicament of medicalization and physical embodiment; the problem of 
societal complacency; and the theological questions raised when limits are encountered 
across fluid contexts. These lingering areas of focus are important to address because 
they reverberate with medical, social and theological repercussions regarding the limits of 
war and its aftermath on human individuals. 
 
2.3.2.1  The Problem of Embodiment and Medical Connotations 
A critical concern in the scholarship on Moral injury, as well as its all too 
simplified conflation with PTSD, is a critique of the hyper-medicalized approach to 
treatment when presenting symptoms are described. The medical world can all too easily 
disintegrate into mechanized views of the body that separate muscle, breath and flesh 
from morality, soul and life.428  Lost in this hyper-mechanized account are many deep 
issues: for example, a robust conceptualization of what it means to be human, an 
                                                 
428 Shay makes note of this as well as he describes the impact of “dramatic successes” in medicine on our 
expectations and paradigms regarding what kind of healing may or may not be possible.  Shay, Achilles in 
Vietnam, 185. 
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understanding of trauma and its encodement into the body,429 a probing conversation 
regarding the limits of technology, and a deep reflection on the proper aim of the medical 
craft. Kinghorn is clearest in his critique of “the medical model and the means-end logic 
of techne”430 whereby psychiatrists and psychologists are the soul care-providers to the 
morally injured. The assumption of their work is an absolute end to suffering without 
questioning if there is any meaningful suffering possible. 
Conversation partners Kinghorn engages in this discussion range from Aristotle to 
Joseph Dunne and Gerald McKenny to wrestle with the question: can suffering be healed 
by medical technique?431  Kinghorn argues that a psychological approach such as Litz’s 
assumes suffering must end.  But with a turn to theology and the Christian narrative, 
there can be a redemptive turn within suffering that provides meaning and sense-making 
amid trauma.  To make this point clear, Kinghorn turns to the work of philosopher Joseph 
Dunne who questions scientific assumptions in the practices of psychotherapy and 
medicine by reappropriating Aristotle’s thoughts on techne and phroenesis.  In simple 
terms, Aristotle describes techne as the ability “to make” and phroenesis as the ability “to 
act.”432 Making, for Aristotle, is directed toward “an end other than itself”433 while acting 
does not, phroenesis then is its own end.  With techne, there is always a final product in 
mind as the technician “fixes his gaze and increases or releases the tension 
accordingly.”434  This begs the question then, to what exactly is the gaze fixed? Dunne 
                                                 
429 Bessel van der Kolk, When The Body Keeps the Score, (London, UK: Penguin Publishing, 2015). 
430 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 57. 
431 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 66. 
432See, for example: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a2-5 and 1140b1-4. 
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argues against easy technical solutions to what appear to be technical problems and 
invites alternative teleological ends to be considered.435  
 Theologian and Bioethicist Gerald P. McKenny builds on the work of Aristotle 
and Dunne as he questions assumptions of modern bioethical claims to minimize 
suffering and maximize choice.436 The problem with bioethics today is an avoidance of 
analyzing these deeply held beliefs that prevents an articulation for alterative potential 
values for suffering. If the relief of suffering is removed as the teleological end of 
medical treatment, what could be imagined as another potential telos?  While Kinghorn 
briefly explores Aristotle, Donne and McKenny, perhaps an additional helpful 
conversation partner would be Michel Foucault and his analysis of “bio-power.”437 
Foucault argues that “bio-power” is operative through an overriding narrative presenting 
a normative view of human life and ability.  Under this narrative, human being itself 
becomes a means to an end, with the end being a social conceptualization of normalcy. 
Bio-power operates within a perception that it expands choices and therefore limits 
suffering, but because bio-power is a tool used toward societal ends, instead it increases 
                                                 
435 Kinghorn, “Combat Trauma,” 65. For Joseph Dunne, there is a distinction between techne and 
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Rough Ground: Practical Judgment and the Lure of Technique (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University 
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suffering and limits choices.438 Bio-power aids political structures and societal norms, at 
the expense of human lives for example, in suggesting disability must be eliminated 
because it causes suffering instead of imagining alternative narratives and medical 
possibilities.439   
In addition to Foucault, Kinghorn would benefit from conversation with 
Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s and her work “Giving the Body Its Due,” 
where she argues for a new metaphysics of the body to replace the “imbalance created by 
Cartesian dualism.”440  This new metaphysics would replace the objectified, 
disassociated, compartmentalized and thoroughly dissected view of the body that 
dominates Western medical treatment suggesting all “injuries” may be treated by medical 
applications, pharmaceutical products and the latest technological advancements and 
suggests instead a new metaphysics is needed in the twenty-first century.441   Trauma in 
the old metaphysics is subjected to the rationality of cognition as if “the body [was] drone 
to an all-powerful, rational mind”442 rather than a metaphysics with a deeper sensibility of 
embodiment and full-bodied humanity.  Stress in the body is treated by anti-anxiety 
medications, rather than attention to grief that becomes “fossilized” within the layers of 
the body.443  Sheets-Johnstone articulates poetically, “The way to health in present-day 
Western medicine is not by invocation but by ingestion.”444  Over time, disease became 
disassociated from the larger body and reduced to isolated locations within a materialist 
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conceptualization of the body rather than understanding the nexus of disease within the 
wider systems of the body.  In the face of this compartmentalization, Sheets-Johnstone 
argues for a “corporeal turn”445 in medicine that rights the imbalance, gives the body its 
due, and honors the truth of experience that becomes embedded within a body. 
Sheets-Johnstone invites deeper reflection on embodiment with an eye toward 
“giving the body its due” and self-reflection on medical models that err on mechanized 
views of the body.  Is it possible that theology and Christianity, perhaps at times, have 
maintained mechanistic views of death?  This is the question asked by Kent Drescher:  
The development of moral injury in the psychological literature can be 
interpreted as suggesting that the medicalization of psychological trauma—
embodied in both the diagnosis of PTSD as a mental illness, as well as in the 
treatment of PTSD as a fear-based disorder—is a simplification of what it means 
to survive a traumatic event. The construct of moral injury points to the need for 
much more complex conceptualizations of suffering in the wake of trauma, 
including traumatic acts that one may have perpetrated. Morally injurious 
trauma of this type presents survivors with the inescapable task of 
accommodating death into their life narrative. In the dominant cultures of 
medicine and Christianity, death is something to be conquered, not something 
that is permitted to remain. But it does remain for many who have survived 
trauma, and psychotherapies and theologies that fail to make room for this 
remainder will prove too shallow to accommodate the depths of human 
suffering.446 
 
What becomes embodied in Drescher’s account is not only the morally injurious event, 
but the encounter with death itself.  For Sheets-Johnstone, this encounter with death, as 
well as encounters with situations of ongoing anxiety producing stress, result in the 
fossilization of trauma within the body creating a “tonic immobility”447 where a chasm is 
created between the body and its ability to heal itself.  In the face of these death 
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encounters, there is a “continually aborted grief”448 that creates a space for the 
recapitulation of past traumatic events in daily life.  Medical treatment is not the answer 
for this embodied grief, instead, the corporeal turn may only occur through ritual.449  
Ritual allows what German poet Rainer Maria Rilke calls “the life…unlived”450 of our 
bodies to gain life, voice, expression, credence and honor.  Reclaiming the “living sense 
of the body” which has been suppressed through western medicine will allow healing and 
greater sense making.451 Instead of progressive fragmentation and isolation of pain within 
the body, corporeal reflection realized in ritual, will bring completion to the “continually 
aborted grief.”  In addition, the cultural history enfleshed and embedded within our 
bodies will bear witness to a story greater than our own choices.452  Our bodies, by means 
of this corporeal turn, will be recognized for the greater societal trauma embedded in 
sinew, heart, mind and spirit. 
 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone looks beyond western culture for insights on disease, 
healing and trauma; her book includes essays from a multiplicity of global perspectives. 
Japanese philosopher Yasuo Yuasa proposes a wholly other body scheme than the typical 
Western Cartesian dualism.453  Yuasa envisions four circuits that are not self-sufficient 
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systems, but instead are integrated in ways we can only begin to understand.  They 
include: the neurophysiological, the kinesthetic, the psychological and the emotional-
instinctual.454  In this schema, knowledge is gained through the body not by way of the 
intellect.  Even more so, the four-fold schema works together to produce a certain “ki-
energy” that can be disrupted when there is trauma to one portion of the quartet.  Is it 
possible then, for us to imagine, a disruption to the moral code embedded in one of these 
four circuits within the body?  And if so, what exponential effect might that disruption 
have on the larger systems and the ki-energy, as Yasua, suggests?   
 Recognizing the challenge to traditional medical, and even psychological, 
treatments, a 2016 team of scholars, of which Drescher is a part, suggests several 
alternative therapies.  With an eye to complementary and alternative medicine (CAM), 
these scholars remain committed to “holism, empowerment, access, legitimacy, and 
health, as opposed to sickness.”455  Their study assumes a disconnect within traditional 
treatments and argues for alternative therapies including: Adaptive Disclosure (AD), 
Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT).  In light of these advances, the team of scholars advocates a support mechanism 
other than these “alternative” treatments.  Despite their turn away from medicalization 
and the metaphysics of Descartes, these avenues for treatment are still not enough.  They 
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suggest spiritual care through ongoing pastoral counseling as a necessary component to 
the success beyond any of these treatments alone.456 
 Sheets-Johnstone, Kent Drescher, Yasuo Yuasa, and the team of scholars in the 
2016 study led by Marek Kopacz identify the inability of a purely “medical model” to 
address the wound behind moral injury.  According to Sheets-Johnstone, medical 
treatment needs a “corporeal turn” to reclaim a metaphysics of the body.   Kent Drescher 
argues space must be made in treatment for the narratives of death experienced in real-
time and then embedded for all time within the body.  And, the scholars led by Marek 
Kopacz identify the inability of medical and psychological treatment alone to tend to the 
many dimensions of moral injury, spiritual care (Reiki, prayer, rituals, etc.) is a necessary 
complement to any medical treatment.  In conclusion, let this be perfectly clear: a 
medical approach is insufficient for diagnosis, treatment and ongoing support of the 
morally injured veteran; their injury is deeper than any medical art can heal. 
 
 2.3.2.2 The Problem of Social Dimensions 
 Just as Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone prompts a shift in thinking 
beyond standard medical practices for moral injury to include larger considerations of 
embodiment, theological reflection prompts a shift from seeing the soldier and his or 
wounds as a singular, individual concern, but a more complex societal and institutional 
one. This shift raises serious matters: the often unjust social forces at play in creating the 
military457, the social distortion of “goods” pursued,458 the greater moral injury latent 
                                                 
456 Sheets-Johnstone, Giving the Body Its Due, 29. 
457 See for example: “Small Towns Absorb the Toll of War,” National Public Radio, February 20, 2007, 
http://www.npr.org; and “Military Recruitment 2008: A Look at Age, Race, Income and Education of New 
 
  118
within the larger society, the glaring lack of society’s inability to mourn and grieve war 
and loss, and the institutional sin of social power.459 These sizeable, consequential and 
hyper-complex topics should shoulder some of the ‘injury’ our veterans feel; but all too 
often, soldiers are left paralyzed by these greater structures at play in society.460  While 
the literature in review has addressed several critical themes, three additional notes will 
be addressed here regarding socially constituted bodies, social trauma461 and social grief. 
 
Social Injustice and Socially Constituted Bodies 
 A discussion of moral injury must attest to social forces that shape the military; 
forces often based on class, race and social location.  For some, voluntary enlistment 
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provides a paycheck, identity and career where otherwise impossible.  Recently, J.D. 
Vance wrote in his biography Hilbilly Elegy of the Marine Corps as his only escape from 
the poverty that entrenched his family system and limited his future possibilities.462  Rita 
Nakashima Brock’s opening chapter of Soul Repair “I Became a Soldier” frames the 
social injustice of military service.  For example, she notes:  
“The numbers are significant: almost three-fourths of U.S. troops in Iraq were 
from towns where per capita income fell below the national average.  Military 
recruiters, drive by quotas, work in offices found in poorer areas of cities, and 
new Army recruits come primarily from lower to middle class communities, 
southern states, and black, Hispanic and Asian communities, according to 
official U.S. Army data…. In neighborhoods with high crime levels or in 
unstable or abusive families, military service may offer greater safety and what 
one man termed, ‘three hots and a cot.”463 
 
Theologian, veteran and Dean at Boston University Pamela Lightsey spoke eloquently of 
the classism, racism, and sexism rampant within military recruitment in a 2016 lecture at 
The Chautauqua Institution in a week whose overarching theme was moral injury.464 
Lightsey draws on Judith Butler’s concept of “socially constituted bodies”465 to describe 
the poor, young,466 uneducated,467 racially divided body of military enlistees. War is not 
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the only violence these enlistees face, Lightsey claims, they face “national violence”468 
against them when the institutional sins of racism and classism injure them.  She argues,  
“We enter the military as “socially constituted bodies” and the moral injury faced in the 
military can have rippling effects across social contexts for generations. Lightsey notes 
the ongoing and continually unfolding social constitution of bodies: bodies are shaped 
socially prior to military engagement and they are shaped further by the social structures 
of the military and the call of service there.469   
Lightsey provides, to what she deems the nascent field of moral injury, the 
“complicating inquiry” of “social contexts” to complicate the landscape and language of 
the unfolding discussion.  She explains that, “Our social interactions help shape who we 
are, help shape our thoughts about our world, and how we comport ourselves daily.  This 
also means our perspectives about war are also impacted by our social contexts and also 
differ based on those contexts and our experiences in this world…. We can not talk about 
moral injury unless we acknowledge social context has some impact as well.” Lightsey is 
not only a veteran, her son Dweylon serves as well.  Their stories are featured in Brock’s 
Soul Repair470 and Lightsey serves on the Board of the Soul Repair Foundation.  Her 
lecture’s title may be named the “honorable discharge to dishonorable conditions”; 
however, her focus reveals the dishonorable structures of society revealed before, during 
and after military life that comport and distort human bodies, minds and souls. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.  Accessed December 5, 2017.  
Download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/Reports/2014-Demographics-Report.pdf  It should be noted 
that active duty officers have a substantially higher rate of education than the general population. 
468 Lightsey. “Honorably Discharged.”  
469 Lightsey. “Honorably Discharged.”  
470 See for example: Brock, Soul Repair, 8-12, 28-31, 57-60, 81-86. 
  121
Social trauma 
 Rita Nakashima Brock acknowledging the forces both Powers and Lightsey 
recognize are at play in our social fabric, adds an interesting twist to the social 
implications for moral injury in her current work, by suggesting larger trauma systemic in 
societal structures that have gone undiagnosed, untreated and whose latent grief and 
power have a gravitational pull we can only begin to imagine.  Brock’s background in 
trauma studies and her own familial history informed and directed her desire to draw 
theology into conversation with moral injury, in so doing, she greatly furthered the 
conversation and created both “The Soul Repair Center” as well as “The Truth 
Commission on Conscience in War.”  To further the conversation now, Brock believes a 
reckoning with larger systems of moral injury is key to addressing individual injury.  She 
writes: 
When an entire community has experienced moral injury, it must process its 
suffering or it can over-determine its identity and erupt as mistrust, toxic 
relationships, and suspicion of outsiders.  Communities that fail to address moral 
injury can also inflict it by losing themselves in a victim identity and being 
unable to see their own power and responsibility or the harm they cause.  Akin 
to a low grade fever, moral injury saps the energy for human flourishing, and it 
can erupt as a full-fledged life-threat when ordinary activities and life tasks fail 
to repress its invisible suffering….When and how it emerges in a life or a 
community is dependent upon how social and cultural meaning systems and 
taboos are enacted and how moral failures and traumas are processed.471 
 
While it may seem counter-productive to divert attention from individual trauma toward 
larger communities of the morally injured, Brock’s argument is clear.  To address moral 
injury at the micro level, it must be addressed socially on a macro level.  Doing so will 
require discernment and recognition, but even more so exploration of both the meaning 
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systems and how traumas are grieved and processed within communities as a whole.472 
Jonathan Shay argues for a “communalization of the trauma”473 that disrupts social 
conventions that work all too often to “deflect, deny, and forget trauma narratives.”474 
 As we continue to work through the Veterans’ Creed written by Judge John Reed 
for recitation at the Mercer Country Veterans’ Court, it should be noted that implied 
within the creed, though not explicitly stated, is an acknowledgement of shared trauma by 
the veterans.  When the creed is recited at each session of the Veterans’ Court, certainly 
the creed itself has meaning, but perhaps there is also an implied stress and grief that goes 
unnamed, but is understood amid the camaraderie. 
 
Social grief 
Political Theologian John Kiess invites a shift in thinking from complacency 
about war’s mentality to grief about war’s moral complexity and tragedy.  In his purview, 
a soldier’s private pain cannot be separated from a greater societal context. Just as 
standard medical models cannot diagnose and treat moral injury, current models do not 
exist within society for “giving grief its due.” Instead, a soldier is left to deal privately 
with personal pain rather than engaging in a larger societal ritualization of weeping, 
grieving, mourning, and perhaps, healing.  To make this argument, Kiess draws on 
Augustine and the “politics of mourning” he expresses in his theological thinking.475 
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 Kiess finds it surprising that Augustine critiques the Roman culture of his day for 
failing to grieve476 because Augustine is well known for his “misgivings about mourning 
in the face of loss.”477 For example, Kiess points to the shame Augustine articulates in his 
own Confessions about the tears he shed over the death of his mother, “I closed her eyes; 
and there flowed a great sadness on my heart and it was passing into tears, when at the 
strong behest of my mind my eyes sucked back the fountain dry, and sorrow was in me 
like a convulsion.”478  Certainly, shame in crying as a response to the death of his mother 
is not in the same realm as tears shed and shame embodied over a morally injurious 
situation, however, the shame Augustine experienced in his deeply personal grief 
regarding his mother is helpful for our reflection. The act of grieving, first of all, 
demonstrates a particular way that loves may be ordered479 wherein love for human life 
does not exceed love for God.480  
Second, Augustine considers grief as formative in the development of moral 
judgment.481  When these are considered together, we must then ask what a “rightly 
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Morals of the Catholic Church, here we will explore how fortitude, justice, prudence and temperance are 
shaped by love and ordered to God through that love and the virtuous life they demand.  Four virtues are 
shaped by forms of love each pointed to God.  So, fortitude is “love readily bearing all things.”  Justice is 
“love serving” the beloved alone.  Prudence is “love distinguishing with sagacity.”  Temperance is “love 
giving itself entirely” to the beloved. Any exhaustion of these virtues is depleted love (Chapter 15, Section 
25). 
480 Paul Helm, “Augustine’s Griefs,” in Augustine’s Confessions: Critical Essays, ed. William E. Mann 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 148. Eric Gregory is helpful in showing Augustine’s 
evolution in understanding love of God and love of neighbor.  Early texts reveal an understanding of 
neighbor as uti et fruit, that is we both use and enjoy our neighbor.  See Augustine, On Christian Doctrine.  
Ardent critics demean Augustine’s “instrumentalist” view of love toward neighbor.  Eric Gregory suggests 
this is too harsh a view and one should consider this early work as Augustine working out his theological 
views (338).  After this instance, Augustine never speaks again of “use” of one’s neighbor.  Instead, one 
loves a neighbor because they too reside within God, not within the lure of our projected needs.    
481 Paul Griffiths, “Tears and Weeping: An Augustinian View,” Faith, Rationality, and the Passions, ed. 
Sarah Coakley, (Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 2012), 19. 
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ordered grief” looks like in a society, as well as, considering what wrongly ordered grief 
might activate.  While Augustine criticized the Roman society for a failure to grieve, 
Kiess is certainly at work offering that critique of our society today.  If, as Jonathan Shay 
suggests, “Moral injury is the “betrayal of what is right by a person in authority in a high 
stakes situations” could this definition be extended beyond the war arena, to the high 
stakes situation of a society welcoming a soldier home?  If so, could we then extend 
Shay’s definition to suggest the person in authority is the greater society, who in 
neglecting to grieve and mourn what has been lost at war, inflicts a moral injury upon the 
confused soldier who questions the moral judgment of the greater societal landscape?   
 Several Augustinian scholars have argued that “rightly ordered grief” becomes a 
place of moral formation and effects the development of virtue over time in individuals 
and in the institutions of society.482  Public grief then becomes a critical element of 
citizenship, when neglected, causes the loss of virtue and the diminishment of moral 
formation.  Kiess describes Augustine’s Rome as “a society whose craving for spectacle 
and love of glory leaves it fundamentally alienated from reality and incapable of 
acknowledging loss.”  This wrongly ordered grief represents an incapacity to grieve 
disallowing Roman citizens from coming to the truth about a need for social and political 
reform and the fragility of their eroding community.483 
What we need to remember from Kiess’ work regarding the failure of a society to 
grieve is this: Our work “Entails coming to see how the effects of individual injuries are 
not self-contained, but rupture the deeper relationships and bonds of trust that are a 
                                                 
482 James Wetzel, for example, makes the distinction that Augustine preserves a connection between grief 
and virtue, rather than dismissing them as contradictory as he perceived the Stoics to do.  In Augustine: A 
Guide for the Perplexed (New York, NY: Continuum, 2010): 17-29 he works to connect the two. 
483 Kiess, “Common Ruins of Love,” 209. 
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precondition for everyone’s flourishing.”484   While the problem of moral injury could be 
placed on the shoulders of the individual soldier, a key theme that needs further 
exploration is the societal responsibility for war:  jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post 
bellum.485  Key to this societal responsibility is the active work of grief, which Kiess 
describes as “the slow work of reconstituting the moral boundaries that violence has 
disrupted.”486 When society loses the inability to grieve, as well as the inability to 
reconstitute those violated moral boundaries, chaos and blame ensues.  Consider, for 
example, Vietnam Veterans who were treated like moral outcasts upon return home.  
Mahedy notes “Like Pontius Pilate, like Lady Macbeth, the American people washed 
their hands of the war assuaging their own consciences by treating the veterans as moral 
outcasts.”487 
 From these discussions further by Brock, Lightsey, Powers, Kinghorn, Kiess and 
others, it is clear that social structures, conditions and injustices must be explored for 
their effect in causing, contributing to and sustaining moral injury.  For the soldier who 
feels the weight of the trauma alone on her shoulders, this social analysis is absolutely 
necessary.  However, like the medical social, the social model is not enough to describe, 
analyze and begin to mend moral injury.  Ultimately, social creation of moral injury is 
certainly an element of the problem, but not the whole.  The medical model addresses 
wounded bodies, the social model probes the social constitution of our bodies and our 
failure to grieve the effects of that social constriction, but further questions remain.  
                                                 
484 Kiess, “Common Ruins of Love,” 222. 
485 Brian Orend introduced the language of “justice after war” to complete the threefold language of Just 
War Theory in his piece:  “Justice After War” in Ethics & International Affairsˆ 16:1 (Spring 2002): 43-56. 
486 Kiess, “Common Ruins of Love,” 223. 
487 William Mahedy, Out of the Night: The Spiritual Journey of Vietnam Vets.  (New York, NY: 
Greyhound Books, 2005), 47.  Uwe Siemon-Netto draws on this quote in The Acquittal of God, 32. 
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These further questions drive this study to probe  “the limit model of disability” for 
furthering the understanding of moral injury and appropriate responses. 
 
2.3.2.3  The Problem of Shifting Limits across Contexts    
 Author and veteran Tyler Boudreau describes a fascinating quandary in his article, 
“The Morally Injured” as he outlines what he calls an “unremarkable” trip to a farmhouse 
in Iraq.  His story is worthy of note because it points to a problem difficult to pinpoint, 
but one important to our unfolding conversation – the problem of shifting limits across 
varied contexts – and the consequences of those shifts in our consideration of moral 
injury.  His story unfolds like this: 
The search itself was conducted flawlessly: I watched from my vehicle as the 
marines knocked on the front door.  A man answered and, through an 
interpreter, they politely explained that we needed to search the premises for 
weapons and bomb-making materials.  They asked him if he’d mind stepping 
outside with his wife and children while we looked around.  The man was 
cooperative and amiable.  There was no shouting or pushing.  The marines wore 
friendly smiles.  They stepped gently through the house and were careful to 
replace anything they moved.  Outside, other marines chatted playfully with the 
kids and gave them pieces of candy.  When the search was complete and nothing 
was found, we thanked the man and apologized for the inconvenience.  It was 
over.  Not a shot was fired, not a drop of blood or a tear was shed, and yet, as we 
withdrew from that farmhouse and roared off into the night, I felt something 
inside me begin to hurt.  What can I call that hurt?488 
 
Boudreau’s vignette is helpful in suggesting a form of moral violation that does not begin 
with overt violence.  Certainly the scene reveals an imbalance of power across cultures, 
but that imbalance is only notable when we recognize the shift in limits across social 
contexts.  In another scenario, this vignette might be acceptable.  But in this context, the 
acceptable limits have shifted, provoking discomfort for Boudreau.  For Boudreau, 
                                                 
488 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 746. 
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stepping over the limits of the household violated his sensibility of power and its unjust 
force and affect on a local family.  In this moment, Boudreau’s agency was disabled.   
 The previous sections of critical analysis explored a medical problem – the 
problem of embodiment – within the literature of moral injury, as well as a social 
problem – the problem of disabling social systems in creating moral injury.  Here, we 
tend to a slightly different nuance that occurs socially, but across varied contexts, for 
moral injury.  Brian S. Powers aids in this discussion when he speaks of “disordered 
goods.”  In so doing, he acknowledges a morality that is perfectly ‘able’ when ordered 
toward the good, and the right and the just within a society.  But, when by means of 
Augustinian original sin, those goods become “disordered” and “false”489 the shift in 
context creates a disablement that had not previously been there.  In this broken and 
disfigured world, the agency of a soldier becomes subject to what Powers deems “a 
limited horizon of choice.”490  When choices become limited in varied horizons and 
contexts, agency that might be perfectly able and capable in certain contexts is suddenly 
disabled and violated.  Interaction with such a limit evokes feelings of guilt and shame 
similar to the grief a victim of trauma might experience. 
                                                 
489 Powers, “Moral Injury and Disordered Goods,” 327. 
490 Powers alludes to this concept in his essay “Moral Injury and Original Sin”, see pages 332 and 334.  The 
particular language of “limited horizon of choice” is from a personal conversation with him regarding this 
essay. Jonathan Shay uses similar language when he refers to “shrinkage of the moral and social horizon” 
in his essay “Learning about Combat Stress from Homer’s Illiad,” 577.  Shrinkage of the horizon is a key 
concept for Shay in this article as he explores its impact on social circles and moral choices.  Shay explains, 
“Initially Achilles' horizon shrinks from the whole Greek army to his own troop, the Myrmidons. As wrath 
festers, his field of moral vision and emotional responsiveness shrinks further to just one man, his foster 
brother, Patroklos” 565.  U.S. Military Officer Crispin Burke argues in his article “How Veterans Can Help 
Bridge the Civil-Military Divide” that there is a widening “civil-military gap.”  While some suggest the 
onus is on civilians to reach across the divide, Burke says the responsibility is upon veterans to reduce the 
division and better understand the society to which they are called to serve.  See: Crispin Burke, “How 
Veterans Can Help Bridge the Civil-Military Divide” The Atlantic  (November 13, 2017) 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/how-veterans-can-help-bridge-the-civilian-military-
divide/545669/ (Accessed December 5, 2017). 
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 Here, then, is a key insight.  The scholarship of moral injury fails to recognize and 
address the role of shifting morality and agency across varied social contexts.  Robert 
Meagher makes strides forward in his book Killing from the Inside Out: Moral Injury and 
Just War as he describes shifting rules of morality and coordinating limits in the varied 
contexts of sexual mores, the war arena and even theological reflection and the church as 
issues of ‘just war’ are discussed and negotiated.  While his work is a difficult read, 
particularly in his descriptions of necrophilia491 and its relationship to war, he draws 
closer in the field to naming certain ‘abling’ and ‘disabling’ aspects of agency across 
varied social contexts. 
 As we consider the need for the present study, this issue of varied limits 
experienced and/or transgressed across varied social contexts will be important.  This will 
be evidenced as we soon examine a hypothetical soldier, Arthur Rowanberry, upon return 
home from battle.  In the context of the war arena, he is a hero.  As he returns home, to 
his own local farm, all that he has experienced more and more disables him.  What made 
sense in one arena, no longer makes sense at home. The question remains, what will 
Arthur Rowanberry do with this new knowledge? And, how will he now live? 
   
2.4 Veteran Rowanberry and the Need for the Present Study 
 
 Theologian and Social Ethicist Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon argues in his essay 
“Moral Injury as Inherent Political Critique: The Prophetic Possibilities of a New Term” 
that the embodied knowledge gained through moral injury must bear witness and 
mobilize the veteran toward a cultural self-critique. He makes clear:  “Moral injury is not 
                                                 
491 Robert Meagher, Killing from the Inside Out, 33. 
  129
to be thought of only as harm incurred but as burdensome knowledge embodied that 
concerns one’s self and one’s culture and society.  In some cases, such experiential 
knowledge can and should form a a politically engaged social ethic.”492 Wiinikka-
Lydon’s approach provides the veteran experiencing moral injury an “active” and 
mobilizing response to their existential crisis rather than a “passive” victimized one.  In 
so doing, he nudges the solider to find meaning in their injury that will lay claim upon an 
unjust society, such a claim, according to Wiinikka-Lydon is a “prophetic insight.”493 
 Wiinikka-Lydon’s argument is fruitful as it recognizes the “epistemological 
crisis”494 at the heart of moral injury.  While Wiinikka-Lydon’s acknowledgement of a 
missing piece in both the psychological and theological scholarship of moral injury is an 
important starting point, I would argue that a few steps are necessary between the 
awareness of that “epistemological crisis” and the ensuing pursuit of social justice.  First, 
while Wiinikka-Lydon’s does well to shift the language to “epistemological crisis,” that 
language does not honor the deep questions of embodiment internalized by moral injury.  
The shift moves us from our bodies, to our minds, recapitulating the Cartesian dualism 
that divides rather than integrates.  His reason for suggesting the shift is “to see moral 
injury not as a disability but as indicative of destabilizing knowledge, or at least, its 
potential.”495  The problem with dismissing “disability” as onerous or oppressive is 
precisely the reason disability scholarship emerged in the first place.  Owning and 
embracing one’s disability as a first step toward epistemological knowledge can deepen 
                                                 
492 Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon, “Moral Injury as Inherent Political Critique: The Prophetic Possibilities of a 
New Term,” Political Theology 18:3 (2017): 220. 
493 Wiinikka-Lydon, “Political Critique,” 330. 
494 Wiinikka-Lydon, “Political Critique,” 330. 
495 Wiinikka-Lydon, “Political Critique,” 330. 
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embodiment within one’s own body and strengthen a liberation ethic toward our societal 
body.  Even more so, claiming disability not as a curse, but as a generative source of 
knowledge regarding our body, the social body and the very body of God can be 
liberative and a compelling beginning for a social ethic.  Disability, as reclaimed through 
the voices of excellent scholars and academics, is a unique and generative source of 
“destabilizing knowledge.”   
The additional step to add between Wiinikka-Lydon’s “epistemological crisis” 
and an ethic of social justice is a theological lingering on the prophetic insights gained 
from the crisis.  For example, Wiinikka-Lydon draws on the work of anthropologist 
Veena Das and her terminology of “poisonous knowledge”496 to describe the experience 
unwanted instruction gained through violence – both intimate and societal violence.497  
The rich terminology of poisonous knowledge urges deeper theological reflection perhaps 
through Rita Nakashima Brock’s exploration of the Garden of Eden or Brian S. Power’s 
exposition of original sin and disordered goods.  While this theological reflection is 
beyond the scope of Wiinikka-Lydon’s excellent essay that succeeds in moving the 
scholarship on moral injury forward toward political critique, the loss and its potential for 
theological reflection should be noted and amended. 
The theological neglect, though I believe Wiinikka-Lydon truly values theology 
as insight for epistemological knowledge, may be seen in the following statement:  
“Moral injury can be thought of as a form of epistemological crisis born of the experience 
of political violence where the knowledge from wartime experience undermines one’s 
                                                 
496 Veena Das, “The Act of Witnessing: Violence, Poisonous Knowledge, and Subjectivity,” Violence and 
Subjectivity ed. by V. Das et al., (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000): 221.    205-225. 
497 Wiinikka-Lydon, “Political Critique,” 225. 
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moral, political, and social worldview….sustained through political relationships and 
power struggles both at home and in the war theater.”498 Here, Wiinikka-Lydon confronts 
the moral, political and social limits provoked by moral injury.  But two limits are 
missing from this list – first, the limits of embodiment and second the limits of theology. 
 Perhaps the need for further study can best be articulated through considering a 
veteran himself.  Take for example, the fictional character of Arthur Rowanberry who 
returns to his hometown farm after years of war described by author Wendell Berry in his 
short story “The Long Walk Home.”  At his best, one can imagine Veteran Rowanberry 
reciting the Veterans’ Creed embodying both the best and most difficult facets of service 
to which it attests: 
I mastered the weapons of war and became expert in defense and security – and 
I make no apology for my skills. I am a warrior and have seen and done things 
that many may not understand. I have proudly served my country with honor 
and dignity. I am one in fifteen – a seven-percenter – a member of a team 
spanning the nation – veteran brothers and sisters, bonded by our common 
values and experiences. 
 
At worst, one can imagine as Berry does Rowanberry’s disquieted change: “From a man 
in the light on the outside of the world, he was transformed in the twinkling of an eye into 
a man in the dark on the inside of himself, in pain, and he thought that he was dead.”499   
Our society is in crisis as we welcome home the living dead, the many Arthur 
Rowanberry’s of our day.  Tending to their despairing spirits must go beyond 
medicalization and societal judgment and complacency.  In the face of this pressing need, 
theologians, psychiatrists, activists and veterans are working to respond in order to 
prevent the twenty-two suicides a day by veterans who succumb to the despair of moral 
                                                 
498 Wiinikka-Lydon, “Political Critique,” 228. 
499 Wendell Berry, “Making It Home” Fidelity (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992) 88-89. 
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injury.  Certainly, Jonathan Shay’s lifetime of psychiatric treatment is a legacy of 
listening and healing, but he would argue, this is still not enough.  Certainly, Rita 
Nakashima’s Soul Repair Center at the Brite Divinity School offers resources not 
available at local VA hospitals, not providing therapy, but offering networks of resources, 
reflection, and most importantly, relationships.500 And consider the program encouraged 
by Camillo Bica, a U.S. Marine Corps Vietnam Veteran, in his documentary Thank You 
for Your Service where he argues for a “Behavioral Health Corps” that could attend to the 
wounds of spirit not able to be treated by current VA hospitals.501  The efforts of Shay, 
Brock and Bica are highly admirable in both their care for individuals in despair and in 
their labors to shout to a society all too unwilling to hear the depth of that despair and 
their complacency. What is needed are ongoing studies building on their efforts to further 
define the landscape of the problem, to listen deeply to untold trauma and to create 
institutional structures that respond to the pain.  Doing so will require an 
acknowledgement of disability, neither as a political term, nor as one that is pejorative; 
but instead, a recognition of disability’s claim and liberating potential.  Perhaps most 
needed, is sustained theological reflection that can equip the church and academy to 
embrace a community of people who are still standing at the cross on Good Friday where 
all morality has imploded and a new frontier must be navigated. This new frontier must 
explore new landscapes of human embodiment, new rituals for grief and mourning across 
society, and ultimately, must raise new theological reflection on the questions about God, 
                                                 
500 Jake Whitney, “Combating Moral Injury” Texas Observer (October 14, 2016), 
https://www.texasobserver.org/combating-moral-injury/   (Accessed October 17, 2016). 
501 Ashley Lee, “’Thank You for Your Service’ Explores Moral Injury Behind Veteran Suicides,” The 
Hollywood Reporter (October 5, 2016), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/thank-you-your-service-
explores-moral-injury-behind-veteran-suicides-video-935459  (Accessed October 17, 2016). 
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self and humanity in the face of moral injury.502  Imagining Arthur Rowanberry living 
into the prophetic critique Wiinikka-Lydon proposes requires several steps beyond 
epistemological knowledge: first, a claiming of disability and its liberatory potential; 
second, a wrestling with theological ramifications; and third, a living into a social ethic 
that is prophetic and transformative of political structures and sin. 
  
                                                 
502 See:  Tick, “Healing the Wounds of War,” 115. Here, Theologian Edward Tick states that war 
“obliterates oneness” with God, self and neighbor.  In response, he advocates for the spiritual discipline of 
atonement as a necessary step toward healing and focuses on the word “one” at the center of the word as an 
integral element to the healing telos of the practice. 
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Chapter 3 
Disability Theology: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 
 
I will help them face and conquer their enemies, including the demons from within. 
I will never abandon an injured veteran teammate. 
If they need support – I will carry them.  
 




 In chapter two we reviewed the psychological and theological scholarship on 
moral injury: highlighting underdeveloped accounts of “morality” and “injury,” 
questioning the potential of “disability” as a possible framework in which to gain insight 
into moral injury, and examining questions of embodiment in an overly medicalized 
world, social entanglements amid personal suffering, and notions of shifting limits and 
the questions raised of self, God and other in the face of those limits.  In this chapter, we 
will continue to develop the conversation between moral injury and disability recognizing 
the risks and potential of engaging that exploration.  In so asking, we will investigate 
what moral injury might gain from disability scholarship as well as what moral injury 
might lose.  Moving forward will require the recognition that the definition of disability 
changes at different points in the scholarship depending on the locus of emphasis in the 
schema.    To accomplish this task it will be necessary to do the following: outline the 
notion of disability as problematic to the field of moral injury, consider why moral injury 
needs to wrestle with the scholarship on disability, explore why disability needs to reflect 
on moral injury, and then, consider three possible options for moving forward in the 
                                                 
503 The Veterans’ Creed written by Judge John C. Reed, III. 
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conversation.  After presenting these arguments, we turn to a review of historical 
accounts of disability in the work of key theologians, describing themes and tensions 
present in their accounts, continue with a review of contemporary Christian accounts of 
disability that adopt three different frameworks: a liberation framework, a framework of 
social analysis, and frameworks of theological doctrines and their implications.  Finally, 
we will focus more closely on selected themes and questions probed by these scholars 
and consider their implications for moral injury.  The study in this chapter will lay the 
groundwork for chapter four, where we will probe three working models of disability (the 
medical model, the social model and the constructive “limit model” presented by 
theologian Deborah Creamer as an alternative) and assess their strengths and weaknesses 
for providing exploratory frameworks for moral injury.  We will see in this thorough 
overview how contemporary scholarship on disability, as a whole, rejects notions of 
disability as shameful, terminal, judgmental and dismissive; and instead, views disability 
as provocative and full of potential – not in an instrumentalizing way, but in a 
humanizing recognition of flesh, world, and the transformation that can occur between 
the two. 
 
3.2 Disability as Problematic Terminology for Moral Injury 
Disability is a taboo word in the field of moral injury.  For veterans like Tyler 
Boudreau, the language stigmatizes and fails to honor the complexity of the injury 
experienced; here, disability is shameful.  For Psychiatrists like Brett Litz and Jonathan 
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Shay, who might honor the disabling conditions of moral injury,504 the language of 
disability yields to clinical methods, needs addressed and problems solved. Without the 
clinical diagnosis and treatment, “disability” deems a veteran incapable in various 
spheres of life.505  In this case, disability is terminal.  For politicians, who perceive the 
disabling language of moral injury as a critique of authority,506 disability is judgmental.  
For some theologians, the language of disability is a dismissal of other forces at work.  
Veteran Tyler Boudreau and Theologian Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon provide two compelling 
examples of rejecting “disability” because the language is shameful, terminal, judgmental 
and dismissive; consider, for example, Boudreau’s critique: 
Moral injuries are not about benefits or blame. They're not about treatment or 
medications. They're not about disability. They are about our society and our 
moral values. A moral injury is not inherently the same thing as a war crime, 
though clearly the two ideas overlap. But when we talk about war crimes, we 
seek justice; when we talk about moral injuries; we seek a deeper understanding 
of our humanity. We seek healing, in some spiritual sense.507    
 
Boudreau’s experience in Iraq and subsequent moral and theological reflection is 
honorable and worthy of sustained examination for its soul-bearing witness, and perhaps 
even more so, its subtle reframing of how we configure moral injury.  As we proceed 
forward with the argument in this chapter, it will be important to keep Boudreau’s 
reactive critique to the language of disability in mind.  He argues moral injury is not a 
disability; instead, moral injury is about society.  However, the notion of societal 
infliction of disability is precisely one of the helpful frameworks the field of disability 
                                                 
504 Jonathan Shay, “Betrayal of ‘What’s Right’” in Imagine What It's Like: A Literature and Medicine 
Anthology, ed. Ruth Nadelhaft and Victoria Bonebakker (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 
308. 
505 See for example: Charles Hoge, Holly E. Toboni, Stephen C. Messer, Nicole Bell, Paul Amoroso, David 
T. Orman, The Occupational Burden of Mental Disorders in the U.S. Military: Psychiatric Hospitalizations, 
Involuntary Separations and Disability” American Journal of Psychiatry 162:3 (2005): 585-591. 
506 Shay, “Moral Injury,” 183.   
507 Boudreau, “Morally Injured,” 754. 
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can offer moral injury.  In addition, he argues moral injury is not a disability; but does 
take us to a deeper exploration of our humanity.  Disability theory certainly intends that 
same exploration.  The place where his assumption is correct is in his recognition that 
disability, in its current scholarly presentation, does not tend toward critical reflection on 
moral values.   
As we proceed forward in our arguments here, we will move forward toward a new 
form of a moral framework of disability that encompasses the disabling which occurs 
across moral worlds when different limits are transgressed and shame ensues. Before 
outlining exactly how that task will be accomplished, it is worth nothing one more 
rejection of “disability” by Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon.  While Boudreau reacts to the 
language of disability, he recognizes the social entanglements of moral injury and the 
deep questions raised regarding human nature and the need for spiritual healing.  
Wiinikka-Lydon has a similar reaction to the language of disability, but adds another 
dimension to moral injury not as social entanglement, nor a spiritual barrier, but as an 
epistemological framework.  He writes, 
A key way to do this, I argue, is to see moral injury not as a disability but as 
indicative of destabilizing knowledge, or at least, its potential. What is referred 
to as a moral injury may often be the felt result of experience and so is 
something that requires engagement that might not be best understood as 
healing, but instead, as a form of epistemological conversion or reconfiguration. 
Such experience will give rise to moral dissonance that disturbs one’s 
worldview and ethos, disturbs their entire moral subjectivity.508   
 
Wiinikka-Lydon’s critique assumes that disability prevents “destabilizing knowledge” 
and resists its potential to bear witness to political systems and prophetic insights.509  The 
                                                 
508 Wiinikka-Lydon, “Inherent Political Critique,” 230. 
509 See: Simon Hayhoe, “The Epistemelogical Model of Disability, and its role in understanding passive 
exclusion in eighteenth and nineteenth century Protestant educational asylums in the USA and Britain,” 
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combined reactions of Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon dismiss the field of disability as 
not offering insight into social implications, not asking deep reflections into the nature of 
humanity, and not providing an epistemological framework through which to engage 
experience.  As we move forward in this chapter, we will examine the disability 
scholarship of historical and contemporary theologians who wrestled with exactly these 
kinds of questions.  For example, we will see in the contemporary work of Nancy 
Eiesland an analysis of the social structures that create disability, a clear rejection of the 
assumption that disability cannot prompt a liberatory ethic. In the historical review, we 
will see the existential questions raised by Soren Kierkegaard regarding self and God in 
the face of disability.  And, as we examine the scholarship of Deborah Creamer, we will 
see her rejection of the assumption that disability cannot cause an “epistemological 
conversion,” instead, we will learn from her how disability presents new knowledge as 
various limits are confronted.  Perhaps, Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon provide first-
person accounts and scholarly reflection that caution us to proceed carefully.   
 
3.2.1 Why Moral Injury Needs Disability 
 Before turning to a historical review of various Christian scholarship on disability, 
at this juncture it is important to consider what the scholarship on disability might offer 
moral injury, as well as the reverse. In a recent essay, “Why Theology Needs 
Disability,”510 Tim Basselin suggests a rapprochement between two distinct disciplines.   
Basselin understands here the problem with the notion that theology might need 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Journal of Christianity and Education 20:1 (March 2016): 49-66.  He argues that 
epistemological constructs of disability must be very careful to not stigmatize and therefore create 
hierarchies of superiority. Dong so minimizes real improvement to the lives of those who are disabled.    
510 Tim Basselin, “Why Theology Needs Disability,” Theology Today, 68:1 (April 2011): 47-57. 
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disability.  Claiming disability as a need for theology all too easily falls into the trap of 
minimizing and instrumentalizing disability.  His essay so starts with a quote from 
disability scholar and Theologian Thomas Reynolds, “Employing disability for mere 
theological gain is to be vigilantly guarded against.”511  The same critique is important in 
both directions as we consider the relationship between disability and moral injury.  Yes, 
moral injury needs disability, but not at the expense of utilizing disability solely as a 
means to an end.  Basselin draws on a multitude of disability scholars whose work will be 
reviewed in full later in this chapter under current scholarship on disability.  We 
introduce these scholars briefly here in considering Basselin’s argument but will consider 
them in depth later in the chapter.   
Reynolds critiques “the cult of normalcy” which is evident in our fixation and 
reliance upon autonomy.512  It is this challenge to autonomy where, Baseelin argues, 
theology might gain strength and direction. However, before pushing forward Basselin 
pauses, wisely, to confess our own complacency within disabling structures of thought 
and societal interaction. He draws on two scholars in the field of disability and theology, 
Nancy Eiesland and Helen Betenbaugh, to make two claims.  First, alongside Eiesland, 
he claims the true meeting of theology and disability, with an eye to justice, will shake 
theological foundations of the church by setting aside claims to wholeness and perfection 
that are deeply engrained into church life and theology without question.513  Second, 
along with Betenbaugh, he contemplates the possibility of living an “Easter life” in a 
                                                 
511 Basselin, “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 47.  See:  Thomas Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A 
Theology of Disability and Hospitality (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2008), 40. 
512 Basselin, “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 49.  See:  Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 26. 
513 Basselin. “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 51.  See: Nancy Eisland, The Disabled God: Toward a 
Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 111. 
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“Good Friday body.”514 Such a claim begins to push back on assumptions of wholeness 
and perfection by embodying bodily brokenness as an everyday reality.  This claim 
rejects assumptions of abelism inherent in church structures and doctrines. Theology can 
gain from reenergizing our understanding of the kind of dependency and vulnerability 
Eiesland, Betenbaugh and the L’arche communities witness to and live within.  Herein, 
there are new paths of openness to the power of God configured and “perfection” 
(Matthew 5:48) is radically redefined as perfection in vulnerability and dependency, not 
in perfected bodies.  Working within such a framework allows the possibility of the 
“transvaluation” theologian Frances Young sees occurring within the L’arche 
communities.515   
Basselin concludes by demonstrating that a renewed relationality reframes and 
reconstructs theology.  He looks to the work of Amos Yong who reimagines the doctrines 
of creation, the Holy Spirit and soteriology within his book Theology and Down 
Syndrome.516  The doctrine of Creation takes new life when we move from linking fallen 
humanity to particular disabled bodies, to widening that stance to see the fall within 
social structures.517  Soteriology is reframed by understanding a more communal sense of 
salvation.518  The Holy Spirit is revisioned by seeing “multiple forms of corporeal 
flourishing,” instead of a societally dictated singular form of flourishing as a societal 
                                                 
514 Basselin, “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 51.  See:  Helen Betenbaugh, “Disability: A Lived 
Theology,” Theology Today 57.2 (2000): 208. 
515 Basselin, “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 56.  See: Frances Young’s unpublished paper presented at 
a conference at “La Ferme” in the community of L’Arche in Trosly-Breuil France in December, 2002. 
516 Basselin, “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 56.  See:  Amos Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome: 
Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 165. 
517 Basselin. “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 56. 
518 Basselin. “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 56. 
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norm.519  Basselin succeeds in showing the breadth and depth disability scholarship can 
bring to the norms and assumptions of theology. Can we imagine the same to be true, that 
moral injury needs disability as well?  If so, categories within moral injury addressing 
questions of embodiment, social structures, systemic injustice, moral codes, diagnosis, 
treatment, and shame might be deepened by further engagement with the scholarship of 
disability. 
In addition to Basselin, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson offers further reinforcement 
regarding the importance of disability as a particular source of knowledge. Garland-
Thomson presents here a series of “counter-eugenic arguments”520 to conserve the 
category of disability.  She sees disability as a “generative resource”521 rather than a 
problem or liability.  She believes disability has the potential to “gather us into the 
everyday community of embodied humankind.”522  In so arguing, Garland-Thomson 
deepens the commitment of Tyler Boudreau to more fully comprehend the humanitarian 
effects of moral injury and their potentially disabling repercussions.  For example, 
Boudreau offers this lament as his first person account of moral injury progresses: 
And the only way Americans can fathom the meaning of this term, "moral 
injury," is to acknowledge the humanity of the Iraqis. The two ideas are 
inseparable. What I've found most difficult for people to grasp (and for a while 
this was hard for me, too) is the full range of "moral injuries" sustained in 
Iraq.523 
 
                                                 
519 Basselin. “Why Theology Needs Disability,” 56.  See:  Amos Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 
181-182. 
520 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability.” Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 9:3 
(September 2012): 341. 
521 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 341. 
522 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 339. 
523 Boudreau, The Morally Injured, 751. 
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While we’ve acknowledged Boudreau’s initial resistance to the framework of disability, 
we can see in this account the potential (to be clear at this point the language is used with 
necessary caution) mutual disabling of soldiers and societies. 
According to Garland-Thomson, disability, in our culture, has the potential to 
create what Malu Fontes calls “strangers in their own land”524 and certainly we see that 
possibility in Boudreau’s reflection on the Iraqis in the aftermath of war. Julia Kristeva 
portrays the cultural dissonance that continues to reverberate by saying, “the disabled 
person opens a narcissistic identity wound in the person who is not disabled.”525  
Garland-Thomson recognizes the exilic and narcissistic identities found in the personal 
and cultural experience of disabling conditions.  She aims to create positive 
comprehensions of disability by counter-posing her conception of the “inherent 
dynamism of flesh” against other stereotypes.  She proceeds to define disability as “the 
transformation of flesh as it encounters the world.”526  In this pilgrimage of life, our 
bodies are dynamic, fluid and constantly in transformation.527  We are pliable beings, so 
much so, Garland-Thomson argues that “disability is perhaps the essential characteristic 
of being human.”528 Perhaps, scholarship in moral injury can only move forward with 
further reflection on that essential category of being human, and if so, incorporating 
                                                 
524 Malu Fontes, “Disabled people are strangers in their own land,” The World Association for Christian 
Communication’s Media Development 2 (1998). Quoted in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Conserving 
Disability, 340.   
525 Julia Kristeva and J. Herman, “Liberty, equality, fraternity, and ... vulnerability,” Women’s Studies 
Quarterly 38:1/2 (2010): 251–268. Quoted in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 340.  
526 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 342. 
527 See:  Tick,  “Healing the Wounds of War.” Theologian Edward Tick argues shat occurs throughout 
battle are infinite “transformations of oneness and intimacy” (117) affecting the cosmos from every angle.  
He suggests this is precisely why the Bhagavad Gita begins with the provocative statement, “I am become 
Death, the destroyer of worlds” (120). Bhagavad Gita 11:32.  J. Robert Oppenheimer, the developer of the 
atomic bomb, is famously quoted referencing this text. 
528 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 339. 
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Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s insight that disability is an essential aspect of our 
humanity as it transforms over time and space. Certainly we understand Boudreau’s 
caution regarding the language of disability, his goal first and foremost is “to get the idea 
of ‘moral injury’ out there.”529 We proceed with caution here, guided by Boudreau, to not 
overly sentimentalize Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s account of disability.  And yet, just 
as Boudreau invites us to probe our collective humanity and the impacts of our actions 
across space and time; so too does Garland-Thomson prompt an account of 
transformations that occur through our daily interactions in this world.     
To protect and conserve disability, according to Garland-Thomson, several things 
must happen:  disability must be seen as a resource, perhaps even, as a place for making 
meaning in the world.530  With this argument Garland-Thomson indirectly addresses the 
concern of Wiinikka-Lydon who subtly dismisses disability as a category for 
epistemelogical knowledge.  According to Garland-Thomson, disability provides a 
setting for human beings to develop character and voice that the dominant culture needs 
to preserve and to hear, an “epistemic resource” that generates knowledge and “minority 
ways of knowing” and perceiving the world.531  Likewise, disability must be seen as an 
ethical resource.532  She looks here to Michael J. Sandel who says disability moves us 
from aesthetic resource to ethical resource.533  Such a shift to the ethical from the 
aesthetic initiates a conversation about the problem of suffering.  She understands our 
culture wanting to all too quickly eradicate suffering and to solve the problem. However, 
                                                 
529 Boudreau, The Morally Injured, 754. 
530 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 344. 
531 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 345. 
532 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 347. 
533 Michael J. Sandell, The case against perfection: Ethics in the age of genetic engineering (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007): 45. Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 347.   
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if we listen carefully and cautiously we might hear how “suffering expands our 
imagination about what we can endure.”534  Garland-Thomson sees the work of eugenics 
as an act of control – one that want to manipulate the future.  Disability counters that by 
calling the individual radically into the present moment and also, to what she deems “an 
open future”535 untethered by other narratives and expectations.  Narratives of normalcy 
are then halted, and the invitation to living with the unfolding  (rather than the fixing) of 
disability is initiated.  The conservation of disability for moral injury would then reject 
notions of shame, terminal illness, and judgment inherent in the literature of moral injury 
and its perspective toward disability seen so far. 
 
3.2.2 Why Disability Needs Moral Injury 
Having examined moral injury’s need for attention on the scholarship of 
disability, the reverse is important to explore for a moment as well.  Is it possible that 
academic consideration of disability may benefit from the scholarship on moral injury? 
Inviting that conversation encourages a deeper probe of disability’s avoidance of moral 
reflection and a long history of subtly linking disability to morality with divisive and 
judgmental repercussions.  In the Hebrew Bible, two schools of thought inform reflection 
on disability.  First, there are laws informing the Priestly writer’s account of disability as 
unacceptable because it was deemed unclean.  Often these accounts have an underlying 
                                                 
534 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 350.  See: Emily Rapp, Poster Child: A Memoir (New 
York: Holtzbrinck Publishers, 2007). 
535 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 352. The language of “open future” is Garland-Thomson’s.  
However, she appears to be heavily informed here by Michael Sandel’s terminology of “openness to the 
unbidden” who argues against genetic enhancement because such decisions create a closedness to the 
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we do not try and control the outcome.  See: Michael Sandel, ‘The Case Against Perfection,’ The Atlantic 
Monthly 293 (2004): 57.  
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assumption linking morality to the imperfect body.  Second, there is a counterpoint called 
the Holiness Code that allowed space for varying abilities though not always to the 
degree one might hope. One reason disability needs moral injury is to understand texts 
such as these that quietly link morality to disability thus causing injuries to body, mind, 
spirit and society.   First, Sarah Melcher implicates why disability studies needs deeper 
reflection in the area of morality because of the possibility of sustaining injuries from 
moral judgments and the shame thus inflicted by those stigmatizing opinions.  Second, 
Judith Abrams expands that discussion as she compares and contrasts Priestly views of 
holiness versus the Holiness school in Old Testament literature.  Disability needs the 
scholarship of moral injury to help unravel hidden linkages of morality with ideas of 
bodily perfection and wholeness. 
Sarah J. Melcher’s essay “Visualizing the Perfect Cult: The Priestly Rationale for 
Exclusion” examines the world of Leviticus and its desire for “holiness.”536  She notes 
two distinct writers of Leviticus, the first who wrote chapters 1-16 known as the Priestly 
Torah, and the second who wrote chapters 17-26 known as the Holiness Code.  The first 
writer restricts holiness to the Priesthood.  The second writer suggests holiness is 
desirable but unattainable.537  Both seem to suggest that perfection is the norm for 
embodiment with flawlessness as the ultimate ideal (Hebrew םיִמָתּ tamim).538 Because 
God’s displeasure is connected to physical imperfection, those with imperfect bodies are 
                                                 
536 Sarah Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult: The Priestly Rationale for Exclusion,” Human Disability 
and the Service of God: Reassessing Religious Practice, ed. Nancy Eiesland and Don Saliers (Nashville, 
TN: Abingdon Press, 1998): 55-71. 
537 Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult,” 56-57. 
538 Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult,” 57-59.  Melcher draws on Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on 
the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963).  For Goffman, stigma is 
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typically excluded from the community.  One public sign of that was the mark of sara’at, 
a stigmatizing tattoo of moral failure.539 Leviticus is a complex text that includes the 
exclusive text of Leviticus 21 as well as the inclusive text in 19:14 that states: “You shall 
not revile the deaf or put a stumbling block before the blind; you shall fear your God: I 
am the Lord.”540  Melcher implores us to consider what Leviticus 19 lived out in 
community in contemporary society might look like as new ideas of holiness and bodily 
imperfection become embodied in our worshiping and liturgical life.541   
 Sharon Betcher deepens this insight in her article “Rehabilitating Religious 
Discourse: Bringing Disability Studies to the Theological Venue,”542 with an analysis of 
Judith Z. Abrams work Judaism and Disabilities: Portrayals in Ancient Texts from the 
Tanach through the Bavli. Abrams sheds light on what has been a troubling conundrum 
for Biblical scholars:  how can Leviticus 21:16-24 exist within the same book that creates 
the so-called “11th commandment”543 of Leviticus 19:14?  The answer to this is in the 
difference between the Priestly school’s view on disability and the Holiness school.  The 
Priestly school had a strong tie to the temple and was concerned with the priesthood’s 
ability to be holy within the confines of the temple.  The Holiness school had a larger 
frame of reference in making a “sanctuary” out of the greater land extending the temple’s 
                                                 
539 Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult,” 58. 
540 Leviticus 19:14, NRSV. 
541 Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult,” 58.  Melcher relies on the scholarship of Erving Goffmann who 
encourages “the language of relationships” to both address stigma and to move beyond stigma within 
communities.  See: Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Mangaement of Spoiled Identity (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1963): 3. 
542 Sharon V. Betcher, “Rehabilitating Religious Discourse: Bringing Disability Studies to the Theological 
Venue,” Religious Studies Review (Fall 2001): 341-348. 
543 Betcher, “Rehabilitating Religious Discourse,” 344.  See also:  Mary Jo Iozzio, “Thinking About 
Disabilities with Justice, Liberation and Mercy,” Horizons 36:1 (Spring 2009): 32-49. 
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space to the Promised Land.544  Here, those with disabilities are to be respected before 
God and treated righteously even if those injuries have moral connotations.  Can we 
imagine the same to be true, that disability needs moral injury as well?  Models of 
disability currently addressing questions of embodiment, social structures, systemic 
injustice and contextualized limits might be deepened in future scholarship by further 
engagement with the scholarship of moral injury to reveal hidden assumptions that link 
bodily imperfection to morality.  As this study progresses, we will see how early models 
of disability (i.e., the medical model) were an attempt to offer a corrective to overly 
moralistic views of disability whether overt or assumed in the scholarship. 
 
3.2.3 The Disabling Effects of Moral Injury 
Psychologist Jonathan Shay articulates the particular disabling effects of moral 
injury on the life of a veteran and the society that surrounds them.  In a lecture series at 
Chautauqua, in the summer of 2016, Shay made the following five claims: first, moral 
injury disables a person’s ability to “show up to an appointed time and place in a crowd 
of people one doesn’t know well.”545  Second, moral injury disables a veteran’s ability to 
“experience words as trustworthy”546 and in so doing, to not automatically discount 
words and statements as deceitful jargon.  Third, with this failure of words, moral injury 
                                                 
544 Betcher. “Rehabilitating Religious Discourse,” 344. See: Judith Z. Abrams, Judaism and Disabilities: 
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545Jonathan Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”  Lectures given at the Chautauqua Institution.  August 17, 2016. 
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546 Shay, “Moral Injury in War,” Lectures given at the Chautauqua Institution.  August 17, 2016.  
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disables a veteran’s ability to “see the possibilities in persuasion, negotiation, 
compromise and concession essential to democratic functioning.”547 This element 
cements the inability of the veteran to function as an individual within a society making 
clear then the larger ramifications of the scope of moral injury.  The soldier experiences 
only deceptions and lies making it impossible to live within this social context.  Fourth, 
moral injury disables “the possibility of winning a struggle without killing and of losing a 
struggle without dying.”548  And fifth, perhaps most destructively, moral injury disables a 
soldier’s ability to “see the future as real.”549  Here, we encounter the “despair” 
unaccounted for in veteran’s who do not fit the model of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder.550  Shay has long argued the inability of PTSD to include the depths of despair 
experienced by some veterans and the disablement of trust as a presenting clinical 
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condition.  Even more so, Shay recognized prior to many headlines the inability of a 
diagnosis of PTSD to account for the rise in suicides among veterans.551   
 Shay outlines convincingly the disabling effects of moral injury; however, these 
disablements do not easily fit into either the medical or the social models of disability 
which will be outlined in full in chapter four.  In addition, it might be argued that these 
disabling factors do not easily fit into the definition of moral injury Shay posits as: “the 
betrayal of what is right by a person in authority in a high stakes situation.”  Before 
exploring the problem of assessing moral injury within a medical or social model of 
disability, it is important to explore the relationship between Shay’s definition of moral 
injury and its relationship to the five disabling conditions Shay witnesses in his clients. 
His argument is that when betrayal, crisis and person in authority converge creating the 
impact of moral injury then the fivefold disablement affects: personal presence, the 
experience of words, civic discourse, the sense of what is possible and future hope.  The 
agency of a person so entrapped in the web of betrayal, crisis and authority becomes 
disabled beyond a physical condition, or even societal function.  The depth of 
disablement while affecting functionality within a society points toward something 
deeper that involves the hope of words, the hope of discourse, the hope of a future, the 
hope that struggle might lead to something other than death.552 
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 Shay’s outline of the contours of disabling conditions speak to something deeper 
than a medical account: there is more here than an impaired body.  And, Shay’s outline 
points toward something deeper than social implications:  there is something more here 
than a body unable to function within a given social context.  In fact, one is reminded 
here of Thomas Reynolds’ definition of disability:  disability is “a range of 
physiologically rooted social performances, a series of moments defined by relationships 
between human beings.  In a basic sense, the distinction between ability and disability is 
built into the fabric of communal life.”553  As we look to construct a revised limit model 
of disability, I would suggest that such a model should illumine the despair, lack of trust, 
and inability to imagine a future that Shay recognizes across the depth and breadth of his 
patients.   
 
 
3.2.4 Forwarding the Conversation between Disability and Moral Injury 
 Certainly we witnessed in Tyler Boudreau a reflexive retort to identifying moral 
injury with disability unequivocally.  Both Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon invoke caution 
in moving forward with the argument; and to be clear, this caution is taken seriously with 
respect to veterans, their experience, and their return to society. As survivors of trauma 
and with all too many stigmas placed upon them, denying their voice and narrative would 
be antithetical to healing.  And so it is with great carefulness, alongside the scholarship 
outlined in the previous section by Jonathan Shay, I suggest the notion of disability as 
helpful terminology through which to address questions of embodiment, medicalization, 
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social grief, shifting limits and theological issues within moral injury.554  Three 
possibilities are evident to continue this discussion.  First, it would be possible to wholly 
equate moral injury as a disability.  Doing so, I believe, would negate the experience of 
individuals on both sides of that conversation. As we proceed forward to overview key 
moments in the historical scholarship on disability, I believe we will see the risks 
inherent in this equating as we explore the themes and tensions evidenced in that 
scholarship.555  For example, we will see how early notions of disability too easily 
created a simplistic morality creating a dichotomy between sinner and saint that would 
have disastrous consequences for those who are morally injured.  
 Second, one could use the scholarship of disability as a framework through which 
to perceive insights into struggles and questions raised within the scholarship of moral 
injury. As we explore the contemporary scholarship on disability through the lenses of 
liberation accounts, social analysis and doctrinal insight and implications; we will address 
possibilities that disability offers moral injury that have not yet been advanced in the 
scholarship.  Still, there is a risk in applying the framework of one field to that of another 
                                                 
554 Peter Capretto offers a critical and helpful argument against “operationalizing” disability in the pursuit 
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without due caution.  The analysis that follows the contemporary review will demonstrate 
risks and promises inherent in applying frameworks across disciplines.   
 Finally, there is a third option as moral injury and disability are drawn together in 
conversation.  Perhaps, both moral injury and disability draw us into deeper reflections of 
what it means to be human, and to have real limits, before God. The theological 
anthropology that conversation initiates is one that begins with finitude and ends with 
wonder.  In between there is a myriad of emotions that include despair, shame, anger and 
suffering.  Such an anthropology acknowledges human existence functioning within a 
spectrum where changes occur to body, morality and ability over time through a 
multitude of encounters.  Some of those encounters are the shattering encounters of 
trauma that implode and explode all previous accounts of what it means to be human. 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson leans into this kind of theological anthropology with her 
conceptualization of “disability is the transformation of the flesh as it encounters 
world.”556  So too does Deborah Creamer with her account of disability as an encounter 
with limits.  Both Creamer and Garland-Thomson provide accounts of finitude in the face 
of limits that offer helpful insight both to moral injury and disability.  However, their 
accounts do not go deep enough into issues of shame, despair, trauma and suffering, nor 
do they attend to moral problems and possibilities in the face of limits.    To that end, this 
study aims to provide a “revised limit model of disability” that can draw disability and 
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moral injury together into a deeper conversation about human finitude in the face of 
limits. 
 
3.3 Historical Christian Scholarship on Disability 
 A review of the historical Christian scholarship on disability will help us to 
understand early ideas about the category and the definition of disability as a lens through 
which to gain insight into the theological anthropology of what it means to be human in 
particular times and places from Ancient Greece to the modern era.  The scholars we will 
engage, chosen as a sampling from different eras, are wrestling with ideas of deviance 
and perfection for individual bodies within the body of greater societies that have 
perceptions of worth, functionality and normalcy based on how deficient or sufficient the 
capacities of a certain body are at that time. To be clear, the scholarship is often 
disjointed, sporadic and episodic for two reasons.  First, the topic of disability is not the 
first and foremost idea addressed within their work.  And second, there is not a larger 
collective of disability scholarship as a sustained conversation to which they are 
contributing.557  At best, we will encounter conceptions of disability as divine 
                                                 
557 Brian Brock cautions the modern era for too easily dismissing the schema that disability is only a 
modern idea.  In the work he edited with John Swinton, Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader, he 
makes clear that disability scholarship should be engaged within the time period in which it was 
constructed to do three things:  what were the disabling conditions of the time, what might be the 
challenges of that particular account of disability, and what do we have to learn in this era about that 
description and the challenges it posits.  See:  Brian Brock, “Introduction: Disability and the Quest for the 
Human,” Disability and the Christian Tradition, 10-11. 
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revelation.558  At worst, we will explore the implications of the gods’ “displeasure”559 
where disability is seen as a disorder of the gods.560   
 As these theologians struggle to make sense of differing bodies we often see a 
tendency to lean toward language informed by simplistic views of normalcy and 
functionality as convenient and perhaps, repercussions of the episodic nature of the 
scholarship.  Perhaps it is precisely this tendency toward too easily making catastrophic 
judgments to which Boudreau rightly reacts.  In investigating the literature we will begin 
to see additional strains of thought develop around the areas of interest to this study, and 
we will note tensions that arise as we note particular understandings of morality, 
disability and injury.  We will also see periodic consideration of matters such as 
embodiment, social constructs and limits within certain contexts. To be clear, it would be 
anachronistic, as Brian Brock argues, to suggest that any of these scholars have a 
developed theology of disability.561  And so their work must be engaged with caution and 
care, while probing it for insight into social concepts of the day and scholarship that 
either mitigated the status quo or highlighted it. 
 
3.3.1 Scholarship through 500 CE: Societal Disorder or Soteriologial Reordering 
 Throughout this chapter we will explore themes and tensions in the historical 
scholarship from Plato through Karl Barth.  In the historical scholarship prior to 500 CE, 
                                                 
558 Elaine Ledgerwood, “Saints Not Sinners: An Investigation into the ‘Positive’ Constructions of Disability 
by the Early Church,” Colloquium 42:1 (2010): 95. 
559 Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult,” 69. 
560 Almut Caspary, “The Patristic Era: Early Christian Attitudes to the Disfigured Outcast,” in Disability in 
the Christian Tradition: A Reader, ed. by Brian Brock and John Swinton, (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2012): 24.      
561 Brian Brock, “Augustine: Hierarchies of Human Wholeness and Healing,” in Disability in the Christian 
Tradition: A Reader, ed. Brian Brock and John Swinton (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 2012): 65.   
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we see discussion that claims disability is a disordering that occurs by the God and has 
social repercussions for the civitas.  In turn, theologians pushed back on the language of 
disorder with soteriological claims of divine restructuring of human life.  The tensions 
here are clear:  is disability ultimately discordant to the point that true harmony will only 
be experienced in the resurrection?  Or, does disability actually reverse societal contagion 
of corruption and stereotypes by calling humanity to deeper levels of relating beyond the 
surface?  Here, we will explore briefly the work of Plato, Aristotle, Tertullian, the 
Cappadocian Fathers and Augustine. 
 
3.3.1.1 Plato and Aristotle 
Disability, in ancient times, was viewed as “disorder” by the gods.562  Because of 
this, care for the vulnerable and infirm was quite limited.  At best, wounded soldiers 
received care in the valetudinaria.563  During this time, a person’s value was always 
connected to his or her social value and ability to contribute virtuously to the public good. 
Aristotle’s famously succinct account states:  “Let there be a law that no deformed child 
shall live”564 reflected an extant view of the fourth century B.C.E. world in which he 
lived. 
For Plato who lived and wrote in the fifth century B.C.E., human physicality 
consisted of the intellect, the soul and one’s physical body.  Together these three are 
                                                 
562Caspary, “The Patristic Era,” 24. 
563 Eugene Hugh Byrne, "Medicine in the Roman Army," The Classical Journal 5:6 (April 1910): 267-272. 
564 Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21 The Politics, translated by H. Rackham. (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944), Book VII, 1335b, 20.  To be clear, this 
succinct phrase summarizes his view.  Some scholars have worked to resource larger schemas within 
Aristotle’s philosophy to gain wisdom for embodiment and disability.  For example, see:  Susan S. Stocker, 
“Facing disability with resources from Aristotle and Nietzsche,” Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 
5:2 (2002): 137-46 wherein she argues when “we take up someone else's good as our own is empowering” 
for those with disabilities. 
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ordered toward a teleological end of health and harmony. Socrates’ argument in Book IV 
of The Republic reveals a theological anthropology based on domination as preferential to 
disorder:  "to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation 
of dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring it 
about that one rules or is ruled by the other contrary to nature."565 Within the right 
workings of a city, that normative health (Hygeia) does not stand in isolation; but instead, 
is a part of a larger hold aimed toward overall order.  The right order of a body is a 
constitutive piece of the larger right ordering of a city. Right ordering leads to harmony; 
disorder yields disharmony.566  When there are perceived societal failures of physical 
and/or rational ability there is a failure of order that has societal repercussions.  
Philosopher Thomas Joseph Kiefer argues this disorder has a twofold consequence: first, 
justice is not possible for that individual and second, entrance into the ideal city of The 
Republic is improbable.567 
Such arguments allowed Plato to make difficult decisions regarding abortion, 
eugenics and infanticide.  The best progeny was desirable for the right ordering of the 
city, on a philosophical level, as well as for the right protection of the city on a practical 
level.568  Disabled infants and fetuses were disposable goods for Plato.  Kiefer suggests 
three reasons why:  disablement prevents human dignity,569 physical disablement 
                                                 
565 Plato, The Republic, 444d3-6.   
566 Thomas Joseph Kiefer, “Reason and Normative Embodiment in Plato's Republic: On the Philosophical 
Creation of Disability” Disability Studies Quarterly 34:1 (2014), http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3319/3523 
(Accessed October 17, 2017). 
567 Thomas Joseph Kiefer, “Reason and Normative Embodiment in Plato's Republic.” 
568 David J. Galton, “Greek Theories on Eugenics,” Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (1998): 263.   
569 Plato, The Republic, 406b3-c. 
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prevents societal functioning570 and, intellectual disability does not allow the necessary 
education, particularly in morality, vital to the ideal571 city.572 
Platonic teaching carries weight regarding those with intellectual disabilities 
because reason is linked to value and growth in virtue.  Without paradigmatic “reason” a 
person with intellectual disability in Platonic society is ranked lower on the scale of 
human being.573  Physical disability prevents the specialization aimed toward in The 
Republic where order is preserved through specified tasks driven by fully functioning, 
non-disabled workers.  Any disruption in this aim disorders justice, harmony and the 
desired order.574  Corruption in either physical or intellectual abilities hinders moral 
formation toward civic virtue.  Thus, Plato’s political philosophy subjugates varying 
abilities as it fosters civic order and justice.  As archaic as this view may sound, 
sociologists Freund and Maquire argue that its stigmatizing presence lingers in societies 
today as disabilities pose threats to “social order.”575 
While Plato’s arguments regarding physical and intellectual disability appear to be in 
a more formative stage, Plato offers more extended thought on what might be deemed the 
forefather of moral injury as he explores the concept of a “just soul”576 going to battle.  If 
the right ordering of humans within a city are aimed toward the protection of The 
                                                 
570 Plato, The Republic, 406d-e. 
571 Plato, The Republic, 410a1-3. 
572 Thomas Joseph Kiefer, “Reason and Normative Embodiment in Plato's Republic.” 
573 Tim Stainton, “Reason and Value: The Thought of Plato and Aristotle and the Construction of 
Intellectual Disability,” Mental Retardation 39:6 (2001):  452.   
574 Anna Greco, "Natural Inclinations, Specialization, and the Philosopher-Rulers in Plato's Republic" 
Ancient Philosophy 29:1 (2009): 18.    
575 Peter E. S. Freund and Meredith B. McGuire, Health, Illness, and the Social Body: A Critical Sociology, 
3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1999): 118. 
576 Plato, The Republic, Book IV, 443e.  Plato writes, a person should choose “the just and honorable action 
to be that which preserves and helps to produce this condition of the soul.”  Plato had a threefold view of 
the soul that included the appetitive, the logical and the spirited.  For a person’s soul to be just, the logical 
aligns with the spirited offering courage and strength to do good and justly in complicated circumstances. 
See: Plato, The Republic, Book IV, 436 b6 – CI.   
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Republic, what happens when those who have put their minds, bodies, morals and lives in 
service to the city become injured in body, mind, morality or spirit and can no longer 
assist in the right ordering of the city?  Plato’s account of Socrates’ service to the 
Peloponessian war demonstrates an attunement to the reality and sacrifice of service 
through deployment, the war arena and homecoming. While Plato celebrates the 
resilience of Socrates,577 he also laments the difficulty soldiers had in returning to the 
ordinary spheres of life.578  
Plato is at his best when he explores the psychological depth a soldier must embody 
and navigate, for example, in the alignment of a just soul and its proper application in 
combat. Plato highlights the fact that Socrates does not come undone in the midst of 
wartime service, his resilience and sense of justice carry him through, though the struggle 
is real. Plato establishes the resilience of Socrates (who serves despite his disagreement 
with the premise for war in the first place)579, even amid the losses he faced, against the 
context of the needs of the larger city.580 And yet, is the fact that Socrates does not “come 
undone” a helpful model or ideal for soldiers today?  Plato highlights the sound mind and 
body of Socrates, one might argue, to such an uncommon measure that it becomes an 
archetype of wholeness rather than a helpful portrait of a soldier changed by war.  In so 
doing, he maintains wholeness as ideal rather than corruption inciting civic disorder. 
  
3.3.1.2 Tertullian 
                                                 
577 S. Sara Monoson, “Socrates in Combat: Trauma and Resilience in Plato’s Political Theory,” Combat 
Trauma and the Ancient Greeks, ed. by Peter Meineck and David Konstan (New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2014): 139-147.   
578 Monoson, “Socrates in Combat,” 143. 
579 Plato, Gorgias, 515e-517a, 519a-b. 
580 Plato, The Republic, Book X, 603e – 604c. 
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With Greco-Roman views in the background, the early church fathers wrestled 
with new views of embodiment in light of the incarnation. Tertullian, writing in the late 
second, early third century of the Common Era, viewed the body as the stage where the 
natural and the supernatural worlds interacted. In light of the incarnation, all bodies, not 
just disabled bodies, were in need of redemption.  Theologian Charlotte Radler explains, 
Tertullian “creates a reordered soteriological structure that classifies flesh, filth, and 
dishonor as curative.”581 Tertullian challenged the view of Plato and Aristotle who did 
not condemn the termination of newborns with disabilities nor fetuses when he wrote:  
But to us, to whom murder has once for all been forbidden, it is unlawful even to 
destroy the fetus in the womb whilst the blood is still forming into a human 
being. Prevention of birth is premature murder; nor does it alter the question 
whether one takes away a life already born, or destroys one which is in process 
of formation. That also is a human being, which is about to become one, just as 
every fruit exists already in the seed.”582   
 
And Tertullian took issue with contemporaries such as Marcion who deemed all flesh as 
deviant, and instead, posited a view of fleshly existence that carried “salvific power.”583  
For Tertullian, order and disorder in the body became a place of divine interaction.  In a 
treatise on the patience of Job, he illumined how that interaction takes shape within the 
trajectory of a real person’s life and struggle:   
Thus did that hero who brought about a victory for his God beat back all the 
darts of temptation and with the breastplate and shield of patience soon after 
                                                 
581 Charlotte Radler, “The Dirty Physician: Necessary Dishonor and Fleshly Solidarity in Tertulliano 
Writings” Vigilae Christiane 63 (2009): 345.    
582 Tertullian, The Apology of Tertullian for the Christians, ed. by T. H. Bindley (Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press, 1890).  Apology 9:4. 
583 Charlotte Radler, “The Dirty Physician: Necessary Dishonor and Fleshly Solidarity in Tertullian’s 
Writings,” Vigiliae Christianae 63 (2009): 354. See:  Tertullian, Five Books Against Marcion, in Anti-
Nicene Fathers: Volume 3, ed. by Alexander Roberts (New York: NY: Cosimo Classics, 2007).  See, for 
example, chapter XXIV: ‘The Goodness of Marcion’s God only imperfectly manifested; it saves but few, 
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recover from God complete health of body and the possession of twice as much 
as he had lost.584 
 
Tertullian advances the conversation by taking emphasis away from divine favor or 
disfavor and offering instead a more reciprocal interaction between the human and the 
divine.  At stake though, for Tertullian, is his overly positive emphasis on the total return 
to health that appears to conflate disorder with revelation.  Views such as his will become 
problematic as Christianity will grow to interpret and preach scriptures pertaining to 
disability in ways that problematize the disabled person and hope for miraculous cures 
such as Job’s.585  Despite this weakness, Tertullian’s view on disability is shaped by his 
understanding on redemption and salvation before God, not before the needs of a city 
such as Plato. 
 
3.3.1.3 The Cappadocian Fathers 
The Cappadocian fathers, writing in the fourth century C.E., argued for 
philanthropy toward disfigured adults. Basil the Great envisioned a new city for social 
outcasts and laid out instructions for life together in his work “The Long Rules” where he 
saw theoria always going hand in hand with philanthropoiea.  Gregory of Nazianzus 
argued in his Oration 14 for philanthropy in cities and appealed to all humans as being 
created in the image of God.  Finally, Gregory of Nyssa saw decomposition as a 
fundamental transformation of the human being over time as a common nature to us all.  
He wrote two particular homilies that addressed the disfigured and the poor.  Gregory of 
                                                 
584 Tertullian, Disciplinary, Moral, and Ascetical Works: Fathers of the Church, Volume 40, trans. by R. 
Arbesmann, Sr. E. J. Daily, and E.A. Quain (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press of America, 
1959): 14. 
585 Sharon V. Betcher, “Saving the Wretched of the Earth,” Disability Studies Quarterly 26:3 (Summer, 
2006).  http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/721/898   (Accessed:  February 7, 2018).   
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Nyssa advocated for the utility and functionality of all people, even when disabling 
conditions were present, "The hand is mutilated but it is not insensitive.  The foot is 
gangrenous but always able to run to God. The eye is missing, but it discerns invisible 
goodness, nonetheless, to the enlightenment of the soul if we want to be received by them 
[the lepers] in the eternal dwellings, let us receive them now."586 For Gregory of Nyssa, 
these words implied the possibility of the person with disability to pass on the beauty of 
their inward spirit, even past the outward disfigurement that kept them at bay in society.  
Some scholars describe this affect as “reverse contagion.”587  The reversal is twofold: 
first, perceived contagion is reversed in the eye of the beholder; second, the unusual 
choice for the word “contagion” (the Greek μεταδίδωμι) had the first connotation of 
compassionate sharing.588  So, the reversal became not just a changed perception; but 
instead, an actual gift to the caregiver who crosses normal societal boundaries.  Their 
work stands in contrast to the traditional views of their day; but we will see as scholarship 
continues to develop (even in the sporadic and episodic, rather than sustained 
investigation) that for every step forward toward normalizing disabled bodies within the 
social spectrum, there will soon be a step back. 
3.3.1.4 Augustine 
While the Cappadocian fathers offered steps forward for compassion in reversing 
societal perception, Augustine’s work does not advance their consideration.  At best, his 
work is often paradoxical when disability themes are explored; and at worst, his work 
                                                 
586Gregory of Nyssa De pauperibus amandis in Gregoru Nysseni Opera ed. by Arie van Heck (Leiden, The 
Netherlands: Brill Publishing, 1967), 9.1: 122-123. 
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heralds images of perfection and beauty that are damaging to disabled bodies.  Much of 
his work focuses on a view of perfection, for example, the idea that in the resurrection a 
person will be restored to his youthful vitality.  In answering that question, he may have 
been responding to the text from 1 Corinthians 15:35:  How are the dead raised? With 
what kind of body do they come?589 For Augustine, the dead will be raised into perfect 
bodies with perfect symmetry and proportionality590 expressive of his summation: “for all 
bodily beauty is the harmony of parts” (omnis enim corporos pulchritude est partium 
congruentia).591  Here, a conflation of ancient aesthetics alongside Christian teaching 
appears to infuse his views on the resurrection. 
One wonders if Augustine’s hope for the resurrection had to do with his own 
physical condition of weakened lungs,592 which he describes in Confessions: 
The pains in my chest made breathing difficult and my lungs would not no 
longer support clear and prolonged speaking.593 
 
And, along with the weakened lungs, Augustine knew the disabling effects of aging as 
bodies change and transform over time and space.  He described his condition later in life 
as, “full of complaints, coughing, phlegm, bleary eyes, besieged with various aches and 
                                                 
589 Translation from the New Revised Standard Version, 1 Corinthians 15:35. 
590 See: Candida R. Moss, “Heavenly Healing: Eschatological Cleansing and the Resurrection of the Dead 
in the Early Church” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Dec. 2011): 1008-
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pains.”594 Augustine’s vision of old age for himself is interesting in that this excerpt 
appears to show his self-focus amid his changing condition, but the broader context of the 
quote reflects his equating of his old age with a changing world.  “The world’s like a 
man;” Augustine argues, “he’s born, he grows up, he grows old…The world has grown 
old; it’s full of troubles and pressures.”595  This insight is interesting to read in light of his 
views on the resurrection where he sees the fall of Rome as an aging world that is 
perishing like our bodies.  Christ offers a vision “to put you together again when 
everything else was going to pieces”596 where youth will be renewed, like the wings of 
eagles as depicted in Psalm 103:5 and Isaiah 40:31. The implication is that resurrection in 
Christ will free the body from the disintegration and fragmentation of aging bodies in an 
aging world. 
Brian Brock speaks well to Augustine’s view of the resurrection, “the perfect 
individual pattern hidden in humanness from conception will be expressed in its fullness 
in the resurrection.”597 At best, this view expresses the potential for full imaging of the 
imago dei; at worst, it would be possible to read into this view a highlighting of 
perfection that becomes problematic for those disabled in this life.  Despite the risk this 
perspective might overly exalt perfect bodies, Augustine maintains a “principle of 
diversity” where he sees that each person will maintain his or her uniqueness in their 
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individual identity,598 even if ironically, quirks in bodies will be changed and 
transformed599.  One must wonder the implications of Augustine’s views for moral injury.  
Certainly perfection and return to an individual’s primary pattern offers hope for those 
damaged by an “aging world,” and yet, such a view dismisses disabled bodies in need of 
change.  We will return to this discussion later when we discuss contemporary theologian 
Brian S. Powers who addresses Augustine’s notion of disordered goods in that aging 
world and the effect of that disordering on human agency and willing.600 
These brief thoughts on Augustine give insight into his views on resurrection, 
bodily life and an “aging world.”  Over and above this schema, it is important to note 
Augustine’s view of the Trinity and how it might impact our notions of disability and 
moral injury. An important addition Augustine makes to Trinitarian thought is revealed in 
the second half of De Trinitate wherein he compares the inner life of the Trinity to the 
inner life of a human being.  Knowledge of God begins with exercitatio mentis (an 
exercise of the mind) that bridges the life of the soul to the life of the Trinue mystery. 
With his description of a “psychological trinity”, Augustine adds a new dimension to 
Trinitarian theology by combining the inner-workings of – memory, understanding and 
will.601  Human beings, through their memory, understanding and will, may begin to 
perceive the Trinitarian nature of God.602  Care should be taken to not reduce Augustine’s 
Trinitarian theology to the psychological trinity alone;603 and yet, we must question the 
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extent to which his assumptions of sound memory, sound understanding and sound will 
affect perceptions of those human beings whose memories, rationality and will are 
disrupted and even disabled.  Augustine knew the divine trinitarian love must be realized 
in history through the Easter mystery and the salvation narrative begun at the incarnation. 
For Augustine, Trinity points always toward an outward soteriology – not an inward 
psychology.604  Rationality, central to Augustine’s conception of the Trinity, as well as 
his construction of the human being605 created in the image of God will be a legacy that 
future scholars in the field will have to wrestle with as intellectual and moral impairments 
are considered. 
 
3.3.2 Scholarship from 500 to 1500 CE: Corpus Infirmitas and Wounds of Christ 
 In the medieval era, Thomas Aquinas and Julian of Norwich advance 
conversation of disability beyond questions of disordered society and ultimate harmony 
in the resurrection, bearing witness to vulnerable bodies.  Aquinas advocates a theology 
of baptism in relationship to his understanding of the innate vulnerability in the corpus 
infirmitas and the need for divine protection.  Julian of Norwich critiques the culture of 
her day by inviting vicarious suffering with the wounds of Christ, and disabled humanity, 
to better understand the love of God and the pain Jesus suffered. This interlude in 
scholarship is a refreshing pause between the disordered civitas of the Greeks and the 
moral judgment during the Reformation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
offers a helpful corrective and reminder here on Augustine’s Trinitarian work.  He argues that to only focus 
on the psychological image of the Trinity in Augustine is to miss his bigger project which is to draw 
believers into the “Christodramatic” narrative and the dynamism of life in the Trinity.   
604 See: Basil Studer, Trinity and Incarnation: The Faith of the Early Church (New York, NY: T&T Clark, 
1993): 167-188.   
605 We must recognize at this point that Augustine’s conception dates back to the scholarship of Plato and 




 By the time of Aquinas, this legacy of rationality is a given in the tradition dating 
back to Aristotelian views. Given the high priority placed on rational thought by Thomas 
Aquinas,606 one would imagine a system of thought within his work setting aside those 
with intellectual impairments from the possibility of a telos of a flourishing life.   
However, while Aquinas addressed physical “impairment” throughout his work – 
recognizing all human souls as impaired in various forms – most of his corpus is focused 
more to the concerns of spiritual and moral impairment.607 Miguel J. Romero helpfully 
explains that Aquinas posits what might be called a “theology of bodily weakness” where 
all humans are subject to decay over time.608  At baptism we are drawn into life with 
God, and through the transformation that occurs over a human being’s lifetime in that 
corpus infirmitas, our baptism grounds us in that love and life of God as seen in this text 
from Aquinas on Baptism:  
The spiritual regeneration effected by Baptism is somewhat like carnal birth, in 
this respect, that as the child while in the mother’s womb receives nourishment 
not independently, but through the nourishment of its mother, so also children 
before the use of reason, being as it were in the womb of their mother the 
Church, receive salvation not by their own act, but by the act of the Church.609 
 
Aquinas affirms that in the grace given at Baptism a child receives salvation through the 
Church prior to any intellectual or rational achievement.  In the same way, those with 
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intellectual impairments receive the same act of grace.  Because those who are impaired 
in wisdom and rational thought through intellectual disability are not, by themselves, able 
to separate themselves from the love and grace of God, John Berkman claims a Thomistic 
viewpoint where these individuals are actually “sacramental icons of heavenly life” since 
they are never separated from the love of God.610   
Throughout his work, Aquinas addresses amentia (profound cognitive 
impairment) and the amens (the imbecile).  He maintains a lovely “grammar of grace” for 
those with amentia.611  Lack of reason does not affect a human being’s capacity for 
relationship to God, although it may prevent that human being from fully and properly 
bearing God’s image.612  Likewise, amentia does not impede the grace-filled infusion of 
supernatural virtue.613  Someone with amens is related to God by way of ordination and 
origination.  Aquinas’ view of resurrection life is that there is continuity between our 
bodies however that continuity is through the soul.  In that resurrection moment,614 the 
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Response  (New York, NY:  Fordham University Press, 2011), 96.   
613 John Berkman, “Are Persons with Profound Intellectual Disabilities,” 94. 
614 A brief discursus on views of resurrected life and disabled bodies is helpful here. Augustine believed a 
little child who died would become at the resurrection the mature perfection of their possible youth.  Origen 
wondered how our bodies – which are in constant change and flux over time – would appear then in the 
resurrection.  He suggested an eidos  which is an image of the unchanging form.  Gregory of Nyssa thought 
that our bodies will be freed from sin in the resurrection.  Here, the Greek notions of unchanging and 
perfected forms still seems to be at play.  Contrary to Origen, Methodius of Olympus believed not in a 
spiritualized eidos, but in the physical bodily structure itself.  Aquinas too disagreed with Origen and 
claimed bodies would be perfect and physical in their resurrected life – even if some defect or lack needed 
to be claimed from another source.  For further reflections on this, see: Gilbert Meilaender, “Terra es 
animata: On Having a Life” in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives on Medical Ethics, ed. by  
Stephen E. Lammers and Allen Verhey (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Press, 1987): 390-400. 
Contemporary theologian Amos Yong, where in a powerful point he says “the body itself finds its rest in 
the unending process of being transformed by the glory of God in ways that overturn the binary 
dichotomies not only of male/female but also of disabled/nondisabled.”  Yong’s argument is that individual 
disabilities will be preserved in the eschaton and recognized as essential in the communion of saints and the 
“divine scheme of things.”  In addition to individual affirmation, there will be communal reconciliation and 
restructuring of broken societal relationships.  Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 281). Scripture offers 
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“glorified” soul overflows into our body and perfects and glorifies its bodily 
operations.615  Until that moment of glorified resurrection, Aquinas maintains the 
virtuous courage and humility of those who bear earthly bodily impairments although he 
hopes for transformation in resurrected life.616  
Aquinas’ account of the resurrection and its implication for those with disabilities 
is much in tune with his intellectual forebears,617 but stands in contrast to prominent 
views in the Greco-Roman world. For example, Candida Moss points to the story of 
Oedipus who believed he would maintain his disabling blindness in the afterlife, and to 
Virgil’s The Aeneid that assumes disabling wounds from the scars of battle would be 
preserved in the afterlife as well.  Her examples point to the presence of bodily continuity 
from this life to the next.618  The Jewish view of the afterlife began to reshape these 
beliefs by suggesting that bodies would be created anew in the resurrection. Worthy of 
note here is the implication for theologians in their accounts of disability: wrestling with 
impairment raises questions regarding the self, the other, and God as bodily limits are 
encountered.  These three spheres of life necessitate discussions of disability that are not 
just medical, but social, and even eschatological.   
                                                                                                                                                 
conflicting accounts from the scars of Jesus preserved after the resurrection in his encounter with Thomas 
to a differing account in 1 Corinthians 15 when all will be changed “in the twinkling of an eye.” 
615 John Berkman, “Are Persons with Profound Intellectual Disabilities,” 93. 
616 Miguel J. Romero, “Aquinas on the Corpus Infirmitas,” 122. 
617 See: Candida R. Moss, “Heavenly Healing: Eschatological Cleansing and the Resurrection of the Dead 
in the Early Church” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Dec. 2011): 991-
1017. She explains how Pseudo-Justin Martyr argued the resurrection of the body would lead to bodily 
perfection suggesting if Jesus can do this much on earth, “How much more will he do” through healing in 
heaven.  Pseudo-Justin Martyr saw the transformation of this world into the kingdom of God happening 
eschatalogically in the here and now.  That transformation would be completed, perfectly, in heaven.  
Irenaeus tended to agree seeing the dead rising and the walking of those who had been limp as  practically 
synonymous.  These views show the troubling conflation of sin and disability both in scripture and the 
early church, perhaps, one might call this an “exegetical model of disability.”   Augustine culminated these 
views emphasizing the substantiality of resurrection where we become “more embodied” but we would 
find the strength of our youth and the loss of all that deforms.  He envisioned a perfect aesthetic in heaven.   
618 Moss, “Heavenly Healing,” 997. 
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3.3.2.2 Julian of Norwich 
 By the fourteenth century, amid the political justice system of the medieval blood 
sanction619 as convicts were beaten and bloodied to the point of disablement, the mystic 
Julian of Norwich sought spiritual understanding of suffering, wounds and even blood.  
She sought knowledge of “every kind of pain, bodily and spiritual . . . every fear and assault 
from devils.”620  In a society fearful of pain, Julian prayed for infliction.  In a society fearful 
of disablement, Julian prayed to be wounded.  In a society fearful of bloodshed, Julian prayed 
her bleeding would draw her closer to the redeeming love of Christ.   
 When she was thirty years old, and on her deathbed, Julian received a series of 
visions disclosing the suffering of Christ appeared to Julian.  She wrote a manual known as 
The Short Text to record those sixteen visions.  Later, as she continued to reflect on their 
meaning for redemption and renewal, she wrote a piece now known as The Long Text.  While 
the existence of both texts is important historically; it is also worth of pause to note the 
distance in time passed between the two texts allowed for significant reflection, discernment 
and interpretation of her experience with suffering and its salvific meaning.   
 Julian believed she could have understanding of redemption by grace: 
I desired three graces by the gift of God. The first was to have recollection of 
Christ’s passion. The second was a bodily sickness and the third was to have, of 
God’s gift, three wounds . . . the wound of contrition, the wound of compassion, 
and the wound of longing with my will for God.621 
 
                                                 
619 Trisha Olson, “The Medieval Blood Sanction and the Beneficence of Pain: 1100-1450,” Journal of Law 
and Religion 22.1 (2006/2007):  63-129. 
620 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, trans. by E. Colledge and James Walsh (London and 
New York, 1978): 126. 
621 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, 125. 
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For Julian, redemption is not abstract but available in the here and now, even amid real 
suffering. Amy Laura Hall explains how Julian’s Revelations of Divine Love develop the 
“grammar of grace” that Aquinas exposited.622  Julian’s characterization of suffering 
describes how Christ’s body flows - into our bodies, the church body, the dismembered 
social body of the world, and into all of creation itself.  Hall sees in Julian’s work a 
“bleeding together of boundaries”623 that are both physical and social.  This imagery of 
bleeding emerged from a moment when Julian, gazing on the cross, could at first only 
cast her eye heavenward just above the cross.  When she lowered her eye to the crucifix, 
the flow of blood as a vision emerged.  Julian speaks out of bodily and cognitive 
solidarity with the body of Christ as she herself requested three wounds and a bodily 
illness so she could empathize.   
Out of the intense unity Julian finds with Christ, she knows in that unity there is 
salvation for all people.  Her vision spoke in a revolutionary way to Julian’s troubled 
time.  Blood was then seen as disordered creation.  Women were prevented from 
receiving the ‘blood’ of the Eucharist.  The plague and its aftermath had ostracized and 
outcast the sick.  Julian’s vision shows how body fragility can have generativity and not 
be something to be scared or ashamed of when experienced.624  Of importance to note 
here is how disability reshapes the body politic instead of social context and structures 
shaping or defining who and what is disabled. 
                                                 
622 Amy Laura Hall, “A Ravishing and Restful Sight: Seeing with Julian of Norwich,” in Disability in the 
Christian Tradition: A Reader, ed. Brian Brock and John Swinton (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 2012): 152-183. 
623 Amy Laura Hall, “A Ravishing and Restful Sight,” 154. 
624 Amy Laura Hall, “A Ravishing and Restful Sight,” 158.  For this insight, Amy Laura Hall draws on 
Frederic Christian Bauerschmidt, Julian of Norwich and the Mystical Body Politic of Christ (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). 
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Julian found safety in the flow of blood and tears unlike the rest of her society.  Key 
to Hall’s interpretation of Julian are the works of Mary Jo Iozzio and her nomenclature of 
“radical dependence”625 to describe the relationship between Julian’s blood and the blood 
of Christ, as well as the relationship of all humanity with Christ’s human incarnate 
bleeding. Julian reminds us that Jesus says to us: “He did not say, ‘You shall not be 
tormented, you shall not be troubled, you shall not be grieved,’ but he said, ‘You shall not 
be overcome.’”626  Julian of Norwich predates the work of Burton Cooper, Jürgen 
Moltmann and Nancy Eiesland, but her imagery of suffering, disablement and their 
potential for broken bodies to inform and guide the body of Christ foreshadow their 
work.  Julian of Norwich is to be remembered for her empathy and suffering particularly 
the depth to which she describes the sickness and wounds within her body.  Her 
vulnerability to that reality, raw as it seems, was a counterpoint to other societal 
narratives of her time that needed challenged. 
 
3.3.3 Scholarship from 1500 to 1950 CE:  Providential for one or Universal for all? 
 The conclusion of this section will probe a variety of tensions and themes in the 
historical scholarship recognizing the diversity of thinkers across time.  For now, in this 
section we pay attention to the questions of disability as circumstance, providence or 
existential state.  Martin Luther leaned toward questions of morality in his assessment of 
the disabled either as sinner or saint, monster or minister to the people.  Kierkegaard, in 
contrast, claimed disability as a universal existential state inclusive of all humanity.  The 
                                                 
625 Mary Jo Iozzio, Radical Dependence: A Theo-anthropological Ethic in the Key of Disability (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming). 
626 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love (The Short Text).  Abridged edition.  Translated by 
Elizabeth Spearing.  (London: Penguin Press, 1998):  22, 4:19. 
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questions of disordering continue, though more subtly, as do the concerns about the 
effects of disorder on civic life and even, resurrection life. 
 
3.3.3.1 Martin Luther 
Luther’s view of disability can be understood through reflecting on his theology 
of the cross which affirms that the only source of knowledge of God may be found at the 
cross itself.  Luther’s direct discussion of disability is somewhat troubling in his 
paradoxical views of disability as either monstrous or saintly.627  He is known and rightly 
critiqued for a disturbing passage wherein he encouraged the suffocation of a twelve-
year-old disabled boy with Prater-Wili syndrome who in Luther’s view who “did nothing 
else but eat and excrete.”628  The Nazis assimilated this view into their program of 
removal.  However, a story also exists of Luther encouraging the mother of a young 
disabled girl to go home and feed her and love her and for the mother to “put her trust in 
God.”629  At best, Luther may be seen as viewing individuals in their particularity 
becoming the medium for the message of God’s salvation story, as well as possessing the 
ability to articulate that story as well.   
Despite the deeply problematic ways that Luther speaks of disability at points in 
his work, his overall anthropology has constructive potential for contemporary reflection 
on disability.  Luther’s anthropology is weak in the sense that he sees humanity being 
transformed by God over time in the course of their lifespan.  Luther sees true human 
                                                 
627 Stefan Heuser, “The Human Condition as Seen from the Cross: Luther and Disability,” in Disability in 
the Christian Tradition: A Reader, ed. by Brian Brock and John Swinton, (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2012): 185. 
628 Martin Luther, Luther's Works, ed. by J. Pelikan & H.T. Lehmann, various translators. (St. Louis, MO: 
Concordia Publishing House and Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1955-1986): 54:396-397. 
629 Heuser, “The Human Condition,” 185.  Heuser draws on the 2003 movie Luther for this vignette. 
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being both at the cradle and at the cross; and so humanity’s call is always to the weak, 
vulnerable and one might surmise, disabled.630  In so doing, Hans Reinders suggests 
Luther would dismiss any “ethics of choice” toward disability; and instead, understand 
the working of a providential God who chooses for us, not against us.  Reinders also 
stresses that for Luther God’s choice matters far more than anything we might choose 
ourselves.631 Given the large corpus of Luther’s writings, his view of disability – as 
disparate as his references to it may seem at times – must always be interested through 
his theologia crucis which stands in contrast to a theologia gloriae.632 In both the light 
and the shadow of the cross, God stands with the humble and the weak revealing an 
alternate glory to the ways of the world.  From this theologia crucis, all human beings are 
to embody amor cruces, that is, the deep love of Christ offering compassion and humble 
service to those in need.633 
 
3.3.3.2 John Calvin 
 In our review of key scholars and their relationship to themes raised by disability 
(theological anthropology, morality, sin and salvation, doctrines of creation and 
resurrection)634 it is fascinating especially to understand disability through the 
                                                 
630 Heuser, “The Human Condition,” 197. 
631 Hans Reinders, “Life’s Goodness: On Disability, Genetics and ‘Choice,’ in Theology, Disability, and the 
New Genetics: Why Science Needs the Church ed. by John Swinton and Brian Brock (London and New 
York: T&T Clark, 2007): 164. 
632 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 203. 
633 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 204. 
634 Meilaender offers helpful insight regarding the particular interest in resurrection in the field of theology 
and disability.  He writes, the interest in the resurrection is “to relate the body’s history to their concept of 
the person’s optimal development.”  See: Meilaender, “Terra es animata: On Having a Life,” 390.  He 
quotes a novelist Robertson Davies through the character Ozy Froats who says, “Health isn’t making 
everybody into a Greek ideal; it’s living out the destiny of the body.”  See: Robertson Davies, The Rebel 
Angels (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 1983): 249. 
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embodiment of those who suffered in their bodily life.  For example, John Calvin knew 
suffering.  His wife died only nine years into their marriage.635  All of his children died in 
childbirth.636  In his own body he wrestled with “migraines, hemorrhoids, consumption, 
gout, kidney stones and tuberculosis.”637  One must wonder, before entering his ethical 
theological, and exegetical reflections, what a person who believed strongly in doctrines 
of depravity and predestination would make of disability considering his own experience.  
One letter Calvin wrote to a friend, Madam de Coligny, reveals an initial insight: 
“Illnesses serve us as medicine, to purify us form the desires of this world and to cut 
away what is superfluous in us.  They are messengers of death and they can teach us to 
free our feet so that we can depart from this life, whenever it pleases God.”638 
 Given the language of death and the doctrine of predestination, it is surprising to 
see glimpses of other themes in his work.  Deborah Creamer argues there are themes of 
inclusion, equality, interdependence and the relevance of embodiment in this world 
throughout his thought.  She organizes his disparate corpus into four themes:  an analysis 
of ways he exegetes specific texts on disability,639 a look at church structure and 
organization with an eye to his radical inclusion of those on the margins (see for example 
                                                 
635 Bernard Cottret, Calvin: A Biography (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2000). 
636 Alister E. McGrath, A Life of John Calvin: A Study in the Shaping of Western Culture (Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1993). 
637 Deborah Creamer, “John Calvin and Disability,” in Disability in the Christian Tradition: A Reader, ed. 
Brian Brock and John Swinton, (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2012): 218.  
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638 Machiel Van den Berg, Friends of Calvin, trans. by Reinder Bruinsma (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2009): 142. 
639 Deborah Creamer, “John Calvin,” 218.  For example, consider Calvin’s interpretation of Genesis 32:25-
32.  The limp Jacob receives from God, this new impairing disability, is a reminder of God’s strength, 
human weakness, and our humility before God.  See:  Greg Baughman, “John Calvin and Disability: 
Unique Insights from Three Perspectives,” 
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ves (Accessed online February 28, 2018): 8.  
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Draft Ecclesiastical Ordinances),640 bodily themes (i.e. the body is a prison),641 and his 
use of metaphors that use disabling language.642  Some paths to follow in Calvin’s 
thought would also include a study of inclusion in his discussion of the sacraments, his 
view that knowledge of self is knowledge of God, and his wrestling with areas of 
theodicy.643  Calvin can be called out for using language that is offensive and must be 
reckoned with:  i.e. “brute beasts”644 as language for physical impairment and “mad-men” 
as problematic language for mental impairment.  However, his overall thought should not 
be quickly dismissed and his theological complexity should be wrestled with to find 
deeper meaning and themes, particularly, I would argue for the purposes of this 
argument, regarding Calvin’s doctrine of the incarnation.645  In Calvin’s commentary on 
the Gospel of John, particularly verse 1:14 “And the Word was made flesh,”646 Calvin 
suggests that Calvin uses “made flesh” rather than “made man” to present the limits God 
would encounter entering into the new social context of human being.  He writes,  
In spite of the vast distance between the spiritual glory of the Word of God and 
the stink of our filthy flesh, the Son of God stooped so low as to take upon 
himself this same flesh which is subject to so many miseries. Flesh here means 
not, as so often with Paul, our nature corrupted by sin, but mortal men in 
general.647 
 
                                                 
640 Creamer, “John Calvin,” 218. 
641 Creamer, “John Calvin,” 219.  See for example: Elsie Anne McKee’s introduction to John Calvin, 
Writings on Pastoral Piety ed., trans. and intro. by Elsie Anne McKee (New York: Paulist Press, 2001). 
642 Creamer, “John Calvin,” 219.  See:  John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion ed. by John T. 
McNeill, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1954):  I.14.1.  Calvin speaks 
of the veil by which God hides and our inability to see God because of that blurriness, our impaired vision 
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643 Deborah Creamer, “John Calvin,” 220-222. 
644 Used often in Calvin’s commentaries – for example Hosea, Psalms, Isaiah, etc. FIX 
645 Deborah Creamer, “John Calvin,” 223. 
646 John 1:14, NRSV. 
647 John Calvin, Calvin: Commentaries translated and edited by Joseph Haroutunian and Louise Pettibone 
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By putting on “flesh” God subjects God’s very own being to a new social context, and in 
so doing, a new encounter with human limits.  Calvin predates a social model of 
disability that will be extrapolated in the next chapter, and yet, we see his thought 
straining to push beyond ideas of impairment and medicine, toward the intersection of 
human creatures in social contexts.  In so doing, whether intended or not, Calvin pushes 
back on Platonic and Aristotelian notions that disability is disorder divined by the gods 
which has repercussions for the civitas.  Instead, it will be the city itself and the social 
conventions within it that disable flesh. 
 
3.3.3.3 Soren Kierkegaard 
Two key themes from Soren Kierkegaard, Danish theologian of the nineteenth 
century, play out in his work that can inform contemporary study of disability.  First, all 
people live with a “sickness unto death” which is a desire not to be one’s self.  All of us 
are disabled, in a way, by sin and by a general state of angst.  Kierkegaard sees this as the 
biggest problem of human existence that is more troubling than any particular state of 
ability or disability.  In response to that sickness, we take “a leap of faith.”  All humanity, 
including those with various abilities, must make millions of little leaps of faith every day 
past their own insecurities, sins, abilities, disabilities.  Kierkegaard helps us to critique 
the societal norms of normalcy and he in particular does not rely on a universal standard 
of normalcy.  In contrast with the medical model of disability that will be developed after 
Kierkegaard’s lifetime, Kierkegaard’s view of the sickness unto death helps us to see that 
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all humanity is incomplete and suffering.648  In keeping with the social model of 
disability (again, Kierkegaard predates these models but foreshadows their insight), 
Kierkegaard saw how the social norms of his day created prejudices and stereotypes.649  
One key aspect of his view of that sickness unto death is that the state that creates that 
sickness is not just the internal or the physical, but that sickness is caused by a 
relationship in the world by something other than one’s self.  Kierkegaard viewed sin as 
the ultimate disability; all else paled in comparison.650  Recognizing the existential angst 
and dread in which Kierkegaard is so often known, Bill Hughes argues from a 
Kierkegaardian perspective a reversal of thought from societal codes of normative bodies 
suggesting instead:  “What is required is a critical social ontology that problematizes non-
disablement and exposes the forms of invalidation that lie at the heart of disabling 
culture.”651  In making this suggestion, Hughes encourages a more generalized sociology 
of impairment as the norm, rather than the outlier.  One wonders if Kierkegaard could 
have imagined such a world – where all, truly, are impaired – when he writes regarding 
despair: 
Just as a physician might say that there very likely is not one single living 
human being who is completely healthy, so anyone who really knows mankind 
might say that there is not one single living human being who does not despair a 
little, who does not secretly harbor an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, an 
anxiety about an unknown something or a something he does not dare to try to 
know, an anxiety about some possibility in existence or an anxiety about 
himself, so that, just as the physician speaks of going around with an illness in 
the body, he walks around with a sickness, carries around a sickness of the spirit 
that signals its presence at rare intervals in and through an anxiety he cannot 
                                                 
648 Christopher Craig Brittain, “Kierkegaard and the Abilities and Disabilities of Subjectivity,” in Disability 
in the Christian Tradition: A Reader, ed. Brian Brock and John Swinton (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. 
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explain.  In any case, no human being ever lived and no one lives outside of 
Christendom who has not despaired.652 
 
While the disability scholar might cringe at the equation here between disability and 
despair, Kierkegaard’s thought here is helpful in universalizing and normalizing 
disability as a real possibility for all people across a spectrum of human permeability and 
vulnerability over time. Much more examination of Kierkegaard’s vast, diverse and witty 
corpus is needed within disability studies; his intellect is underused in this arena. 
 
3.3.3.4 Karl Barth 
Barth is a fascinating conversation partner in the field of disability and theology 
and will be important later in chapter five as we understand the context in which Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer developed his theological construct “the orders of creation.”  In addition, 
Barth will serve as a foil for understanding the importance of Bonhoeffer’s views on 
finitude, natural law and revelation.  For now, it is helpful to understand Barth’s working 
conception of disability.  Donald Wood, author of “This Ability: Barth on the Concrete 
Freedom of Human Life,” recognizes that Barth is often seen as being removed from the 
experience of the human with his focus on Christology, scripture and revelation.653  In 
addition, Barth’s focus on the universality of the gospel makes suspect any attempt to 
cordon off his thought for a particular sub-group.  Wood recounts a story where Barth 
and a friend Heinrich Vogel discuss resurrection and the disabled.654  Vogel believes his 
                                                 
652Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, vol. XIX in Kierkegaard’s Writings.  Translated and edited 
by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980): 22. 
653 Donald Wood, “This Ability: Barth on the Concrete Freedom of Human Life,” in Disability in the 
Christian Tradition: A Reader, ed. by Brian Brock and John Swinton, (Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. 
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daughter will be freed from her impairment and will walk.  Barth envisions her disability 
being the very thing of which heaven is made and holds in high honor.  She will sit at the 
head of the banquet table and God will say to her, “I have loved: you.”655  Wood sees the 
term “disability” as functioning in Barth’s thought to invite a conversation between “the 
intersection of the individual and society.”656  And so we see in his thought a movement 
from disability being defined as a medical impairment toward a more complicated 
entanglement between the body and society.  That insight informs Barth’s view of 
covenantal community.  Because we are involved in a covenant community, we are 
called to a life of ethical responsibility toward all people.  Barth explains,  
Responsibility [Verantwortung: the actual responding] does not need to be 
advertised as an ethical programme, because 'responsibility' [Verantwortlichkeit] 
marks human life as an elemental, non-negotiable phenomenon. As creatures 
addressed by God, human beings cannot but exist 'in responsibility' 
[Verantwortlichkeit]. We live in responsibility, which means that our being and 
willing, what we do and what we do not do, is a continuous answer to the Word 
of God spoken to us as a command.657 
 
Human beings live with God as the centerpoint and full partnership of God in that 
covenant with a responsibility to act and care for all others within that covenant 
community.  Given the beauty and possibility of the covenant community now, Barth 
explores a very different approach to resurrection as he sees the resurrection not marking 
a new epoch fleeing human history.  Instead, resurrection is the “reverse” side of this 
life.658  That reverse is now hidden from us but one day it will be revealed to us.  
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Exploring this view of resurrection for disability theology would be helpful to further his 
views on eschatological transformation and what that entails for bodily life. 
 
3.3. Themes and Tensions in the Historical Scholarship on Disability 
As these varying models of disability are presented over time, some schematically 
and others by piecing together work of scholars, several themes and tensions are 
revealed. In Chapter Two, we explored the themes of morality, injury and disability 
within the psychological literature on moral injury.  In addition, through the theological 
literature review we discovered themes of embodiment, social context and limits.  All six 
of these themes are evidenced in the historical literature on disability; however, they are 
often revealed as tensions across varying viewpoints.  In these historical accounts we see 
the struggle to define, to discern disability’s relationship to the divine, to come to terms 
with one’s own changing bodies, and differing accounts of disability depending on 
whether they are accounts of bodies or minds.  While a social analysis is not fully 
developed in any of the scholarship, we begin to see the intersection between disabled 
bodies and the social systems around them.  Even more so, when attention is less focused 
on the disabled body in this world, we see in the historical accounts a wrestling with 
disability in the resurrection questioning whether there will be a return to a youthful 
pattern or the preservation of ‘scars’ from this life.  Here we will explore themes and 
tensions in the historical scholarship on disability before turning to contemporary 
scholarship and the way the legacy of these thinkers will be addressed in the future. 
Consider for example the themes within the psychological literature of morality, 
injury and disability.  A historical analysis explicates a tension between morality as 
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simplistic or complex.  Martin Luther’s account, not unlike the monstrosities in 
Augustinian thought, appears to present a simplistic conceptualization: those who are 
disabled are either monstrous or saintly.659  Perhaps Soren Kierkegaard offers a 
counterpoint to this simplicity as he wrestles with the existential nature of the sickness 
unto the death and the complexity that sickness plays out in our psyches, choices, moral 
agencies and societies.  This tension is of particular import for moral injury wherein 
returning veterans are all too often categorized in dichotomous ways by a simplistic 
societal diagnosis of “saint” or “sinner” rather than sustained attention to the complexity 
of the moral situations from which they emerged.   
With the theme of disability, as provoked by the psychological literature, insight is 
gained by looking at the scholarship on disability and resurrection life.  We see in the 
historical conversation regarding disability there is the tension between disability as a 
category that should be preserved even in the realm of resurrected life versus a disorder 
that should be rejected.   Even the scholars discussed here who preserve disability in this 
life still maintain a view that disability will be rejected in the afterlife differing from the 
Greco-Roman legacy, illumined by the story of Oedipus and Virgil’s The Aeneid, that 
preserve disability the category of disability for eternity. 
Regarding injury as a theme within the psychological literature, the historical 
documentation of disability among theologians wrestles with exactly what kind of 
“injury” disability is.  There is a tension between the scholars of the injury as one that is 
inflicted unduly by the gods versus an injury that provides an opportunity for vicarious 
                                                 
659 Stefan Heuser, “The Human Condition as Seen from the Cross: Luther and Disability,” 185. 
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suffering with God.  Hildegaard of Bingen reveals the perception of affliction when she 
writes: 
If this torturing pain which I was suffering in my body had not come from God, 
I would not have been able to live any longer. Although through all this I was 
being punished, I still spoke, sang and wrote concerning the divine vision what 
the Holy Spirit wished to announce through me.660 
 
And we see in Tertullian’s account of Job the same kind of wrestling with affliction from 
God that demands perseverance and becomes a test of obedience and faith.  Julian of 
Norwich offers a counter perspective with the view of an injury as a place for vicarious 
suffering.  The invitation to participate in the suffering of others became the prompt for 
her prayer as she invited “every kind of pain.”661 Julian’s vicarious suffering offers an 
important prompt for contemporary society that too easily compartmentalizes the 
experience of veterans.  Her theological reflection on suffering and solidarity are 
important considerations for a society that does not suffer vicariously with the experience 
of veterans on their terms.  These three themes: morality, disability and injury; and the 
tensions they reveal: simplistic morality/complex reality, preservation of disability in the 
resurrection/rejection of disability in the resurrection, and vicarious suffering with 
God/inflicted suffering by God will be helpful to remember as we continue to deepen the 
conversation between disability and moral injury.   
 The religious literature on moral injury exposited themes related to the need for 
deeper conversation on the intricacies of embodiment and medicalization, social contexts 
and the social construction of moral injury, and the implications of changing moral limits 
across varied contexts.  The historical review of disability reflections by philosophers and 
                                                 
660 Monk Godefridus et al., The Life of the Holy Hildegard (Collegeville, MN.: Liturgical Press, 1995): 62-
63. 
661 Julian of Norwich, Showings, 126. 
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theologians ranging from Plato, to Julian of Norwich to Karl Barth, reveals tensions 
related to these themes as well.  With the question of embodiment, there is the tension 
between perfection and transformation.  Aristotle and Augustine, for example, highlight 
themes of perfection in their hopes for disabled bodies to not disorder society and for 
resurrected bodies to return to their youthful perfection.  On the other hand, Aquinas and 
Gregory of Nyssa speak to the possibility of transformation that exists when human 
beings embrace the reality that their bodies will change and decay over time and invite 
into that eschatological journey the possibility of divine knowledge and participation.  
 The historical literature on disability speaks with greater insight than might be 
suspected to the complexities of disability and its relationship to society.  The tension 
here exists between disability as a societal impediment and disability as a societal 
intersection.  Plato, for example, viewed disability as an impediment to the good ordering 
of society and Aristotle agreed, suggesting, perhaps the disabled could factor into a 
society’s downfall if the disabled were allowed to live.   Karl Barth offers an alternative 
view, as perceived through the scholarship of Donald Wood, that disability is a revelation 
of the intersection between an individual and the society in which they live.  That 
intersection invites reflection, responsibility and a renewed commitment to covenantal 
community.   
 Finally, the third emphasis in the religious literature on moral injury explores the 
lack of interest in the concept of “limits.”  Without the recognition of limits in relation to 
human experience, the category of moral injury fails to explain the complexity of 
morality and its potential disabling within and across various social contexts.   The 
implications of this issue are subtle, but still relevant and present within the review of the 
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historical literature on disability.  One tension here lies between limits as obstacles and 
limits as opportunities.  Consider, for example, Martin Luther’s view of the young man 
with Prater-Wili syndrome.  Luther’s simplistic conceptualization of him as someone 
who “did nothing else but eat and excrete” fails to recognize the possibilities inherent 
within this young man in certain contexts; and so, Luther perceives his disability solely as 
an obstacle.  John Calvin, offers an alternate position with some theological complexity, 
as he sees the opportunity involved when certain limits are engaged with possibility.  The 
incarnation takes on limits within a certain context as God takes on flesh and in so doing, 
takes upon God’s own being the possibility of decay and disability.  These three themes: 
embodiment, social constructs and limits within contexts reveal certain tensions in the 
historical review of disability: perfection/transformation; impediment/intersection; and 
obstacle/opportunity. 
 Across these themes and tensions, we begin to see the conceptualization of 
disability as revelatory.662  The crux of the revelation may differ, but the deliver of the 
message is still a transcendent God.  The missive varies: a Judeo-Christian663 divine 
judgment regarding sin,664 a Platonic response to a disordered world, a Pauline reminder 
of our weakness and God’s strength, a Cappadocian reversal, or an opportunity to suffer 
along with Christ as Julian of Norwich reminds us.   Even if these views appear dated; it 
is important to note two things: first, echoes of these views can resonate today and 
second, new messages voiced are important to note.  Across the scholarship, one message 
                                                 
662 Elaine Ledgerwood, “Saints Not Sinners:  An Investigation into the “Positive” Constructions of 
Disability by the Historical Church,” Colloquium 42:1 (2010): 95.     
663 See for example:  Mary Elise Lowe, ““Rabbi, Who Sinned?” Disability Theologies and Sin” Dialog: A 
Journal of Theology 51:3 (Fall 2012): 185-194. 
664 Carol Thomas, Female Forms: Experiencing and Understanding Disability (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1999): 57. 
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remains clear:  disability reveals "everyone's vulnerability to weakness, pain and 
death"665 and societal implications for that vulnerability.  But perhaps, of most 
importance, is the earliest explanation for that revelation given to disability in ancient 
times by the Greeks.  Disability was understood as disorder by the gods.666 Everyone in 
that ancient society was subject to the potential for that disordering and the havoc it 
would create for bodies and for society.  Is it possible, that moral injury proves the 
reverse to be true?  Whether ancient Achilles or modern day Billy Lynn,667 is the morally 
injured veteran deemed to be the former “god” who has now become fundamentally and 
irreversibly disordered?668 Perhaps this is the reason for Boudreau’s knee-jerk reaction in 
too easily categorizing moral injury as a disability. As disability scholarship progresses 
across the centuries into more robust and sustained accounts, the disordering of disability 
begins to shift from the work of the gods to the structures of civilizations. 
 
3.4 Contemporary Scholarship on Disability 
Against the background of these historical theologians, several of whom let 
“disability be a sign of moral imperfection or divine retribution for sin,”669 contemporary 
scholars in disability strive toward liberative models, even though they too upon occasion 
                                                 
665 Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability (New York, NY: 
Routledge Press, 1996): 60. 
666 Caspary, “The Patristic Era,” 24. 
667 Achilles is the soldier at the center of Homer’s Iliad.  Billy Lynn is the title character of Ben Fountain’s 
novel turned screenplay Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk. 
668 Jonathan Shay would agree with the premise for this assessment.  He outlines the ‘god-like’ character of 
the berserk state in Achilles in Vietnam (84 – 86).  He writes: “Gods are immortal; man is moral.  Gods 
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669 Eiesland, The Disabled God, 71. 
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instrumentalize, demonize and/or valorize disability and its potential for suffering.670 
These scholars are important for “conserving”671 the category of disability and 
negotiating questions of embodiment, systemic societal structures and limits.  A careful 
overview of scholars Nancy Eiesland, Sharon V. Betcher, Jennie Wiess Block, Amos 
Yong, Thomas Reynolds, Molly Haslam, Hans Reinders, Amy Laura Hall, Stanley 
Hauerwas, and Rosemarie Garland-Thomson will certainly orient us to the field, even if it 
is not entirely comprehensive. After reviewing this scholarship here in Chapter Three, we 
will examine in Chapter Four two key models of disability that emerge, and at times 
blend, within these contemporary sources: a medical model of disability and, a social 
(also known as the minority) model of disability.  Review of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each model will then pave the way for an alternative model, the limit 
model, presented by Deborah Creamer.  In this discussion of disability scholarship and 
key models for disability, it will be important to keep in mind the ongoing conversation 
with moral injury and the potential scholarship on disability has for resourcing and 
response. 
 To order this review, to continue to deepen the overall argument of this study, 
and, to respect the representative voices of Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon; the 
scholarship in this contemporary review will be organized into three categories: 
scholarship that focuses on disability and the need for deeper engagement with liberation 
theology, scholarship that wrestles with disability through an analysis of society, and 
                                                 
670 Again, it is important to remember the caution and challenge of Brian Brock who recommends gracious 
readings with an eye toward constructive criticism in order to move scholarship, and humanity, forward 
along a continuum of growth and learning.  See: Brock, “Introduction: Disability and the Quest for the 
Human,” 11. 
671 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 339. 
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scholarship that highlights particular theological doctrines and their importance for 
disability studies.  Here we remember the second of our three options for drawing 
disability into discussion with moral injury: the conceptual frameworks (not the precise 
definition) of disability have something valuable to offer the field of moral injury. 
 To be clear, the ten scholars to be reviewed in the contemporary scholarship on 
disability offer a small sample of the vast, excellent work achieved in this area since 
Eiesland’s publication of The Disabled God in 1994 and Burton Cooper’s Theology 
Today article “The Disabled God” in 1992.  The past twenty-five years of scholarship is 
rich with anthropological insight, theological complexity, and sociological challenge. The 
conceptions presented here serve as a gleaning and point toward larger conversations 
across the scholarship.   
 
3.4.1 The Framework of Liberation and Disability: Eiesland, Block, Betcher   
 The first framework through which to examine disability scholarship in the 
contemporary era is through the nexus of liberation.  Liberation theology seeks to free 
those entangled in just structures of economic, social, corporate life thereby releasing 
those entangled within them from those “architectural and attitudinal”672 barriers that 
function in meta, systemic and hyper-complex ways affecting individual human life.  
Nancy Eiesland is to be credited with beginning this conversation in the scholarship of 
disability and her legacy of liberation continues to this day. 
3.4.1.1 Eiesland 
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While Nancy Eiesland is credited with the powerful phrase “The Disabled God,” 
she is indebted to two theologians that are worthy of note to set the stage for her 
liberation framework.  First, Burton Cooper published an essay “The Disabled God” in 
Theology Today in 1992 prior to her publication of the eponymous book. The strength of 
Cooper’s essay is his willingness to use disability as a lens through which to ask some of 
the hardest theological questions:  how do we understand God’s perfection?  What sense 
do we make of suffering?  And, what does hope mean for disabled and nondisabled in 
this life and the next?673  Cooper addresses the first question on perfection by suggesting 
there are only two possibilities; either God is complete in eternity and perfect therein or 
God’s perfection is made clear in Christ and his suffering.674  Cooper stands with Jürgen 
Moltmann and Dietrich Bonheoffer who see God’s identity to be clarified in the cross of 
Christ and the participation with the suffering of the world.  With this, one might place 
the metaphor of “disabled” upon God, but he notes that caution and care should be used 
with this symbol.675   
Regarding the question of suffering, one of the first theological issues that must 
be untangled is whether or not suffering is a result of sin.  Too often theodicy gets 
entangled with these three basic elements:  God is behind all events, God can overcome 
all powers within these events, meaning can be found within suffering from the power of 
God.  In response to this, Cooper offers a fascinating counterpoint.  What if God were not 
the power beneath and behind all things?  Instead, what if God were a “lure for 
                                                 
673 Cooper, “The Disabled God,” Theology Today 49:2 (July 1992), 173-174. 
674 Cooper, “The Disabled God,” 175. 
675 Cooper, “The Disabled God,” 177. 
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things”?676   That is, what if God called free human beings into the divine relationship 
through ever-growing love and greater and greater creativity?  Because of God’s ever-
present care and concern in that luring one dimension we can understand of God’s 
‘disability’ is through the concreteness677 of God’s love for the disabled person and the 
suffering and empathy God feels in that moment of care.  Cooper points to the Biblical 
story of Matthew 25:31-46 and the great judgment to help us see God’s disabling in each 
of the moments of poverty, hunger, estrangement, and might we add disability.678  God’s 
ability comes not in a power that is able to do all, end all, be all.  But instead, “ables”679 
us to overcome suffering with meaning, power, purpose, creativity and compassion for 
ourselves and for each other.  Cooper’s response to the question of resurrection hope and 
eternal life is that the full personality of the person enters into communion with God and 
that personality has been shaped by a lifetime of living with a disability.680   
A second theologian important to Eiesland is Jürgen Moltmann who envisioned a 
“crucified God”681 that became central to Cooper and Eiesland’s vision of God who 
understands pain, suffering, difference and disabling conditions.  Moltmann contends that 
when all of life is viewed as a gift, and vulnerability is accepted as a basic state of our 
humanity made clear through the image of the crucified God, then clear lines of ability 
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and disability recede.682 With an eye to liberation, Moltmann believes God is on the side 
of the poor, but also, God will side as well with those who oppress the marginalized. It is 
the work of the church to call that reconciliation into being as an act of hope for the 
kingdom of God in this world.683   
Nancy Eiesland offered the 1994 publication The Disabled God: Toward a 
Liberatory Theology of Disability that became a groundbreaking piece in the field of 
disability and theology. In that work, she does not draw directly on the eponymous essay 
of Burton Cooper, though, it is listed in her bibliography.  She does make explicit 
reference to Moltmann’s eschatological image of a disabled Jesus that she contends calls 
the church to “a communion of justice.”684  As the church struggles for justice, the body 
of Christ becomes the proleptic image of the eschatological Christ.  She draws on 
Moltmann who argued:  
The one who is to come is then already present in an anticipatory sense in 
history in the Spirit and the word, and in the miserable and the helpless.  His 
future ends the world’s history of suffering and completes the fragments and 
anticipations of his kingdom which are called the church.685 
For Moltmann, Eiesland and Cooper the disablement of God in Christ becomes a 
prototype through which to reexamine all of the churches doctrines, practices, liturgies, 
missions, scriptures, symbols and metaphors.686 The broken body is not just sacramental; 
it is pastoral, it is a call to justice, it is eschatological. Here, the disability scholarship 
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challenges current work in moral injury to consider the same.  How are the morally 
disrupted bodies, minds and spirits of returning veterans challenging the church to 
reinterpet issues of justice, liturgy, and even eschatology?  Eiesland offers first steps 
forward, informed by her intellectual predecessors Moltmann and Cooper. 
Prior to Eiesland’s work, scholarship in the field was often sporadic (as in the 
case of the historical Christian scholarship on disability explored in the previous section), 
exegetical,687 or pastoral.688 During her career, scholars such as Dawn Devries, Andrew 
Purves and Stanley Hauerwas were just beginning to write more robust essays and books 
on theological doctrine and their implications for disability.689 Eiesland stands out in the 
field for her singular, extensive book on disability and theology informed by her personal 
experience. She recognized two trends persistent in the conversation between disability 
and theology in the historical tradition: first, the tendency to correlate the category of 
tragedy to disability and second, the tendency to romanticize, and even heroize, those 
with disabilities and their rise above suffering.690  Eiesland cautions against both 
approaches in her seminal work The Disabled God.  Following in the line of Jürgen 
Moltmann’s “crucified God” and Burton Cooper’s Theology Today article “The Disabled 
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God,”691 Eiesland speaks from her experience and draws on an emancipatory 
methodology of liberation to carry out her project.  After laying out a theological method 
drawing on the work of Rebecca Chopp’s “critical praxis correlation,”692 she explains the 
social construction of disability and suggests a liberatory theology of disability that will 
ultimately pry open the constraints of the social construction.  Eiesland relies on the 
embodied stories of Diane DeVries693 and Nancy Mairs694 to compare and contrast 
various “bodies of knowledge.”  These stories matter in Eiesland’s overall project 
because they help empower the embodied voices of those living within various 
circumstances.  Both DeVries and Mairs disdain the tragic approach to disability, while 
still maintaining the ability to grieve.  Both see in their experiences the possibility of 
creative knowledge and integral relationships as joys within their embodied experience.  
Chapters three and four look at the structure of society and the structure of scriptures and 
churches to unearth disabling tropes and boundaries and search for ways forward.  
Eiesland laments how little the church has followed and responded to the Americans with 
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Disabilities Act of 1990.695  Within the structure of the church, Eiesland laments the 1980 
passing of the ALC’s statement “The Church and Persons with Handicaps:  Unmasking a 
Hidden Curriculum of the Christian Community”696 and then five years later barring as a 
body people with significant physical or mental handicaps from ordination.   
When Eiesland pictures a disabled God, this God does not fall into those tropes of 
either tragic figure (consider from the historical review Augustine and Martin Luther) or 
saint (consider Tertullian and Julian of Norwich).  Instead, this God is “not an 
omnipotent, self-sufficient God, but neither a pitiable, suffering servant….I beheld God 
as a survivor, unpitying and forthright.”697  Such an image of a disabled God has 
profound theological implications as it de-centers the conversation and begins a 
transformative process having initiated the working metaphor from “concrete 
existence.”698 What would it look like, one must wonder, if the imago dei itself were not 
as imagining ‘perfect’ Godhead, but a broken body? Eiesland’s vision of a disabled God 
normalizes nonconventional bodies and calls the church to imagine new forms of justice.  
Eiesland concludes with reflections on sacramental bodies and a concluding liturgy for 
sacramental practice.699  The Eucharist is the ultimate broken body and “affirms our 
existence as painstakingly, honestly and lovingly embodied beings.”  The Eucharist calls 
all within the church to be very attentive to our embodiment and the embodiment of God 
in Christ.700 
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3.4.1.2 Jennie Weiss Block 
Catholic theologian Jennie Weiss Block envisions a “theology of access” that 
draws on a model of liberation and offers critique to the church to be hospitable in 
architecture and attitudes, liturgy and hymns, nearly a decade after Eiesland’s concerns 
were raised from a liberation standpoint as well. Block’s work on theologies of liberation 
and the view of “the accessible God”701 she presents in her 2002 work Copious Hosting: 
A Theology of Access for People with Disabilities are noted by Deborah Creamer702 as 
instructive along with Eiesland’s model of “the disabled God”703 and Kathy Black’s 
model of “the interdependent God.”704  
Block’s methodology is twofold:  first, she draws on the revisionist/correlational 
model of David Tracy.705  Second, she works with a theology of liberation.706  Both of 
these help her to accomplish three tasks:  to explain the disability movement to Christian 
theologians, to examine Christian ‘texts’ (scripture, liturgy and Sacraments) from a 
disability perspective and to present a theology of access that ultimately leads to 
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vulnerability and friendship.  The title of her book is a phrase from Edward Schillebeeckx 
who described Jesus as a “copious gift of God.”707  Block believes the church can model 
this kind of copious hosting where there is an abundant supply of all that is needed for 
everyone at the table of Christ.  Her theology of access provides an enlarged Christian 
anthropology, a deepened theology of embodiment, and a new form of exegesis of the 
Scripture texts that speak to disability, a greater hospitality within liturgy and sacrament, 
a deepened spirituality and ultimately a liberatory response to the oppression of those 
who are disabled.  She uses the language of Gustavo Gutierrez who describes the 
“irruption of the poor”708 as those erased from history, now becoming a part of the story.  
This too is the same for those with disabilities as this liberatory movement increases.  She 
critiques an “ableist” bias in scriptures as well as the “healing cult” within the Christian 
tradition aiming to “fix” through faith healing.709  In fact, she makes clear to note the 
‘disabling’ of Jesus that occurred before his death.710 Access, for Block, is a mystical and 
moral necessity that can be heightened through deepened pneumatology and an 
ecclesiology that is self-critical and willing to change.711   
A theology of access reminds all that God is not present to us on our own terms 
but instead in ways that invite our deepest hospitality and vulnerability. 712 Jesus as 
copious host has abundant supply, plenty of resources of mercy, grace, inclusion, love 
and acceptance for all people.  Block’s twofold method of correlation and liberation 
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leverages new readings of traditional texts to find a deepened theology of access and a 
broadened sense of copious inclusion. 
3.4.1.3 Sharon V. Betcher 
Theologian and disabled scholar Sharon V. Betcher serves as a counterpoint to 
Eiesland and Block as she takes an alternative approach to a framework of disability and 
liberation.  She disagrees with Eiesland that a methodology of liberation is helpful for 
disability arguing that the general public does not conceive disability in terms of 
oppression and exclusion, but instead comprehends disability as impairment first and 
foremost.713 For Betcher, ideas of normalcy and degeneracy, told within the miracle 
stories of Scripture and preached through Christian missions, have become oppressors 
rather than liberators throughout the history of colonization as they have been 
operationalized.714 “Crip bodies,” Betcher contends, become objects of capitalist 
economics, unjust systems and colonizing missions through the Christian tradition.715 As 
her work in this area develops, bodies become for Betcher “the materializations of social 
structures”716 while our flesh is “an ever-changing materialization of spirit in finitude.”717  
Here, Betcher takes a slightly more positive view of flesh than does John Calvin, 
however, her sentiments echo his.  “Flesh” for John Calvin, implied that God would 
                                                 
713 Sharon V. Betcher, Feminist and Disability Theologies on the Edge of Post-Humanist Discourse” 
Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 26:2 (Fall, 2010): 123.  This essay is a response by Sharon V. 
Betcher in a roundtable honoring the work of Nancy Eiesland.   
714 Sharon V. Betcher, “Saving the Wretched of the Earth,” Disability Studies Quarterly 26:3 (Summer, 
2006).  http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/721/898   (Accessed:  February 7, 2018.) See also: Capretto, “On Not 
Operationalizing Disability,” 909. 
715 Betcher, “Saving the Wretched of the Earth.” 
716 Betcher, “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh,” 123. 
717 Betcher, “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh,” 123. 
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encounter limits within the social world of human beings.718 While our bodies might 
become infused with unwelcome social judgments and barriers, our flesh invites 
transcendent transformation for life in this world.  This transformation of the flesh is 
“ever-changing” and becomes a “materialization” of the effervescent spirit moving and 
changing and evolving within the limits of finitude.  
Betcher develops this distinction between flesh and body in her book Spirit and 
the Politics of Disablement where she continues to untangle the nuances between flesh 
and body.  Bodies, Betcher argues, are the “objectified form of our social 
engagements.”719 In suggesting this conception of bodies, Betcher invites consideration 
of the fossilization of social entanglements within our bodies: social structures, 
environmental toxins,720 societal stereotypes, the gaze of the other, particular laws all 
become embedded within our bodies.  Her argument complicates any easy filtering of the 
body into normalcy or not.  Even more so, her conceptualization of the flesh beyond 
bodies invites further complications in thinking.  Flesh is the entanglement of our bodies, 
                                                 
718 John Calvin,  Calvin Commentaries   Translated and edited by Joseph Haroutunian and Louise Pettibone 
Smith  (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1958): 163.  
719 Betcher, “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh,” 123.   
720 Betcher’s views are seen as she applies these concepts in her essay, “Disability and the Garden State.” 
Betcher adds ecology to the conversation between theology and disability.  Herself an “eco-theologian” she 
names the anthropocene as a “disabling environment,” critiques certain concepts of disability, examines the 
concept of “social flesh” and claims herself as a self-called “crip” an “earth-assemblage” of sorts.  She 
builds first on the misnomer that human disability is an “individualized” problem rather than a communal 
one.  Her naming of the anthropocene as a disabling era relies on the work of Steingraber, Estabrook, 
Robbins and Dracos all of whom provide statistics and stories that link disability to ecology. All of these 
create new acts of injustice as this “slow violence” relocates dangerous industries across the globe causing 
ecological damage and communal injustice.  Betcher invites us to consider this “slow violence” as it passes 
through the generations and “folds of flesh, releasing its unnecessary mutations.” This linking of ecology, 
disability and theology helps theologians first and foremost to reconsider “flesh” as social, rather than 
individual.  Social disablement, by ecological terror, then falls into the structure of the dominant culture’s 
medical and social views of disability.   See: Sharon V. Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State” 
Religious Studies News.  
 http://rsnonline.org/index47ae.html?option=com_content&view=article&id=1462:of-disability-and-the-
garden-state&catid=25:spotlight-on-theo-educ&Itemid=1620.  (Accessed October 10, 2014). 
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shaped by their encounters with the world, with something of the Spirit.  Betcher’s 
argument in her book points to the way that even the wonderful and holy notion of the 
Holy Spirit can become politicized as the Spirit drives for an idealized “wholeness” that 
is heralded within political structures and laws.  Betcher accomplishes three tasks:  flesh 
complicates the idea of normalcy, flesh becomes a conversation point across disciplines, 
and flesh invites a deeper conversation in the area of pain that is too often 
compartmentalized to bodies alone and does not recognize the role of the spirit.721  
 Betcher works to normalize some disability by drawing on the words of 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson who says disability is “the transformation of the flesh as it 
encounters world.”722  Betcher sees this social flesh materialize in her own body, as crip, 
as an “earth assemblage.” Through this lens, Betcher herself becomes “social flesh.” 
While Betcher’s essay may appear irrelevant at first glance to questions of disability and 
moral injury, her reflections are surprisingly prescient as she describes an interaction 
between body, flesh, society and spirit that can either enable, or disable.  The colonizing, 
oppressing and unjust effects of social flesh are worthy of consideration as we draw 
moral injury into conversation with disability.  Social flesh, for Betcher, is in need of the 
liberatory work of an unpoliticized Holy Spirit.723 And, disability study is in need of 
complex notions of the finitude and vulnerability of the flesh in the face of systems that 
                                                 
721 Betcher, “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh,” 123. 
722 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State.”  See: Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “The Case for 
Conserving Disability,” Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 9:3 (September 2012), 342. 
723 Betcher, Spirit and the Politics of Disablement, 48. 
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work against bodies to oppress.  She makes clear, “Disability is just something that 
happens to flesh, that occasions our persistent negotiation with limits and finitude.”724 
Eiesland, Block and Betcher pave the way through their frameworks of liberation from 
unjust social structures toward considerations of disability that address directly questions 
of social analysis, including medical critique and ethical response. 
 
3.4.2 The Framework of Social Analysis and Critique: Reinders, Hall and Hauerwas 
 As scholarship in the field of disability continues to progress, the issues facing the 
field are as futuristic as the potential for transhumanism and yet as ancient as those 
questions facing Plato, Aristotle and Tertullian about the ethics of abortion amid the 
possibility of disability.  Scholars such as Hans Reinders, Amy Laura Hall and Stanley 
Hauerwas contemplate issues of ethical norms, societal programs, and prenatal testing. 
Their work conveys mastery of the discipline with the vulnerability of the human heart; 
all three scholars offering wisdom, discernment and guidance to individuals and 
institutions facing the complexity of human life in contemporary society. 
 
3.4.2.1 Hans S. Reinders 
Ethicist Hans S. Reinders invites in his analytical work The Future of the 
Disabled in a Liberal Society: An Ethical Analysis a lingering reflection on the subtle, 
and often blatant, discrimination at hand in prenatal testing, the diagnosis of disability 
and state support for those who are disabled.725  His work provides a different angle then 
                                                 
724 Betcher, “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh,” 109. 
725 Hans S. Reinders, The Future of the Disabled in Liberal Society:  An Ethical Analysis (Notre Dame, IL: 
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many examined here so far, but is worthy of note for the questions he raises regarding 
care for the disabled, particularly care for the disabled when it is known prior to birth that 
a child will come into this world with a disability.  Reinders will prove to be a fascinating 
conversation partner as we consider moral injury as a disability; and then, wrestle with 
the consequences of societal responsibility.  And, to make the point perfectly clear, 
provide accountability for societal consequences when the military-industrial-complex 
knows in advance the disabling of body, mind and spirit that can occur through the 
weapons and mechanisms of war. 
Reinders lives in the Netherlands where euthanasia is supported by the state as a 
viable option for those in crisis.726  With this ‘liberal’ background to his study, we 
become clear from his argument how detrimental this policy can be to those with 
disabilities of all kinds.  His concern with prenatal testing is how that moment can have a 
trajectory over the lifespan of all people who might then receive a negative devaluation of 
their own lives with the choices made after the testing.727  Reinders critiques the 
utilitarian ends of such policies and their wider social implications.  As selective abortion 
post pre-natal testing becomes more widespread, then the consequences of parental 
choice for those who choose otherwise become more complicated in a liberal society.728  
If a parent ‘chooses’ to have a complicated child, where does the burden of support then 
fall – onto the taxpayers or onto the parents who made the choice?  There are dangerous 
possibilities at play here that demand a finely tuned ethical eye to how policies play out 
across a complex spectrum.  Reinders pushes society to consider life as a gift in the midst 
                                                 
726 Reinders, The Future of the Disabled, 5. 
727 Reinders, The Future of the Disabled, 52. 
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of finitude.729  Instead of seeing only the need for societal responsibility, he invites social 
relationality as full of possibility and wonder. He invites a more robust conversation 
between theological resources and contemporary moral life.  In the end, he pushes for a 
more complex understanding of suffering that is not presumed by an outside society and 
is upheld by religious resources for naming lament.730  Real concern remains for the 
disabled, and those who “choose” disability in a liberal society.  Because of this solidarity 
is less and less possible, even though liberal societies herald inclusion, equal opportunity 
and access. Jean Bethke Elshstain, in a review article, offers a helpful summary:  “over 
time our capacity to recognize, to welcome, to support, and to care for human persons 
who lives seems to us entirely pointless and burdensome will collapse.”731  She surmises 
and agrees with Reinders assessment that liberal society can at times corrode our “moral 
intuitions.”732  As we continue to link disability to moral injury, the question of societal 
responsibility and guilt will grow in importance.  For now, it is important to remember 
the phrase “limited horizon of choice”733 for veterans who make difficult moral choices 
with few options.  For a liberal society, where choice is “paragon,”734 how will society 
reincorporate those who made difficult choices, choices so difficult that they had 
disabling effects? 
 
3.4.2.2 Amy Laura Hall 
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732 Elshtain, “What Counts as a Person,” 25. 
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Issues of genetic testing and pre-natal choice are areas of scholarship and interest 
for Amy Laura Hall.  She provides a thought provoking book review (Expecting Adam by 
Martha Beck, Testing Women, Testing the Fetus by Rayna Rapp, The Future of the 
Disabled in Liberal Society by Hans S. Reinders and Choosing Naia by Mitchell 
Zuckoff) worthy of note here,735 illumined by the theological concept of hospitality.  And 
one theological step further, the concept of interruption as a real dynamic within 
hospitality and also within raising children, particularly children with disabilities.  She 
begins by looking at Rapp’s work on “the social impact of amniocentesis in America” 
that is calling upon women to be “moral pioneers”736 in the decisions they make.  Rapp 
probes deep in untangling the motives and methods available to these moral pioneers.  
However, Hall asks her to go deeper by calling upon the possible “prophetic witness” of 
women who make unconventional choices.737  Rapp’s anthropological approach belies 
the testimonial nature of her work as well:  Rapp has taken the tests and made tough 
choices. Rapp draws on the language of another scholar who describes a “kinship of 
affliction”738 for both children with disabilities such as Down Syndrome, and even for 
their parents and families.   
Hall notes that Reinders’ work examines the dilemma that arises in a society 
when prenatal testing emerges in better and better forms in a society, so that, when 
families choose whether or not to have a child with special needs there are then societal 
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implications.  He wonders whether societies will fund disability services, which is truly, a 
question of hospitality.  He hopes for a world where relationships and the responsibilities 
they demand will be unconditional.  This kind of hospitality and the prophetic witness it 
demands is an act of a robust Christian imagination.  In turn, Beck’s work Expecting 
Adam is a testament to the inhospitable arena of an Ivy League graduate school, one that 
is countered only by a myriad of “puppeteers” and “angels” who nudge her to truly 
accept her Down Syndrome son-to-be Adam.  Hall highlights the inefficiency of 
hospitality and all its interruptions over and against a “society bent on efficiency.”739  If 
we want to make the courageous choice to expect and accept Adam, such moral pioneers 
– moms, public witnesses, extended families, the society and the church – must work 
against a world that all too often is determined to reject Adam. 
Hall’s review offers surprising resources as we consider moral injury as a 
potential disability; as well as accessing disability resources to strengthen our 
conceptualization and care of the morally injured.  Just as Rapp recognizes “moral 
pioneers”, one of the reasons for the state of the morally injured today is their venture 
into territories of modern warfare heretofore been unexplored.  Resources are not existent 
for mapping the moral landscape they enter – both for the mother anticipating genetic 
testing, and the soldier entering new arenas of conflict.  Reinders reckons with the 
choices those moral pioneers make and wonders whether society has the resources to live 
with their choices.  Again, an echo of the territory our morally injured veterans now find 
themselves upon return home.  Beck’s work should not be taken lightly in this 
conversation as well.  Are we rejecting Lieutenant Adam upon return home because of 
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our “society bent on efficiency,” or expecting Adam and the interruptions and 
inefficiencies his new life will demand? 
 
3.4.2.3 Stanley Hauerwas 
 Stanley Hauerwas has written extensively on the topic of disability, inclusion and 
hospitality in the life of the church with an eye toward the beloved community of God in 
Christ.740  Brief note will be made here of a short but significant essay, helpful for our 
ongoing conversation regarding disability, moral injury and morality.  In his essay, “Must 
a Patient Be a Person to Be a Patient?  Or, My Uncle Charlie Is Not Much of a Person 
But He is Still My Uncle Charlie,”741 Hauerwas enters here a conversation that seems to 
him to have suddenly come to light – what does it mean to be a person?  He argues that 
society is looking to a definition of personhood for health care, rather than see “what only 
a substantive community and story can do.”742  He begins with looking to Paul Ramsey 
who emphasizes that no person should be used toward the good of another person.  
Hauerwas says this is Ramsey’s Kantian protection on what is all too utilitarian an 
approach in medicine today.743  Perhaps, according to Hauerwas, the striving to define 
personhood is mobilized by a permissive rather than a protective tendency; if someone is 
not a person, then perhaps we are permitted to let the other have more rights rather than 
protecting the one who is vulnerable and needs those rights saved.  Hauerwas criticizes 
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modern medicine for losing its “story” amid our society.  There is a vacuum in consensus 
when it comes to the collective moral beliefs of our society.  Leaning toward story, 
particularly the stories formed by faith communities, might mean a change in life span, 
cure, and technology.  But so doing, might ensure greater emphasis on “how we choose 
to survive” rather than on our simple “survival.”744  So doing, may be a different plan for 
Uncle Charlie because of his story and his community.  Hauwerwas’ account challenges 
our culture’s tendency toward medicalization while rejecting deeper views of 
embodiment.  He values story as a vehicle to move us forward where our morality might 
be otherwise lacking.  And, he provides a vision for alternative structures of society that 
disallow disabling, and encourage enabling through story-formed community.745 
 
3.4.3 The Framework of Theological Doctrine: Haslam, Yong and Reynolds 
 As we consider different frameworks for perceiving insight into disability today, 
an important lens to explore disability is through deep engagement with theology and the 
various doctrines presented throughout Christian history.  Scholars like Molly Haslam, 
Amos Yong and Thomas Reynolds compel accounts of disability that invite us to take 
very seriously the claims made by Christian theology.  Haslam asks us to consider our 
theological anthropology with full knowledge of intellectual disability and its 
repercussions for relationality.  A robust vision of pneumatology, is for Yong, a 
kaleidoscopic lens through which to interpret disability with regard to the church.  
Reynolds prompts consideration of human vulnerability with regard to the doctrines of 
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creation and redemption.  Each of these scholars invites us to do two things: first, to draw 
disability into conversation with traditional theology to expose weaknesses within 
particular doctrines; and second, to allow theology to more fully guide and shape our 
wholehearted response to disability. 
 
3.4.3.1 Molly C. Haslam 
With so many scholars addressing primarily physical disabilities, theologian 
Molly C. Haslam critiques the western bias toward ‘reason’ that reveals a bias toward 
body and a neglect of those who are intellectually impaired in her book A Constrcutive 
Theology of Intellectual Disability: Human Being as Mutuality and Response. When 
humans are categorized by their abilities for ‘reasoning’ or even by their ability to 
cognitively ‘be in relation’, there is a quiet exclusion of those with profound intellectual 
disabilities that might not be able to participate in either of those categories of relating.  
Haslam becomes a fascinating conversation partner, even hypothetically, with Nancy 
Eiesland and her conception of the disabled God.  Eiesland offers a portrait of God in a 
sip-puff wheelchair; and yet, can we imagine the visceral metaphor continuing through 
the lens of Haslam’s work to include a God who is intellectually disabled?  
Haslam argues for an understanding of humanness as ‘responsiveness’ that does 
not require a particular intellectual capacity.746 She suggests an avoidance of turning 
‘inward’ toward a particular capacity such as reason and an avoidance of turning 
‘outward’ toward a particular way of relating within a community.  Instead, she moves 
beyond these dualistic conceptions toward a holistic understanding of God and the world 
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in a responsive relationship that takes a step forward in illuminating the impact of bodily 
bias.747 
Haslam hopes to renegotiate the legacy of Eiesland whose liberatory vision of 
God in a “sip-puff wheelchair” unintentionally excludes disabled and non-disabled, by 
proving God unrecognizable to the child with Down Syndrome, the autistic adult, the 
currently non-impaired theologian, the schizophrenic young adult, the non-responsive 
disabled child.  Eiesland’s insight simultaneously embraces those who are ‘other’ while 
unintentionally excluding yet another who feels removed from self-dignity and divine 
creativity.  Haslam recognizes the strength and the weakness of Eiesland’s legacy.  
Haslam appreciates Eiesland’s affirmation in naming “the paucity of theological 
exploration of social, emotional and intellectual disabilities as scandalous”748 but she also 
laments Eiesland’s reluctance to struggle with disabilities beyond those solely physical.  
Recognizing this rift, Haslam’s work addresses the bias against intellectual disability and 
attempts a theology rooted in mutuality749 and response, rather than a theology based in a 
particular image of God’s physicality.  Haslam advances the conversation in recognizing 
the bias toward bodies and against intellectual and mental disabilities, her work is 
important in creating the space alongside intellectual and mental disabilities for the 
possibility of a disabling that occurs across social contexts when new limits of reason, or 
lack thereof, are experienced. 
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 The anthropology of Martin Buber’s “I-Thou” relationship provides Haslam with 
the resources she needs to move beyond being linked to capacity, metaphysics, intellect, 
or language.  Human being, for Buber and Haslam, is mutuality and response.  This move 
allows her to move beyond Gordon Kaufman’s conception of human being as 
“intentional agent”750 and Gordon Lindbeck’s analysis of human being as a “language 
user.”751  Using a phenomenological approach, Haslam strives to describe human being in 
relational terms and concludes in the end imago dei is relational yearning, not rational 
acquisition.752 
 
3.4.3.2 Amos Yong 
 Throughout his book Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in 
Late Modernity,753 Amos Yong examines a range of theological doctrines (creation, 
salvation, eschatology, Christology) through a twofold lens of his Pentecostal background 
and the particular disability of Down Syndrome.  Yong’s theology is deeply personal, 
informed by his Pentecostal faith background as well as the relationship with his brother 
with Down Syndrome. As a Pentecostal theologian, Yong’s interests are in the healing 
tradition of Pentecostalism and in the spirit-filled community Pentecostals are known for 
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in their worship and fellowship.  Yong imagines healing not of individual diseases, but of 
systemic inability to be hospitable and inclusive.754 When this hospitality is gained 
through healing then the possibility begins for that spirit-filled community to receive 
hospitality back to itself through the gifts and Holy Spirit surprises of those with 
disabilities. 
Like several of the historical theologians, including Augustine and Barth, 
Theologian Amos Yong also struggles with the relationship between disability and 
resurrection. This is just one example of the many doctrines he wrestles with and 
reconceives for late modernity. While that may seem removed from engaging deeply in 
the reality before us, questions regarding the resurrection address very much our current 
identity and the injuries we face in this life.  Questions about disability and resurrection 
press the deepest concerns and commitments of embodied life. Yong engages a historical 
overview of resurrection and its relationship to disability.  Augustine believed all bodies, 
except those scars of the martyrs, would be perfect in heaven.  All monstrosities would be 
eliminated.755  The Augustinian view of personal identity along a continuum of 
transformation through life is that the “flower” of one’s youthful body would be 
resurrected.756  Aquinas shared a similar view of restoration in our bodies at resurrection.  
In addition, Aquinas who believed in the pursuit of virtues, would have excluded those 
with intellectual disabilities from this realm because the possibility of “perfect 
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relationship with God” would be prevented by their lack of cognition.757  Even today, 
such views persist so that ultimate freedom resides in the dismissal of disability in 
eternity.  More modern views fall across a spectrum of understanding – perhaps in 
heaven, what matters most is the larger collective body fully present to the love of God.  
Nancy Eiesland would not rid herself of her disability in heaven because “my disability 
has taught me who I am and who God is.”    Hauerwas takes her viewpoint a step further, 
“to eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject.”758  
In light of these, Yong presents a “dynamic eschatology” to come alongside his 
“dynamic anthropology.”  He shapes this in light of a disability reading of 1 Corinthians 
15 as well as the epectasis (eternal journey of the soul) in Gregory of Nyssa.759  Is it 
possible, with these in mind, that a person might be both preserved and transformed over 
time in eternity?760  Yong believes our viewpoint on resurrection and eschatology informs 
and shapes current practices now.  Sarah Coakley’s view of the eschaton shapes Yong, 
where in a powerful point he says “the body itself finds its rest in the unending process of 
being transformed by the glory of God in ways that overturn the binary dichotomies not 
only of male/female but also of disabled/nondisabled.”761  Coakley’s argument that the 
eschaton disrupts societal norms and advances Christian concepts of identity that allow 
for fluidity, vulnerability and less dichotomy than certain cultural norms is helpful to 
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Yong who argues for a dynamism and ascent in the afterlife other than what is 
experienced in this life.  Yong’s argument is that individual disabilities will be preserved 
in the eschaton and recognized as essential in the communion of saints and the “divine 
scheme of things.”762  In addition to individual affirmation, there will be communal 
reconciliation and restructuring of broken societal relationships.  Yong uses the example 
of Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav’s “Tale of the Seven Beggars” to illustrate a world 
inhospitable and broken structurally that will be redeemed and well understood in 
resurrection life.763  The seven beggars each are disabled and their disablements in the 
story are intended to reveal two things:  first, the broken nature of this world and second, 
a signpost of the world to come that will mend what is broken.  However, as much as this 
appears to be a story of condemnation of disability and anticipation of a new world to 
come, Rabbi Nahman of Bratslav made sure to convey in this story that what was most 
broken was society’s inability to accept the beggars as they are.  In fact, those unable to 
see the wholeness of the beggars are in fact “deformed” as well.764  What we learn 
through deep reading of Amos Yong is that his theology is poised to reverse the failure of 
this morality tale.  As Yong says, it is “an attempt to make sense of my brother.”765 
3.4.3.3 Thomas E. Reynolds 
Thomas E. Reynolds’ work Vulnerable Communion (2008) develops from his 
commitment to relational ontology, but even more so, from Reynolds own experience as 
a family within a church where his son Chris, host to a variety of unseen disabilities, was 
                                                 
762 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 282. 
763 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 288-289. 
764 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 289.  For the story of the rabbi see: Shaul Magid, “Nature, Exile, 
and Disability in R. Nahman of Brastlav’s ‘The Seven Beggars,’” in Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, ed., Judaism 
and Ecology: Created World and Revealed Word (Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press, 2002): 355.   
765 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, 293. 
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at first marginalized.  He draws on Eiesland’s “two-way access”766 as a theological 
method that mobilizes those with disabilities greater access into institutions while at the 
same time provides the non-disabled with glimpses into the “social-symbolic world” of 
those who do have disabilities.  Such a two-way privileging of disability is not unlike 
Gutierez’s “preferential option” and “irruption of the poor.”   Reynolds works within the 
ADA framework that defines disability in a threefold manner:  as real impairment of 
body or mind, as a record of that impairment, and/or as being regarded as having that 
impairment.767  Reynolds sees the Apostle Paul as one of the first theologians of 
disability whose “thorn in the flesh” becomes a Christological witness to the power of 
Christ’s saving message at work within him.768  This is one example of the “metaphorical 
reversal” that Reynolds will emphasize through this work as an overturn of the “cult of 
normalcy.”  Such a cult of normalcy has theological implication in the fact that it can 
even effect a normalizing projection upon God.  A hermeneutic of disability must avoid 
trivialization or denigration of those who are disabled.  While calling disability a tragedy, 
it is not the impairment that is tragic but the social consequences that are.  Questions of 
theodicy can fall prey to the cult of normalcy.  Reynolds encourages a conversation about 
human vulnerability beyond those traps toward a deeper ecclesiology and systematic 
theology. 
 Like Amos Yong, Reynolds offers thorough reviews of the doctrines of creation, 
redemption and the imago dei and ecclesiology. Two points are key to Reynolds theology 
of creation as a generous and ongoing gift of God.  First, he believes in a knowledge of 
                                                 
766 Thomas E. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Brazos Press, 2008), 15.  See:  Eiesland, “The Disabled God,” 20-23. 
767 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 18. 
768 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 19. 
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God that is a priori  - inscribed as a strong sensibility on the human heart – rather than 
knowledge of God that is a posteriori – learned from reasoning within the world.  While 
this may sound contradictory to a love of God that is “learned” in vulnerable communion, 
Reynolds argues what is gained in that vulnerability is a justification of the longing we 
have known all along.  In addition, Reynolds stands behind the Reformed tradition’s tenet 
of creation ex nihilo.769 The ex nihilo must not be neglected, Reynolds asserts this fact 
alongside Tertullian, Irenaeus and Augustine who argued similarly to claim that creation 
remains without form, absolute nothing, without God’s guiding presence.  Even though 
this is not specifically outlined in scripture, this tenet expresses our reliance upon God at 
every moment – we are created ex nihilo – in vulnerable communion for all time.770  
God’s creativity as gift in creation reminds us that we live in an “economy of 
superabundant grace”771 rather than subsisting in the cult of normalcy and all that such a 
cult entails.  In this chapter Reynolds speaks to the “transformation” that can occur 
through disability as vulnerability becomes embodied within a community. One response 
to the fact that we are created in the imago dei is to then become imitators of that image – 
or as Reynolds says – to model imitatio dei.772   
 It should be noted here that Reynolds does not venture into any theological 
reflection here on the Trinity, which would be helpful.  Instead, he focuses on the imago 
dei as creativity, relationality and availability.773  These capacities – particularly the 
                                                 
769 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 154. 
770 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 154. 
771 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 137.  Reynolds draws here on a conceptualization of “super-
abundance” posited by Paul Ricœur.  See:  Paul Ricœur, “Ethical and Theological Considerations on the 
Golden Rule,” 293-302 and “Love and Justice,” 315-329, in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and 
Imagination, trans. David Pellauer, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995). 
772 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 178-179. 
773 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 180. 
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capacity for love – call us into the capax Dei (the capacity for God).  Reynolds’ last 
chapter begins with the lovely and often-quoted words of Gerard Manley Hopkins, but 
read here within the framework of disability, “For Christ plays in ten thousand 
places,/Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his/To the Father through the features of 
men’s faces.”774  The kingdom, evidenced in the church, will welcome in these “out of 
control” bodies that affront our sense of normalcy and yet through a metaphorical 
reversal come to model the very body of Christ in our midst.   The “power of inability” is 
realized once and for all in the cross and it is the radical charge to the church that 
demands modeling true vulnerability in the midst of that inability for God to meet us 
here.775 
 Reynolds leans toward a model of disability that is less medical (he writes, 
“disability is not a thing”776) and is instead something sociologically complex.  Disability, 
for Reynolds is “a range of physiologically rooted social performances, a series of 
moments defined by relationships between human beings.  In a basic sense, the 
distinction between ability and disability is built into the fabric of communal life.”777  
When we learn Reynolds own son has Aspergers, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, 
Tourette’s Syndrome and Bipolar Disorder, this suggests that personal experience moved 
him toward a more nuanced definition. Such a definition moves us toward an 
understanding of our own identity that is shaped and reshaped amid many myriad 
moments across social contexts. For Reynolds, a suffering and liberating God actively 
                                                 
774 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 214. 
775 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 204, 207-209. 
776 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 53. 
777 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 53. 
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draws near to those who become disabled in those “physiologically rooted social 
performances” and then works to liberate their oppression.778 
 
3.4.4 Themes and Questions in the Contemporary Scholarship on Disability 
  The hope this chapter began with is that moral injury “needs” disability. 
Recognizing the cautions raised by Boudreau and Wiinikka-Lydon, we drew moral injury 
into conversation with these frameworks for interpreting disability: the framework of 
liberation, the framework of social analysis and medical critique and the framework of 
theological doctrine and its implications. Here, we will look at themes and tensions raised 
within these frameworks with regard to the medicalization of bodies, the sociological 
construct of disability, and limits encountered. While each of these themes explores 
issues of human finitude, it will be in the next section as we interpret the work of 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson that their implications will be fully realized and then 
suggested as a helpful third option for relating moral injury and disability. 
 Phenomenologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone argues for a “corporeal turn”779 in 
medicine to better respect the complexity and humanity of embodiment. Perhaps, she 
recognizes like Garland-Thomson the situation of human finitude by understanding the 
vitality and vulnerability of the human being.  Nancy Eiesland adds to this corporeal turn 
by dismissing notions of God as perfect in body; and recognizing not just the human but 
also the divine with regard to complex notions of frailty and vulnerability.  Her 
                                                 
778 John Swinton in his review essay “Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality,” 
Practical Theology 2:2 (August, 2009): 305, questions whether Reynolds advocates enough for reversal of 
oppressive power structures amid the powers at hand.  He believes Reynolds advocates a suffering God, but 
does not pursue far enough a God who overturns power structures.   302-305. 
779 Sheets-Johnstone, Giving the Body Its Due, 15. 
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conceptualization of the disabled body of God complicates norms, expectations, ideals 
and projections within human bodies. Thomas Reynolds pursues an alternative route, but 
toward a similar end in complicating notions of disability.  Disability, he argues, is “not a 
thing.”780 In the western world of Cartesian dualisms, Reynolds refuses to enter the door 
of easy dualisms and expects instead respect for the body not as a mechanism or easily 
fixed or medicalized subject, but instead, a socially complex phenomenon.  Betcher 
demands the same respect for the complexity of human bodies amid the mechanics of the 
medical world as she invites reflection on social bodies, spirited flesh, and the subtle 
ways ecological changes can wreak havoc on human bodies. Medicine, in its treatment of 
human illness and treatment of certain disabilities, must also pay attention to the societal 
and ecological sources of those ailments and alterations of ability. 
 Contemporary scholarship on disability makes clear the social nature of disability 
and the effects of social constructs and expectations on those of varying abilities.  
Eiesland sought liberation for the disabled from unjust structures and her colleagues 
continue her cry.  Thomas Reynolds’ work in Vulnerable Communion assumes the social 
construct of disability that Eiesland seeks liberation from by means of her disabled God.  
Reynolds offers a provocative phrase, worthy of note and continued reflection.  
Disability, he understands, is a “physiologically rooted social performance.” Such a 
definition could easily be misunderstood as overly dramatic or even judgmental.  But his 
sentiment is wholly otherwise: what we perceive as disability is an enactment of greater 
social norms, failures and projections. For our morally injured veterans, Reynolds words 
both identify and challenge.  It would be all too easy to focus on what is first presented 
                                                 
780 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 53. 
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(shame, distrust, isolation) rather than explore the deeper sociological influences. A 
counterpoint is offered within Block’s exploration of Gutierrez’s notion of the “irruption 
of the poor.”  So much of the scholarship suggests that societies create disabilities 
through inhospitable acts, unjust laws, and expectations of perfection. Block’s view 
reveals the opposite; that is the capacity of those in minority groups to upset the status 
quo and in so doing, to demand new social structures.  Gutierrez envisioned an irruption 
of the poor that Block commends.  Authors, theologians and veterans today are 
demanding a similar “irruption of the veteran” to invite a complacent society to engage 
the reality of war-torn and morally injured veterans. Block’s reflection echoes Yong’s 
insight that there is a systemic disability within society to include the disabled, and this 
too has consequences for those whose presenting disability is moral injury.  
 Certainly we see within the contemporary scholarship issues relevant to medical 
and social models of disability that will be explored more fully in Chapter Four.  Of 
interest to this dissertation is the exploration of how different abilities within particular 
bodies are revealed or hidden within and across various social constructs.  The notion of 
“limits” and its implication for bodies, morality, disability and society is a little explored 
topic within the fields of morality, disability and moral injury.  The contemporary 
scholarship on disability raises some interesting insights regarding the notion of changing 
functionality and/or flourishing across varied contexts.  Two contrasting views may be 
seen in the work of Hans Reinders and Amos Yong.  Reinders offers a real world cost 
analysis of the societal implications of choosing disability.  Reinders recognizes the ill 
effects of a liberal society that will place limits on disabled people and those who choose 
to bear the disabled into existence.  This viewpoint presupposes judgments on those with 
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varying abilities and their preconceived inability to function across various contexts.  
Yong proposes an interesting counterpoint with his vision of a dynamic eschatology 
imagining human beings take on a sacred journey of ascent that will naturally assume 
decay and disability and transformation over time experiencing different limits across 
different contexts but all the while maintaining the possibility of a particular kind of 
flourishing. Perhaps it is Amy Laura Hall who explores a third way:  new contexts and 
new choices create the space for new moral decisions.  When time and space between 
collapse, those left in their wake must make difficult decisions as “moral pioneers.” A 
moral pioneer, forced into new, unexpected and uncharted territory, will find themselves 
at times ‘abled’ and ready to make difficult choices within a changing context.  And yet 
the opposite is also very true:  at times the moral pioneer will become disabled – that is 
limited – when context closes in and they are no longer able to function and make 
decisions as they have in the past. Hall’s language of “moral pioneer” drawn from the 
scholarship of Rayna Rapp certainly has implications for our morally injured veterans, 
pushed to the limit to make difficult and pioneering moral choices in landscapes and 
contexts no one could have ever imagined. 
  
3.4.5 The Framework of Human Finitude: Garland-Thomson 
 These questions of medicalization, social construction and engagement with limits 
all probe the depth of human finitude: what does it mean to be finite in the age of techne? 
What does it mean to be finite as a socially constructed body?  And what does it mean to 
be finite as we encounter real limits in a complex and broken world? Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson invites direct engagement with those issues in her work.  In so doing, she 
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provides a helpful alternative for pairing disability and moral injury that does not rely on 
definitions, or even frameworks, but instead a complex theological anthropology that 
accounts for human frailty, failing and finitude in the face of the fall.781 
 
3.4.5.1 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson 
The academic field of disability studies provides a promising conversation partner 
for engaging and reflecting on the complexities of moral injury.  Individual and social 
identity is at the heart of questions regarding impairment and disability. The problem 
with understanding disability, according to disabled scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson 
is that in our society we do not have a clear “collective notion…of what it means to be 
disabled”782; in so asking, Garland-Thomson raises the question of human finitude.  
Garland-Thomson laments the singular defining factor of disability by many in our 
culture: “The one thing most people do know about being disabled is that they don’t want 
to be that.”783 To begin to expand notions of disability, one step important to Garland-
Thomson is to invite others to consider the fluid and ever-changing nature of our own 
bodies.  In so doing she invites reflection on disability as an experience all will 
experience at some point in their own lifetime, even when they can’t imagine being 
“that” – whatever “that” is for them.  She explains, “The fact is, most of us will move in 
                                                 
781 See: Capretto, “On Not Operationalizing Disability,” 895.  Capretto argues that Garland-Thomson defies 
easy categorization.  Though she provides a social analysis, she holds onto the medical model of disability 
as it allows attention to the depth of pain possible within disabling conditions that are not due to social 
construction (ie. schizophrenia, fibromyalgia) and so she tends to transcend both with a new account that 
honors both experiences and their collective effect on various systems. 
782 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Becoming Disabled” The New York Times, (August 19, 2016), 
www.nytimes.com/2016/8/21/opinion/sunday/becoming-disabled.html?_r=0 (Accessed October 14, 2016). 
783 Garland-Thomson, “Becoming Disabled.” 
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and out of disability in our lifetimes, whether we do so through illness, an injury or 
merely the process of aging.”784 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson answers some of her own questions in a particularly 
compelling definition of disability stating, “What we consider disability is the 
transformation of flesh as it encounters world.”785  Impairment, as this definition 
suggests, occurs as flesh – all flesh – encounters the world.  As we consider moral injury, 
and the particular wounds that occur during wartime, this definition becomes even more 
compelling as one wonders how flesh, in all its dimensionality, is transformed as the war-
zone world is encountered.  If “injury” is one of the disabling possibilities for all of us, is 
it possible for us to imagine an injury that is moral and thereby disabling?  One can 
imagine the implications such a broadening to include morality might have then in 
defining disability.  When the American with Disabilities Act describes disability as “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities,”786 one must wonder if moral impairment (that touches a deeper place than 
mental capacity) might be included. 
Garland-Thomson notes our shared vulnerability given the “inherent dynamism of 
the flesh”787 and its “movement through time and space in the process we call life.”788  
Garland-Thomson’s work here is to “conserve” disability as a potential for “meaning-
                                                 
784 Garland-Thomson, “Becoming Disabled.” 
785 Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342. 
786 Cited in Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Becoming Disabled.” 
787 Here, it is interesting to hold in comparison Amos Yong’s vision of eschatological ascent rooted in the 
soteriology of Gregory of Nyssa; and, to hold in sharp contrast Calvin’s conceptualization of disability as 
“a messenger of death.”  Garland-Thomson holds true to a view of dynamic anthropology that offers 
potential, hope, and of course, transformation over a lifespan. 
788 Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342. 
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making” by finding within both impairment and disability a narrative resource, an 
epistemic resource and an ethical resource.789  Garland-Thomson’s definition is 
particularly helpful in honoring the full complexity of life, acknowledging human 
suffering but also affirming the joy within which it is entangled.790  She understands the 
intimate connection between flesh and world that is recognized in the World Health 
Organization’s definition of disability that understands the complex interplay between 
“features of a person’s body and features of the society in which he or she lives.”791  To 
be clear, too often the features of society only acknowledge the contextual limitations 
placed on a body in any given social context rather than acknowledging societal factors 
that can contribute to mental, physical, and we will argue here moral, disabilities that 
might occur through environment, wartime engagement and other disabling elements.  
The definition put forth by Garland-Thomson is deceptively simple and yet utterly 
compelling.  As noted above, her words recognize the impact the collective social world 
has on individual bodies, even to the point of injury.  This impact creates a shared 
vulnerability that calls us all into the spectrum of disability.  But perhaps, her thirteen 
word definition of disability creates a framework noting within her definition each of the 
                                                 
789 Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 344. 
790 Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 353. 
791 Cited in Garland-Thomson’s article, “Becoming Disabled.”  Original source: Definition of “Disabilities” 
on the World Health Organization website. The definition in full describes disabilities as, “an umbrella 
term, covering impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions.  An impairment is a problem 
in body function or structure; an activity limitation is a difficulty encountered by an individual in executing 
a task or action; while a participation restriction is a problem experience by an individual in involvement in 
life situations.  Disability is thus not just a health problem.  It is a complex phenomenon, reflecting the 
interaction between features of a person’s body and features of the society in which he or she lives.  
Overcoming the difficulties faced by people with disabilities requires interventions to remove 
environmental and societal barriers.”  Drawing this definition alongside Jonathan Shay’s list of five 
disabling aspects of Moral Injury helps us to categorize Moral Injury as a particular kind of disability 
wherein activity and participation are restricted due to a particular impairment. 
www.who.int/topics/disabilities/en/ (Accessed October 14, 2016). 
  222
models of disability:  flesh acknowledges the medical model, world incorporates the 
social model, and transformation points to the possibility a limit model and the 
questioning of limits might enact.  Before turning to explore these three models in full 
later in this chapter, it is important to understand how Garland-Thomson engages 
conversation amid the field of disability scholars. 
In her New York Times essay, “Becoming Disabled,” Garland-Thomson sets the 
foundation for a series of essays on disability by prominent scholars and activists in the 
field.  In her viewpoint, “becoming disabled” is a strength to live into no matter where 
you are on the disabled spectrum.  Becoming disabled, acknowledging the areas where 
one is a “misfit between body and world” becomes then “an occasion for 
resourcefulness.”792 Becoming disabled allows greater humanity, especially when one 
considers the fluidity and fragility of life.793 Becoming disabled prevents a disabled 
person from the persistent thought that society demands them to be other than their own 
self with a particular mind and body.  And, finally, “Becoming disabled means moving 
from isolation to community, from ignorance to knowledge about who we are, from 
exclusion to access, and from shame to pride.”794   
This chapter on “Disability” began with arguments regarding disability’s need for 
moral injury, and the reverse, moral injury’s need for disability.  Garland-Thomson offers 
a compelling argument for “conserving” disability not just as a category, but as a 
resource both for individuals and institutions that creates knowledge, access and pride. 
The language provided with deceptive insight and simplicity by Garland-Thomson that 
                                                 
792 Garland-Thomson, “Becoming Disabled.” 
793 Garland-Thomson, “Becoming Disabled.” 
794 Garland-Thomson, “Becoming Disabled.” 
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disability is the transformation that occurs as flesh encounters the world will prove to be 
helpful lens through which to view Bonhoeffer’s scholarship in Chapter Five as well as a 
critical tool for developing a revised limit model of disability that takes into account 
varying contexts and “worlds.”  Before turning to Bonhoeffer in Chapter Five, in Chapter 
Four we will analyze and assess the medical and social models of disability, introduce 
Deborah Creamer’s “limit” model as a new constructive model, and investigate the need 
for a “revised limit model of disability” to address the weaknesses in her model for the 
particular needs of returning veterans.  The literature addressed in this chapter ranges 
from scholarship that in the language of the Veterans’ Creed “abandoned” the disabled to 
scholarship that offered resolute “support.” With an eye to deepening and strengthening 
that support, the conversation between disability and moral injury will continue in the 
next chapter and moves us toward the development of a revised limit model of disability 




Models of Disability and the Need for a Revised Limit Model 
 
If I cannot carry them – I will call for help. 
 




4.1 Models of Disability and Socially Encoded Meanings 
Our review of historical and contemporary scholarship on disability and the push 
for interchange between the fields of disability and moral injury in chapter three aided in 
recognizing the potential stigma inherent in the language of disability.796  Tyler Boudreau 
and Joseph Wiinikka-Lydon invite resistance to the transfer of the stigmatizing label of 
disability to moral injury. Disability and moral injury both provide an epistemology of 
“destabilizing knowledge”797 that may not be immediately evidenced, but that I would 
argue is rooted in a recognition of human vulnerability and finitude. However, the 
stigmas and stereotypes evidenced in the historical accounts, social analyses, and even 
theological doctrine reviewed in chapter three can at times prevent deeper engagement of 
the epistemology and theological anthropology at stake. 
Perhaps this is because disabled bodies, and the language of disability itself, carry 
messages that have symbolic and cultural impact.  Samuel Joeckel refers to disabled 
                                                 
795 Veterans’ Creed written by Judge John C. Reed, III. 
796 Peter Capretto notes the “double-bind” problem that exists between theology and disability is a 
“frustration for those working to bridge and unite disciplines and collaborate on shared objects of study.” 
See: Capretto, “On Not Operationalizing Disability in Theology,” 915.  
797 Wiinikka-Lydon, “Inherent Political Critique,” 230. 
  225
bodies as “having symbolic power embedded in cultural structures of meaning”798 that 
can sometimes bear erroneous messages.  For some, according to Joeckel, the message is 
“divine disfavor”799 where a broken body is revelatory of a judgment by God.800  For 
others, the message is a heroic overcoming of an obstacle revealing a strength that is 
inspiring to others.801 Because of the “error” in those messages, disability scholars 
continue to challenge problematic ideologies and offer constructive accounts of 
disability. The messages of divine disfavor and heroic triumph may appear simplistic, but 
their usage reflects and often reinscribes entrenched patterns of cultural interaction, 
power relations and epistemological meaning.  Bodies, according to Michel Foucault, 
“emit signs”802 that reveal their complex relationship to power as well as injustices 
embedded in particular ideologies and practices. 
 In this chapter, we will explore the traditional models of disability: the medical803 
and the social models.804   In these models, as much as they aim for precision to describe 
                                                 
798 Samuel Joeckel, “A Christian Approach to Disability Studies:  A Prolegomenon” in Christian Scholar’s 
Review, 35:3 (Spring 2006), 323.     
799 Joeckel, “A Christian Approach to Disability Studies,” 326.    
800 Lingering effects of these models are still present.  For example, see: Pauline A. Otieno, “Biblical and 
Theological Perspectives on Disability: Implications on the Rights of Persons with Disability in Kenya" in 
Disability Studies Quarterly, 29:4 (2009). Otieno works here to draw the work of Nancy Eiesland and her 
liberatory praxis to Kenya and particularly the Kenyan church.  The Kenya Demographic Health Survey 
(KDHS) claims that 10% of Kenya’s population of 32.2 million are disabled.  The Kenyan church is mired 
in dated ways of considering the intersection between disability and theology as outlined by Eiesland:  
disability is associated with sin, disability as associated with a suffering that is virtuous, and disability seen 
as a prompt for charity.   
801 Joeckel, “A Christian Approach to Disability Studies,” 326.  Joeckel explains how these two messages 
of divine disfavor and heroic triumph were present in the eighteenth century by drawing on the work of 
Helen Deutsch.  See:  Helen Deutsch, “Exemplary Aberration: Samuel Johnson and the English Canon,” in 
Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities, eds. Snyder, Brueggemann, and Garland-Thomson (New 
York: Modern Language Association, 2002), 199. 
802 Joeckel draws on Michel Foucault to illumine this point, “A Christian Approach to Disability Studies,” 
330.  See: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison (New York: Vintage, 1977), 25. 
803Historian of disability studies, Lennard Davis claims that the medical field established the earliest model 
of disability to account for pain, difference and impairment. Lennard J. Davis, “The End of Identity 
Politics: On Disability as an Unstable Category.” In The Disability Studies Reader, edited by Davis, 
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a particular manifestation of disability, they still serve more as broad descriptors to 
describe a “cluster of somewhat related experiences or situations.”805  After we outline 
working dimensions of the medical model of disability and the social model of disability, 
we will pay attention to the strengths and weaknesses of each.  Finally, we will turn to the 
work of Deborah Creamer who notes dissatisfaction with both models and offers instead 
a “limit model of disability.”  In our ongoing dialogue with moral injury, the medical and 
social models of disability offer insight that is helpful and appropriate, even when 
disability is most often deemed taboo in the military world.  However, it is Deborah 
Creamer’s “limit model” that is most compelling for focusing on the various experiences 
of disabilities across contexts.  This chapter will conclude with the suggestion we expand 
Deborah Creamer’s limit model to take into account which limits are natural, and are to 
be embraced, and which limits result from sin and should be challenged. We will note 
how Creamer’s model begins the conversation but does not give enough clarity; therefore 
it will be necessary in the next chapter to draw on Dietrich Bonhoeffer for an assessment 
of the moral demands of each type of limit.   
 
4.1.1 A Moral Model of Disability?  
 At this point in the conversation, we have seen attempts both wittingly and 
unwittingly to connect disability to morality through both the historical and contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lennard J., (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2013): 263. Others note the development of the World 
Health Organization’s 1980 classification system for identifying impairments, disabilities and handicaps. 
See: WHO, International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps,1980. 
804 Michael Oliver and Bob Sapey are credited for first naming a “social model of disability.”  See: Michael 
Oliver and Bob Sapey, Social Work with Disabled People (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 1983): 29. 
805 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 22. 
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models. Some scholars argue that “a moral model of disability” is the oldest model 
predating medical and social models.806  To be clear, standard practice is to name only 
medical and social models of disability that will be outlined later in the chapter.  
However, scholars noting the existence of a kind of “moral model of disability” are trying 
to articulate and draw together nuances in thinking around disability that linked bodily 
impairment to morality.  Consider for example, Robert Garland’s The Eye of the 
Beholder:  Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World which is a historical 
overview of deformity beginning with ancient Rome. Garland explores both the curious 
as in the teraton agora ‘monster market’ in Rome to the concerning practice of 
infanticide.  He outlines a “physiognomic consciousness” that idealized the perfect body 
and shamed those misshapen bodies as indicative of the soul’s “hidden energies”807 
whose moral consequences are revealed in bodies. Nancy Eiesland fought fiercely to 
retrieve Christian exegesis and tradition from the link between morality and disability. 
She argued, Christian faith can no longer let “disability be a sign of moral imperfection or 
divine retribution for sin.”808   
 In this kind of model, disability is seen as a punishment and leads to social 
exclusion and a lowering of social status due to misdemeanors done by the individual or 
                                                 
806 Julie F. Smart. “The Power of Models of Disability,” Journal of Rehabilitation 75.2 (2009), 4.   See 
also: Jonathan C. Drimmer Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal 
Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. rev. 1341, 1397 (1993): 1346.  And 
also: E.E. Enwereji, “Understanding Models Necessary to Treat Disability Issues” Global Journal for 
Research Analysis International 4:5 (May, 2015): 410-413. 
807 Robert Garland, The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World 
(Bloomsbury, UK: Bristol Classical Press, 2010): 87-104. 
808 Eiesland, The Disabled God, 71. 
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their family member.809 Here, bad action is presumed to result in a congenital disability.  
Not unlike the doctrine of Karma, this implication of a moral model struggles with the 
effects of sin and morality. Those who assumed a moral reason for the disability in the 
body, often hid their disabled family member preventing them from engaging in society 
and meaning making.  Shame, self-hatred and social ostracism are key components of 
this model.810 While this model contains many facets that are disturbing theologically 
(disability as punishment, disability as moral failing, disability as challenge from God to 
be overcome),811 for our purposes, the model fails to show what happens when morality 
itself, that is, an individual’s participation in the moral community is disabled.  Moving 
forward would require a model of disability that moves beyond moral judgment toward a 
more robust understanding of the disablement of moral agency through morally injurious 
situations brought on by one’s self or by the failed person in authority.  At the same time, 
moving forward will require honest wrestling with the effects of sin and shame, 
consequences and confession in the face of finitude that are at the heart of moral injury.  
We need a model deeper than the mark of sara’at from the book of Leviticus that was a 
stigmatizing tattoo of moral failure.812 What model might create a space beyond stigma 
for theological reflection? What model might navigate a new landscape for those “moral 
pioneers”813 where focus is less on morality, and more on the changing landscapes and 
how that affects coping and embodiment and morality over time and space?  Even prior 
                                                 
809 Kofi Amponsah-Bediako, “Relevance of Disability Models from the Perspective of a Developing 
Country: An Analysis” Developing Country Studies, 3:11 (2013): 127.   
810 Deborah Kaplan, “The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability Community” Journal of 
Health Care Law and Policy  3:2:5. (2000): 353. 
 http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jhclp/vol2/iss2/5 (Accessed October 14, 2016). 
811 See:  Rebecca P. Cameron “Honoring the Experience of Disability” Phi Beta Kappa 94.2 (2014), 17.    
812 Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult: The Priestly Rationale for Exclusion,” 55. 
813 Hall, “Put to the test,” 34. See:  Rayna Rapp, “Moral pioneers: women, men and fetuses on a frontier of 
reproductive technology” Women Health 13:1-2 (1987): 101-16. 
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to Nancy Eiesland recognizing disability as no longer a sign of “moral imperfection,”814 
the medical model of disability was advanced to challenge the dominant underlying 
conception of morality that informed earlier perceptions of disability. 
4.1.2 The Medical Model of Disability 
As we turn to a fuller description of the medical and social models of disability, it 
is important to keep in mind that the medical model was an advance, in response to a 
weakness from these earliest models and the judgments they exacerbated.  As the first 
recognized formal model, the medical model815 began as the medical world conceived 
disability as bodily impairments that differ from the norm and studied “pathological 
physiological conditions.”816 The medical model focuses on functioning versus non-
functioning parts of the body and mind.817 In response to these ailments, service 
industries employ their techne toward care for the disabled population and societies are 
judged by their compassion, or not, toward them.  These industries, according to Mitchell 
and Snyder have “established their scientific and social credentials (as well as their 
professional legitimacy) through the ‘humane’ study and provision of services to disabled 
populations that are at the outermost margins of social interest and cultural value.”818 In 
the medical model of disability, disability is a physical impairment shaped by the world 
                                                 
814 Eiesland, The Disabled God, 71. 
815 Some literature refers to the Medical Model of disability as either the “Biological-Inferiority Model” or 
the “Functional-Limitation Model.” See for example:  Scot Danforth, “A Pragmatic Evaluation of Three 
Models of Disability in Special Education” Journal of Developmental and Physical Disabilities, 13:4 
(December 2001), 343-359. And, J. Fields, D. Sobo, J. Sanford, N. Toll and R. Wheatland, “The 
Disablement Model: the relationships between and among impairment, functional limitation, and disability 
in the elderly population” Issues on Aging, 22:3 (1999), 5-9. 
816 Joeckel, “A Christian Approach to Disability Studies,” 327. 
817 We will see as this study progresses, how moral injury challenges each of the standard models of 
disability studies.  In the medical model that emphasizes the functionality of body and mind, moral injury 
adds the dimension of spirit and its relationship to a moral code as a possible locus for disability to occur. 
818 David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder, eds., The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of 
Disability, (Ann Abor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 1. 
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of ‘perfection’ that invites societal norms for our bodies and then determines who is 
impaired and who is not.   
At stake in this model is a concern that disability is defined in terms that stress its 
deviation from a norm or ideal version of human being.  David Mitchell and Sharon 
Snyder, professors in the Department of Disability and Human Development at the 
University of Illinois, Chicago, describe this problem through the term “similitude”:  
“Dreams of similitude underwrite the social debasement of disabled people.”819 Mitchell 
and Snyder argue that this debasement of disability is evident even in academic efforts to 
define disability: “Across the modern academy, entire research domains have been 
devoted to the pathologization and, subsequently, normalization of disability as 
deviance.”820  For the purposes of this dissertation it is particularly important to note the 
Christian tradition is complicit in reinforcing norms that encourage the definition of 
disability in terms that show its lack of similarity to the standard ideal body:  
Variations on this thesis with respect to biblical narratives:  gender ambiguity; 
the likeness of humanity made in God’s image; the economically abject’s 
location on the outskirts of biblical society; bodily incapacity as expression of 
divine disapproval; the use of disabled people as a defensive frontline to ward 
off intruders; disability as a marker of tainted priesthood or moral failing; mental 
illness as satanic possession; the perfect body of Christ as the approximation of 
godliness; physical disability as loss of claim to hereditary kingship; sexual 
infidelity as source of childhood deformity; excessive vulnerability as the 
definition of impairment; among others…. Their bodily, cognitive, and sensory 
differences continue to provide opportunities for exclusion rather than 
embrace.821 
                                                 
819 David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder “Jesus Thrown Everything Off Balance: Disability and Redemption 
in Biblical Literature” in This Abled Body:  Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies    Edited by Hector 
Avalos, Sarah J. Melcher and Jeremy Schipper (Atlanta, GA:  Society of Biblical Literature Press, 2007), 
174. 
820 Mitchell and Snyder, “Jesus Thrown Everything Off Balance,” 174. 
821 Mitchell and Snyder, “Jesus Thrown Everything Off Balance,” 174. 
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The medical model of disability then designates bodies as disabled or abled through a 
process of assessing consistency with an idealized norm.  Any presenting bodily issue 
that fails the similitude test is then subject to medical cure. 
 The effect of this assimilating norm can be seen in discussions on healing, 
genetics and medical treatment.  Under the medical model, those with disabilities are 
considered broken people who require technology to assimilate toward a norm of 
preconceived health and vitality.  In his book A Theological Diagnosis: A New Direction 
on Genetic Therapy, “Disability” and the Ethics of Healing, Matt Edmonds wrestles with 
these issues.  His central concern is the over-medicalization in response to disabilities 
rather than reshaping civic structures toward greater inclusion, and even more, toward 
grace and friendship.822  Radical medicalization leads to genetic options that are 
untoward for Edmond as the field of genetics then becomes a curative resource for 
disabilities.823 For Edmonds, problems occur when reducing the individual either in 
globalizing theories of disability or in preventive genetic treatments.  The way forward 
beyond these easy reductions is to “enable each and every one of us to develop 
friendship, life and love.  By rescuing the individual from unnecessary categorization – 
by giving the person a name.”824  While Edmonds’ ‘diagnosis’ and ‘treatment’ for the 
problems inherent to the medical model may appear idealistic (civic engagement, 
enablement and the exercise of ‘naming’ an individual), his suggestion is counter-
intuitive to the medical world.  His argument recognizes the tendency to technologize 
                                                 
822 Matt Edmonds, A Theological Diagnosis: A New Direction On Genetic Therapy, “Disability” and the 
Ethics of Healing  (London:  Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2009), 12-13. 
823 Edmonds, A Theological Diagnosis, 70-72. 
824 Edmonds, A Theological Diagnosis, 139. 
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healing and to dismiss the individual.  Genetics becomes for Edmonds an avenue toward 
preventive “healing” and “disability” is the object of that healing act.  Such a move 
objectifies an individual: both the existent individual who becomes the image of possible 
disablement as well as the not-yet existent embryo who is being shaped technologically 
toward a particular future.825 
Medical ethicist Jeffrey Bishop sees the tendency within modern medicine to 
“claim power”826 and objectification over bodies, so much so that it has become “The 
standard bearer of western metaphysics.”  Bishop works with Emmanuel Levinas here to 
resituate the “other” from object of medicine to constituting subject.827 Bishop 
appreciates the ethical demand of Levinas who argues that it is violent to totalize another 
person by reducing them to our categories of comprehension.828  Instead, the medical 
world needs to have what Levinas deems a “non-allergic relation with alterity.”829   All 
too often, we have what Levinas defines as “a reduction of the other to the same.”830   
Bishop’s argument suggests the need for the medical world to a new understanding of the 
patient and discover within that person “the astonishing feat of containing more than it is 
possible to contain.”831  
Bishop also draws on the work of Jean Luc Marion’s theologies of the idol and 
the icon.  While an individual constitutes idols over and over again (creating a sense of 
                                                 
825 Edmonds, A Theological Diagnosis, 50-51. 
826 Jeffrey P. Bishop, “The Broken Body and the Disabled Body:  Reflections on Disability and the Objects 
of Medicine” in Theology, Disability and the New Genetics, ed. by John Swinton and Brian Brock (New 
York, NY: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2007): 214.        
827 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 222.   
828 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 222. 
829 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969): 47. 
830 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43. 
831 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 27 
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utter exhaustion), an icon is what constitutes that person and gives life.   For Marion, an 
“idol” is that place where “the gaze has just stopped:  the idol concretizes the stop”832 
while the “icon” is that which envisages: the icon opens in a face that gazes at our gazes 
in order to summon them to its depth.833   In the relationship between a health care 
provider or physician and a person with disability, Bishop argues, the switch means a 
reversal from the “constituting gaze of the doctor”834 to the one who is the “constituted 
subject-physician.”835  This reversal places power back into the hands of the person who 
had been deemed disabled.  For Bishop, the disabled body is the one that does not 
measure up to the idealized body of the false god of medicine.836  Bishop acknowledges 
that objectification is a natural accompaniment to many of medicine’s strengths, but then 
graciously pushes a reconsideration of reversals that might be helpful.837  Bishop 
understands the “broken body” as simply a human being, one who longs to worship and 
one who hopes to be reconstituted by the liturgical body through divine worship.838  
Bishop concludes with a high calling to divine liturgy and worship to “re-constitute” the 
physician through prayer, but it should be noted that Bishop is arguing for an ethical high 
calling as well.  He looks to Levinas and Marion as two ethicist-theologians who 
transcend Kant’s “categorical imperative”839 with a call to contextual responsibility that 
will always be “so demanding that sin is necessary, and failure inevitable.”840   
                                                 
832 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, Translated by Thomas A. Carlson, (Chicago, IL:  The University 
of Chicago Press, 2012), 11. 
833 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 226.  Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 19. 
834 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 226. 
835 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 226. 
836 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 227. 
837 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 226. 
838 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 229-230. 
839 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 223. 
840 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 223. 
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 The medical model has been subject to widespread and longstanding criticism 
among scholars of disability.  At its basest, the medical model sees the individual as a 
person with errors that might be erased through the proper procedures.  Humans then are 
categorized into “curable” or “uncurable” dependent on whether or not technology exists 
to fight the disabling condition.  This model considers the disabled person alone as the 
sole indicator of whether or not disablement is present, neglecting societal forces.  In so 
doing, the model minimizes the effect of culture and even though it has an eye toward the 
individual, still manages to ignore the identity of the whole person, seeing instead only 
ability or not.  In its drive toward rehabilitation, the medical model neglects the 
subjectivity of persons with disabilities.  The weakness of the medical model then is in its 
tendency to judge humans themselves as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ based on their level of 
abilities.   
The strength of the medical model, first and foremost, is its advancement beyond 
the moralistic judgments inherent to early observations of disability.  The medical model, 
as noted in the creed above, heard a certain “cry for help” within disability studies to 
address the moralistic questions.  As Joeckel notes divine disfavor and heroic triumph 
were components of the earliest understanding of disability.  Using these moralistic 
formulations is evident in the texts of Ancient Rome841 and early Christian writings842 
                                                 
841 See for example:  Carlin A. Barton, The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiators and the 
Monsters (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Barton argued that the spectator culture of 
ancient Rome led to the creation of the Roman “monster.”  Here even in ancient Rome we see social 
disability manifested in the “strictures of civilization” that create disablement.   
842 See for example:  Julia Watts Belser and Melanie S. Morrison, “What No Longer Serves Us: Resisting 
Ableism and Anti-Judaism in New Testament Healing Narratives” in Journal of Feminist Studies in 
Religion, 27: 2 (Fall 2011): 153-170.  Belser and Morrison offer a fascinating insight and corrective.  When 
the move is made in scriptural exegesis to deemphasize the medical model of disability by not focusing on 
healing as a literal act, then the next step is to critique the institutions as one would in a social model of 
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where judgments regarding ability and the possibility of human flourishing are often 
harsh, simplistic and reductionistic.843 Joeckel explains the importance that we might 
otherwise take for granted: 
While the other paradigms invest disability with a cosmic significance or 
associate disability with the resiliency of the human spirit, the medical model 
approaches disability as impairment to be medically ameliorated.844 
The academic shift in language eliminated “the stare of wonder”845 that carried a message 
of either judgment or providence and replaced the engagement with “a clinical gaze.”846 
The socially encoded meaning of disability shifted at that point from messages of favor or 
                                                                                                                                                 
disability.  The “double bind” they describe is that in “resisting ableism” one can easily fall into a pattern of 
anti-Judaism.  The two scholars work together in a risky move for an essay.  They re-visit a sermon written, 
preached and published by Morrison on the story of the bent over woman in Luke 13:10-17.  The reader 
can practically hear Morrison cringe in her use of the Dutch word for resurrection Opstanding as a theme 
through the text.  Belser, her partner in this essay is a disabled scholar whose mobility is provided by a 
wheelchair.  Belser helps Morrison to listen deeply to what Devorah Greenstein calls a “rhetoric of 
affliction” that can plague sermons and preaching.  While Morrison had hoped to witness to the dynamic 
process of resurrection at work in ongoing lives, rather than a single event, her portrayal of the bent over 
woman is problematic.  Morrison imagines her in a miserable state rather than imagining the possibility this 
woman might have lived in “resourcefulness and creativity, supporting and sustaining herself – and perhaps 
others, as well.”  Even in quoting Irenaeus in this sermon that “the glory of God is a human being fully 
alive,” she speculated that the bent over woman was anything but fully alive.  What Morrison and Belser 
realize together is that changing this narrative can all too easily lead to the next step in the double bind 
which would be criticizing the broken society in which the “bent over” woman lives.   
843 Adele McCollum offers an alternate viewpoint to these as she suggests further study on folktales as a 
helpful resource.  See:  Adele B. McCollum, “Tradition, Folklore and Disability: A Heritage of Inclusion” 
in Human Disability and the Service of God:  Reassessing Religious Practice, eds. Nancy Eiesland and 
Don Saliers (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1998): 167-187. McCollum advocates for a resourrcement of 
traditional folktales that speak to inclusion in the face of a liturgical time she deems as abstracted from 
ordinary life.  This liturgical disconnect may be reframed through the lens of folktales. She looks to the 
Stith Thompson Motif Index for an exhaustive indexing system of folktales.  Here, she is able to look up 
“lame”, “blind, “crippled”, “idiot”, “monster” and find a wealth of resources.  In the face of exclusion, she 
finds in folklore radical inclusion of people with varying abilities.  She also briefly explores themes of 
occupational injury, disability by deception, the curse of a disability and healing in these tales.  She 
believes that folktales are at the heart of any given community and help to embody and include people of 
all abilities.  Some motifs she sees in this lore are things like “the disabled change agent” of Tiny Tim who 
softens hearts; the “clever people with physical disabilities who improvise” like the cat with the wooden 
paw, “the blind character with insight” like Tiresius and “the wise fool.”  This compendium of tales shows 
the importance of what McCollum calls “concrete contact groups” and their role for inclusion.   
844 Joeckel, “A Christian Approach to Disability Studies,” 327. 
845 Lennard Davis, “Dr. Johnson, Amelia, and the Discourse of Disability in the Eighteenth Century,” in 
“Defects”: Engendering the Modern Body, eds. Helen Deutsch and Felicity Nussbaum (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000), 62. 
846 Davis, “Dr. Johnson, Amelia and the Discourse of Disability,” 62. 
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disfavor toward the distance of a clinical assessment.  And so, an additional strength of 
the medical model one might argue is its potentiality to strengthen existing skills when 
medical treatment functions within a holistic view of humanity, one that acknowledges 
the whole person and aims to enhance existing skills where medically possible. Such 
advancements can be positive when oriented not to erase errors, but instead work to 
fostering humanity with the best of technology.  Living into this strength is fraught with 
judgment and stereotype, one must consider the body, mind and spirit of the individual on 
their own terms and with their own hopes realized rather than projected upon by others.  
We will see as we move from the medical model to the social model, how that 
advancement in scholarship was fueled by a need to better understand the intersection 
between bodies and societies.   
 
4.1.3 The Social Model of Disability 
The social model of disability847 argues that disability is largely socially 
constructed, deeply informed by worldly structures of institutions and stereotypes that 
create a societal ‘disabling’ of an individual through restricting access or provoking 
judgment.848 In the medical model, attention is focused on the embodiment of individual 
                                                 
847 In some literature, the social model of disability is referred to as the Minority-Group Model of disability.  
See for example:  Gerald V. O’Brien, “Eugenics, Genetics and the Minority Group Model of Disabilities: 
Implications for Social Work Advocacy” Social Work 56:4 (October, 2011), 347-354.  And also:  Dimitris 
Anastasiou, “Disability in Multicultural Theory: Conceptual and Social Justice Issues” Journal of 
Disability Policy Studies 27:1 (June 2016), 3-12. And, Andrew Batavia and Kay Schriner, “The Americans 
with Disabilities Act as Engine of Social Change: Models of Disability and the Potential of a Civil Rights 
Approach” Policy Studies Journal 29:4 (2001), 690-703.  To be clear, the social model is not exclusive to 
the frameworks of social analysis examined in chapter three. 
848 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 22-31. 
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physicality.  In the social model, attention is given to discrimination that occurs in the 
world through societal structures that create minority groups through exclusion by the 
physical and social nature of institutions.849  Sociologist Michael Oliver was instrumental 
in establishing the social model in 1983 with his work Social Work with Disabled 
People850 wherein he advocated for social justice and championed an approach through 
which to see societal barriers otherwise taken for granted.  The social model centers 
critical attention on the way societal structures create disadvantages and cause restrictions 
for people with diverse impairments.851   
Three theologians offer insight into the social model of disability: Nancy 
Eiesland, Stanley Hauerwas and Sharon V. Betcher.  Eiesland invites liberation from 
unjust societal structures.  Hauerwas asks demanding questions of the intersection 
between intellectual capacity and social structures.  Sharon V. Betcher prompts 
discussion between the environment and its potential to disable bodies through social 
injustice.  Nancy Eiesland advocates for the social model in her understanding of the 
liberatory struggle those with disabilities face to overcome societal oppression, alienation 
from particular norms, and stigmas promulgated by stereotypes.852 In the face of such 
limitation Eiesland, like Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, experiences disability as disabling 
interchanges between the world and one’s body through “architectural and attitudinal”853 
barriers. While Eiesland wrestles with the societal dimensions of disablement in 
                                                 
849 See for example Nancy Eiesland’s description regarding the social construction of disability in The 
Disabled God, (23-25). 
850 Michael Oliver, Social Work with Disabled People, (London, UK: Macmillan Press, 1983). 
851 Pam Thomas, Lorraine Gradwell and Natalie Markham, “Defining Impairment within the Social Model 
of Disability,” Greater Manchester Coalition of Disabled People’s Magazine, (July 1997). 
852 Eiesland, The Disabled God, 102. 
853 Joeckel, “A Christian Approach to Disability Studies,” 341.   
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interactions with her own disabled body, Stanley Hauerwas adds to the conversation in 
the social model the question of intellectual disablement wherein there is a social 
construction of disability with regard to intellect and reason.854   
 Theologian Sharon V. Betcher adds dimension to the social model of disability by 
inviting reflection on ecological devastation as a contributing factor for creating disability 
rather than seeing disability as a natural phenomenon seen as an “individual tragedy.”855  
The socialization of disability, for Betcher, is something that occurs prior to birth through 
social contexts and devastations rather than after birth as a body enters a social context 
inhospitable to their particular condition.  For Betcher, the anthropocene856 itself is a 
disabling social environment.  She explains, “Disability is not merely a ‘natural’ 
evolutionary mutation.  In the Anthropocene era, as human activity drives and aggravates 
planetary evolution, environmental disability is increasingly a form of human-on-human 
injustice.”857  The effect of this societal injustice is what Betcher deems an “earth-
assemblage.”858  For Betcher, society disables in two ways: first, through our shared 
“fleshy commons”859 which can create bodily disablement prior to birth; and, second, by 
                                                 
854 For example see:  Stanley Hauerwas, “The Church and the Mentally Handicapped: A Continuing 
Challenge to the Imagination” Critical Reflections on Stanley Hauerwas’ Theology of Disability: Disabling 
Society, Enabling Theology (London: Routledge Press, 2005), 53-62. 
855 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State.”  Religious Studies News. 
http://rsnonline.org/index47ae.html?option=com_content&view=article&id=1462:of-disability-and-the-
garden-state&catid=25:spotlight-on-theo-educ&Itemid=1620.  (Accessed: October 10, 2014). 
856 Atmosphereic chemist, Paul Crutzen describes the anthropocene as, “A new geological epoch 
characterized by pervasive human influence throughout earth’s systems.” The cumulative condition 
exhibited by the anthropocene is the effect that ‘industrial humanity’ enforces as an evolutionary force 
affecting both ecology and biology thereby affecting certain disabilities.  See for example:  P.J. Curtzen and 
E. Stoermer, “The Anthropocene,” Global Change Newsletter 41, no. 1 (2000).  Crutzen drew on the 
language of ecologist Eugene F. Stoermer who coined the term to popularize the concept giving it cultural 
weight to describe this new geological epoch at play. 
857 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State” 
858 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State” 
859 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State” 
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the disabling that occurs after birth when the culture that created the particular disability 
then continues to “marginalize and minoritize.”860  Here, there can be a move back 
toward the medical model of disability when the society that both creates and perpetuates 
disability then “conspires to fix, cure, and rehabilitate disability.”861  In the face of these 
forces, both medical and social, “certain assumptions of normalcy”862 are heralded and in 
so doing the disabled person’s “agency, autonomy and reason”863 are suppressed within 
the system.  
 Betcher’s thesis is an important addition to understanding the many dimensions of 
the social model of disability as she makes clear the ramifications of “unthought after-
effects of human historical processes”864 on an individual life existing within a greater 
over-powering context such as the Anthropocene. Betcher’s willingness to challenge 
current notions of the socializing effects of disability is helpful for this dissertation which 
aims to understand the disabling effects of moral injury brought on by, in Betcher’s 
words, the “unthought after-effects of human historical processes.”  For our purposes, the 
critical move is not from the disabling effects of dismissive social contexts to the creating 
forces of the Anthropocene, as Betcher suggests, but from dismissive social contexts to 
the disabling forces at play in the ongoing theatres of war. 
 Eiesland, Hauerwas and Betcher offer glimpses of the social model of disability 
and its implication for disabled bodies.  And yet, the social model bears significant 
weaknesses.  While the social model attempts to move the structures of disability beyond 
                                                 
860 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State” 
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862 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State” 
863 Sharon V. Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State” 
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the impairment (or not) of an individual, the model is criticized for exactly that, as it  
“undermines or underestimates both the pain and the distinctiveness of the impaired 
body.”865  Additionally, a related weakness is in its attempt to demonstrate societal 
limitations on an individual, the social model highlights what a body “ ‘cannot do’ . . . 
[rather than] what they ‘can do.’ ”866 As much as the social model moves beyond binary 
conceptualizations, hyper-individualization and the over-medicalization of the medical 
model, the social model is still controversial.867  By focusing primarily on individual 
interaction with social environment, the social model often assumes that the disabling 
effect of society occurs consistently across societal structures.  Here, disability becomes a 
socio-political category rather than a medical determination.   
The reason for distinguishing between medical and social categories may 
originally have been an attempt to positively, rather than negatively describe disability.  
Scholars Roy McCloughry and Wayne Morris explain the creation of this category by 
saying, “In an attempt to address the fact that the medical model is a deficit model, the 
social model can go so far as to elevate impairment to a place beyond regret.”868  In so 
doing, the social model counteracts the problem of “ableism.” Ableism, according to Fred 
                                                 
865 Richard Cross, “Disability, Impairment and some Medieval Accounts of the Incarnation: Suggestions 
for a Theology of Personhood” Modern Theology 27:4  (October, 2011), 651. 
866 Hans S. Reinders, Receiving The Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology 
and Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI:  Eerdmans, 2008), 329.   
867 See, for example, Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement: A Sociological Approach (New York, 
NY: St Martin’s Press, 1990).  And also Sharon V. Betcher, Spirit and the Politics of Disablement 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007). 
868 Roy McCloughry and Wayne Morris, Making a World of Difference: Christian Reflections on 
Disability, (London, England: SPCK, 2002), 17. 
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Pelka, is “the belief that people with disabilities are different from ‘normal’ people, and 
that their lives are inherently less worthwhile than those of people without disabilities.”869 
And yet, a problem with the social model (also called “minority group model”) is 
that in its shift to societal structures, suffering that is real and inherent to some disabled 
bodies may be minimized and neglected.870  Jewish scholar Julia Belser-Watts argues 
there is a two-fold weakness of the social model.  First, the social model is “ill-equipped 
to handle the fluidity of disability,”871 and second, the social model has the potential to 
“efface the significance of actual, physical difference or to ignore the sometimes negative 
aspects of disability.”872 Certain disabling conditions are uniquely bearers of pain from 
within that are not caused by societal barriers: consider, for example, fibromyalgia.873 
 The social model of disability aims to rescue the medical model from the binary 
problem of “failed health.”874  In so doing, the model offers strengths worthy of note 
here. One strength of the social model is the recognition that a body always exists within 
a community, in fact, it might be argued that one might not exist without a “thou” to 
acknowledge one’s own personhood. Certainly a strength; but also an inherent weakness 
perhaps, is the social model’s naming of societal prejudice and stereotypes both in 
attitudes and media, as well as in pervasive architecture.  The shadow side of naming 
                                                 
869 Fred Pelka, The Disability Rights Movement (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 3. 
870 For example, Garland-Thomson appreciates the social model but acknowledges it can diminish the 
“material complexity” of people with disability.   See: Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary 
Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1996): 15-16. She writes: “Disability, then, can be painful, comfortable, familiar, 
alienating, bonding, isolating, disturbing, endearing, challenging, infuriating, or ordinary. Embedded in the 
complexity of actual human relations, it is always more than the disabled figure can signify” (13-14). 
871 Julia Watts Belser, “Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities” 
Theology Today 68:2, 2011, 185. 
872 Belser, “Disability and Christian Theology,” 185. 
873 Capretto, “On Not Operationalizing Disability,” 896. 
874 Betcher, “Of Disability and the Garden State.” 
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stereotypes is inherent in its potential to create stereotypes and thereby keep perpetuating 
them.  Despite its weaknesses, and even in spite of its strengths, the social model propels 
society forward to consider inclusion as a fundamental moral issue.875  The social model 
of disability finds strength in its ability to name the impact on the disabled of their 
inability to reach personal goals and forward their future because of societal 
limitations.876  
When comparing the social and the medical models of disability, some scholars 
have suggested the medical model might be seen as an “essentialist” approach to 
impairment existing within the very essence of the person versus a “constructionist” 
approach wherein society constructs disability.877  As we turn now to a new model of 
disability offered by Deborah Creamer, we will encounter what we might deem an 
“existentialist” account of disability as she wrestles with human limits before a limitless 
God and the existential questions raised by those real and exacting limits.  As we turn to 
her account, we will integrate her analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each model 
into our assessment and then review her constructive alternative. 
 
4.2 The Limit Model of Disability 
                                                 
875 See: Lorella Terzi  “The Social Model of Disability: A Philosophical Critique” The Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 21:2  (August 2004), 141.    
876 Cross, “Disability, Impairment and some Medieval Accounts of the Incarnation,” 650-651. 
877 Myriam Winance, “Rethinking disability: Lessons from the past, questions for the future. Contributions 
and limits of the social model, the sociology of science and technology, and the ethics of care” Alter: 
European Journal of Disability Research 10(2016): 106.   
  243
Creamer’s powerful work Disability and Christian Theology Embodied Limits 
and Constructive Possibilities critiques the dominant medical and social models878 of 
disability and provides a constructive alternative of a “limit model of disability.”  Her 
recognition of the weaknesses of both models is helpful in our ongoing desire to draw 
disability and moral injury together as helpful conversation partners.  It became clear in 
the review of both the psychological and theological literature on moral injury the 
reservations regarding medicalization of the injury and the complexity of societal 
involvement.  While the medical and social models of disability provide helpful starting 
points for assessing and refining the definition of moral injury, each model has 
shortcomings that restrict its usefulness.  Creamer’s limit model will lead us forward in 
considering how disability, and perhaps even human morality itself, encounters limits in 
varying spheres of life that can provoke disabling encounters. 
Creamer’s work invigorates study in disability by depicting the unavoidable 
limits879 of human embodiment and naming the equalizing power of this assertion for all 
humanity.  Creamer’s work is important because it addresses the real “limits” that studies 
in disability probe and pursuits in theological method quickly meet.  For Creamer, this 
sense of “limit” is an integral part of being human, not simply a term that applies to those 
                                                 
878 Creamer refers throughout her book refers to the social model also as “the minority model of disability” 
(25-26). 
879 Nancy Eiesland recognized human limits in her work The Disabled God but leaves that recognition for 
further development.  Eiesland writes, “The disabled God makes possible a renewal of hope for people with 
disabilities and others who care. This symbol points not to a utopian vision of hope as the erasure of all 
human contingency, historically or eternally, for that would be to erase our bodies, our lives. Rather, it is a 
liberatory realism that maintains a clear recognition of the limits of our bodies and an acceptance of the 
truth of being human.” Eiesland, The Disabled God, 103. 
  244
who currently experience a disabling condition.  Her understanding of “limit” is positive:  
limits are unsurprising, limits are intrinsic to existence, limits are good – not evil.880  
By recasting limits in positive terms, Creamer erases some of the negativity 
associated with limits and disablement and expands “limit” to suggest a particular 
theological anthropology that touches all humanity.  She uses the “limit-ness” of human 
experience to offer a third way beyond the operative “medical” and “minority” models of 
disability. For Creamer, the “medical” model of disability that understands disability as 
intrinsic to an individual misses the larger social implications of societal constructions 
that create their own impairment for a person who is “medically” disabled.881  Instead of 
using the more standard term “the social model of disability,” Creamer instead refers to it 
as the “minority” model of disability to overcome this dismissal. By renaming the model, 
she offers a clear socio-political depiction of the way society fails to meet the physical 
and vocational needs of disabled persons thereby creating minorities.882  Creamer’s 
articulation of “limit-ness” as a model for both disability and theology clarifies the bias in 
both that assumes “normal” bodies as the norm.  A “limit” model for both disability and 
theology reveals a fundamental aspect of human experience as bound by limitation. 
Creamer’s model is a promising revision to the standard two models as she suggests the 
particular way in which disability is not always a given, but emerges fluidly within 
varying contexts.   
                                                 
880 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 94-96.  Creamer will note later not all limits are good, but 
her point is clear.  Human beings react to limits and deem them negatively.  She aims here to reverse this 
reaction by claiming the overwhelming goodness of limits that humans encounter. 
881 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 22. 
882 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 25. In so doing, Creamer offers a reversal of the Platonic 
“disorder of the gods” creating havoc in the civitas.  Here, she reverses the dynamic and describes how the 
civitas disorders the body, mind and spirit of ordinary citizens limiting abilities. 
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Creamer offers this third model as a “limit model” of disability to describe the 
fluidity through which flesh encounters various worlds and discovers inconsistent 
disabling since limits vary in various contexts. Though disability studies’ “social model” 
of disability emphasizes the way that social structures and built environments “disabled” 
particular individuals, this model does not does not adequately describe the “fluid” nature 
of disability where disabilities do not occur in all social contexts, but in certain social 
contexts when limits are encountered. Creamer argues that both the social and medical 
models fail in five ways:  their inability to take into account the fluidity of disablement 
across social contexts883, the inability to embrace the great diversity of disability884, the 
inability to wrestle with experiences of disability such as chronic pain, the actuality that 
the state of disability is “more normal” than other states of being as we bear witness to 
the universal experience of flesh changing over time885, and the inability to engage 
certain areas of theological reflection886 beyond conversations key to the social model 
such as liberation and social justice.887  In moving toward a limit model, Creamer hopes 
to acknowledge “the prevalence of limits,”888 to avoid negative evaluations of a human 
being.  This threefold posture will allow Creamer to add “necessary complexity”889 to the 
field of disability.   
                                                 
883 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 31. 
884 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 32. 
885 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 32.  In the historical scholarship on disability, we noted the 
work of scholars like Augustine and Kierkegaard who lived with chronic pain and were keenly aware of 
their decaying bodies and yet arrived at different conclusions related to disability and theology. 
886 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 33. 
887 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 115-116. 
888 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 116.  Again, worthy of note here is that the disordered 
body does not wreak havoc on the structures of the civitas; instead, the civitas in all of its complexity is a 
place of encounter with limits that can then disable and disorder. 
889 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 116 
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The beneficial result of this “necessary complexity” is the possibility of a deeper 
conversation across disability and theology, and even more so, between persons 
regarding the depth of their theological reflection in light of their own experience.  With 
this shift, Creamer moves us from the medical world, through social contexts, into greater 
theological reflection.  To accomplish this task, Creamer critiques the societal tendency 
to dismiss disability as an element of “the uninteresting randomness of life.”890 In so 
doing, Creamer invites deepened creativity, deepened humanity and deepened 
theology.891  However, it is possible the very name “limit model” is a misnomer for 
exactly what Creamer hopes to convey.  Perhaps, one might consider the suggested 
“contextual limit model of disability” to better represent Creamer’s twofold thought 
process:  a person may be disabled in certain contexts when he or she encounters a limit; 
and that limit then raises questions of depth and substance about their world and 
relationships within that world. 
Creamer’s contribution to the field is her ability to funnel these large 
conversations regarding justice and liberation, crucifixion and resurrection, access and 
exclusion as questions that deal with human limit.  Her model is both radically inclusive, 
in that all human beings face limits.  Creamer recognizes the insights of social model 
advocates that disability is informed, created and defined by social structures.  Her 
model, promising as it is, requires revision in order to acknowledge the depth of human 
response to limit beyond her suggested affirmation that “limits are good” revealing 
                                                 
890 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 52. 
891 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 33. 
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instead the anger, shame and self-hatred that can results in the face of limits.892  In her 
discussion of limits, Creamer would do well to elaborate on different kinds of limits 
placing them along a spectrum of “goodness.”  For example, some limits are a result of 
being creatures with embodied finitude; some limits are inevitable as vulnerable creatures 
living in God’s created universe; other limits stray from goodness when sinful human 
choices are made or societal structures create sinful institutions and contingencies.     
And yet, Creamer does not make these distinctions.  Instead, for Creamer, her key 
theological assertion framing her argument is that sin is the failure to acknowledge 
limit.893  Building on the work of feminist Sallie McFague, Creamer adds a fourth 
construction of limit in addition to McFague’s traditional threefold rubric of sin as a 
violation against humans, creatures or nature.894  Creamer adds that sin can occur against 
oneself:  “Me versus Myself: living in a lie in relation to oneself.”895  Creamer explains, 
“This lie recognizes that we tend to hold inaccurate self-representations, especially 
insofar as we deny or depreciate our own limits.”896  Drawing limits into the theological 
category of sin betters our ability to discuss the difficulty in societal discourse regarding 
moral injury.  When Creamer states, “From the limits perspective, sin might now be 
redefined as an inappropriate attitude towards limits as we both exaggerate and also reject 
                                                 
892 Julia Watts Belser in her review article of Creamer’s book considers the dangers of deeming limits 
“good.”  Belser’s conclusion is clear: “I fear that a limits model of disability may inadvertently deepen the 
perception of disability as a negative, even tragic condition.”  See:  Julia Watts Belser, “Disability and 
Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities,” Theology Today 68:2 (June, 2011):  
186.   
893 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 71.  Creamer makes clear: “This lie recognizes that we 
tend to hold inaccurate self-representations, especially insofar as we deny or depreciate our own limits.” 
894 McFague, Body of God, 113. Creamer, Disability and Christian Tradition, 71. 
895 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 71.   
896 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 71. 
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our own limits and the limits of others,”897 those of us interested in Moral Injury can 
imagine then the sinful limits that exist within a society that all too easily chooses what it 
wants to hear and what falls on deaf ears.  Even more so, in discussing Creamer’s work, 
Mary Elise Lowe suggests, “This dread of disability can be framed in theological terms 
as the failure of the temporarily able-bodied to accept their limits as mortal, fragile, 
embodied, and vulnerable creatures of God.”898 Perhaps the societal inability to discuss 
Moral Injury is driven by much the same dread since the culture is unable to accept their 
limits as moral (sic), “fragile, embodied and vulnerable creatures of God.”899 
Creamer’s work represents several shifts in thinking.  First, she offers a shift in 
the world of disability scholarship by encouraging her peers to look beyond the medical 
and social models toward a more fluid model that takes into account the diversity of 
experiences of disability.  Second, she, along with scholars like Sallie McFague, offers a 
shift in theological reflection to consider the religious significance of our bodies and the 
impact of embodiment on theological reflection.  Third, and perhaps most important, 
while the social model is a helpful step beyond the medical model moving from a 
singular body to a social body, Creamer’s limit model engages a shift to a third sphere 
beyond the singular and the social bodies to consider, in McFague’s language, “the body 
of God.”  While this shift sounds dramatic, and perhaps even impossible to consider, it is 
helpful for our purposes to think of the relationship between disablement and spheres of 
thinking beyond our own bodies and beyond the social body.  Disablement, whether 
                                                 
897 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 33. 
898 Mary Elise Lowe,  “Rabbi Who Sinned? Disability Theologies and Sin” Dialog: A Journal of Theology, 
51: 3 (September, 2012), 188. 
899 Lowe, “Rabbi Who Sinned?,” 188. 
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physical, mental or moral, intersects our ways of thinking about theological 
anthropology900 and theology.901 
 
4.2.1 Strengths of the Limit Model of Disability 
Creamer’s argument widens the horizon of disability studies beyond the spheres 
of the medical and the social to the theological.  Her work allows for greater 
differentiation in the experience of disability then the social model and invites sustained 
reflection on particular limits encountered and their effect on the body, mind, spirit of the 
person who experienced them. Creamer claims the messiness of embodiment and its fluid 
unfolding across time and space through the limit model to a degree that the medical and 
social models do not acknowledge.  She challenges existing dichotomies that draw lines 
between “us and them”902  (that is, persons with and without disabilities) moving the 
conversation regarding limit to a horizon other than the distance between two humans 
and instead to the limits of finite humanity in the face of God.  For example, Creamer 
provides the example of two women meeting in wheelchairs.  The first was paralayzed 
since birth.  The second was paralyzed late in life during a skiing accident.  The medical 
model would equate much of their experience.  The social model would equate much of 
their experience.  The limit model succeeds in differentiating between their experiences 
                                                 
900 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 108-110.  Aquinas, for example, took disability into 
account when he developed his doctrines of the imago dei and ecclesiological baptism as a blessing for 
vulnerable bodies. 
901 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 111-113.  Karl Barth shaped an account of heaven and the 
resurrection with disability in mind as he explored heaven as the reverse side of life.  See:  Karl Barth, 
Church Dogmatics III/4: 338. 
902 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 118. 
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and the limits they encounter.903 With these strengths, Creamer invites new possibilities 
for perseverance, courage, strength, creativity, community, theological reflection, 
interdependence and deepened conversations requiring honesty and self-reflection.904 
 
4.2.2 Challenges of the Limit Model of Disability 
Despite the great strengths of Creamer’s model and the advance the model 
achieves in the scholarship, there are weaknesses that are important to note.  The three 
weaknesses that must be addressed are the lack of: depth in moral emotion, discernment 
for knowing which limits are good and which limits are bad, and development of the 
constructive model.  First, does Creamer delve deep enough into human suffering in the 
face of limits?  A repeated mantra throughout her work is that “limits are good.” Creamer 
does makes clear: “The limits model does not aim to dismiss or deny experiences of evil 
or suffering, nor does it devalue efforts to overcome limits – it does not propose that all 
limits are good or that we ought to embrace or accept them all.”905 While the assertion 
helps clarify her thinking, the reader is still left wanting a deeper probe of the effect of 
encountering limits on the experience of shame, despair and pain.  Without attention to 
                                                 
903 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 117. 
904 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 118-120.  Creamer’s work here resonates with several 
contemporary scholars in disability who advocate for relationality, vulnerability and deepened community 
such as Amos Yong and Molly Haslam.  Haslam offers an extended phenomenological account of a 
relationship with a non-verbal disabled friend in A Constructive Theology of Intellectual Disability: Human 
Beings As Mutuality and Response. 
905 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 118. 
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these moral emotions the power and possibility of their ability to “globalize”906 and affect 
contexts beyond the individual are dramatically increased. 
Second, Creamer’s weakness is her lack of discernment in acknowledging which 
limits are good and which limits are not, as well as her lack of attention in guiding the 
reader to make that discernment as well.907   In her review, Marilyn Martone makes clear 
two points: first, she questions how one is to discern, given Creamer’s model, when 
limits are good and when they are not.  Martone invites further reflection on that element 
of discernment.  Second, Martone does understand Creamer of having a sense of human 
finitude in the face of limits.  Sin, for Creamer according to Martone, “is the refusal to 
accept our proper place.” To be clear, that notion of sin is not linked to disability or 
morality, but instead to the inability to acknowledge limit.  Creamer begins to make the 
distinctions between sin, finitude and limit; but as Martone acknowledges, she does not 
go far enough in the discussion.  Creamer recognizes finitude but doesn’t distinguish 
finitude which is part of human nature from sin, which is not. 
Third, reviews of her work have invited further development of a constructive 
account of this limit model of disability rather than a deconstruction of previous 
                                                 
906 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
907 Marilyn Martone’s book review of Creamer’s describes her work as a “nascent theology of disability” 
recognizing the need despite the solid foundation articulated by Creamer to further develop her theology of 
limits.  See: Marilyn Martone, on “Disability and Christian Theology by Deborah Creamer” in Theological 
Studies, (March 2010), 262.  Martone makes clear two points: first, she questions how one is to discern, 
given Creamer’s model, when limits are good and when they are not.  Martone invites further reflection on 
that element of discernment.  Second, Martone does understand Creamer of having a sense of human 
finitude in the face of limits.  Sin, for Creamer according to Martone, “is the refusal to accept our proper 
place.” 
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models.908 Aaron Klink, for example, argues Creamer’s book takes “scant time 
developing its own interesting constructive proposal.” Doing so would require 
developing an account of limits that are beneficial, limits that are dangerous,909 and how 
to discern between the two.  In addition, doing so would develop an account of those 
moral emotions, such as despair, in the face of limits.  And, doing so would deepen a 
depiction of God who willingly takes on a self-limitation in order to encounter human 
beings in their own limitations.  Furthering that theological account would demand 
further construction of theological doctrines such as the incarnation, crucifixion or 
resurrection, as other scholars have helpfully accomplished.  Despite these few 
weaknesses, Creamer’s scholarship is respected across the disciplines of disability and 
theology to kindle creativity and invite new possibility for deeper engagement of the 
limits we encounter. 
For moral injury, questions then are raised as changing contexts and the limits of 
morality within those spheres, prompt difficult reflection regarding one’s own moral 
agency and self identity, relationships to both comrades and persons of authority, as well 
as religious crises amid the moral void. In response to those questions, the limit model 
offers possibilities.  While Creamer’s initial presentation does not offer substantial depth 
to the shame and guilt residing in moral injury, the questions of limits resonate. As we 
turn in the next chapter to our own constructive alternative – that is, “a revised limit 
model of disability” we will have to keep in mind the weaknesses of Creamer’s 
                                                 
908 Aaron Klink notes the need for further constructive work on Creamer’s model in his review article of 
Disability and Christian Theology.  See:  Aaron Klink, “Disability and Christian Theology” Religious 
Studies Review 35:3 (Sept. 2009): 157.   
909 Belser, “Disability and Christian Theology,” 186. 
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construction.  While Creamer needs further depth in the moral emotions; further 
discernment in knowing which limits are natural and good and which limits are sinful and 
bad; and further development in a constructive model; we will see in the theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (that preceded Creamer’s work) helpful constructs which will aid her 
work and ours. 
 
4.3 Toward A Revised Limit Model of Disability 
 While Creamer’s “limit model” succeeds in expanding the conversation beyond 
the standard medical and social models, her model benefits from further refinement as we 
set forth a constructive “revised limit model of disability.”  These benefits will include: a 
recognition of limits changing fluidly across contexts, an assessment of how functioning 
changes amid those differing fluid contexts, and, an account of moral emotions that 
includes shame and despair in response to those limits.  Certainly we have learned that 
moral injury is deeper and more embodied than mechanized views of humanity and the 
healing arts; moral injury is not captured within a medical model of disability.  And we 
have toured the contours of social issues that both contribute to and reverberate from 
moral injury; and yet, the social model of disability is inadequate.  Creamer’s model 
offers promise by recasting disability in relation to an exploration of limits and the 
repercussions those limits have for God, self and neighbor.  In particular, Creamer’s 
model is most helpful in showing how ‘disabling’ occurs in various spheres of life as 
limits are met and grief ensues. However, more development on the depth of shame and 
despair in human experience is needed in order to validate the depth of lament and loss a 
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veteran experiences beyond the simple explanation Creamer offers that limits are not evil, 
but a good and right part of being human.   
 Creamer draws on the scholarship of Sharon Betcher to refine her own work with 
an eye to deepening awareness of the depth of pain experience when limits are 
confronted. In response to Betcher’s critique, Creamer offers a threefold response. 
Creamer argues first, that “limits” should be embraced as a challenge to the idea of a 
more traditional normal.  When limits are recognized, suddenly there is new space in 
which to act and “to make and unmake issues of identity, relationality, space and 
place.”910  Second, she argues that scholars should engage across disciplines of theology, 
sociology and psychology.  The conversation can then serve to, “question and 
complicate, to challenge and play, to propose and subvert, and to push continually toward 
complexity.”911 And finally, she proposes what she deems “a pedagogy of pain.”  Betcher 
notes the tendency of physical pain to turn inward, mute and suppress.912  Creamer cites 
the work of Elaine Scarry as well who argues, “physical pain does not simply resist 
language but actively destroys it.”913  If the physical pain of the body is inexpressible, 
how then can the reverberating pain of the spirit entangled with flesh find words?  Even 
more so, Creamer acknowledges that unexpressed pain, pain that is turned inward for 
lack of words, only increases.914  Most poignantly for the purposes of our overarching 
conversation regarding Moral Injury, Creamer takes note:  “Cultures of privilege need 
                                                 
910 Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 125. 
911 Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 126.  Here, we are reminded of Sheila Maguen and Brett Litz’s cross-
disciplinary challenge to address the most hyper-complex of societal problems such as moral injury.  
Maguen and Litz, “Moral Injury and Veterans of War,” 2. 
912 Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 126. 
913 Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 126.  Regarding Creamer’s discussion of Elaine Scarry see: Elaine 
Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 
1985), 4. 
914 Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 127. 
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such a pedagogy of pain.”915  Pain, for Creamer, becomes one of the impetuses for a new 
model of disability that can transcend the predisposition to bodily “errors” of the medical 
model and the prejudices and stereotypes of the social model of disability.916  The 
scholarly conversation between Creamer and Betcher reveal openness by Creamer for 
further engagement and refinement.  In the same spirit, I will draw on these three 
deepened points to present a revised limit model of disability. 
To be clear, a revised limit model of disability is needed to make space in the 
discourse for moral injury to be considered a “disability.” This terminology allows us to 
reject a conception of disability as taboo and instead to resource the depth and breadth of 
disability discourse. Here, I suggest seven reasons why a revised limit model of disability 
is essential for moral injury.  First, a revised limit model of disability makes a claim upon 
the scholarship of moral injury and invites collaboration with the field of disability 
studies.  Jonathan Shay revealed in his lectures at Chautauqua the many ways in which 
moral injury is a disabling condition.917 Second, a revised limit model of disability 
acknowledges “the limited horizon of choice” in which veterans are forced to make 
decisions thereby causing at times, and in ways big and small,918 disablement.  When 
those limits are confronted and choices are made or invalidated; the potential exists for 
the disabling of body, mind and spirit.  Third, a revised limit model of disability allows 
for the complexity of morality across varying spheres of life – acknowledging that 
different moral codes exist in the warzone, the bedroom and the boardroom.  Each of 
                                                 
915 Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 127. 
916 Creamer, “Embracing Limits,” 127. 
917 Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”   
918 Again, an important nuance of this is described in Tyler Boudreau’s essay “The Morally Injured.” 
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these changing contexts presents rules of morality that might face different limits in an 
alternative context.  Fourth, a revised limit model of disability reveals the reduced coping 
that occurs when a limit is transgressed in a particular context.  The limited horizon of 
choice919 and its assault of past moral codes affect embodiment and the ability to cope 
where functioning and flourishing once occurred with ease.  One might wonder if 
morality then truly becomes limited further due to the reduced coping, the stress on 
embodiment, and the questions raised of God, self and other.  Can changing flesh 
contribute directly to a changing morality? Fifth, a revised limit model of disability 
challenges previously held beliefs of God, self and neighbor.  Veteran Michael Yandell 
explains,  
This is what moral injury is—the winds that blow when all the laws, all the 
understood ways of relating to other human beings have been laid flat. For when 
we release the terms good and evil and start applying those terms to human 
beings and whole groups of people, we allow ourselves the capacity to lay flat 
any moral qualms in order to pursue the enemy to the ends of the earth.920 
 
In this brief reflection we hear the challenges to God (good and evil), others (ways of 
relating) and self (we allow ourselves…).  Sixth, a revised limit model of disability will 
travel the distance beyond Creamer’s easy acceptance that “limits are good”921 to a more 
                                                 
919 The language of “moral horizon” is critical to the work of Theologian Sarah Bachelard. In her book 
Resurrection and the Moral Imagination, our moral imagination is conceiving the resurrection as a new 
reality, a new world possible within this world, provides a “new horizon” (2) against which to act. The 
Christian moral agent does not live solely with laws or commands within the complexities of this world, 
instead, the Christian moral agent acts within this new horizon the resurrection provides. Bachelard’s view 
stands in contrast to Oliver O’Donovan’s Resurrection and the Moral Order.  For Bachelard, resurrection 
creates a “new world” over and against the world broken by the fall.  For O’Donovan, resurrection provides 
justification for the current created order. Bachelard’s believes the church has a responsibility to speak 
from this new horizon, with non-religious language (185), in order to reach those who do not present an 
explicit religious belonging. Her willingness to risk religious language, though fundamentally grounded in 
a theology of the resurrection, echoes Bonhoeffer’s often quoted advocacy of a “religionless Christianity” 
in a “world come of age” (183).  See: Sarah Bachelard, Resurrection and the Moral Imagination: 
Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014). 
920 Yandell, “The War Within,” 12. 
921 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 96. 
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nuanced engagement with a kind of Kierkegaardian angst that engagement with limits 
create an existential crisis and we might even become in that moment “sick unto death.” 
To create space for the shame and anguish experienced by our vets will be an essential 
component of a revised limit model.  Finally, a revised limit model of disability draws the 
conversation regarding moral injury beyond the lone injured vet into a larger societal 
conversation regarding the limits all creatures encounter.  Could this be in the vein of 
Guttierrez, an “irruption of the poor” for the twenty-first century? In no way should this 
element of the model negate the unique and wounded experience of our returning 
veterans.  Instead, a reflection on creaturely limits might shape a theological 
anthropology worthy of self-reflection and societal complicity for all.922 
 Here, then, are seven reasons why a revised limit model of disability is needed for 
our veterans to gain some empowerment in recognizing moral injury as a disabling 
experience.  Above all these reasons, however, I would herald one more.  It is time that 
the mark of sara’at, that stigmatizing tattoo of moral failure,923 is removed from the 
shoulders of our veterans.  Instead, a mantle of responsibility for all needs to be claimed, 
understood and addressed for our complicit cooperation in the forces that create and 
sustain the potential for moral injury.  A revised limit model of disability makes space for 
individuals and institutions to understand the limits within which we live and move and 
                                                 
922 See for example:  John Macquarrie, “Theological Reflections on Disability,” Religion and Disability:  
Essays in Scripture, Theology and Ethics, ed. Marilyn E. Bishop (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward Press, 
1995): 30-32. Macquarrie’s essay is an extended discussion on what it means to be human.  A “thing,” as 
Macquarrie describes has a certain number of fixed properties.  A “human” on the other hand, is comprised 
of limitless possibilities that “may or may not be realized.”  A human being then is an ironic mix of 
limitation and possibility; we are finite but attracted to the infinite. However, Macquarrie looks to 
theologian David Pailin to claim that within this mix there is no definite set of features that necessitate full 
humanity.  Herein, texts like Romans 8:22-23 “we groan inwardly…as we await the redemption of our 
bodies” and Mark 10:27 “with God all things are possible” make sense 
923Melcher, “Visualizing the Perfect Cult,” 55. 
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have our being, and how structures of societal injustice create a limited horizon of choice 
causing moral injury to be inflicted in traumatic, nuanced and subtle ways on larger 
populations of people than we might ever imagine.924 
 
4.4 Next Steps Toward a New Model of Disability to Address Moral Injury 
 Given the demand for the revised limit model, what then is needed to proceed 
forward? Rosemarie Garland-Thomson says, “Disability is the transformation that occurs 
as flesh encounters the world.”925 Her account of disability as a transformation of the 
human along a spectrum of life926 that acknowledges finitude, vulnerability and limits is 
an attempt to de-stigmatize the language of disability. The dynamic theological 
anthropology of her definition creates a conceptual space where “the world” limits, again 
and again, over the course of a lifetime.  However, her language creates room for 
imagining the possibility of transformation within those encounters.  Using Garland-
Thomson’s definition as a lens through which to engage the theology of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer will allow us to “revise” Creamer’s “limit model” to explore the depth of 
despair when human agency encounters real-world limits thereby encountering world-
shattering trauma.927 
                                                 
924 Rita Nakashima Brock in her essay “Sophie’s Choice” articulates an inclusive stance on moral injury 
that argues for a much larger societal depth and breadth to moral injury than originally intended when the 
term was first designated for veterans of war. 
925 Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342. 
926 David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have been instrumental in naming the construction of a continuum 
that places disability along a value spectrum between ill and healthy.  See: David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. 
Snyder, eds., The Body and Physical Difference, 1. 
927 See: Ronnie Janoff-Bulman: Shattered Assumptions: Toward a New Psychology of Trauma (New York, 
NY: Free Press, 2002).  We will continue in the upcoming chapters to deepen the language of trauma 
within the revised limit model of disability to include notions such as Janoff-Bulman’s that when the 
“assumptive world” in which a human lives is shattered, the only language in response is the language of 
trauma. Key assumptions we maintain are: the world is good, the world and our lives within it have 
meaning, and my self has worth (6).  When these assumptions are fragmented, the self does as well. 
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Drawing on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s view of limit will prove to be a helpful 
corrective and guide to deepen our conception of human limit by addressing these 
weaknesses and therefore, probe human suffering in the face of limit, explore further an 
aspect of the theological doctrine of sin as a failure to recognize finitude, and engage 
sustained theological reflection on theological anthropology, Christology and theology.  
This movement toward Bonhoeffer to strengthen Creamer’s limit model will aid in our 
probe for a “revised limit model” for moral injury. Garland-Thomson’s definition will 
allow us to look at Bonhoeffer’s theology through the lens of “world” (creation), “flesh” 
(creatures), “encounters” (the fall, and the continual fall), and  “transformation” (the 
orders of preservation). Bonhoeffer’s exposition will deepen and revise Creamer’s 
conceptualization of grenze (limit); but even more so, Bonhoeffer acknowledges limits 
and encounters across varying spheres of life through his description of the “mandates of 
creation” and “the order of preservation” within those spheres once a limit has been 
crossed and shame ensues so that there may be functioning and flourishing in both the 
life of the individual and the affected society. 
 Recognizing the weaknesses in Creamer’s account (the depth of moral emotion, 
the need for discernment of dangerous versus advantageous limits, and the further 
development of the details of a constructive model) will aid our discussion of Bonhoeffer 
and guide our assessment of his account of finite creatures within creation, his assessment 
of human sin, and his hope for redemption through the orders of preservation and the 
mandates of creation.  Bonhoeffer’s development of these areas will directly address the 
weaknesses in Creamer’s presentation.  Even more so, Bonhoeffer will be helpful in 
discerning limits that are natural, and thus advantageous to humanity, versus limits that 
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are sinful, and thus can be dangerous to humanity.  In so doing, Bonhoeffer proves 
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BONHOEFFER’S VIEW OF LIMIT 
When I struggle with my own pain, my veteran teammates will support me;  
and I will reach out of the darkness and grasp their helping hands. 
 
- The Veterans’ Creed928 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 In chapter three we established that drawing moral injury into conversation with 
disability might happen in any of three ways: by way of definition, by way of an 
operational framework such as social analysis, or by way of a deeper theological 
anthropology shaped by a robust concept of human finitude. We also recognized the 
potential of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s account of disability to draw us deeper into 
that sense of finitude. In chapter four, we continued our exploration into models of 
disability by analyzing the medical and social models, noting their strengths and 
advancements of scholarly conversation, while also clearly conveying their weaknesses. 
Then we turned to Deborah Creamer who saw the need for a model of disability that 
recognized human finitude and so presented “the limit model of disability.”  While that 
model advances the conversation, and provides helpful insight for moral injury, her 
model does not address the globalizing emotion of human shame and despair when 
confronted with those limits that raise questions about God, self and other.  Nor does 
Creamer differentiate among different types of limits and their moral implications.  We 
noted the need for “a revised limit model of disability” that would take into account those 
concerns.  This chapter furthers the advancement of that revised model by drawing 
                                                 
928 Veterans’ Creed written by Judge John C. Reed, III. 
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Creamer into conversation with Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his conceptualization of “limit” 
as a necessary part of human finitude. 
To comprehend Bonhoeffer’s view of limits and finitude, it will be necessary to 
present a contextualization and schematization of Bonhoeffer’s Genesis 1-3 lectures now 
published by the title Creation and Fall.929  These lectures offer, as Genesis 1 does, a 
sweeping view of creation (world) and God’s act in that ongoing creation. Genesis 2 
presents, instead of that sweeping view of creation, a more personal introduction to two 
creatures, Adam and Eve (flesh).  Within that broad overview of both creation (world) 
and creature (flesh), it will be helpful to focus on several significant terms important to 
Bonhoeffer in these lectures:  circle, middle, limit, other, tob/ra, shame and preservation.  
We will see, as we analyze Bonhoeffer’s text, that Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s 
definition of disability as “the transformation of the flesh as it encounters world”930 
proves to be a helpful lens through which to read and understand Bonhoeffer’s accounts 
of creation, fall and redemption as we draw those doctrines alongside Garland-
Thomson’s language of “world”, “flesh”, “encounter” and “transformation”.931  
                                                 
929 The life, theology, teaching and public witness of Bonhoeffer’s are described in two recent biographies.  
See:  Charles Marsh, Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2014) and Eric Metaxas, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2010.) 
Also of note is the account of Bonhoeffer’s dear friend Eberhard Bethge.  See:  Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer: A Biography, trans. Eric Mosbacher et al., revised edition (Minneapolis, MN.: Fortress Press, 
2000).  After Bonhoeffer’s death, Bethge is credited with encouraging review and publication of 
Bonhoeffer’s work. 
930 Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342.  See also:  Nirmala Erevelles, Disability 
and Difference in Global Contexts, 26-27.  Erevelles argues disability is “not a condition of being, but of 
becoming, and this becoming is a historical event, it is its material context that is critical in the theorizing 
of disabled bodies/subjectivities” (26).  Also see: Robert McRuer, Crip theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness 
and Disability (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006): 207.  Robert McRuer questions, “What 
might it mean to welcome the disability to come, to desire it?” (207).  In so asking McRuer, according to 
Ervelles, “celebrates the transformative potential of disability” (27). 
931 To be clear, all care will be taken not to read Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s schema of world, flesh, 
encounter and transformation into Bonhoeffer’s text.  Instead, a thorough review of his exegetical work will 
allow us to see how his text presents his particular view of world, flesh, encounter and transformation.  This 
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Bonhoeffer presents a unique interpretation of the Biblical fall account as a certain kind 
of “transformation of the flesh” as Adam and Eve encounter other-than-God experiences. 
Exploring this crucial terminology and its implications for morality will then allow a 
probe into the overarching theme for Bonhoeffer of “the orders of preservation,” a central 
dimension of Bonhoeffer’s theology of creation.   The orders of preservation are a saving 
force, in the face of the fall, a mode of divine activity through which flesh that encounters 
the fallen world is preserved and upheld by Christ.  In his later work the “Ethics” 
Bonhoeffer expands his account of the orders of preservation, associating this 
preservation in Christ more broadly within the very structures of society Bonhoeffer 
deems “the mandates of creation.”932   
Throughout this exposition and exploration, important to keep in mind are three 
vital themes to which Bonhoeffer speaks: bodily life, morality and disability. Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson’s definition provides exegetical clarity after reading Bonhoeffer.  The 
terms, themes and theological exposition Bonhoeffer uses resonate with Garland-
Thomson’s language of flesh, world, encounter and transformation.  These words matter 
for Bonhoeffer’s account of bodily life and divine preservation. Bodily life, in all its 
brokenness after the fall, has direct consequences for Bonhoeffer’s account of morality. 
Because we are finite, vulnerable beings living in a complex world, concrete reality will 
demand ethical responsibility that is faithful and contextual.  Encounters with those 
worldly demands will affect, and potentially disable, flesh; and yet, Garland-Thomson 
                                                                                                                                                 
language will prove helpful for us to consider these themes in Bonhoeffer:  creation (world and flesh), the 
fall and sin (encounter) and redemption.  Perhaps it is in this last step where we must be careful not to read 
Garland-Thomson into Bonhoeffer.  While she uses the language of “transformation,” he uses the language 
of the orders of preservation to explain Christ’s ongoing redemptive work. 
932 See:  Robin W. Lovin, “The Mandates in an Age of Globalization” in Ontology and Ethics.  19-31. And: 
Markus Franz, “The Conversion of Social Life: Bonhoeffer’s Mandates as Theological Dispositifs, “ 133-
149. 
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and Bonhoeffer both hope for divine transformation beyond the initial pain of change.  
This chapter concludes with an exploration of the themes of bodily life, morality and 
disability in Bonhoeffer and their significance for our study given the theological 
anthropology, Christology and soteriology Bonhoeffer develops. The conclusions 
Bonhoeffer draws in these three theological areas will aid our venture to present a revised 
limit model of disability to respond to Moral Injury.  One might argue, the whole of 
“Creation and Fall” is an attempt to create such a model; to present an account of human 
being, transformed as flesh encounters world,933 confronted with questions regarding the 
limits of God, self and other, heightened by a debilitating moral crisis.  While Creamer 
fails to distinguish between natural and sinful limits across a spectrum of social contexts 
and the different moral demands of those varied limits, Bonhoeffer offers such resources 
in his exegetical and theological work. 
 
5.2 Creation and Fall 
Bonhoeffer’s biblical exegesis of Genesis 1-3 from Tuesday, November 8, 1932 
to Tuesday, February 21, 1933 at the University of Berlin on the subject “Creation and 
Sin” (Schopfung und Sunde) became the book later titled “Creation and Fall.”934  In these 
lectures, Bonhoeffer strove to be scholarly while using the methods of exegesis. But 
                                                 
933 Biblical scholar Paul Cho offered an insight worthy of note here.  For those who have experienced 
trauma, the notion that flesh encounters world does not adequately describe the devastation of traumatic 
experience.  He notes the scholarship of Ronnie Janof-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Toward a New 
Psychology of Trauma (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992). Janof-Bulman makes clear extreme life 
events are greater than simple ‘encounter,’ instead; they are earth-shattering and world-changing (4). This 
strengthens our need for Bonhoeffer who argued there must be a move beyond ‘encounter.’  The divine 
presence through the orders of preservation and the mandates of creation is at work transforming the world. 
934 Christine Schliesser, Everyone Who Acts Responsibly Becomes Guilty: Bonhoeffer’s Concept of 
Accepting Guilt  (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 55.  Schliesser makes clear that 
upon request of Bonhoeffer’s students for the lectures to be published, he was no longer able to use the 
original title because of the publication of a 1931 book by Emanuel Hirsch entitled Creation and Sin. 
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instead of delivering the lectures in typical academic oration, his lecture style was that of 
kerygma (proclamation).935  This shift in oratory style coincided with a broader shift in 
audience,936 and perhaps a personal turning point as well, where Bonhoeffer moved from 
the academic exercises of works like “Sanctorum Communio” (Sanctorum Communio: 
eine Dogmatische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche) and “Act and Being” (Akt 
und Sein) to more pastoral works such as “The Cost of Discipleship” (Nachfolge) and 
“Life Together” (Gemeinsames Leben). 937  Throughout his reflections on Genesis 1-3, 
Bonhoeffer reiterated the question, “How can these words live?”938  One attendee 
described the profound impact of his theological discourse: “In these lectures this 
extraordinary man, Bonhoeffer, exploded everything I had taken for granted as custom or 
tradition in theology/the church, the state/politics, academic scholarship/research and so 
on.”939  Even Bonhoeffer himself, reflecting back on this period of teaching, seemed 
surprised by the impact of these lectures not on his students, but on his own thinking:  “I 
came to the Bible for the first time.”940   
Creation and Fall is the corpus of Bonhoeffer’s teaching to students at the 
University of Berlin during that winter of 1933.  As we well know in retrospect, this 
                                                 
935 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, ed. l.W. de Gruchy; trans. D.S. Bax (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1996), (=DB WE 3), 5.   
936 See for example, Clifford J. Green’s chapter “From the Phraseological to the Real: 1932” in his book 
Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality.  Here, he notes a 1932 letter from Bonhoeffer to Edward Bethge: 
“There are people who change, and many who can scarcely change at all.  I don’t think I have ever changed 
very much, except perhaps at the time of my first impressions abroad and under the first conscious 
influence of my father’s personality.  Then a turning away from the phraseological to the real ensued.”  
Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 
105. 
937 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 6.  
938 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 8.  
939 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 3.  
940 Letter from Finkenwalde dated January 27, 1936 in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works 
Volume 14: Theological Education at Finkenwalde  (1935-1937), (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 
2013), 113 
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season was a time of disorienting unrest.941 Historian John A. Moses describes 1933 as a 
pivotal year when Germany was transitioning from the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) to 
the National Socialist Dictatorship of Hitler.942 Amid many changes, one of note was the 
passing of the Enabling Bill on March 23, 1933, just a few months after the completion of 
Bonhoeffer’s lectures that allowed the Chancellor complete power, eliminating all other 
political parties so that the Chancellor could make authoritarian decisions without 
opposition.943 The unrestricted power of the new German chancellor developed in 
response to the flailing power of the German parliament and their inability to move 
forward on key elements of national life such as the economy.  These shifting power 
dynamics – from flailing to full-fledged authoritarianism – are worthy of note in 
relationship to Bonhoeffer’s kerygmatic lectures.  Bonhoeffer, as well as some of his 
students, came to understand again the provocative power of scripture and its 
proclamation as a challenge to other powers that be, even when those powers included 
the state Lutheran church. 
 Scholars have noted the prescient timing of Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation.944 
Theologian Wayne Floyd, Jr. argues Bonhoeffer seemed to know, “not only how these 
themes could again become compelling for theology, but also when these specific themes 
                                                 
941 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 1.  
942 John A. Moses, “Bonhoeffer’s Germany: The Political Context” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer ed. by John W. deGruchy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3.   
943 Moses, “Bonhoeffer’s Germany,” 15. 
944 Brian Brock notes that we are called to reflect on the doctrine of creation at moments of “estrangement” 
in our lives.  He learns from Bonhoeffer who in his cultural crisis of total estrangement turned to the 
doctrine of creation to ask questions of his society.  Brock writes, “What it is about our present that makes 
it so hard to be where we are? And how does the Christian confession of God as the Creator of heaven and 
earth ‘bring us back to earth’ – recreating us, with all our limits, in all our fullness as creatures?” (433).  
Alongside the doctrine of creation we are compelled to reexamine our Christology as well to sense Christ 
as the origin and the end of all things (433).  See: Brian Brock, “On Becoming Creatures: Being Called to 
Presence in a Distracted World,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18:4 (October 2016): 432-
452. 
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should come forth with prophetic vigor.”945 In addition, Bonhoeffer’s friend Ebehard 
Bethge noted how Bonhoeffer managed to do two difficult tasks given the challenge of 
the social mileu of the time.  Bonhoeffer possessed an “arcane tact” when needed and 
knew those moments were a “possible silence” was needed.946 To be clear, tact and 
silence were needed to preserve the power of the church speaking in a compelling way to 
the needs of the world so that the church was not a noisy gong or clanging symbol, but an 
institution that would speak the truth in love acting toward justice. With this context in 
mind, we proceed to analyze Bonhoeffer’s doctrines of creation, fall and redemption 
through the language of world, flesh, encounter and transformation. 
 
5.2.2 WORLD: God’s Creation in Genesis  
 We will examine Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation in two sections: focusing first 
on the created world as a whole and then on human beings specifically. Our exploration 
of “world” centers on four movements within Bonhoeffer’s thought.  First, we note the 
attention Bonhoeffer gives to human anxiety and circularity in thinking in trying to 
comprehend the divine act in creation.  Second, we consider the notion Bonhoeffer has of 
the world’s creation ex nihilo as an unrestrained act of God’s freedom.947  Third, we turn 
to Bonhoeffer’s development of creation from days one through six through the schema 
of what is “fixed” and what is “alive.” And fourth, we consider Bonhoeffer’s theological 
                                                 
945 Wayne Floyd, Jr., “Christ, Concreteness, and Creation in the Early Bonhoeffer,” Union Seminary 
Quarterly Review, 39:1-2 (1984): 101.    
946 Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York: Harper and Row, 1977): 186, 786, 882. 
947 Niels Henrik Gregerson, “The Mysteries of Christ and Creation: “Center” and “Limit” in Bonhoeffer’s 
Creation and Fall and Christology Lectures,” Mysteries in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A 
Copenhagen Bonhoeffer Symposium ed. by Christiane Kirsten Tietz, Busch Nielsen, Ulrik Nissen 
(Copenhagen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007):141. Gregorson argues that Bonhoeffer too unconditionally 
accepts standard theology of the day regarding creation ex nihilo instead of allowing himself to probe 
philosophical questions regarding the mind of God prior to the moment of creation. 
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conviction that God is at work prior to the fall upholding the created world in goodness. 
One insight that should be noted as we continued is how Bonhoeffer shifts from language 
regarding the order (Ordnung) of creation to create a theological framework other than 
the problematic theology Bonhoeffer was experiencing in his day regarding “the order of 
creation” that he believed legitimized the Nazi regime.948  We will hear in Bonhoeffer’s 
account the doxology and liturgy evident in the Genesis account of creation but with 
emphases on theological nuances different than “order.”   
 Bonhoeffer’s lectures begin by addressing human anxiety caused by the human 
predicament of being caught in a “circle” of thinking.  Despite this anxiety, Bonhoeffer 
begins poetically:  “The place where the Bible begins is one where our own most 
impassioned waves of thinking break, as thrown back upon themselves, and lose their 
strength in spray and foam.”949 This first statement makes clear that Bonhoeffer’s biblical 
exposition of Genesis 1 will be more than a description of God’s act of creation, instead, 
Bonhoeffer begins with a pair of unexpected claims beyond the act of creating itself.  
First, as we can see from the opening words, Bonhoeffer begins with a philosophical 
explanation of the conundrum in which human beings find themselves.  Our very asking 
“Why” regarding all the probing questions we might ask regarding the beginning of 
creation is simply “an expression…of thinking that lacks a beginning.”950  All of those 
whys implode upon the abyss of the deep and get tossed within the strength of the spray 
and foam that is there.  Because human thinking can never conceive the beginning, their 
                                                 
948 Joshua A. Kaiser, Becoming Simple and Wise: Moral Discernment in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Vision of 
Christian Ethics (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2015): 158. 
949 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 25.   
950 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 26.  
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conundrum is living in the middle951 between the beginning and the end encircled then, 
by the anxiety, of all those “Whys?”   Anyone then who would claim knowledge of the 
beginning, will be deemed by others either a “liar” or a “savior” and in the act of making 
truth claims about the beginning will ultimately be killed by their peers.952  Bonhoeffer’s 
opening prose may seem startling, but in light of Job 38:4 this Biblical exposition makes 
sense:  Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me, if you are so 
clever!953  Because of this epistemological paradox, the creature who lives in the anxious 
middle suffers a difficult plight.  That plight, the human condition, evidenced by 
Bonhoeffer in Genesis 1 in the face of the  ֙וּה ֹ֨ת וּה ֹ֔בָו (tohu wa bohu)954 is unforeseen given 
that creatures have not yet been created at this point in the story.  It is here, in the 
circularity of human thinking breaking on the spray and foam, wherein his reflection 
becomes Christological:  “Our thinking, that is, the thinking of those who have to turn to 
Christ to know about God, the thinking of fallen humankind, lacks a beginning because it 
is a circle. We think in a circle, but we also feel and will in a circle. We exist in a 
circle.”955 
 Before delving into Bonhoeffer’s exposition of Genesis itself, it is important to 
stress a claim central to his Genesis exegesis: human beings exist in a circle and God’s 
word meets them in the circle. Bonhoeffer presents this claim as prelude to God’s act of 
                                                 
951 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 28.  
952 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 28.  
953 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 29.  
954 Karl Barth and Bonhoeffer disagree on their conceptions of nothingness prior to creation.  While 
Bonhoeffer maintains the tohu wa bohu as absolutely nothing and a point of contrast for recognizing God’s 
freedom, Barth argued otherwise.  He conceived the nothingness as having “no positive qualification” (Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics III/I, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (London, UK: T&T Clark, 2010), 
107.)  In addition, it becomes a “caricature” of God’s good creation (103) and is a theological picture of 
“the abyss of that which is intrinsically impossible” (104). 
955 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 26.  
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creation.  Because human beings are incomplete in their knowledge of God, themselves, 
and creation, Bonhoeffer argues their thought process lacks a beginning.956  And because 
knowledge of the future is just as incomplete, human thinking lacks an ending.  Within 
this conundrum, since there is no beginning and no end, humans “Think in a circle.  But 
we also feel and will in a circle.  We exist in a circle.”957  Because of this conundrum in 
all its circularity, humans get trapped within a  predicament of circuitous argument that 
bares ongoing fault and error and so is a “circulus vitiosus.”958  
As he turns to the text itself, Bonhoeffer links the thinking that “pounds itself to 
pieces on the beginning”959 with the imagery of the spray and foam at the beginning of 
creation as the spirit hovers over the deep. He suggests that the waters over which God 
hovers exhibit the tensions we experience as creatures: “The place where the Bible begins 
is one where our own most impassioned waves of thinking break, are thrown back upon 
themselves, and lose their strength in spray and foam.”960  Being caught within the 
circularity creates anxiety from “being in the middle.”961  Meeting us in the middle of that 
anxiety is the Word of God that “comes alive for us here in the middle, not as a distant, 
eternal being in repose but as the Creator.”962  
 If the first limitation placed on the human agent is the very fact of being caught in 
the middle of a circle, the second limitation arrives with the Word of God.  The arrival of 
God’s Word helps to create the very individuality of the human being as “The word 
                                                 
956 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 26.  
957 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 26.   
958 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 27.  
959 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 27.  
960 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 25.  
961 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 29.  
962 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 30.  
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brings into relief; it outlines and limits the individual.”963  God’s Word reveals a limit.  
To be clear, this limit is good.  The limit exists here to clarify our existence as creatures 
and our status as vulnerable and dependent human beings.  At the same time, God’s 
Word also reveals our fallen character, suggesting that Bonhoeffer understands limit both 
as empowering as creatures and as revelatory of our imperfection as creatures.  
Bonhoeffer associates the fall not solely in the Genesis story of Adam and Eve in the 
garden, but more generally recognizes the fall in humanity’s inability to comprehend the 
unity of God’s activity in the created world.  When speaking of Genesis 1:3 “And God 
said, ‘Let there be light’ and there was light” Bonhoeffer explains, “Our complete 
inability to hold the indicative and the imperative together in our minds shows that we no 
longer live in the unity of the active word of God but are fallen.”964  Humans then, find 
themselves in the center of this story – the very Word of God – with the inability to see 
forward or backward.  Eden is that picture of the circle that places limits upon human 
existence, the circle in which humans find themselves, disabled.  
 The second assertion made by Bonhoeffer is that God created freely ex nihilo.  
Within that circle, by the grace of God’s revealed word, humanity comes to understand 
several key assertions: In the beginning, God created.965  In the beginning, God created 
freely.966 And in the beginning, God created freely out of nothing [das nichts].967  With 
these three statements, Bonhoeffer attempts to negate any reckoning of these concepts as 
expressing temporality or causality.  God exists beyond time and thereby creation must 
                                                 
963 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 43.  
964 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 43.  
965 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 31.  
966 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 36.   
967 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 32.   
  272
not be viewed as an unfolding of temporal events.968 Temporality, causality and freedom 
are linked terms as Bonhoeffer presents a God who creates freely, beyond cause and 
effect, beyond time, ex nihilo, in order to depict the utter distinction between Creator and 
creature.  Freedom, for Bonhoeffer, is an important theme both for emphasizing that 
distinction between God and creation, but also for maintaining God’s freedom in 
resurrecting Christ from the dead.  Creation ex nihilo is an affirmation Bonhoeffer makes 
regarding both creation and resurrection:   
The fact that Christ was dead did not provide the possibility of his resurrection 
but its impossibility; it was nothing itself, it was the nihil negativum.  There is 
absolutely no transition, no continuum between the dead Christ and the 
resurrected Christ, but the freedom of God that in the beginning created God’s 
work out of nothing.969   
 
The creator who fashions creation and resurrection in absolute freedom is the one who is 
“Lord [over nonbeing]” and has “power to rise up again.”970  These two qualities, 
“Lordship over nonbeing” and “rising up again power”, create the capacity for God’s two 
actions in relationship to creation.  First, God is the one who “wrests” creation out of 
nonbeing and then “upholds” creation to affirm being, even when being is under threat.971  
Prior to the fall, these two actions are held together within a singular movement.  After 
the fall, the unity of these two acts (creation and preservation) will be split. 
 The third point worthy of note is the way in which Bonhoeffer presents each act 
of creation from day two through day six by that which is “fixed” and that which is 
“alive.” These unfold after the establishment of light on the first day. The world God 
                                                 
968 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 32.  
969 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 35. 
970 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 36. 
971 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 47. 
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creates is full of light.  Light functions to “awaken the darkness to its own being”972 and 
in this awareness “form becomes aware of existing over against something else.”973 
When the creation then,  “sees the Creator’s light”974 there is gratitude, praise and 
thanksgiving on behalf of creation.  With the separation of light from the darkness, day 
and night are wrested into being.  Bonhoeffer laments the inability of creatures to the 
wonder and power and gift of any given day.  Technology exhausts creatures from the 
possibility of daily appreciation.975  The world rests in the “rhythms” of “God’s daily 
works”976 which involves the “give and take” of God’s resting and movement over the 
course of a day. 
 Bonhoeffer collapses God’s creative acts of the second day (firmament, earth and 
sea) and the fourth day (stars, sun and moon) in his chapter “That Which is Firmly 
Fixed,” his exposition of Genesis 1:6-10 and 14-19.  His reason for advancing in the 
narrative appears to be a desire to explore what is “fixed” before he examines “that which 
lives” in Genesis 1:11-13 and 20-25.  The fixed nature of the firmament, and the 
fixedness of the stars are beyond human existence.  They are not changed by human 
power and freedom.  Humans, however, function within the world of “what is fixed” 
because they “know numbers.”977   Numbers come into play for Bonhoeffer with the 
“days, years and epochs of time” that “happen with complete regularity and without 
change.”978  Here, what was once formless becomes “fixed” and “bound to form.”979  A 
                                                 
972 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 44. 
973 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 44. 
974 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 44. 
975 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 48. 
976 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 49. 
977 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 52. 
978 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 52. 
979 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 55. 
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noteworthy moment of foreshadowing that occurs within this exposition is Bonhoeffer’s 
connection between what is fixed, the numbering of creation and God’s “law.” He 
concludes that the connection between numbers and law are both upheld by God even 
when the fallen creation can no longer comprehend their power or live within their 
rhythms and structure. 
 With a dramatic turn, Bonhoeffer moves from the world of what is fixed to “that 
which lives”; he writes, “Like a waterfall that plunges from the heights down into a alley, 
creation moves from on high down to do its final work.”  The movements in the 
unfolding of creation are from what is formless, to “form in rhythm”, to a form that is 
revealed in “law and in numbers.”980  As creation gains more and more form, it continues 
to gain “distinction from the form of the Creator.”981  In the movement from what is 
fixed, to what bears life (grass, plants, trees, birds, wild animals, reptiles) God in freedom 
“does not will to be Lord of a dead, eternally unchangeable, subservient world; instead 
God wills to be Lord of life with its infinite variety of forms.”982  What was once “dead 
stone” becomes instead, “alive and fruitful.”983  Now that both “law”984 and “life” have 
been created, Bonhoeffer makes clear neither of these, but only God alone, are worthy of 
praise and adoration.985   
                                                 
980 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 57. 
981 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 57. 
982 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 57. 
983 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 57. 
984 Bonhoeffer introduces the language of “law” in “That Which is Firmly Fixed” to describe the eternal 
law that holds the firmament fixed in the heavens (51).  Bonhoeffer refers to this fixed law as “the 
command of the word of God itself.”  Later in the text, Bonhoeffer’s reflections on this fixed law are linked 
to philosopher Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason.  Kant states that human beings are able to 
consider “the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.”    
985 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 59. 
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 The fourth point Bonhoeffer makes regarding creation is that God is at work 
upholding the goodness of creation prior to the fall.  There is a joyous refrain that ripples 
through Genesis “and God saw that it was good.” Goodness is not intrinsic to what is 
fixed or alive, but only because the God who created these elements is bursting with 
goodness.  Goodness, then, is a sign of God wresting creation freely into being and 
upholding that creation, preserving its integrity all within a singular act prior to the fall. 
 Before turning from creation to creature in Bonhoeffer’s reflections on “The 
Image of God on Earth” in Genesis 1:26-27, it is important to make clear, in our effort to 
bring Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s definition of disability into conversation with 
Bonhoeffer, what Bonhoeffer might understand as “world.”  Doing so requires taking a 
few steps forward in the Genesis text beyond Genesis 1 and 2. The exegesis of these 
claims by Bonhoeffer will be developed in the upcoming sections. First, “the world is 
created for God, for God’s honor alone.”986  Second, the world is fallen.  The state of 
being, for humanity, within this fallen world is a state of estrangement.  Humans think 
they are to have dominion and to be good stewards of the world, but instead “we are 
ruled.”987  Bonhoeffer explains further, “The world rules humankind; humankind is a 
prisoner, a slave, of the world, and its dominion is an illusion.  Technology is the power 
with which the earth seizes hold of humankind and masters it.”988  As the story unfolds, 
once flesh is created and fall occurs, human beings are “allowed to live in this world”989 
and they will not be deprived of God’s relationship with them through the Word.  Third, 
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human beings after the fall survive in the world “under a curse.”990  Bonhoeffer makes a 
poignant point at this juncture, because the world is under God’s curse, not just any curse, 
therefore “the world is not wholly God-forsaken; instead it is a world that even under 
God’s curse is blessed and in its enmity, pain, and work is pacified, a world where life is 
upheld and preserved.”991  God’s curse is both, strangely, an affirmation, human beings 
get what they want in this world to be “like God” and, God’s curse is also preservation 
because humans are “allowed” to live within this world.992   
The curse and the promise that occur after the fall (to be discussed later in this 
chapter), reveal a creator God who in freedom chooses to preserve the world.  God’s 
world is upheld.  In this world, God will provide “restraint and order [Ordnung]”993 to 
guide fallen humanity.  Here then is a fundamental insight: this twofold restraining and 
ordering is a particular way God engages creation after the fall.  Bonhoeffer explains, 
“God’s way of acting to preserve the world is to affirm the sinful world and to show it its 
limits by means of order.”994  Limits then, are both revealed and healed within a 
particular ordering of creation that is intended by God to “uphold or preserve life.”995  We 
will explore these orders, and the limits they both reveal and heal, later in this chapter.  
And, it will become clear how limits are related to Bonhoeffer’s theological conception 
                                                 
990 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 135. 
991 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 135. 
992 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 132. 
993 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. To be clear, Bonhoeffer uses the language of Ordnung which he 
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Hirsch (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985): 100. 
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of finitude as an important aspect of his doctrine of creation and will become central to 
his ethical theory.996 
For now, it is important to note that God takes a new action within the world to 
uphold what has fallen.  The world we now live in, for Bonhoeffer, is “the old world.”997  
Prior to his exposition of Genesis, Bonhoeffer begins the very first paragraph of his 
introduction with the claim: “The church speaks within the old world about the new 
world. And because it is surer of the new world than of anything else, it sees the old 
world in in the light of the new world.”998  Implied within this deceptively simple phrase 
are three critical claims.  The first is Christological: Christ will reveal through the church 
a new world. The second is anthropological: human beings dwell in a fallen world.  The 
third is soteriological: there is the need for salvation and redemption of this fallen world 
into newness in the end that seems illusive from the middle.  The good news for 
Bonhoeffer, even in the very beginning of Genesis, is that “the God of Israel and of Jesus 
Christ is always in the midst of the world and can only be encountered there.”999 For 
Bonhoeffer, this is good news for all the world, perhaps what one might call his gospel of 
Genesis.   
 
5.2.3 FLESH: Creature in the Created World 
                                                 
996 Larry Rasmussen, “The Ethics of Responsible Action,” The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer ed.by John W. de Gruchy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 213.  
According to Rasmussen, the danger of neglecting finitude as a theological and ethical concept is, “mastery 
that knows no limits as undertaken by autonomous humans in the name of freedom without constraint” 
(213). 
997 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 21. 
998 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 21. 
999 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 10.  This insight is a comment noted by editor John W. de Gruchy. 
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 With the affirmation of God in Genesis 1:26, “Let us make humankind in our 
image, according to our likeness” Bonhoeffer explains ““Something altogether original, 
is about to happen.”1000  The originality of this creation is that creatures are not fashioned 
from nonbeing as all that has gone before, both “the fixed” and “that which lives.”  
Instead, creatures are made with “significance and sublimity”1001 through a new form of 
God’s planning derived from God’s image.  At this moment in Genesis, suddenly “the 
narrative is about us.”1002  
 Within Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation, he presents a theological anthropology 
that is derived from both the Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 accounts.  Bonhoeffer explores the 
story of Adam and Eve created in the imago dei in absolute freedom by God dividing the 
study into five short chapters:  “The Image of God on Earth” (Genesis 1:26-27), 
“Blessing and Completion” (Genesis 1:28-31, Genesis 2:1-4a), “The Human Being of 
Earth and Spirit” (Genesis 2:7), “The Center of the Earth” (Genesis 2:8-17) and “The 
Power of the Other” (Genesis 2:18-25) with a brief interlude between Genesis 1 and 2 
entitled “The Other Side.”  
 To understand Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology it is necessary to: delineate 
two aspects of freedom for the creature and two aspects of relationality; outline three 
possible states of being human (blessed, cursed, resting); distinguish between the 
Yawhist and Elohim accounts of being human; and finally, notice the distinction 
Bonhoeffer makes between being human and becoming flesh.  We will conclude in this 
section by analyzing Bonhoeffer through the lens of Rosemarie Garland-Thomson and 
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Deborah Creamer’s concepts of flesh, limit and finitude. In so doing, important to keep in 
mind is what happens when flesh encounters limits?  Bonhoeffer aids in the development 
of Creamer’s limit model by recognizing the moral emotions stirred by limits and the 
moral demands made by limits that can be either natural or sinful. 
 First, Bonhoeffer makes two critical statements regarding freedom for the human 
being and two crucial statements regarding relationality. Regarding freedom, Bonhoeffer 
posits that the creature, like God, is free.  Bonhoeffer notes the constraints on that 
freedom: freedom is constrained within the bounds of the created universe, freedom is 
revealed through the word of God, freedom is aimed toward worship of the Creator who 
fashioned both the universe and the unique individual.1003  Second, because of the 
variables of these limitations, freedom contains a certain paradox.  Bonhoeffer explains, 
“Freedom is not something that people have for themselves but something they have for 
others.”1004  Freedom exists then only in the state of relationality with another.1005  
Because of this freedom isn’t something that simply exists, instead it is something that 
happens over time as a relationship develops “being-free-for-the-other.”1006  
                                                 
1003 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 62 
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1006 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 63. 
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 With regard to relationality, Bonhoeffer claims, first, the “likeness” reflecting the 
image of God in humanity is relationality and this is not an ontological state of being, but 
of relating.1007  Bonhoeffer emphasizes this distinction very clearly when he says: this is 
not an analogia entis but instead, an analogia relationis.1008  The depth and breadth of 
this relating between humans, and their mirroring the very image of God: “Human beings 
exist in duality…. that can be defined in simply no other way than in terms of the 
existence of human beings over-against-one-another, with-one-another, and in-
dependence-upon-one-another [nicht anders zu bestimmen als in dem Gegen€uber-
Miteinander-Aufeinander-angewiesen-sein der Menschen]’.1009  Created in the imago dei  
human beings are created with the hope of “being-free-for” relationship.  And second, 
while human beings are in a state of “being-free-for” relationship with God and other 
human beings, humans are in a state of “being-free-from” the rest of God’s created order.  
Bonhoeffer derives this difference from God’s call in Genesis for the ones created in 
God’s image to have “dominion” over the rest of the earth.  The difficulty is that in “the 
world” these two states are less idealized and more conflated.  Others, to whom the 
                                                 
1007 So profound is Bonhoeffer’s view of relationality that Theologian Barry Harvery asserts that a singular 
‘saint’ can never exist for Bonhoeffer.  Instead, that saint is always held within a network of greater 
relationships.   Harvery explores this in the last chapter of his book Taking Hold of the Real: Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and the Profound Worldliness of Christianity where he explores the relationality of the French 
pacifist pastor Andre Trocme’s roll in rescuing hundreds of Jews through the community at Le Chambon.  
See: Barry Harvey, Taking Hold of the Real: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Profound Worldliness of 
Christianity (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015): 272, 287-289, 291-294. 
1008 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 64-65.  The footnotes to this point in Bonhoeffer’s lectures make clear 
he disagreed with the popular theology, methodology and metaphysis of Catholic theologian Erich 
Przywara.  While difference and dissimilarity between God and creation, although sacramental connection 
remains, are the main themes of the analogy, Bonhoeffer’s argument is wholly other preserving the 
relational link between creature and Creator.  See:  Erich Przywara, Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original 
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individual is bound, can affect the creatures that the individual is free from.  So 
Bonhoeffer makes a statement which appears paradoxical:  “In my whole being, in my 
creatureliness, I belong wholly to this world: it bears me, nurtures me, holds me.”1010 He 
continues, “The thing, the world, rules humankind; humankind is a prisoner, a slave, of 
the world.”1011  Implied here, is the fact that even in their freedom for God and others, 
human beings lose some of the power of that freedom within a world where collective 
creatures impact one another creating things like “technology” that “seizes hold of 
humankind and masters it”1012 even despite a human being’s freedom.  Despite these 
constraints, in their ideal representations, states, “being-free-for” and “being-free-from” 
express the likeness and image of God within human beings.1013 
 Second, in the next section, Bonhoeffer briefly describes three particular states of 
being human:  being blessed, being cursed, and finding rest.  It is unexpected, at this 
juncture in the Genesis story, where a “curse” is not yet mentioned that Bonhoeffer 
would introduce the concept.  However, blessing and curse are interrelated concepts, one 
cannot be comprehended without the other.  They are both “burdens that God lays upon 
humankind.”1014  What is critical to understand regarding Bonhoeffer’s exposition of the 
blessing that Genesis 28-31 introduces is greater than the “behold, it was very good” that 
the text itself pronounces.  Instead, blessing – in all its dimensions to bear fruit, to 
increase, to serve the earth, and to subdue it – are key to a greater insight linking creature, 
in freedom, to the created world:  “This blessing…affirms humankind wholly within the 
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world of the living in which it is placed.  It is humankind’s whole empirical existence that 
is blessed here, its creatureliness, its worldliness, its earthliness.”1015  What might seem 
more appropriate than the blessing/curse relationship is the dynamic that occurs in this 
section between blessing and resting.  If blessing means wholly being within the world, 
rest is an opportunity to retreat from the world’s demands.  However, instead of making 
this connection Bonhoeffer links blessing to curse, both ‘burdens’ from God; and then, 
links rest to a foreshadowing of the resurrection hope of the Gospels, though seemingly 
far removed from the God of Genesis.  But for Bonhoeffer, the relationship is clear.  A 
strong theology of resurrection hope will find its origins in the creation.  Here, the day of 
resurrection is also the day of rest. 1016  
 The third point begins with the interlude that occurs here in “Creation and Fall” is 
the juncture between the first creation story of Genesis 1 and the second creation story of 
Genesis 2.  While Bonhoeffer lists points of contrast between the two stories (frame of 
reference, the character of God, the order of creation), the contrast that matters most for 
our understanding of human beings is this: “The first account is about humankind-for-
God, the second about God-for-humankind.”1017  Hence, he titles the section “The Other 
Side.”  According to Bonhoeffer, we need both depictions as necessary, not 
“arbitrary”1018 dimensions of the whole.  Certainly, there are implications from the 
remaining list of contrasting points that impact creaturely life:  is God removed or 
relatively close at hand, is God more abstract or anthropomorphic, is God creating 
humanity last or first and how does that impact our understanding of humanity’s 
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importance in God’s created world?  Bonhoeffer accepts the paradox of all these 
affirmations in tension with one another, but particularly the tension between God and 
humanity.  Humans, in Genesis 1 are created for God – to worship, to reflect God’s 
image, to share dominion.  God, in Genesis 2, is there for humankind – in proximity, in 
presence, even, in planting there in the garden.  While we might experience these two 
statements as conflicting truths, Bonhoeffer understands them as “representations 
[Darstellungen]”1019 showing the same thing from two separate sides. 
 The creator God of Genesis 2 is no longer the distant Elohim of Genesis 1, but the 
breathy and spirited God close at hand and down to earth named Yahweh in Genesis 2.  
Three significant assertions structure this chapter:  first, our bodies come from the earth. 
Second, those bodies come to life through the breath of God.  And third, within our 
enlivened bodies blessed by the very breath of God we become “the image of God.”1020  
To ground and develop these three claims, Bonhoeffer presents a theology of the body: 
 
It is from God’s earth out of which humankind is taken.  From it human beings 
have their bodies.  The body belongs to a person’s essence.  The body is not the 
prison, the shell, the exterior of a human being; instead a human being is a 
human body.  A human being does not ‘have’ a body or ‘have’ a soul; instead a 
human being ‘is’ body and soul.  The human being in the beginning really is the 
body, is one – just as Christ is wholly his body and the church is the body of 
Christ.  People who reject their bodies reject their existence before God the 
Creator.  What is to be taken seriously about human existence is its bond with 
mother earth, its being as body. 1021  
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This body, comes to life, from its previous “state of nestling [Hingeschmiegstein]”1022 by 
the breath of God which animates.  The creator God breathes spirit into the dust, the 
earth, the human who had only known nestling, and becomes a human being.  God’s 
glory, therefore, then shines through the body – first, through human being, second, 
through the body of Christ and third, through the sacraments.1023 
 Fourth and finally, the section of Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology “The 
Power of the Other” is the exegesis of Genesis 2:18-25.  Until this point, creaturely life 
has been introduced as “human kind”, “Adam”, and “bodies”, but it is not until the 
Genesis text introduces the word “flesh.” The Genesis text progresses from the state of 
being human to the state of being in relationship as flesh.  The creation of Eve draws 
Adam into the life of flesh as the first social construct of intimacy and relationship is 
formed.  To be clear, Bonhoeffer does not introduce the word “flesh” to his description of 
creaturely life until scripture itself does so in the second creation story of Genesis 2.   
Now, this creature is ‘flesh’ fashioned when God, in Genesis 2:21 grabbed hold of 
Adam’s rib and “filled out its place with flesh.”1024 Adam as human being is not alone for 
long, we learn from the Biblical story, and quickly our understanding of flesh unfolds 
with the first words Adam speaks to Eve, “This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of 
my flesh.” In their flesh, though both are naked, there is no shame.1025 With this language 
Bonhoeffer acknowledges three ramifications of life in the flesh: flesh is the gift of the 
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other as suddenly a human being becomes a social being,1026 flesh creates space for 
relational intimacy and unity, and flesh delineates a new limit for Adam.    
 The first connotation of flesh is that it is “God’s gift.”1027  Adam, who had been 
“alone,”1028 even in the presence of animal life, is in need of a companion, a 
‘helpmate’1029, a partner who shares in the work and in the experience of being a human 
in God’s created order.  In this chapter, there is only a singular use by Bonhoeffer of the 
terminology “flesh” outside of any direct quotation of scripture.  That instance is utilized 
in the description of the relationship between the newly formed Eve and Adam: “Thus 
Adam understands the uniqueness of this creature that God has shaped with the 
contribution Adam has made, out of human flesh, but Adam sees what Adam has done 
for the other wholly in the light of God’s gift.”1030  Flesh is used then, to describe the 
substance of the other, to whom Adam is called into relationship and all its complexity 
but who ultimately, as the text makes clear, is “gift.”  Bonhoeffer’s rendering of the 
Genesis account is that “flesh” is the substance they share: “They have from their origin 
been one, and only in becoming one do they return to their origin.”1031  Flesh then is both 
a reminder of union and division, something that has been torn apart and something that 
will one day be united.1032   
                                                 
1026 Here we remember John Calvin’s commentary on John 1:14 when Jesus became flesh and dwelt among 
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 Here begins the second connotation of flesh: flesh allows the possibility of deep 
union to take place.  To be clear, Bonhoeffer makes vivid the fact that union does not 
negate the individuality of the unique creature.  Instead, he maintains diversity within 
their ultimate unity: “This becoming one never means the merging of the two or the 
abolition of their creatureliness as individuals.  It actualizes to the highest possible degree 
their belonging to each other, which is based precisely on their being different from each 
other.”1033  In the beginning, Adam and Eve share flesh as Adam recognizes “This at last 
is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.”1034 And, that unity will be regained when 
Adam leaves his mother and father and cleaves to Eve and “they will be one flesh.”1035 
So, flesh is a shared substance that still maintains the essential difference between two 
freely created beings who share the dust of the earth and the breath of God’s spirit, but it 
is also the shared hope of returning in sexual union and intimacy.1036   
 Third, and most important for our thesis, is the fact that flesh is a denotation of 
Adam’s limit.1037  Flesh, then, becomes what Bonhoeffer understands as the 
“embodiment of Adam’s limit”1038; herein, lies both the possibility for both desire and 
hatred.  Limit then becomes for Adam, both the center of his existence in the garden, and 
                                                 
1033 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 98. 
1034 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 97. 
1035 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 100. 
1036 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 100. 
1037 Clifford Green explains: ““The other person is a real Grenze to the I, a limit to the dominating 
ambitions of the self; the other person is also, as embodying the Word of forgiveness ab extra, the promise 
and possibility of the self’s liberation into a new existence.... It is only because Christ is present as person 
that the self acknowledges the other as a genuine person and not as an entity or merely extant thing.”  See:  
Clifford j. Green, Bonhoeffer. A Theology of Sociality, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmanns 
Publishing, 1999), 89. 
1038 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 98. 
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another limit that is met and engaged and different points in the circle as limit “takes on 
form”1039 through Eve. 
 Bonhoeffer’s view of flesh differs from the account of Garland-Thomson in his 
notion that flesh emerges from relationship.  For Bonhoeffer, flesh is what happens to the 
human being when they are called into relationship with another human being.  For 
Garland-Thomson, flesh is a dynamic and changing entity that is shaped in “its 
movement through time and space in the process we call life.”1040 For Bonhoeffer, flesh 
is embodied limit that is a helpful gift, a hoped-for union, and an occasionally resented 
limit.  Garland-Thomson maintains a vitalistic conception of flesh as “inherent 
dynamism” at play within the world.1041   
 In her work Disability and Christian Theology Creamer focuses more on the 
language of embodiment rather than making a distinction between flesh and body.  For 
Bonhoeffer, a body becomes flesh when a limit is encountered through the gift of another 
human being.  It could be argued that this moment is precisely when the first “moral 
injury” occurs since that human being, gift of God that she is, will make a moral choice 
“other” than what her partner might make.  In so doing there is the potential for a moral 
injury.  Creamer maintains a focus on embodiment as a neglected epistemological 
resource for theology and disability.1042 When she speaks of flesh, she denotes moments 
when a human being can more fully engage the fleshly nature of sensory existence within 
                                                 
1039 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 98. 
1040 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 342. 
1041 Garland-Thomson, “Conserving Disability,” 342. 
1042 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 56-57. 
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the world, as well as the potential depth and struggle of human being.1043  Bonhoeffer’s 
emphasis on flesh as “other” more fully allows space for the demands and emotions the 
limitation another human being creates simply by being alive. Bonhoeffer aids in 
nuancing Creamer’s account of limit through his account of the flesh by teasing out limits 
that can unite in love, as well as the flip side of those limits that can when human love is 
“obliterated” cause the creature to “hate the limit.”1044 In so doing, Bonhoeffer agrees 
with Cremer’s assessment that limits are “inherent in the experience of humanity”1045 and 
engage “the complexity of experiences”1046 of human being.  And he appears to agree 
with Creamer who acknowledges that some limits “enable” while others “make difficult” 
our embodied lives.1047   But Bonhoeffer takes steps beyond Creamer’s notion of limit as 
he irreducibly links limits both to the center of existence, as well as the very nature of 
existing in the flesh.  At this point in the exegesis, Bonhoeffer has not yet begun to 
exponentially increase the dynamics of flesh as relationships are encountered beyond the 
two-some of Adam and Eve.  But that will soon happen as the two encounter a snake in 
the garden. 
 
5.2.4 ENCOUNTER: The Fall 
                                                 
1043 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 56.  To do so, she draws on the language of James Nelson 
who argues: “Body theology starts with the fleshly experience of life – with our hungers and our passions, 
our bodily aliveness and deadness, with the smell of coffee, with the homeless and the hungry we see on 
our streets, with the warm touch of a friend, with bodies violated and torn apart in war, with the scent of a 
honeysuckle or the soft sting of autumn air on the cheek.”  See:  James Nelson, Body Theology (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992): 42. 
1044 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 99. 
1045 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 109 
1046 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 118. 
1047 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 118. 
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 Having outlined Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation, and his theological 
anthropology, we turn in this section to an exploration of Bonhoeffer’s account of sin and 
the construct of the fall.  Here, we use the language of “encounter” as presented by 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson.  As cautioned earlier, it would not be helpful to distort 
Bonhoeffer’s account by unconditionally using Garland-Thomson’s language.  And yet, 
“encounter” provides a surprisingly appropriate framework within which to appropriate 
Bonhoeffer’s account of the Fall.  The creator God has created human being in the image 
of God with a particular hope.  Bonhoeffer writes, “It is the very God…who chooses to 
encounter [zu begegnen] the creature as its Creator.”1048  God freely chooses to create 
human beings with the ultimate hope of meaningful and intimate encounter; and yet, the 
human being chooses otherwise.   
 To be clear, the singular time Bonhoeffer uses the word “encounter” is in 
relationship to the hope God has for relationship with human beings.  It is the series of 
actions that unfold in Genesis 3 that warp and negate the initial possibility for that 
encounter.  One might argue then, that for Bonhoeffer, sin is characterized by rejecting or 
resisting a possible encounter with God, and then, choosing over and over again other-
than-God encounters. Brian Brock explains this state of sin by saying of Bonhoeffer’s 
account, “In their fallen state they continue to be entrapped by the dynamics of their 
flight from God – becoming centripetal and dissatisfied creatures who are uneasy with 
themselves and their limits.”1049 In the exposition that follows, we will see how 
Bonhoeffer develops that account as human beings continue to choose encounter after 
                                                 
1048 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 41. I have added the German translation for “to encounter” which is not 
included in the original text. 
1049 Brock, “On Becoming Creatures,” 437. 
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encounter that takes them away from God and the limits at the center of their existence.  
To do so we will explore five alternative “encounters” Bonhoeffer highlights culminating 
in his account of the fall.  In conclusion of this section, we will briefly compare and 
contrast aspects of Bonhoeffer’s account with Creamer’s and Garland-Thomson’s.  
Despite all the beauty and possibility and gift of being a creature, of being created 
in the flesh for the world, humankind exists in a particular state of “not-wanting-to-be-a-
creature [Nicht-Gesch€opf-sein-wollen].”1050  Laden in that restlessness is the possibility 
of encountering the world in a “not-wanting-to-be-a-creature” state of being.  Over half 
of the “Creation and Fall” lectures are devoted to the fall and the series of encounters that 
precipitate the fall: the placement of Adam in the center of Eden, the creation of Eve in 
relationship to Adam, the interaction with the Serpent, the taste of the fruit, and the 
reckoning with God in the aftermath. Within the framework of this ancient text, 
Bonhoeffer understands some of the difficulties of bringing meaning from “the old 
picture language of the magical world into the new picture language of the technical 
world.”1051  In this section, we will explore Bonhoeffer’s exposition of the “limit” met in 
these encounters, as the flesh of Adam meets both the prohibition and possibility within 
the world.   
In the first other-than-God encounter, described within the chapter “The Center of 
the Earth,” God places Adam within the Garden of Eve wherein two trees – the tree of 
knowledge and the tree of good and evil – stand at the center of the Garden.  Bonhoeffer 
makes clear, Adam himself is not at the center; however, his entire orientation is to the 
                                                 
1050 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 116. 
1051 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 83. 
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center because this is where the life that comes only from God is grounded.1052 With 
Adam’s point of reference and entire circumference of being shaped by this center, Adam 
knows at this stage in the encounter only “unbroken obedience to the creator.”1053 The 
tree of life, the center of divine life, represents the life that allows Adam to live and move 
and have his very being.  Even more so, the possibility for life with God at the center is 
one of freedom and flourishing.  The life represented by this tree, in all of its potential for 
fullness and flourishing, may only be threatened by the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil.1054  Yahweh points out to Adam both trees, but it is only with the second tree that 
God attaches a very particular prohibition:  “You shall not eat; for on the day you eat 
from it you shall die.”1055  Herein, is the possibility of a new kind of encounter one that 
will move from “unbroken obedience” to the possibility of death.  In naming this reality, 
a singular prohibition stated by God who envisions so much more for Adam to live 
“sumptuously and with delight,”1056 God points out for the very first time “Adam’s limit 
[Grenze].”1057   
Encounter, then, within this garden is full of latent possibility, but also a clear and 
defined limit.  Crossing this limit will have consequences.  The footnotes reveal 
Bonhoeffer’s intent that “limit” is “a creaturely limit that cannot be surpassed.”1058  
Bonhoeffer’s text provides two synonyms as well:  “boundedness” and 
“creatureliness.”1059  In a surprising turn, drawing on the Genesis text, Bonhoeffer reveals 
                                                 
1052 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 83. 
1053 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 83-84. 
1054 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 84. 
1055 Biblical text Genesis 2:17. 
1056 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 82. 
1057 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 85. To be clear, this is the first mention of “limit” in Creation and Fall.   
1058 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 85.  Footnote 15. 
1059 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 85. 
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the limit of humanity is not at the edges, but at “the center of human existence.”1060  Here, 
several affirmations are made regarding the limit.  First, “life is possible only because of 
the limit.”1061 Second, “the limit is grace.” Limit, then, in its first iteration is full of life 
and grace, and so implied in these affirmations is the potential for life-giving and grace-
filled encounter. Third, the limit is at “the center”, not the edge, of human existence.1062  
And fourth, knowledge of the limit is experienced within an “internal” framework 
revealing an “internal limit.”1063 
For now, it is only possible for Adam who lives in “unbroken obedience” to 
understand the limit as God’s very presence with him at the center, even though the text 
states and we hear clear prohibition.  Because Adam is oriented solely to God at the 
center, “Adam cannot conceive of the breaking apart of that knowledge into good and 
evil.”1064  The remainder of this chapter explores however, what this good and evil might 
come to represent and exude within Adam’s world.  To be clear, Adam has made no 
transgression; he lives in “unbroken obedience.”  And yet, the possibility of “a moral 
split” is articulated by Bonhoeffer to foreshadow what will come in the garden.  “Tob” 
and “ra” speak to the good and evil yet unleashed, but when released will have the effect 
of “splitting apart” what once has been unbroken, whether it is Adam himself, or the 
world in which he lives.  Here, Bonhoeffer appears to get ahead of himself in the Genesis 
story, but his point in introducing the possibility of a “split apart”1065 world is to show 
                                                 
1060 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86. 
1061 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 87. 
1062 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86. 
1063 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86. 
1064 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 87. 
1065 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 89. 
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what is germinating in the garden with the elements of “life, knowledge and death.”1066  
Nothing, until now, has been lost.  “Tob” and “Ra” are united, not unlike Adam’s 
“unbroken obedience” in the tree of knowledge of good and evil.  They are inseparable, 
always appearing in a pair.  They represent something greater than a simple moral code, 
but instead express the complicated good and evil of what is “pleasurable” and 
“painful.”1067 And, “tob” and “ra” in their inseparability strangely always enhance the 
other.  These three assertions witness to what is at play and will come to pass as the 
“ultimate split [Zwiespalt] in the world of humankind.”1068  Encounter, the reader of both 
the Bible and Bonhoeffer will become aware, is poised to rupture and break both the 
human being and the world itself.  Foreshadowed here is “the state of being divided or 
torn apart into tob and ra in the world and in humankind.”1069  Tob and ra, both evil and 
goodness, will become burdens for the human being to bear.  Life will no longer be gift, 
but instead a commandment.  Why a command? Because, according to Bonhoeffer 
knowledge of death will be a burden on life giving life itself the sense of “to-have-to-
live”1070 rather than willingly received gift.  Any splitting apart of flesh or world, due to a 
shaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, will directly affect and ultimately 
harm the precious gift of the tree of life.  Encounter, given Bonhoeffer’s exposition of 
Genesis 2:8-17 is intended to pulse with life and gift and grace, and yet, dormant even 
within the garden is the possibility of “an ultimate split.”1071  
                                                 
1066 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 83. 
1067 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 88. 
1068 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 88. 
1069 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 90. 
1070 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 91. 
1071 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall 88. 
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Bonhoeffer’s description of a second other-than-God encounter is revealed in his 
exposition of Genesis 2:18-25 in “The Power of the Other,” which explains further the 
paradox described above wherein both the “limit and life” at “the inviolable, inaccessible 
center of paradise around which Adam’s life circles.”1072  So it is interesting to note, that 
the creation of Eve described in this chapter is not solely to be a companion so that Adam 
will not be alone with himself, but also so that Adam will have a partner with whom to 
share the limit he new faces.1073  Prior to the fall, Adam receives this companion, not in 
pride or remorse, but with deep gratitude1074 for the load she will share. The limit at the 
center of the Garden takes on “embodiment” as Eve becomes Adam’s limit. In this, 
Bonhoeffer sees an early witness to the church as “two persons in community” bear 
witness to the limit of life at the center of human existence.1075  Lisa Dahill makes clear 
the possibility inherent in this encounter which, though “other-than-God,” still has the 
potential to bear witness to God’s presence as the human being matures through this 
relationship with the other: 
[Bonhoeffer] insists that it is in our encounter with the barrier or limit created by 
some “other” that persons mature and responsible agents, selves, “I’s” before 
God – are formed.  His theology of the formative role of such an encounter, in 
which the other mediates the ultimate alterity of God working to create and re-
create persons, remains in place here in Creation and Fall; but not this “other” is 
an actual person with a name.1076 
 
                                                 
1072 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 99. 
1073 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 98. 
1074 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 97. 
1075 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 98-99. 
1076 Lisa Dahill, “Con-Formation with Jesus Christ: Bonhoeffer, Social Location and Embodiment.” In 
Being Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Social Thought, ed. by Jens Zimmermann and 
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Bonhoeffer’s theology presents a case that once God realizes intimate encounters with the 
divine might be neglected by humanity, offers a new possibility for divine intimacy 
through human encounters with the limits of another. 
At this point in the Genesis story, before the ultimate other-than-God encounter 
of the fall, this encounter between Adam and Eve is one where shame does not yet exist: 
“And they were both naked, the man and his woman, and they were not ashamed.”1077 
However, Bonhoeffer uses this moment to introduce the concept of shame as one that 
will express a person’s sense of “divideness” (Entzweiung)1078 both internally within 
their own spirit, as well as an expression of their external encounters with a divided 
world.  Shame, when it manifests will become a certain kind of “cover” within which a 
person may hide.1079 The Biblical story, Bonhoeffer foreshadows, will introduce shame 
within three spheres of life in the “split-apart-world.”1080  Shame is taken on as a cover 
when one encounters the limit of knowledge, the limit of death and the limit of 
sexuality.1081 
The third other-than-God encounter, for Bonhoeffer, is explored in the chapter 
“The Pious Question” in which the serpent tempts Adam and Eve.  Here, the limit that 
was once experienced as grace and life-giving to Adam, now instead, becomes 
provocation and law-abiding.1082 Of note from this chapter is Bonhoeffer’s wrestling with 
theodicy and the problem of evil.  He argues that the Genesis text does not describe “the 
                                                 
1077 Genesis 2:25. 
1078 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 101. 
1079 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 101. 
1080 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 101. 
1081 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 101.  Meagher’s extended reflection on necrophilia, sexuality and war 
in Killing from the Inside Out come to mind. 
1082 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 103. 
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origin of evil,”1083 instead, the text illumines guilt and the burden human beings carry 
because of that guilt.  The serpent succeeds in this story, even before the physical 
manifestation of the fall, by leveraging a distance between Adam and God. 
The fourth other-than-God encounter describes the moment the serpent said to 
Eve: “You will not die at all.  Instead God knows that on the day you eat from it your 
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, and know what good and evil is.”1084  The 
crucial instance the serpent describes is the moment Adam and Eve would suddenly “be 
like God,” that is, become second gods or “Sicut Deus” as Bonhoeffer deems.  In the face 
of becoming “like” God the “limit” suddenly becomes “unlimitedness”1085 as the serpent 
pushes the boundary that God has presented.   And yet, Bonhoeffer provides a gracious 
reading of the text as he suggests Adam’s desire to “sicut deus” not as a desire to become 
a God, but instead as an invitation to more – “more pious, more obedient.”1086  The next 
encounter will reveal how flawed in thinking Adam was in envisioning “more.” 
The fifth other-than-God encounter describes the moment of “the fall.”  In that 
encounter, Adam loses his limit.  The serpent, shoved his way into the center crowding in 
on the boundary; but ironically, leaving Adam and Eve paradoxically alone.  For 
Bonhoeffer, the fall starts the day that humanity begins to live without God at the center.  
Instead the human creature lives by its own resources, apart from God and without 
limits.1087  Humankind lives with their eyes wide open to the static – that tob and ra, good 
and evil of creation.  Bonhoeffer’s language for this is breaking–apart [Entzweiung].  The 
                                                 
1083 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 105. 
1084 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 111.  Genesis 3:4-5. 
1085 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 113. 
1086 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 113. 
1087 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115. 
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two are no longer a unity, but always at odds with each other in duality.  In this 
“breaking–apart” world, the original picture of unity and beauty of creation is lost.  What 
is left is, “now covered in a veil; it is silent and lacking explanation, opaque and 
enigmatic.”1088  This “breaking-apart world” may seem like the starting point of 
theological reflection.  But for Bonhoeffer, where the work of theology is aimed, is not at 
the “why” of fallen creation or the origin of any kind of evil in the world.  Instead, “The 
theological question is…about the actual overcoming of evil on the cross.”1089  Such a 
statement radically redefines the work of theology and the stewarding of theological 
questions away from the “why” of creation and fall, and instead toward the “who”; that 
is, the one who will be at work preserving what is left of the good. 
Bonhoeffer describes the new existential state of Adam after the fall in terms of 
the absence of limits: “Adam as limitless” (Der grenzenlose Adam).1090  The 
consequences of this grenzenlose are exponential.  Bonhoeffer makes here several key 
points regarding the ongoing consequences of this implosion of limits:  first, the act is 
both inconceivable and inexcusable;1091 second, the act is final;1092 third, the resulting 
guilt is infinite;1093 fourth, the act creates a “continual fall;”1094 and finally, the act 
demands a theological reorientation regarding the question of evil.  Bonhoeffer explains, 
                                                 
1088 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 126. 
1089 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120. 
1090 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115. 
1091 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 119-120. 
1092 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 119. 
1093 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120.  Bonhoeffer’s language here is: “I am infinitely burdened with the 
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“the theological question is not a question about the origin of evil but one about the actual 
overcoming of evil on the cross.”1095  
Limits then, once at the center, have now imploded causing internal and external 
consequences with continual ramifications and deep theological questions.  In this series 
of encounters we see the development of “limit” (grenze) as a key theological category.  
Limits, in Eden, were: central, in the middle, internal, life-affirming, grace-providing, 
revealed in relationships.  In contrast, limits, after the fall, are: continual, everywhere, 
external, shame-invoking, guilt-producing, and a source of infinite burden.1096  Moving 
forward with a revised limit model of disability, one wonders if it is possible to 
acknowledge all the dimensions, pre and post fall, of Bonhoeffer’s exposition of grenze 
and grenzenlose. 
In Bonhoeffer’s account of the fall, three things became clear: first, God’s original 
hope for the relationship between Creator and creature was the possibility of real 
encounter [begegnen]; second, creatures continue to choose “other-than-God” encounters 
with increasingly drastic consequences; and third, central to God’s vision for creation 
was the notion of “limit” at the center of human experience that could help guide possible 
encounters in human life.  For Bonhoeffer, encounter is the founding hope God has for a 
relationship with humanity; but results instead in the theological crisis known as “the 
fall.”  For Garland-Thomson, encounter is the hinge moment between world and flesh 
when disabling occurs through encounter – those encounters might be physically 
                                                 
1095 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120. 
1096 Christine Schliesser, in the fourth chapter of her book Everyone Who Acts Responsibly Becomes Guilty: 
Bonhoeffer's Concept of Accepting Guilt (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2008) offers commentary on 
Creation and Fall that affirms the universal reality of sin within the fall, and our shared guilt with Adam in 
that sin.  But also, on a positive note, that fall creates a universal connection of all people across time and 
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impairing of embodiment as world damages flesh, but it also may be a sociological 
impairment as world negates certain types of flesh thereby creating a social construction 
of disablement.  For Creamer, in turn, that encounter is a limit as world limits flesh.  
Encounter, then, is a nexus for these disparate thinkers in the field of Theology and 
Disability.  
Moral Injury is a particular form of disabling encounter as a crisis of morality 
occurs between flesh and world that causes a traumatic injury.  We turned to Bonhoeffer 
to deepen Deborah Creamer’s notions of limits and the complex theological anthropology 
in the face of those limits, and yet, we are reminded by the literature of trauma that 
Bonhoeffer still does not go deep enough. At this point, it will be helpful to call to mind 
the framework of scholarship in the field of trauma mentioned briefly in chapter two.  
The language and scholarship of trauma necessitates taking into account “encounters” 
that are shattering,1097 shaming1098 and silencing.1099 As we develop in the next chapter “a 
crucial limit model of disability” we will take into account the explosive potential when 
flesh encounters world in traumatic ways that silence, shame and shatter.  In developing 
that new model, what must be taken into account is not just the cumulative effects of 
fallen “encounters” in this world and their effect on flesh, but also the devastating 
                                                 
1097 See: Ronnie Janof-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Toward a New Psychology of Trauma (New York, 
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potential of traumatic encounters that create “shattered knowledge.”1100  Jonathan Shay 
explains, “Severe trauma explodes the cohesion of consciousness.”1101 What can be left in 
their wake is “the ruins of character.”1102 A revised limit model must take into account 
Bonhoeffer’s view of the critical effect of all the world’s encounters with moments other 
than God and then ask questions of the moral emotions encountered in the face of trauma 
and the moral demands required. For now, we turn to Bonhoeffer’s account of God’s 
response to the fall as we explore his doctrine of redemption as presented in Creation and 
Fall. 
 
5.2.5 TRANSFORMATION: Creation Upheld through Preservation in Christ 
After the fall, Bonhoeffer recognizes through the scriptural account in Genesis 
that a new and redemptive action must take place to preserve and uphold the fallen world.  
As Creation and Fall continues its exegesis of Genesis, the last chapters describe this 
redemptive work as “preservation” in Christ.  We have been following Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson’s schema to highlight Bonhoeffer’s doctrines of creation (world and 
flesh), sin (encounter) and now, redemption.  In this next step, I must be clear that the use 
of Garland-Thomson’s language is a stretch.  While she speaks of “transformation,” 
Bonhoeffer instead speaks of “preservation.”  Once we have unpacked in this section 
Bonhoeffer’s concept and construct of “preservation in Christ,” we will note implications 
of the difference between the two.  For now, the disparate language is held together by 
the shared theological conviction that in the midst of human finitude God acts.  This 
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section will outline Bonhoeffer’s view on “the orders of preservation” 
[Erhaltungsordnungen] and show how it differs from the more traditional account in his 
day of “the orders of creation” [Schöpfungsordnungen].  We will examine Bonhoeffer’s 
critique of those orders and his constructive presentation of redemption through 
preservation.  In addition, we will make clear theological nuances Bonhoeffer draws on 
to achieve his insight.  From there, we will journey beyond Creation and Fall to see how 
Bonhoeffer’s new concept of preservation becomes the theological basis for his Ethics 
and the structure he begins to lay out in his ethics for “the mandates of creation.”   
The previous section introduced the argument that for Bonhoeffer, limits are 
polyvalent: limits are at the center (not the edge) of human life, limits are a unique way 
God provides grace, limits are intimately connected to our relationships, limits cause us 
to be ‘second gods’, limits invoke wrath, and limits can provoke shame as our human and 
divine limitations are acknowledged.1103 Humanity experiences those limits over and over 
again within the created universe. Limits function paradoxically in a twofold manner: 
first, as the response of humanity to the withdrawn creator, and second, as the creator’s 
response to humanity as a reminder of their creaturehood.  As a revised limit model 
begins to take shape, we see how crucial “limits” are for Bonhoeffer’s anthropological, 
Christological and soteriological convictions.  The orders of preservation, a unique 
theological response to an issue of Bonhoeffer’s day, are built on those very limits.  For 
Bonhoeffer, the day that humanity begins to live without God ‘at the center’ becomes a 
place where moral injury is possible.  Here, the human creature lives by its own 
                                                 
1103 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115-120. 
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resources, apart from God and without limits.1104  Because of that predicament, protection 
is needed and since God does care for humanity, despite their shortcomings, the creator 
God offers preservation.1105 
In response to this linked chain of “other-than-God” encounters culminating in the 
fall examined in the previous section, Bonhoeffer makes a remarkable claim regarding 
“God’s New Action”1106 in the world.  A transformation, of sorts, is possible within this 
schema.  Bonhoeffer makes that clear with these words: “The creator is now the 
preserver; the created world is now the fallen but preserved world.”1107 This gracious and 
generous response to humanity is a distinctive trait of God alone who “made them 
cloaks”1108 as an act of preservation rather than retribution. Once their eyes have been 
opened to good and evil, to the inherent nakedness of their own being and of the world 
around them, God will not leave them in that vulnerability but clothes them, cloaks them, 
robes them with garments of restraint.1109  This is good news, as night comes and 
humankind remains in the twilight.  God’s new action, with this clothing, will be to, 
“preserve humankind in its fallen world, in its fallen orders, for death – for the 
resurrection, for the new creation, for Christ.”1110  Until then, humanity will remain in the 
twilight of tob and ra, but God will uphold and preserve humankind in just this place. 
The terminology of “cloak” is particularly prescient given Jonathan Shay’s account of 
                                                 
1104 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115. 
1105 See also: Brian Gregor, “Shame and the Other: Bonhoeffer and Levinas on Human Dignity and Ethical 
Responsibility,” Ontology and Ethics, 72-85.  Brian Gregor notes the role of shame as one component of 
God’s work in preserving us. He writes, Bonhoeffer’s “Christological ontology allows us to understand the 
burden of divided being and the role of shame in preserving us, but also our ultimate source of hope for the 
healing of being in Christ,” 85. 
1106 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
1107 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
1108 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
1109 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
1110 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 140. 
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themis, Homer’s language for “what is right.”1111  Themis is, according to Shay, “the 
cloak of safety”1112 we wear in our day-to-day social morality operating within a 
framework of what is collectively known to be moral and right.  Bonhoeffer’s choice of 
words is comforting given Shay’s implication that combat trauma removes that cloak of 
safety leaving the soldier vulnerable in the world. 
To understand this act of “transformation” through preservation several steps are 
needed.   To comprehend the new theological language Bonhoeffer is using regarding 
“the orders of preservation” it is necessary to describe the prevailing theology of his day 
regarding “the orders of creation” and the context within which those orders became 
perverted.  Then, it will be possible to better understand the framework Bonhoeffer’s 
presents deeming “the orders of preservation” as an intentional alternative with notable 
political and moral implications. Crucial at this juncture will be understanding 
Bonhoeffer’s theological context regarding the orders and the ways in which his view of 
“the orders of preservation” makes particular commitments regarding natural law.  
Finally, in this section, it will be important to consider the relationship between 
Bonhoeffer’s orders of preservation and “the mandates of creation” a phrase Bonhoeffer 
uses in his later work to describe requirements of the ethical life. 
 In the decades immediately preceding Bonhoeffer’s “Creation and Fall” lectures 
during the winter of 1933, German Christians relied heavily on a phrase “the orders of 
creation,”1113 (Schöpfungsordnungen) to undergird concepts of Volk and “blood and soil” 
                                                 
1111 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 193. 
1112 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 193. 
1113 See: Mickey L. Mattox, “Order in the House? The reception of Luther’s orders teaching in early 
Lutheran Genesis commentaries,” Reformation and Renaissance Review 14:2 (2012): 110-126. 
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that were ultimately used to legitimize the German National Socialist Movement.1114   
Prior to this co-opting of Lutheran theology, Martin Luther developed the orders of 
creation to account for human relationships in the home, the church and the state after the 
fall.  For Luther, the orders of creation are the common structures of existence created by 
God through which humans can relate to each other and serve one another. However, the 
faithful see within the orders the divine command of God.1115 The language of “orders” 
describes the household, the government and the church.1116  Luther explains, 
Thus Psalm 127:1 says that there are only two temporal governments on earth, 
that of the city and that of the home. “Unless the Lord builds the House: unless 
the Lord watches over the city.”  The first government is that of the home, from 
which the people come; the second is that of the city, meaning the country, the 
people, princes and lords, which we call the secular government.  These 
embrace everything – children, property, money, animals, etc.  The home must 
produce, whereas the city must guard, protect and defend.  Then follows the 
third, God’s own home and city, that is, the church, which must obtain people 
from the home and protection and defense from the city.  These are the three 
hierarchies ordained by God, and we need no more indeed, we have enough and 
more than enough to do in living aright and resisting the devil in these three.1117 
 
In Luther’s own exegesis of Genesis in 1535, he outlines these orders of creation.  The 
first order is that of the human being embraced by God and called to the ecclesial order of 
the church.  The second is the order of the household, where marriage is a blessing, and, 
                                                 
1114 Ballor, “Christ in Creation,” 7. 
1115 Carl E. Braaten, “God in Public Life: Rehabilitating the Orders of Creation,” First Things (December, 
1990): 34. 
1116 Bonhoeffer later expands on Martin Luther’s original conception of “three estates” which included the 
church, marriage and government.  See for example:  Martin Luther, On the Councils and the Churches  
(1539), Sermon on Matthew 7:15-23, The 8th Sunday after Trinity, House Postil, Table Talk (1542-1543), 
Great Confession Concerning the Lord’s Supper (1528). 
1117 Luther, “On the Councils and the Churches,” 1539.   
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work a necessity.  The third order, necessary because of the fall, is the order of the state 
created by God to maintain civility.1118  
 Through these structures of creation, as Luther explains them, God orders human 
life and provides a law all humanity may perceive and abide by through natural 
sensibilities. Ethicist Richard Higginson explains the problem that can be raised in 
conceptions of “the orders of creation”: “The notion of certain God-given ‘orders’ or 
areas of life, meanwhile, inculcated a rather static, compartmentalized view of existence, 
one which allowed little scope for a critical assessment of the existing state of affairs.”1119 
While this may be a risk, it is not inevitability.  For the purposes of this dissertation, 
understanding the attempt to describe different social contexts and one’s agency, or lack 
of agency, within those contexts will be helpful as we move toward a revised limit model.   
An example of the use of “orders of creation” in Nazi Germany can be found in 
the “Guiding Principles” of the German Christian Faith Movement1120 published in June 
of 1932.  This document presents the orders of creation described in this manner: 
We see in race, folk, and nation, orders of existence granted and entrusted to us 
by God. God's law for us is that we look to the preservation of these orders. 
Consequently miscegenation is to be opposed. For a long time German Foreign 
Missions, on the basis of its experience, has been calling to the German people: 
"Keep your race pure;' and tells us that faith in Christ does not destroy one's race 
but deepens and sanctifies it.1121 
 
Bonhoeffer challenged this understanding of creation directly in a paper he presented at 
the Youth Peace Conference in Czechoslovakia on July 26, 1932 entitled “Towards a 
Theological Foundation of the World Alliance [for Promoting International Friendship 
                                                 
1118 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, Vol. 1: Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 1-5, ed. Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, 
Hilton C. Oswald, and Helmut T. Lehmann (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1999): 103–104. 
1119 Higginson, “Bibliography: The Two Kingdoms,” 41. 
1120 Burtness, Shaping the Future, 80. 
1121 A.C.Cochrane, The Church’s Confession under Hitler (Pittsburgh: Pickwick,1976): 222-223. 
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through the Churches].”1122  He argued that no consistent theology existed for the 
growing ecumenical movement seeking to stand in opposition to a growing synchronicity 
between church and state.1123 He argues that the orders of creation cannot serve as a 
resource because the church misuses them.1124  He notes the problem once again of trying 
to sort out the fallen from the good in the orders of creation, 
Because certain orders are evident in creation, one should not rebel against 
them, but simply accept them….Now there is a special danger in this argument; 
and because it is the one most used at the moment, it must be given special 
attention.  The danger of the argument lies in the fact that just about everything 
can be defended by it.  One need only hold out something to be God–willed and 
God–created for it to be vindicated for ever, the division of (man) into nations, 
national struggles, war, class struggle, the exploitation of the weak by the strong, 
the cutthroat competition of economics….But the mistake lies in the fact that 
…creation and sin are so bound up together that no human eye can any longer 
separate the one from the other, that each human order is an order of the fallen 
world and not an order of creation.1125 
 
Worthy of note here is the problem Bonhoeffer names that addresses one of the 
weaknesses in Creamer’s limit model of disability: “Creation and sin are so bound up 
together that no human eye can any longer separate the one from the other.” 
 As the address continues to unfold, Bonhoeffer introduces the concept that will 
replace “the orders of creation” in his theological thinking.  He offers instead, “the orders 
of preservation” (Erhaltungsordnungen) as the third and final command to justify and 
direct the church in the world after the fall.  He writes,  
                                                 
1122 Plant, The Sacrament of Ethical Reality, 72. 
1123 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords (New York, NY:  Harper & Row, 1965), 161. 
1124 In the address, Bonhoffer argues that while the Sermon on the Mount might seem like a mission 
statement for the church, he argues this is not the starting place. The answer he provides is somewhat 
unexpected.  Even scriptural witness like the Sermon on the Mount is not universally applicable, the church 
must listen “afresh” for ethical guidance and responsible action during certain ages.   
1125 Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords, 161–162. 
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All the orders of the world only exist in that they are directed toward Christ, 
they all stand under the preservation of God as long as they are still open for 
Christ, they are orders of preservation, not orders of creation.1126 
 
While Protestant theologians used “the orders of creation” to describe the structure of 
reality within the divine universe differentiating from Catholic theologians who upheld 
natural law as a fundamental structuring of reality, Bonhoeffer was angered by the 
“uncritical” acceptance of “the orders of creation.”1127  The 1932 lecture prompted by 
ecumenical necessity paved the way for the exegetical work Bonhoeffer engaged in the 
winter of 1933 on the book of Genesis as he provided theological argumentation for “the 
orders of preservation” as preferential to the preexisting “orders of creation.”  According 
to Jordan Ballor, Karl Barth rejected both the orders of creation and the orders of 
preservation.  Emil Brunner affirmed both. Bonhoeffer, in response, rejected the orders of 
creation and yet affirmed the orders of preservation. 1128  This distinction is important to 
note within the Protestant tradition wherein Barth’s approach is often heralded.  
Following Barth’s rejection of both orders, one would come to the conclusion that God 
cannot reveal Godself through either creation or anything preserved within the creation.  
For Barth, God’s revelation would only occur through an infusion of that revelation into 
the natural world.  Protestant affirmation of this approach is so thorough that 
Bonhoeffer’s work is often interpreted in the same vein as Barth’s in an assumed   
rejecting of both.  Bonhoeffer however, is a middle ground between Catholic and 
Protestant thought.  
                                                 
1126 Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords, 162. 
1127 Wayne Whitson Floyd, “The Search for An Ethical Sacrament: From Bonhoeffer to Critical Social 
Theory,” Modern Theology 7:2 (1991): 183.    
1128 Jordan J. Ballor,  ‘Christ in Creation:  Bonhoeffer’s Orders of Preservation and Natural Theology’ in 
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Several challenges emerge for Bonhoeffer in this reenvisioning of what had been a 
central theological notion within Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran tradition and the broader 
Protestant witness.  James Burtness describes the task Bonhoeffer must tackle: 
The problem is how to recast and transform the distorted and misused doctrine 
of the orders of creation, taking into account sin and grace, the fact that the 
creation is fallen, and that Jesus Christ is now present. The task is to restructure 
this notion so that it is dynamic rather than static, redemptive rather than 
repressive, oriented to the future rather than to the past.1129 
 
Bonhoeffer’s prelude to full development of his thoughts on the orders occurred during 
those talks for peace at the Youth Peace Conference in July of 1932.  The orders of 
preservation emerged from a question that had distinct implications for the work of 
theology in practical ministry: “How can the Gospel and how can the commandment of 
the church be preached with authority, i.e. in quite concrete form?”1130  While he answers 
his rhetorical question only briefly at this point with the orders of preservation, he 
develops the concept more fully toward the end of Creation and Fall: 
The Creator is now the preserver; the created world is now the fallen but 
preserved world.  In the world between curse and promise, between tob and ra, 
good and evil, God deals with humankind in a distinctive way.  “He made them 
cloaks,” says the Bible.   That means that God accepts human beings for what 
they are…1131 
 
Two points are worthy of note regarding Bonhoeffer’s development of “the orders of 
preservation.”  First, they are God’s ongoing work to uphold and preserve what is good 
within a creation that is fallen and reality within that creation is a difficult complexity 
within which to function.  No outside revelation is necessary, instead, the possibility of 
preservation is present within Christ.  Second, in a move differing from traditional 
                                                 
1129 Burtness, Shaping the Future, 81-82 
1130 Jordan J. Ballor,  ‘Christ in Creation:  Bonhoeffer’s Orders of Preservation and Natural Theology’ in 
Journal of Religion 86 (2006): 6. 
1131 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
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Catholic theologies of natural law, the orders of preservation acknowledge the fact that 
the original order in creation no longer exists.  What can be identified after the fall is 
what has been preserved toward Christ.1132  God’s work now will be to preserve now that 
creation is complete.1133  While humanity lost its center at the fall, Christ becomes the 
new center for beginning, living and ending all of human life.  Bonhoeffer’s theology on 
the nature of Christ is so radical that Christ “exists” only in relationship.   
 For a fallen creation, where brokenness reigns over all relations; here is the 
possibility not just for a new creation but also for a new relationship.  There is a radical 
social aspect to the Christology presented by Bonhoeffer.  He writes, “Christ can never be 
thought of as being for himself, but only in relation to me.”1134   For the humanity who 
has only known the duality of tob and ra, in Christ a new possibility for unity is revealed.  
Life is preserved in Christ, and in response to that preservation, the church functioning 
within a fallen world witnesses to the preservation of Christ.  The transformation that 
occurs is God’s new action, not in retribution to the fall, but working in preservation in 
spite of the fall.  Bonhoeffer makes clear: “God’s way of acting to preserve the world is 
to affirm the sinful world and to show it is limits by means of order.”1135  That order is 
not “orders of creation” but God’s new action, “the order of preservation.”  Bonhoeffer 
makes a strategic theological shift regarding the limit that stands at the center of human 
                                                 
1132 In a review of G. Clarke Chapman’s Universal Health Care as a Human Right: The Argument of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2014), Gerald Magill takes note of Bonhoeffer’s 
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and State  58:3 (July 2016): 564-566. 
1133 Ballor, “Christ in Creation,” 7. 
1134 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center (New York, NY:  Harper Collins, 1978), 47. 
1135 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
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existence.  While at first two trees marked the center, the cross of Christ1136 replaces that 
center so human life, ideally, is oriented toward that new center.   
“Where does he stand? He stands pro me. He stands there in my place (Stelle), 
where I should stand, but cannot. He stands on the boundary (Grenze) of my 
existence, yet for me. That brings out clearly that ‘I’ am separated from my ‘I’, 
which I should be, by a boundary that I am unable to cross. The boundary lies 
between me and me, the old and the new ‘I’. It is in the encounter with this 
boundary that I shall be judged. At this place stands Christ, between me and me, 
the old and new existence. Thus Christ is at one and the same time, my 
boundary and my rediscovered center. He is the center, between ‘I’ and ‘I’, and 
between ‘I’ and God”1137  
We remember here in Creation and Fall, how Christ the mediator [mittler] reclaims the 
center [mitte]1138 in a pinnacle moment of transformation.  Christ is both the new center 
as well as the ultimate limit.        
 Bonhoeffer adds another dimension in later work that both complements and 
complicates his concept of “the orders of preservation.”  Bonhoeffer utilizes the term 
“mandates of creation” to describe the way Christ relates to the world through concrete 
structures connecting to what has been preserved of the good.  Now that Christ is the 
center of existence, one of the ways human life within the world is drawn into 
relationship with Christ is through the mandates through whom, “the relation of the world 
                                                 
1136 Benjamin Burkholder draws attention to Bonhoeffer’s penal view of atonement wherein Christ 
becomes the ‘placeholder’ for all of humanity on the cross taking upon himself the sin of all. He argues, 
“Bonhoeffer’s notion of becoming guilty should be brought to bear on the conversation….Bonhoeffer’s 
view that God must punish sin does not result in retributive justice becoming a stated ethical principle that 
justifies violent reprisals, even Bonhoeffer’s. If ever there were an action that seems justified through 
retributive justice, the attempt on Hitler’s life and the machinations of the resistance would certainly fit. 
However, rather than claiming his role in the resistance as morally justified, we find just the opposite. We 
find a person who sees the moral trespass that has been made and refuses to exculpate himself on the 
grounds of necessity. In the end, Bonhoeffer demonstrates that believing God must punish sin does not 
translate into a justification of one’s own violence.”  See: Benjamin Burkholder, “Violence, Atonement and 
Retributive Justice: Bonhoeffer as a Test Case” Modern Theology 33:3 (July 2017): 411.   
1137 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Berlin: 1932-1933: Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 12 (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2009): 306. 
1138 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 165. 
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to Christ becomes concrete.”1139  The mandates are labor, marriage, government and the 
church.1140  These are the spheres in which the preservation of the good will point toward 
specific purposes in the world drawing on their strength in Christ.  To add “for the sake 
of Christ” would be a helpful descriptive for each of the mandates.  Humanity labors for 
the sake of Christ, marries for the sake of Christ, governs for the sake of Christ and is the 
church for the sake of Christ.  Human vocation in these areas seeks to work alongside the 
“Creator and Preserver of life” by seeking preservation over destruction.   
 The mandates become, therefore, a way of giving a spirited structuring to human 
life together after the fall.  The mandates are not static or unchanging, as the orders of 
creation were perceived to be within the dominant Lutheran theology and the greater 
German context.  Instead, the mandates are according to Larry Rasmussen “dynamic 
historical forms, structures of time and place that give form to ongoing responsibility and 
act as the media of moral formation itself.”1141  Bonhoeffer’s critique of the unchanging 
and static “orders of creation” was their lack of reference to greater relationships.  The 
mandates, instead, structure all of reality toward relationship with one another.  When 
those arenas of work and government, family and culture fail to nourish life beyond one’s 
self for the other, they are no longer God’s mandates but human endeavors.1142 God’s 
new action within a fallen creation offers transformation not just as humans are 
transformed by Christ with the orders of preservation, but humanity is transformed 
toward a new way of living, moving and having meaningful being within the world as 
                                                 
1139 Bonhoeffer, Ethics: Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works Vol. 6  (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009): 68.   
1140 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 68. 
1141 Rasmussen, “The Ethics of Responsible Action,” 222. 
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they work within the mandates of creation.  For our purposes, the mandates of creation 
are helpful for recognizing different levels of functionality, morality and disability across 
social contexts where each presents its own limitations at varying points within its 
structure.   
 Bonhoeffer’s account of creation suggests that the limit at the center of existence 
prior to the fall is an essential aspect of being finite human beings.  Both “the orders of 
preservation” and “the mandates of creation” are Bonhoeffer’s attempt to improve 
functioning within those broken relationships amid the real and concrete limits of the 
world after the fall. In light of the limit model of disability, these notions of Bonhoeffer 
offer insight into how finite creatures might be cloaked with preservation in order to 
function and flourish across fluid and varied contexts. 
 
5.3 Themes in Bonhoeffer 
 Having completed a thorough review of Bonhoeffer’s exegesis of Creation and 
Fall by analyzing his lectures and paying attention to the development of his doctrines of 
creation, sin and redemption, it is now helpful to explore themes in this work related to 
bodily life, disability and morality and their relationship to vulnerable finite beings in the 
concrete and complex reality of a broken world.  In both the scholarship on moral injury 
and the scholarship in disability, we noted weaknesses in the areas of medicalization, 
social analysis and the idea of limits and their effects. And we made clear that perhaps 
the most helpful lens through which to draw together moral injury and disability is not by 
way of definition or analytical framework, but through a deepened theological 
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anthropology of human finitude in the face of limits.  Three themes in Bonhoeffer’s 
development of Creation and Fall speak to these issues: his notion of bodily life, his idea 
of morality, and the ways he speaks to issues of disability even prior to its 
conceptualization as a locus of scholarly analysis.  In this section we will explore these 
issues and the implications they have for comprehending finitude and constructing in the 
next chapter a revised limit model of disability. 
 
5.3.2 Bodily Life and Bonhoeffer 
The overarching whole of Bonhoeffer’s corpus from his doctoral dissertation 
Sanctorum Communio to his collected Ethics may be read through the crux of bodily 
life.1143  In the face of Nazi socialism’s idolization of “ideal” bodies and rejection of 
“less-than-ideal” bodies, Bonhoeffer bore witness to a complex view of bodily life for 
individuals and communities as complex in their “interdependent vulnerability.”1144   His 
view of bodily life critiqued mechanization and its utilitarian emphases as well as 
critiqued societal norms.  “Sanctorum Communio,” Bonhoeffer’s doctoral thesis, argues 
for a Christian social philosophy to replace the “idealist philosophy of immanent 
Geist.”1145  Doing so, required a complex conceptualization of bodily life as a person 
whose primal state is sin can only be saved through the revelation of the incarnate one 
who calls each broken body into the greater social body of the body of Christ.  This body 
of Christ, for Bonhoeffer, is not idealized, abstracted or removed.  Instead, this body of 
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Christ is radically present and realized fully in human history as the church.1146   While 
“Sanctorum Communio” is often read as an ecclesiological defense, recent scholarship 
encourages Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology to be seen within the greater context of bodily life, 
and God’s relationship to individuals through the incarnate one, as a more comprehensive 
“theology of sociality.”1147  Just as human life can not be idealized, again a radical 
concept in Bonhoeffer’s context, neither can the greater body of the church be idealized: 
“Genuine love for the church will bear and love its impurity and imperfections too; for it 
is in fact this empirical church in whose womb grows God’s sacred treasure.”1148  This 
body, the church, exists and is realized now within human history not in an idealized 
projection in the future, nor in a purified presumption in the present.1149   
After the completion of Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer needed to produce his 
Habilitationsschrift, a post-doctorate qualification that ensured his ability to teach in 
Germany at the University level.  His work, “Act and Being” (Akt und Sein), is the most 
complex, debated, least understood and least debated of all Bonhoeffer’s works.  Scholars 
debate whether the work is concerned with: theological epistemology, revelation, 
ontology, methodology, philosophy, or ecclesiology.1150 Amid this debate, Clifford Green 
argues that “Act and Being” is ultimately concerned with the body as it develops a 
theological anthropology concerned with “the isolated, self-imprisoned I, violating social 
relationships in its knowing and its intellectual power.”1151 Inherent to this thesis, is for 
Bonhoeffer, a greater soteriological problem that he does not solve in his analysis, but 
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will continue to devote his intellectual and practical pursuits to as he continues his 
scholarship and ministry.1152  The development of this scholarship, both in the answers he 
presents and the questions still to be pursued, unfolds against the growing tyranny over 
bodies within the Nationalist Socialist party and their ideations of “healthy bodies” and 
“healthy societies.”1153 
 It is at this juncture when Bonhoeffer moves from the “phraseological to the 
real”1154 with his Genesis lectures that pursue both a deepened, and less abstract, 
theological anthropology and an initial venture into the soteriological question at the 
heart of bodily life.  To be clear, “Creation and Fall” as a theological exposition of 
scripture has at its heart profound implications for humanity and sociality, all situated 
within this unfolding paradigm of bodily life.  While the winter lectures at the University 
of Berlin were on “Creation and Fall,” Bonhoeffer moved to the subject of Christology in 
the summer of 1933.  Evident in these lectures with Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the body is 
the temptation to become abstracted from the body even with the very theological 
doctrine that insists on the importance of the body.  “The incarnation” can become too 
phraseological.  Instead, at the heart of Christianity is the real, the incarnate one, the 
incarnate one not being an abstraction but a full-bodied presence.  Bonhoeffer explains, 
“If we speak of God, we may not say of him that he is the representative of an idea of 
God, which possesses the characteristics of omniscience and omnipotence; rather we 
must speak of his weakness, his manger, his cross. This man is no abstract God. Strictly 
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speaking we should not talk of the incarnation, but of the incarnate one.”1155  Seeing this 
emphasis in the summer, after the winter lectures on Genesis, helps to make clear 
Bonhoeffer’s Christological reading of the Old Testament text of Genesis. 
 Bodies, then, are at the center of Bonhoeffer’s theology and ethics.  Care for 
bodies and justice amid our “interdependent vulnerability”1156 is what necessitates the 
conversations at play in Bonhoeffer’s “Ethics.”  Bonhoeffer witnessed two extremes 
within bodily life in his context: the notion of a nihilistic vitalism1157 and the possibility 
of an absolutized mechanization.1158  Together, “Vitalism and mechanization…equally 
express a perhaps unconscious despair about natural life, an enmity to life, a weariness of 
life, an incapacity for life.”1159  Between these extremes Bonhoeffer situated “natural 
life.”1160  Life is not a means to an end, but the end itself, as realized in Christ’s life and 
all its “createdness.”1161  All ethical acts emerge not from the extremes of vitalism and 
mechanization, but instead from the very created-ness of Jesus Christ and his call to care 
and justice for all bodies with an eye toward preservation. 
 Just as bodies inform Bonhoeffer’s ethics, so do they likewise inform 
Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology as presented in Life Together and Discipleship.  Life Together 
invites radical praise for the other, another bodily life, even when life together is difficult 
or even impossible.  Bonhoeffer makes clear, “A human being is created as a body; the 
                                                 
1155 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Witness to Jesus Christ  ed. John de Gruchy (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 1991): 117.  This is an excerpt from one of Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures. 
1156 Vosloo, “Body and Health,” 23.  Here, we call to mind the shift in the scholarship in disability from the 
disavowal of Plato and Aristotle to those who were vulnerable in their disability to the “vulnerable 
communion” of Thomas Reynolds.  Reynolds cited the doctrine of creation ex nihilo as insightful for our 
shared vulnerability in that we are all dependent on God.  See:  Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 154. 
1157 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 123.   
1158 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 123. 
1159 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 179. 
1160 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 179. 
1161 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 179. 
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Son of God appeared on earth in the body and was raised in the body. In the sacrament 
the believer receives the Lord Christ in the body, and the resurrection of the dead will 
bring about the perfected community of God’s spiritual-physical creatures. Therefore the 
believer praises the Creator, the Reconciler and the Redeemer, God the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit, for the bodily presence of the other Christian.”1162  The complex gathering of 
these “other Christians” becomes the church and is an absolute necessity in light of the 
incarnate, crucified and risen body of Christ.  The risen body of Christ, after death, needs 
then a particular body in which to dwell.  Thus, the church becomes the community of 
believers [Nachfolgeigemeinde] who are now his body.  Bonhoeffer explains,  “It is thus 
in the body of Christ that the disciples have community. They live and suffer in bodily 
community with Jesus. By being in community with the body of Jesus they are placed 
under the burden of the cross.”1163 The cross then, makes clear, this community of 
disciples is not an idealized body – but a suffering, broken, crucified body.  This body, 
both in its individual members and collective state, is a disabled body.   
Bonhoeffer’s overarching theology is one intimately concerned with bodily life, 
and even more so, it should be noted for the purposes of this dissertation that bodily life 
for Bonhoeffer – whether Christ, or the individual Christian, or the collective church – is 
fundamentally disabled. In an August 1933 letter to his grandmother, Julie Bonhoeffer, 
written following Bonhoeffer’s winter lectures on “Creation and Fall” and summer 
lectures on “Christology”, he speaks in the language of conversion having experienced 
the bodily suffering of epileptics at the Bethel clinics in the Westphalia region.  He 
                                                 
1162 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together and Prayerbook of the Bible: Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 5 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 29.   
1163 Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 215. 
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writes,  “It is said of the Buddha that he was converted by a meeting with a man who was 
gravely ill. It is sheer madness to believe, as is done today, that the sick can and ought to 
be legally eliminated. It is virtually the same as building a tower of Babel, and is bound 
to bring its own revenge.”1164  For Bonhoeffer, this kind of conversion in the face of 
bodily suffering, secured his belief not in any gnostic escape, but instead in the 
radicalness of the gospel realized in human form and human weakness.  Bodily life 
undergoes transformation as  “flesh encounters world” as disabilityson attests, but that 
does not disable life for Bonhoeffer.1165 Instead, new ways of considering responsibility 
and morality unfold. 
 
5.3.3 Morality and Bonhoeffer 
The brief excursus above on Bonhoeffer’s overarching theme of “the body” 
within his theology is important for locating Bonhoeffer within the field of disability 
studies.  Even prior to the development of the field, we see in his work the struggle to 
move beyond the mechanization or ideation of the body that is the weakness of “the 
medical model” of disability.  And, we see in his work the struggle over and against 
social conceptualizations of the body, as “the social model of disability” aspires to do.  
But as his theological anthropology reveals, there is the sense of human limit before God, 
self and neighbor that tugs at his theological quest.  Herein, we see the precursor of “the 
limit model” of disability.  While these confluences are helpful for the purposes of this 
                                                 
1164 Eherhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: Collins, 1970), 231.  
1165 It should be noted here the distinction between “flesh” and “body” as noted in Chapter 3.  While 
Bonhoeffer’s work precedes this scholarly conversation.  If bodies are, according to Betcher, the 
materialization of social structures and flesh, in a deeper way, engages the spirit, then it would be 
fascinating to read Bonhoeffer’s bodily theology through the lens of a spirited flesh that works over and 
against the materialization of social structures. 
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dissertation, the focus on body could all too easily emphasize the “injury” of Moral 
Injury at the expense of considering “morality” as an equal part of the equation.  In 
developing our revised limit model of disability, it is beneficial briefly to consider 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of morality as a dimension of his theological anthropology.   
 For Bonhoeffer, morality is defined in relation to three concrete areas:  the reality 
of human life, responsibility of the individual in the face of that reality, and the 
restructuring of human life amid our sinful structures for the purposes of a future 
generation.  Bonhoeffer believed “the moral ground”1166 of his age was obliterated.  In 
the face of that destruction, morality and its human implications is radically redefined.  
Because of this, morality becomes for Bonhoeffer what Wannenwetsch deems a “vexed” 
moral notion.1167  Responsibility, in the face of the concrete and complex real, becomes 
the new moral category. 
 Wannewetsch sets forth a helpful schema drawing Bonhoeffer into conversation 
with traditional moral categories to illumine “responsibility” as the new moral category 
for Bonhoeffer.  The question asked by the consequentialist is “What shall I do?”  The 
question asked by the deontological agent is “What ought I do?”  The question asked by 
Niebuhr’s “responsible self” is “What is going on?”  The problem with Niebuhr’s 
question is that it invites self-justification rather than the justification of God.  
Bonhoeffer’s critique poses then a different question in response to God and neighbor, “Is 
                                                 
1166 Rasmussen, “The Ethics of Responsible Action,” 207. 
1167 Bernd Wannenwetsch, “’Responsible Living’ or ‘Responsible Self’? Bonhoefferian Reflections on a 
Vexed Moral Notion” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 18.3 (2005): 125. 
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this helpful?” His question probes whether an action is responsible in light of the very 
‘real’ situation at hand.1168   
 Bonhoeffer understood the hazy disparity of tob and ra of life in the real world. 
Because of this Bonhoeffer encouraged conformation toward the form of Christ.  
Bonhoeffer’s relational view of Christ invites not an internal process of self-reflection, 
but instead an external assessment of one’s relationships and connections. Joshua Kaiser 
explains, “Discernment is not an isolated spiritual activity, divorced from the reality of 
the natural world, but as a human activity fully embedded in the world”1169 The shift 
Bonhoeffer makes is that Christians act finally not from a responsible self, but from a 
discerned response to neighbor in the real and complex reality of the world.  We then are 
responsible to each other, in Christ, not to our own moral and responsible self.1170 The 
language Bonhoeffer uses to describe this transition attests to a shattering of past 
understanding: 
The boundary of vocation has been broken open not only vertically, that is, 
through Christ, but also horizontally, with regard to the extent of 
responsibility…Vocation is responsibility, and responsibility is the whole 
response of the whole person to reality as a whole.1171 
 
In this chapter from his Ethics Bonhoeffer returns to the experience of “encounter.”  In 
this moment of responsibility to which a person is called, “The call of Jesus Christ is the 
call to belong to Christ completely; it is Christ’s address and claim at the place at which 
this call encounters me.”1172 
                                                 
1168 Wannenwetsch, “’Responsible Living’ or ‘Responsible Self’?” 126. 
1169 Joshua A. Kaiser, Becoming Simple and Wise: Moral Discernment in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Vision of 
Christian Ethics (Cambridge, UK: James Clarke & Co., 2015), 104. 
1170 Wannenwetsch, “’Responsible Living’ or ‘Responsible Self,’” 125. 
1171 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 293.   
1172 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 292. 
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Bonhoeffer’s views on reality and responsibility then shape the hope he has for 
restructuring the broken moral world.1173  The way reality and responsibility are reshaped 
is is ultimately sacramental. The static of real life becomes sacramental when we tune 
into Christ in the real world filled with all sorts of surprising abilities and disabilities for 
all people.  Bonhoeffer calls this reality “the sacrament of [the ethical] command.”1174  
His words here make the reader pause:  Reality is the sacrament of the ethical.  What 
Bonhoeffer asks us to consider is this.  What is broken open as sacrament is the real.  The 
real is the lived lives – the broken–open, not perfect, tob/ra, abled/disabled – realities of 
living human beings.  Sacrament then is not a sacred other: sacrament is this life, this 
world, this broken reality.  Bonhoeffer inadvertently anticipates Eiesland in this 
incredible tenet.1175  God’s reality is most realized in the midst of this breaking–apart life.  
Bonhoeffer might even use that word ‘twilight’ here to offer that ‘twilight’ is the 
sacrament of the ethical.  The ethical, the command to love God and neighbor, is drawn 
into this ‘breaking–apart’ life and met with the sacramental love of a God who makes 
Godself known in this tob/ra world.  It is here that reality becomes the sacrament of the 
ethical and that the ultimate restructuring of reality begins. 
Bonhoeffer’s move from “orders of creation” to “orders of preservation” names a 
foundation for ethics.  To start an ethical conversation from the Doctrine of Creation is 
impossible because “creation and sin are so bound up together that no human eye can any 
                                                 
1173 Matthew D. Kirkpatrick, “Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard, and the Telelogical Suspension of the Ethical,” 
Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship ed. by Adam C. Clark and Michael 
Mawson (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013): 86-101. 
1174 Stephen Plant, ‘The Sacrament of Ethical Reality: Dietrich Bonhoeffer on Ethics for Christian 
Citizens,’ in Studies in Christian Ethics 18:3 (2005): 71-87. 
1175 Eiesland, The Disabled God, 107-119. 
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longer separate the one from the other.”1176  A starting point of creation would lead to the 
same misrepresentation drawn by other sectors of Protestant theology who used the 
orders of creation to rationalize division, war and segregation.  For Bonhoeffer, the 
starting point of ethics is preservation.  What has been preserved, that is good and of God 
and pointed to Christ, within this fallen world?  Discussions from the starting point of 
creation, then, leave the theologian with static.  Turning to preservation instead, is not 
only the foundation for ethical discourse, but even more so, reality becomes the 
sacrament of ethics. 
This view is refreshing in that reality is filled with static.  Reality is broken.  But 
so too are the sacraments.  Ethics, with its starting place in Christ knows the brokenness 
of “this cross, this blood, this broken body”.1177  What is preserved within reality may 
appear broken, but this is the brokenness of and for and toward the one who by breaking 
his body breaks open his love for the world.  With this high view, reality as sacrament of 
the ethical may sound disconcerting and perhaps even blasphemous.  But in the area of 
theology and disability, reality is real situations where expectations have fallen short.  
The ethical is a call to live into a high calling response to what in the past could have 
been construed as only an unreal possibility.  Sacrament then, is the way that God breaks 
through, blessing the situation.  James Burtness offers this explanation, 
It seems incongruous to place the words “sacrament” and “ethical” together.  
“Sacrament” refers to a purely gracious act of God.  “Ethical” refers to a purely 
human act.  “Sacrament of the ethical” is a surprising, even a strange, phrase.1178   
 
                                                 
1176 John De Gruchy ‘Afterword’, in Creation and Fall, 149. 
1177 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 146. 
1178 James Burtness, Shaping the Future: The Ethics of Bonhoeffer (Minneapolis, MN:  Fortress Press, 
1985), 43. 
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Ethics is intimately connected to the reality of creation as well as to what has been 
preserved within that creation.  The gracious acts of God are perceived not only in the 
bread and wine, but also in human acts broken open as they model the forgiveness of 
Christ, preserving that salvific act of his through their own vocation.  The ethicist then 
works toward a specific purpose.  Bonhoeffer states this very specifically, “In the sphere 
of Christian ethics it is not what ought to be that effects what is, but what is that effects 
what ought to be.”1179  What is is Christ.  Human perception of morality then changes 
from “ought” to “is” reframing the picture by naming the good that already exists and 
inviting society to see that goodness preserved in Christ and to be restructured to that end. 
 
5.3.4 Disability and Bonhoeffer 
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson asserts: “Disability is the transformation of the flesh 
as it encounters world,” and certainly what we deem Bonhoeffer’s “Gospel of Genesis” 
reveals the possibility of a certain form of disability in the face of the fall.  To be clear, 
the nuance here is not a link between original sin and disability; but instead, a certain 
kind of disabling that emerges in response to flesh encountering world and the limits 
those “other-than-God” encounters provoke.  When we outlined possibilities for the 
relationship between moral injury and disability in chapter three, we considered the effect 
of transmitting the definition from one field to the other, we outlined possibilities for 
utilizing different frameworks through which to perceive the other, and then we reflected 
on the option of looking at disability and moral injury through the lens of finitude.  
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Deborah Creamer and Dietrich Bonhoeffer each in their 
                                                 
1179 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Communion of Saints (New York, NY:  Harper & Row, 1963), 146.   
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own way add to the configuration of finitude as an important aspect of our theological 
anthropology for considering disability, moral injury and the limits inherent within them 
that raise questions of theological importance.  In this section we will briefly explore the 
context of Bonhoeffer’s life that may have shaped his understanding of disability and we 
will review the content of Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology as shaped by a 
comprehension of finitude. 
 Bernd Wannenwetsch appears to be the first theologian to bring Bonhoeffer into 
the discourse of theology and ‘disability’.1180  In his essay, “’My Strength is Made Perfect 
in Weakness’: Bonhoeffer and the War over Disabled Life” 1181, he explores the language 
of strength and weakness to understand Bonhoeffer’s claims on the disabled life.  Even 
more so, he situates Bonhoeffer’s understanding of disability through the legacy of his 
father and the community at Bethel.  Wannenwetsch argues that the dignity of the 
disabled is a key them to all of Bonhoeffer’s theology wherein all life is created, 
preserved and redeemed by God.  Wannewetsch uses a comparison of Bethel, a 
community supporting disabled life, versus Buchenwald, a concentration camp that 
disposes of the disabled.  Bonhoeffer is realistic about Bethel that still is a ghetto of sorts 
as it creates a separate place for the disabled.  However, Bonhoeffer is a place of 
ecclesiological community wherein all life is respected.  A key question Bonhoeffer asks 
revolves around the theme, “What is the meaning of weakness in the world?”1182  In the 
                                                 
1180 To be clear, remember here Brian Brock’s anachronistic caution. Brian Brock, “Augustine: Hierarchies 
of Human Wholeness and Healing,” 65.   
1181  Bernd Wannenwetsch,  “’My Strength is Made Perfect in Weakness’: Bonhoeffer and the War over 
Disabled Life” in Disability in the Christian Tradition:  A Reader, edited by Brian Brock and John Swinton 
(Grand Rapids, MI:  Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2012):  353-369. 
1182 Wannenwetsch, “My Strength is Made Perfect in Weakness,” 361. 
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face of weakness, people must find the courage to resist the urge to distance themselves 
from others because of a deep theological conviction that:  
God is weak and powerless in the world, and that is exactly the way, the only 
way in which he can be with us and help us. Matthew 8:17 makes it crystal clear 
that it is not by his omnipotence that Christ helps us, but by his weakness and 
his suffering...only a suffering God can help.1183 
 
Bonhoeffer critiques what might look like the virtue of benevolence deeming it an act of 
condescension rather than true neighborly love that is humble.1184  Our political vocation 
in this world is not to “dully look on”1185 but to be a vicarious representative of Jesus the 
Christ who is the “origin, essence and goal of life”1186 and thereby restructures reality 
through the ongoing work of preservation.  
 When we read Bonhoeffer, as Wannenwetsch has, critically and even viscerally, 
we begin to sense the concreteness and readiness of Bonhoeffer’s theology.  This is not 
abstract, but realized and readied for the here and now. Michael Mawson attributes this 
sensibility to Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology that is grounded in a relational 
anthropology of creatureliness rather than a doctrine regarding the persons of the 
Trinity.1187  Mawson critiques scholars who base their relational personhood solely on 
Trinitarian conceptions of personhood in community (such as Young and Reinders) 
                                                 
1183 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison: Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Volume 8 (Minneapolis, MN: 
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because it disavows the “concrete and embodied”1188 nature of human being.  Bonhoeffer 
does not ground his relational anthropology within a Trinitarian framework and instead 
presents a view of human being that encounters finitude through “the others as a bodily 
limit.”1189 For Mawson, this insight allows relationship with those of varying abilities 
within the concrete limits of the human experience rather than awaiting ecstatic 
transformation or the ideal community of the Trinity.1190  Finitude, then, is essential to 
divine encounter not disposable as other opportunities are anticipated. 
 
5.4 Implications and Next Steps 
 In our aim to develop a “revised limit model of disability” that pays attention to 
human finitude as a construct of our theological anthropology, we have drawn Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer alongside Deborah Creamer to offer deepened accounts of creation, 
theological anthropology, sin and redemption to develop her model.  Creamer, in her 
account, moves from the “what happens” (we encounter limits) to the “why questions” 
those encounters provoke.  For Creamer, particular limiting contexts evoke questions of 
faith.  Bonhoeffer, one might argue, functions in reverse by moving from the “why 
questions” of creation he explores through Creation and Fall to the “what happens” when 
limits are experienced.  Key aspects of “what happens” for Bonhoeffer are the orders of 
preservation, through which we are cloaked with new garments and upheld in Christ, the 
mandates of creation through which we function anew. While Bonhoeffer offers a 
constructive lens through which to further Creamer’s model, particularly in exploring the 
                                                 
1188 Mawson, “Creatures Before God,” 117. 
1189 Mawson, “Creatures Before God,” 135. 
1190 Mawson, “Creatures Before God,” 135.   
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depth of angst, despair and shame experienced within those limiting encounters, still he 
does not go far enough.  
 Bonhoeffer’s account adds depth to the lines focused upon in this chapter from 
The Veterans’ Creed:  When I struggle with my own pain, my veteran teammates will 
support me; and I will reach out of the darkness and grasp their helping hands.1191 And 
yet for as far as Bonhoeffer’s accounts of creation, sin and redemption resonate with the 
depth of struggle, pain, darkness and grasping expressed in this creed; there is one aspect 
that goes unnoticed – the silence of shattering trauma, experienced as moral injury, that 
remains unexpressed.1192 In order to attend to the disabling potential of finitude in the 
face of limits, we will construct a revised limit model in the next chapter that holds at its 
center the unexpressed silence and the need for an integrated narrative through which to 
move onward. 
 As we have drawn together Garland-Thomson, Creamer and Bonhoeffer to 
provide resources for a deepened account of finitude for the scholarship of moral injury 
we have held onto the phrase of Garland-Thomson: Disability is the transformation of the 
flesh as it encounters world.  At this point in the project, it is helpful to consider how 
Creamer might frame her argument for limits in light of that definition.  Perhaps, we 
could argue, Creamer would suggest: Disability is the limiting of the flesh as it 
encounters world.  And, we could argue Bonhoeffer offers a theological nuance: 
Redemption is the preservation of the flesh as it has “other-than-God” encounters with 
the fallen world.  As we return to moral injury in the next chapter to develop a revised 
                                                 
1191 The Veterans’ Creed. 
1192I am thankful to my Louisville Institute cohort for the Winter 2018 Seminar.  In particular, I am grateful 
to Biblical Scholar Paul Cho of Wesley Theological Seminary for insights and wisdom shared. 
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limit model of disability that will address some of those questions of medicalization, 
social grief, and changing limits raised in chapter two, perhaps we can keep this variation 
of Garland-Thomson’s definition in mind: Moral injury is the shattering of the moral 





A Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 
I will never quit. 
I will never give up. 
I will never accept defeat. 
 
- The Veterans’ Creed1193 
 
6.1 Constructing a Crucial Limit Model of Disability  
 Having recognized the need for a revised model of disability, taking into account 
human finitude to address needs in the scholarship of moral injury, in this chapter we 
construct a crucial limit model of disability.  To be clear, a crucial limit model of 
disability will hold steadfast to particular contexts, individual moral agents, and the 
unique interplay that occurs between the two as limits are encountered and shame ensues.  
While Bonhoeffer does not introduce a model of disability, nor does he utilize the term 
“crucial” at length, Bonhoeffer concludes his Genesis lecture with these words: “The tree 
of life, the cross of Christ, the center of God’s world (Der baum des lebens, das kreuz 
Christi, das zentrum von Gottes welt) that is fallen but upheld and preserved – that is 
what the end of the story about paradise is for us.”1194  In so doing, it is appropriate for us 
to derive from the centrality the cross (kreuz) and the cruciality of limits in Bonhoeffer, 
the language of “crucial” for our new model.  A crucial limit model of disability, in turn, 
begins with an account of human finitude, encountered again and again1195 in complex 
social contexts, wherein moral agents experience deep shame (necessitating traumatic 
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embodied silence and having globalizing effects on the larger world).  Important to this 
model is the possibility of real world redemption even when limited horizons of choice 
cause morally injurious decisions to be made.   The real world redemption is a response 
not to traditional notions of “enslavement to sin” and a conception of redemption as 
freedom from that enslavement,1196 but instead, an awareness for Bonhoeffer that sin is 
less of a “bind” and more a problematic limitlessness that requires new order and 
redemptive action.  
 Throughout this study on moral injury we have aimed to draw moral injury into 
the field of disability studies with an eye to “the limit model of disability” developed by 
Deborah Creamer.  Our search for a “revised limit model” is intended to deepen, 
strengthen and extend her model as a resource for reflecting on moral injury. We have 
made use of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s exegetical attention to “limit” in Creation and Fall, 
where he allows a distinction between limits that are natural from limits that are sinful. 
Bonhoeffer emphasizes the deep sense of shame when a limit is transgressed and the 
continual, lifelong burden that life without limits can be. For Bonhoeffer, the story of 
Genesis is a lingering exploration of Grenze (limit) and the moral emotions the shame of 
transgressed limits generates.  The dialogue between Bonhoeffer and Creamer allows us 
to develop a “crucial limit model of disability” wherein agency becomes disabled in 
diverse and unexpected contexts when “psycho-bio-social-moral-existential”1197 limits 
are crossed in a manner that raises deep questions regarding God, self and the humanity 
of others.   
                                                 
1196 Consider, for example, Paul’s letter to the Romans 6:1-23 where he describes enslavement to sin and 
the hope for freedom in Jesus Christ from that enslavement. 
1197 Phrase adapted from language utilized by Brett Litz.  See: Litz, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War 
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 In this chapter I will present a “Crucial Limit Model of Disability” and explain its 
relevance for moral injury.  To do so, it is necessary to engage three critical conversations 
before presenting the twelve essential components of the model.  First, we will analyze 
the etymological roots of “crucial” and explore various definitions and connotations of 
the word itself.  Second, we will look at the four-fold development of Bonhoeffer’s 
notion of “limit” highlighting key points from chapter five and clarifying their import for 
the revised model.  Third, we will glean insights from the scholarship of disability 
presented by Rosemarie Garland Thomson and Deborah Creamer related to human 
finitude in the face of limit.  Once that groundwork has been established, twelve essential 
components of the crucial limit model of disability will be outlined. Finally, after 
outlining this model and its relationship to human finitude, social contexts, moral agents 
and concrete redemption, we will assess the impact of the model for moral injury, 
disability and moral theory.  The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the model. 
 The Veterans’ Creed reminds us the commitment each soldier makes: I will never 
quit. I will never give up. I will never accept defeat.  And yet, the persistence of moral 
injury makes clear the tragic consequences when a soldier draws near to the limits of 
betrayal, disavowal, and moral implosion. Addressing this societal crisis demands an 
account of crucial limits and their disabling potential that wrestles with the complex 
realities of human finitude and the problematic limitlessness of sin.  For vets who are at 
that crucial limit of quitting, giving up and ultimate defeat, the crucial limit model of 
disability acknowledges the despair in that reckoning as moral codes implode and 
questioning of self and society begins.   
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6.2 Etymology of “Crucial”: Definitions and Implications 
 The etymology of the word “crucial” reveals a fascinating legacy dating back to 
the eighteenth century and derived from both the Old Norse kross  and the Latin crux 
meaning cross-shaped.  First, there is a medical dimension to “crucial” with its French 
roots conveying an image of the ligaments of the knee that cross each other.  These 
cruciate ligaments composed of the anterior and posterior cruciate ligaments, run 
diagonally in the middle of the knee and create the juncture wherein a knee can move 
back and forth allowing a large range of motion because of their unique design.1198  This 
definition reminds us both of our intricate embodiment as well as the possibility of joints 
and ligaments becoming disabled over time or due to injury. To be clear, the tear of a 
cruciate ligament is deemed to carry excruciating pain. Second, there is a social 
connotation within the etymology of “crucial” as one might imagine society at a 
crossroads, a literal fork in the road, with a signpost to deliberate and choose the course 
to follow.  Francis Bacon utilized the phrase instantia crucis (a crucial instant) drawing 
on the imagery of the fork in the road to describe how within an experiment there might 
be a critical moment that gives direction to one hypothesis or another.1199  This intimation 
of “crucial” compels us to remember our social setting: the four cardinal points on the 
                                                 
1198 F. G. Girgis; Marshall, JL.; Monajem, A. "The Cruciate Ligaments of the Knee Joint. Anatomical, 
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2007): 215-17, 221, 261. 
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cross of a compass, constellation of the Southern Cross underneath Centaurus in the sky, 
the four winds, the four seasons, the four elements that compose our world.  Third, the 
definition of the word “crucial” compels the hearer to imagine a crisis, a limit reached, 
which commands a decisive action and perhaps, raises existential questions that can be 
severe and trying. This definition invites realistic assessment of decision-making: both 
the actions that prove helpful, the actions that are sinful, and perhaps even, the actions 
that are unavoidable.  Fourth, crucial can designate the form of a cross where a horizontal 
axis intersects a vertical one. This definition carries both the symbolism of the form of 
the cross as well as the metaphorical weight of existential crisis where torture causes 
agonizing pain and troubles all who bear witness to the event.   
 As we examine the implications of the crucial limit model for conceptualizing 
disability, these four connotations of the definition ground our model and its implications.  
We will see, as we turn now to Bonhoeffer, his recognition of the cross-event as the 
critical and decisive moment in human history as the cross becomes the new limit for 
humanity.  And yet, we will also see how all four definitions and nuances of “crucial” are 
implied across his theology. 
 
6.3 Anthropology, Sin and Crucial Limits: Revisiting Bonhoeffer 
 When faced with looming genocide,1200 Bonhoeffer turned to Genesis for 
guidance. In his work Creation and Fall, he wrestled with the concepts of grenze (limit) 
                                                 
1200Prior to the war in 1939, as early as 1932-1933, Bonhoeffer and others were aware of what Bernd 
Wannenwetsch deems “the war over disabled life” and the classification of citizens as “useless eaters” and 
“”life unworthy of life.”  See: Bernd Wannenwetsch, “”Bonhoeffer and the War Over Disabled Life,” 353-
369. In the summer of 1933, after the Genesis lectures, Bonhoeffer visited a community at Bethel where 
those with disabilities were embraced.  The experience at Bethel became a “place of revelation” for 
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and grezenlose (limitlessness) to develop both a theological anthropology and the 
foundation of his view of moral responsibility.  In this section, we will explore 
Bonhoeffer’s account of limits in four critical moments in his exegesis of Genesis.  These 
insights will become critical as we present the importance of his four-fold delineation of 
limits for our crucial limit model.  Then, we will engage briefly the interplay Bonhoeffer 
develops between context and moral agent.  Finally, we will consider how limits shape 
Bonhoeffer’s doctrines of creation, sin and redemption. The interplay between sin and 
anthropology in Bonhoeffer’s work is foundational for articulating the contours and depth 
of a crucial limit model of disability.  This section will help us to assess Bonhoeffer’s 
four-fold conceptualization of “limit” (that is, the theological concept utilized in the 
model) and the implication it has for context and agent guided by Bonhoeffer’s 
theological doctrines of creation, sin and redemption (that is, the theological foundation 
for the model). 
 
6.3.1 Bonhoeffer’s Fourfold Account of Limit in Creation and Fall 
 Four critical moments in Bonhoeffer’s exegesis are worthy of note here: his 
prelapsarian account of limits, his postlapsarian account of limits, his notion of 
preservation in the face of limits, and his conception of the cross for human limits.  As 
examined in chapter five, at the center of Creation, prior to fall, in the series of other-
than-God encounters that ultimately culminated.  In this discussion of the fall we saw that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Bonhoeffer (355) – not the ghetto it was intended to be.  Bonhoeffer wrote a letter to his Grandmother Julie 
explaining the beauty and truth he saw in disabled existence (354). This experience became the basis for 
the Bethel Confession that was the founding document of the Confessing Church.  Unfortunately, 
Bonhoeffer did not agree with the final draft of the document and didn’t sign it. 
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“limits” were: central,1201 in the middle not on the margin of life,1202 internal,1203 life-
giving,1204 grace-providing,1205and revealed even more fully in relationships.1206  While 
the limit reveals: “life, knowledge, death”1207; there is still goodness and grace amid those 
limits.  In the face of that limit, Bonhoeffer explains, “What Adam knows is that the 
secret of humankind’s limit, of the life of the human being, is in God’s keeping.”1208  
Prior to the fall, within the confines of Eden, Bonhoeffer recognizes what I call “the 
crucial limit” at the center of human existence. 
 The second context in which Bonhoeffer developed his particular understanding 
of the term “limit” is in the aftermath of the fall.  Here, sin breaks into creation and the 
“limit” that was at the center of Eden is broken and consequently, “humankind stands in 
the middle, with no limit.”1209 The human being is then alone, limitless, and with out 
divine resources.1210  Human beings, created originally in the imago dei become instead 
sicut deus.1211 The limit that had been grace is usurped.1212 The impact of the lost limit 
has a divine repercussion (grace becomes guilt) as well as relational ramifications (love 
becomes grudge.)  Eve, who was to be grace to Adam as well, is now the human 
                                                 
1201 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86. See also: 98-99.  Bonhoeffer explains: “Limit and life constitute the 
inviolable, inaccessible center of paradise around which Adam’s life circles.  This center takes on form…” 
1202 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86. 
1203 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 86. 
1204 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 87. 
1205 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 87. 
1206 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 99. 
1207 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 83. 
1208 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 93. 
1209 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115. 
1210 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 115. 
1211 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 116. In a play on words in the German, “Gotze” (which resembles 
Grenze) is “False God.”  Adam as Sicut Deus is caught between God and a false God in his loss of limit. 
See also: 114. 
1212Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 118. 
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experience of “God’s wrath, God’s hatred, God’s begrudging.”1213 So in contrast to 
prelapsarian limits, limits, after the fall, are: continual,1214 everywhere,1215 external,1216 
shame-invoking,1217 guilt-producing,1218 and a source of infinite burden.1219  After the 
fall, the crucial limit of human existence has been transgressed and the result is twofold: 
creation exists in the aftermath of this “fallen-falling world”1220 and creatures live with 
the aftershocks of a “continual fall” without limits “dropping into a bottomless abyss.”1221 
Life in this world without limits is overwhelmed with shame.1222 
 The third movement occurs through the redeeming work God begins in Genesis 
and continues until the full knowledge of the meaning of the cross is revealed.  In the face 
of the limitlessness of sin, God’s response, according to Bonhoeffer in his account of 
Genesis, is threefold.  First, God “makes them cloaks”1223 to address their shame and 
nakedness, first and foremost, but even more so to acknowledge that “God affirms them 
                                                 
1213Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 122.  Jonathan Shay provides an account of soldiers in relationship to 
their military and political authorities deemed “REMFS” referring to their status in the “rear echelon” even 
though they were of higher authority.  For the soldiers, the gods’ wrath, hatred and begrudging was 
manifested in the “heartless, crooked, shallow, and self indulgent REMFS.”  Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 
154-161.  It should be noted that Shay points out Homer’s willingness to engage both sides of the gods.  
Homer’s portrayal depicts Zeus who has men near to his heart. See:  Homer, Iliad, trans. by Robert 
Fitzgerald (New York, NY: Anchor-Doubleday, 1974): 20:24ff. 
1214Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120.  Of note here, is the language of continual fall: “From now on that 
world has been robbed of its creatureliness and drops blindly into infinite space, like a meteor that has torn 
itself away from the core to which it once belonged.  It is of this fallen-falling world that we must now 
speak.”  
1215 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 
1216 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 144.   
1217 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 117. 
1218 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 119. 
1219Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120.  
1220 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120. 
1221 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120. 
1222 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 124. Jean Bethke Elshtain offers a fascinating account of the antithesis 
of shame that Bonhoeffer recognized in the National Socialist regime.  She understood that for Bonhoeffer, 
shame preserves human dignity and acknowledges the divided self; while shamelessness disrespects both.  
She writes, “One of the reasons Dietrich Bonhoeffer was so repulsed by Nazism was precisely because of 
its aberrant shamelessness.”  See Elshtain, “Shame and Public Life,” 18.   
1223 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139.  Bonhoeffer envisions here Genesis 3:21. 
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in their fallenness.”1224  Second, God’s action continues “to affirm the sinful world and to 
show it its limits by means of order”1225 through the orders of preservation.1226  Human 
beings are called to work in the fallen creation through the boundaries instituted by the 
mandates of creation.1227   
 The fourth movement consummates at the cross and in the presence of 
resurrection life.  God remembers the tree of life that once was at the center (mitte) of 
human existence and replaces that tree with the cross of Christ who becomes the mediator 
(mittler) between humans and God, thereby becoming “the source of life.”1228  
Bonhoeffer concludes his lecture on Genesis with this: “The tree of life, the cross of 
Christ, the center of God’s world (Der baum des lebens, das kreuz Christi, das zentrum 
von Gottes welt) that is fallen but upheld and preserved – that is what the end of the story 
about paradise is for us.”1229   For Bonhoeffer, the ultimate traumatic event that occurred 
in the crisis of the cross now becomes the center of existence and the redefining narrative 
not just for the Bible, but for all time and space. 
                                                 
1224 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
1225 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 139. 
1226 Bonhoeffer continues use of the language of preservation even in his letters from Prison.  For example, 
see:  Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison: The Enlarged Edition (London: SCM, 1971), 3.  
Here he writes, “It is not with the beyond that we are concerned, but with this world as created and 
preserved, subjected to laws, reconciled and restored.” 
1227 Rita Nakashima Brock shared the vision of the sentinel now guarding the garden in Soul Repair.  
Bonhoeffer relies on this image as well to describe Adam’s ongoing encounter with the new limit that 
assails him again and again from the world as he now exists between the garden and the cross.  As Adam 
tries to return from those trials to the peace of the garden and the tree of life he violated, he experiences “a 
constant attack on the kingdom from which he is shutout, a desperate raging again and again against the 
sentinels who keep watch.”  Bonhoeffer, Creaton and Fall, 144. 
1228 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 165. 
1229 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 146. See also: Brian Gregor, “Shame and the Other: Bonhoeffer and 
Levinas on Human Dignity and Ethical Responsibility,” Ontology and Ethics, 72-85.  Brian Gregor notes 
the role of shame, not only of Christ, at work in preserving us. He writes, Bonhoeffer’s “Christological 
ontology allows us to understand the burden of divided being and the role of shame in preserving us, but 
also our ultimate source of hope for the healing of being in Christ,” 85.  
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 Bonhoeffer’s exposition of Genesis certainly provides a “limit” account of human 
existence both preceding and complementing Debrorah Creamer’s limit model of 
disability.  While they share elements of similarity insofar as both affirm “limits are 
good,” Bonhoeffer’s conceptualization broadens and deepens Creamer’s model.  Most 
significantly, Bonhoeffer offers a construct for prelapsarian moments when “limits are 
good,” but makes room for a post-lapsarian lament where limits create shame and 
displacement.  Bonhoeffer returns to the claim “limits are good” and are needed to rectify 
our limitless condition, echoing Creamer once again, but doing so in a fashion that makes 
clear the breadth and depth of human emotion and divine consequence in relation to those 
limits. 
 To be clear, Bonhoeffer’s exegesis and excursus is not complete – even in 
Genesis – without the cross (French: Crux, German: Kreuz) of Christ at the center of 
humanity. Bonhoeffer wrote to his best friend Eberhard Bethge on July 16, 1944 that, 
“God lets himself be pushed out of the world on to the cross.”1230 While this displacement 
sounds initially like a rejection of the world, for Bonhoeffer, that sentiment is untrue.  
Instead of fleeing the world, God in Christ takes a firm stance at the center, in the middle 
of reality, amid the complexities of the context of this world and stands firm there.  
Bonhoeffer makes clear as he continues, “He is weak and powerless in the world, and 
that is precisely the way, the only way, in which he is with us and helps us.”1231   
 In the midst of failing bodies, with society at a crossroads, the decisive action by 
God is to place the cross at the center of human existence.  After the cross event, the 
church will then stand at the center of complex human existence claiming the middle, not 
                                                 
1230 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 360. 
1231 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 360. 
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the edge.  Bonhoeffer’s fourfold account of “limit” – culminating in the cross event – is 
formative for the crucial limit model of disability.  As we turn now to Bonhoeffer’s 
accounts of context and agent and their implications for ethics, as well as his doctrines of 
creation, sin and redemption, we will briefly explore critical elements that will be 
foundational for our crucial limit model of disability. 
  
6.3.2 Bonhoeffer’s Account of Context and Agent: Implications for Ethics 
 The import of Bonhoeffer’s notion of Christ’s weakness and powerlessness in the 
world highlights two critical aspects of Bonhoeffer’s sense of ethical responsibility.  
First, context matters.1232  Certainly Deborah Creamer understands: contexts are central 
to human existence and can affect human agency.1233  Even more so, moral responsibility 
cannot be abstracted from context as some moral theories have postulated;1234 but must 
find its ground within reality.1235 Second, agency matters.1236  And yet the human agent is 
                                                 
1232 In 1958, G.E.M. Anscombe argued for a retrieval of virtue ethics building on character, rather than 
ethical theories built on legislative “oughts” or universal “shoulds.”  In so doing, she suggested a transition 
from a legislative view of morality to an ethical approach that honored moral psychology, virtue and an 
account of the good where contexts matter beyond all “oughts” and “shoulds.”  See:  G. E. M. Anscombe, 
“Modern Moral Philosophy” Philosophy 33:124 (1958): 1 – 19. 
1233 Ethical models vary tremendously on whether contexts should be considered or dismissed.  Context 
based ethical systems include notions of virtue, while law-based ethics tend to emphasize norms and oughts 
that should be upheld regardless of context.  G.E.M. Anscombe criticized the turn in ethics to rule based 
ethics in her 1958 work    Anscombe outlines the problem of normative theories such as utilitarianism, 
social contract and deontological ethics – describing them as either vile, dishonest or incoherent.  She 
criticizes these ‘law-based’ concepts of ethics that deal with obligation and duty and blames this legacy on 
the Judeo-Christian heritage and the vision of a divine law-bearing God.  “Ought”, for Anscombe, is a word 
that may be used but with only great care and consideration (5).  Too often, “ought” is a word thrown about 
and heard with “mere mesmeric force” (8).  See:  G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 
Philosophy, 33:124 (1958): 1 – 19.  
1234 See:  Jeffrey Bishop’s critique of Kant and his recommendation of Levinas and Marion for ethical 
theory grounded in the contextual and the relational. Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 223. 
1235 For example, Martha Nussbaum makes the argument that a “thick vague theory of the good”” (214) 
allows for flexibility and adaptability in moral response across various contexts rather than specified should 
or perceived outcomes.  See:  Martha Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of 
Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory, 20:2 (May, 1992): 202-246. 
1236 To be clear, the key notion in virtue ethics is that agents and contexts matter more than rules.   
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shaped by particular contexts.  Again, Deborah Creamer makes this the central claim of 
her limit model of disability.  And yet, not all moral theories take into account reality and 
context, and instead, focus on abstracted constructions and hypothetical situations.1237  A 
crucial limit model will hold steadfast to particular contexts, individual moral agents, and 
the unique interplay that occurs between the two in the reality of a given situation.1238 
 To understand this point, it is helpful to note an example from Bonhoeffer’s 
writings before more fully developing the model.  This example is drawn not from 
Bonhoeffer’s early Creation and Fall, but from his writings, Letters and Papers from 
Prison, collected after his death. In prison, Bonhoeffer penned what became one of his 
most memorable, quotable and perhaps least understood phrases regarding a world come 
of age.1239 For Bonhoeffer, a world that has come of age is a world in its complexity and 
maturity requires the complexity and maturity of human beings to meet the ethical 
demands amid the realities the world presents.  The world demands more than doctrine 
                                                 
1237 See: Charles R. Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Press, 2002).  Charles Pinches describes a problem in ethics wherein theory can too 
often neglect both the agent and the context. At stake here is a twofold loss:  neglect of the agent and 
extraction from the context (182).   
1238 Stanley Hauerwas believes this kind of specificity and individuality is the key element often missing in 
discussions of disability. Hauerwas’ essay “The church and Mentally Handicapped Persons: A Continuing 
Challenge to the Imagination” invites us to consider our stereotypes and roadblocks to knowing and loving 
disabled people.  We are called to a deepened discipline of Christian imagination.  Quoting theologian 
Garret Green, Hauerwas conceives the imagination as something that helps us conceive what would 
otherwise go unnoticed. This kind of imagination is never abstracted from reality and it must always be 
fully embodied.  Such an imagination energizes ecclesial life.   See: Stanley Hauweras, "The Church and 
Mentally Handicapped Persons: The Continuing Challenge to the Imagination." Religion and Disability:  
Essays in Scripture, Theology and Ethics, ed. Marilyn E. Bishop, (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1995): 
46-64. 
1239 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 342. The full quote from a letter of June 30, 1944 reads: 
“Let me just summarize briefly what I am concerned about – the claim of a world that has come of age by 
Jesus Christ.” The German for “the world that is of age” is die mundige Welt and speaks of the Mundigkeit  
of the world.  The etymology of the German is important for deeper connotations.  Peter Selby makes this 
clear in his essay, “Christianity in a World Come of Age.” Mund means ‘mouth’ and refers to a person who 
can speak for herself.  Bonhoeffer employs this nuance to depict how humans in this age can speak without 
reference to a dependence upon God.  See: Peter Selby, “Christianity in a World Come of Age,” The 
Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. by John W. deGruchy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999): 238-239. 
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and dogma, but instead invites the devoted to respond in freedom with the depth and 
breadth of the Gospel.1240 While much has been discussed regarding the importance, and 
also perhaps misreading of this phrase,1241 for the purposes of this discussion it is critical 
to note how Bonhoeffer’s notion recognizes a context where a crucial limit has been 
surpassed. Something has changed in this particular world that affects and disables a 
previously ‘able’ agency. The hope Bonhoeffer expresses at this juncture is anything but 
a deus ex machina fix,1242 and instead, a more radical claim to live and stand firm within 
“this-world.”1243  In committing to “this world”, a human being informed by Christ 
allows certain dying and rising again, or, one might argue, a disabling and re-enabling 
within the context of the given world. Bonhoeffer explains: 
During the last year or so I’ve come to know and understand more and more the 
profound this-worldiness of Christianity.  The Christian is not a homo 
religiousus, but simply a man, as Jesus was a man – in contrast, shall we say, 
with John the Baptist.  I don’t mean the shallow and banal this-worldliness of 
the enlightened, the busy, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound 
this-worldiness, characterized by discipline and the constant knowledge of death 
and resurrection.1244 
 
God, in Christ, does not flee the given context. Nor does the moral agent become 
impotent.  Instead, radical commitment to the given reality necessitates “a God who is 
truly a suffering participant within the life of the world.”1245 Agency yields to the reality 
                                                 
1240 It should be noted an interesting turn of phrase used by Bonhoeffer at this juncture.  He writes that 
religion cannot be a flimsy “garment of Christianity.” The phrase appears at first to echo Bonhoeffer’s 
imagery of the “cloak of preservation.”  However, Bonhoeffer elaborates here to argue for a Christianity 
that is deep and complex and attuned to the realities of a broken world rather than an idealized eternity.  
See: Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 280. 
1241 See: Selby, “Christianity in a World Come of Age,” 226-245. 
1242 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 361. 
1243 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 369. 
1244 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 369.  It should be noted here that Bonhoeffer highlights 
Martin Luther as an exemplar of the “this-world” life Bonhoeffer commends. 
1245 Selby, “Christianity in a World Come of Age,” 235. 
  342
at hand with the knowledge there will be a dying, and rising again.1246  The phrase “ a 
world come of age” and the scenario it depicts helps us to understand the starting point of 
a crucial limit model of disability. Similar to Bonhoeffer’s “orders of preservation” and 
“mandates of creation,” a crucial limit acknowledges the framework of a particular 
context in which a limit has been surpassed and the effect that limit has, even 
despairingly so, on a moral agent. 
 
6.3.3 Bonhoeffer’s Accounts of Creation, Sin and Redemption 
 It is important to note how Bonhoeffer informs three critical elements of the 
model that are helpful for moral injury.  First, Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of creation1247 
claims limits as central, natural and good for humanity.  In a positive sense, limits are 
crucial for human existence. Theologian Clifford Green explains, “In the primal state 
Grenze does not mean any deprivation or restriction of the creature’s humanity. On the 
contrary, it is that which guarantees the creature’s genuine human identity.”1248  Crucial 
limits, then, are a good and God-given entity.  There is, however, one “negative 
connotation” at this stage according to Clifford Green.1249  The human being is warned 
“that he should not try to be boundless, unlimited, infinite: that he should not pretend to 
aseitas; that he should not be tempted to become sicut Deus.  To do so would be to forfeit 
                                                 
1246 See: Sarah Bachelard, Resurrection and the Moral Imagination: Transcending Boundaries in 
Philosophy and Theology (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014). 
1247 Clifford J. Green offers a helpful basis for Bonhoeffer’s implicit doctrine of creation.  See:  Clifford J. 
Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 45-48, 185-205. 
1248 Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 194. 
1249 Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 196. 
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his true humanity.”1250  True humanity, then, for Bonhoeffer, is intimately connected to 
finitude.  
 Second, Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of sin acknowledges the depth and despair of 
human estrangement from God, self and others.  Given Bonhoeffer’s “theology of 
sociality” that Green highlights, sin rips the fabric of human existence.  When the crucial 
limit at the center, mitte, of existence is displaced by sin the rupture is radical and 
irreparable.  The other human being, intended for relationship and infused with grenze (as 
the gift of limit to the self), becomes a burden and place of embodied brokenness.  A 
crucial limit then, moves from an entity of grace and providence, to the implosion of 
relationships within a certain context that has a continual effect on reality where the 
residual aftershocks keep ripping one’s relationship with the world apart. Alienation, 
estrangement and the tendency toward a “despotic ego”1251 are the marks of life when 
crucial limits – intended for good - are transgressed.  This is the depth missed by Deborah 
Creamer in her account of limits.  Bonhoeffer returns to the goodness in limits that 
Creamer attests to when he rectifies the problem of limitlessness (grezenlose) by 
reimposing the cross as a limit that preserves and restructures human existence: Christ as 
Mittler (mediator) reclaims the mitte.  Redemption occurs through a new crucial limit 
wherein Christ reclaims the center that was lost, acts to preserve creation, and provides 
mandates for living within those limits in various spheres of life.1252 
  
6.4 Revisiting Disability:  Finitude, Flesh and Transformation 
                                                 
1250 Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 196. 
1251 Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 202. 
1252 See:  Larry Rasmussen, “The Ethics of Responsible Action,” The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, 220-222. 
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 The etymological consideration of “crucial” and Bonhoeffer’s notion of “limits” 
are key component of our crucial limit model of disability.  In this section, we will revisit 
the scholarship on disability to accomplish two things.  First, to reconsider the 
weaknesses of Creamer’s model and, second to take into account Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson’s definition of disability as one that embraces the theological idea of finitude.  
Together, these comments will aid the analysis of “disability” presented in our crucial 
limit model of disability.   
Our review of the literature in disability studies covered similar themes as three 
models of disability were presented: the medical, social and limit models of disability.  
Deborah Creamer’s “limit model of disability” offers a particularly helpful resource for 
moral injury as it accomplishes several things: honors and integrates prior models of 
disability acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of the medical and social models 
while striving for a construct that moves beyond traditional models, names and explores 
varying social contexts as ‘abling’ for some and ‘disabling’ for others, addresses and 
examines theological questions raised when limits are encountered.  The limit model of 
disability, in its original form, is deeply contextual.  The social critique of the limit 
experienced in each context then raises existential questions of God, self and humanity. 
Disability, according to the limit model, is created when flesh encounters various ‘social’ 
worlds and limits are met.   Where the limit model falls short is in probing the depth of 
the moral emotions, such as shame, that occurs from the meeting of those limits. The 
crucial limit model of disability builds on Creamer’s construct by assuming varied 
contexts and divine questions; and yet, deepens the emotional consequence of 
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experiencing those limits with shame and the “global evaluations of self” that can then 
ensue. 
Creamer’s model is constructive and takes the field of disability studies into new 
territory; however, two modifications can improve her model.  First, her creed that “limits 
are good” is intended to affirm the questions introduced when those limits are 
experienced. Humans are finite creatures and those limitations make us aware, in the 
language of Alasdair MacIntyre that we are more “dependent rational animals” then we 
are Sicut Deus.  This growing sense of vulnerability, finitude and crucial limit between 
creature and creator is what prompts Creamer to deem limits as good.  For those caught 
in the tension between that limiting experience and the shame and despair those contexts 
can create, the language of limits’ “goodness” can appear dismissive.  Bonhoeffer adds a 
helpful layer of understanding through his extended meditation on creature, creation and 
Creator in his exegesis of Genesis in “Creation and Fall.” Limits, in the beginning are not 
only good, but they are central to human existence.  When Eve is introduced to Adam, 
reiterating the limit of humanity in the face of the other, the goodness of this limiting 
relationship is existentially evidenced.  After the fall, limits provoke shame, wrath and 
anger as creatures long to be Sicut Deus and the ongoing, continual abyss of limitless life 
wreaks turmoil on creature, creation and perhaps even, the Creator.  When limits are 
reintroduced, as “cloaks” of protection, as the orders of preservation and through the 
mandates of creation; there is a deeper sense of the goodness and providence present in 
those limits.  Even more so, the cross of Christ takes hold of the center of creation once 
again, depicting a vision of salvation and redemption that become clear through the 
introduction of this new crucial limit. 
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Second, Creamer’s model may be too static. Alongside a new and more robust 
rendering of goodness, her account can also be enhanced by a larger awareness of the 
fluidity of changing limits.  Though Creamer allows for shifts in limits as an individual 
encounters different contexts (for example: a person who is deaf may be deaf only within 
a broad sense of society, but not within a particular deaf community);1253 her model does 
not establish a space for wide-ranging fluidity.  There needs to be a model that provides 
allowance for bodies that are continually on a spectrum of change, as well as 
communities and contexts on a spectrum of change.  A “revised limit model” would 
provide space for: the limits, the questions they provoke and the moral implications of 
that experience when there is a crucial intersection between creature and context.  In that 
moment when a creature (with the changing contours of her body, mind and spirit along a 
continuum of ability and disability) crosses into a context (with the possibility intrinsic 
within that world where she may be limited or maybe not) there is the chance that she 
will experience a limit, the limit will raise crucial questions, and the sudden impact of 
that intersection may have moral implications.  But to be clear, it is also possible in that 
moment the creature does not encounter a limit.  The revised limit model of disability 
establishes space within the model for arbitrary encounters that can create sudden and 
despairing angst.   
Both Creamer and Garland-Thomson draw us into a conversation about disability 
rooted in a theological account of human finitude that takes into account concrete limits 
and the realized impact of their encounters. While it could be argued that Boudreau and 
Wiinikka-Lydon found definitions and frameworks regarding disability threatening to 
                                                 
1253 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 97-103.  This example is key in Creamer’s final chapter 
“Limits and Disability Theology” for explaining her concept of a limit model of disability.   
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their experience of moral injury, a probe of human finitude begun by Creamer, Garland-
Thomson and Bonhoeffer becomes a helpful starting place for moral injury to deepen its 
accounts of morality, injury and disability.  Garland Thomson makes clear that finitude is 
at the heart of her understanding of disability, not as a definition, nor as a model or 
framework, but instead is the reality of human being: 
Put more poetically, disabilities are the etchings left on flesh as it encounters 
world. So whereas disability is certainly an index of capability in context, it is 
also a witness to our inherent susceptibility or receptiveness to being shaped by 
the particular journey through the world that we call our life. Although our 
modern collective cultural consciousness denies vulnerability, contingency, and 
mortality, disability insists that our bodies are dynamic, constantly reformed by 
the call and response between flesh and world. In this way, we evolve into 
disability. Our bodies need care; we need assistance to live; we are fragile, 
limited, and pliable in the face of life itself. Disability is thus inherent in our 
being: What we call disability is perhaps the essential characteristic of being 
human.1254 
 
Disability and moral injury share in that essential characteristic of being human as flesh 
knows the limits of finitude. 
 In “the Medical Model” of Disability,1255 focus is on the “flesh” as the location of 
disablement as a human being is medically impaired and subjected both to societal norms 
of perfection in bodies, as well as subjected to the techne of modern medicine.  Encounter 
with the world then becomes a place where potential injuries might occur to body or 
mind causing impairment. The implication of the medical model for morally injured 
veterans is that they are either ‘fixable’ if psychiatry yields potential healing, or, 
‘unfixable’ if techne fails.  Historic models of disability, even Biblical texts, are most 
revealing regarding engrained views of the medical model and its affect on humans and 
societies transfixed by norms of perfection.  
                                                 
1254 Garland-Thomson, “The Case for Conserving Disability,” 342. 
1255 For a comparison chart of the four models of disability see Appendix I. 
  348
 Within “the Social Model” of Disability, focus shifts from flesh to “world” as the 
setting where disablement occurs.  Flesh is socially constructed, and becomes more and 
more disabled when social norms or boundaries are encountered.  The implication for 
veterans is that society is broken, and needs fixed.  Here, theologies of liberation are 
helpful to lament and name the problem as well as to seek solutions from oppression. 
Nancy Eiesland’s The Disabled God is a pinnacle work in this field that was 
revolutionary in her day and continues to be today. 
 Deborah Creamer, in response to these models, sets forth “the Limit Model” of 
Disability where she focuses on ‘encounters’ as the nexus of disability.  Not all bodies are 
disabled at all times.  Not all contexts are disabling contexts.  Instead, she allows a sense 
of fluidity to explain how some bodies become disabled in some contexts.  When that 
disabling occurs through that particular encounter, the situation becomes an 
epistemological source for theological questions about the nature of being human and the 
providence of God.  Transformation occurs when a deep embrace of those theological 
and anthropological questions creates a deeper view of humanity amid those limitations 
that have occurred.  The implication of this model for veterans is that space is suddenly 
created for asking questions of God, self and others in the face of limits.  Constructive 
work continues in response to Deborah Creamer’s Disability and Christian Tradition as 
scholars explore further ramifications of her work. 
 A revised limit model, presented here as “the Crucial Limit Model” of Disability, 
builds on the previous three models by acknowledging and integrating nuances of the 
medical, social and limit models.  This model appreciates Creamer’s understanding of 
shifting abilities across various contexts; and yet, seeks to deepen the shame experienced 
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in response to those moments of disablement and to widen the arbitrary occurrence of 
those encounters.  Potentially disabling limits present themselves in various contexts to a 
variety of human moral agents at unexpected, arbitrary, unpredictable and unparalleled 
moments.  The moment when an implosion of the moral code occurs might defy moral 
norms and codes resisting easy definition or expectation.  A crucial limit is positive in 
that it recognizes limits as necessary for humanity before God to honor moral codes and 
to prevent despotic egos.1256  A crucial limit acknowledges the possibility of a dying, and 
rising again, in response to the loss within a given context of an important moral code. 
Transformation is possible when the crucial limit first, acknowledges the depth of human 
shame and descends to that nexus,1257 and then, offers restoration through the cross of 
Christ at the center of existence wherein the offer for preservation is extended to all, but 
particularly to those disabled and fraying at their limits.  While some moral theories 
present abstract constructs neglecting real agents and real contexts, the crucial limit 
model of disability claims both within the particularities of their worlds all preserved 
through the lens of Christ.  James Burtness explains,  
Bonhoeffer is certainly an ethical “situationist” in that he opposes ethical 
absolutes of all kinds and emphasizes concrete times and places.  Yet to label 
him a situationist without qualifying that term is to misconstrue him completely.  
The Jesus Christ of time and history is also the one in whom the reality of God 
and the reality of the world come together.  Reality, always on the move, is 
structured by Jesus Christ.  Thus the Bonhoeffer who asked who Jesus is for us 
today, and who wanted to know what Jesus means, was as interested in 
structures as he was in situations, and worked his entire life a the intersection of 
the two.1258 
 
                                                 
1256 Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, 202. 
1257 Such a model offers a contrast then to the eschatological dynamic ascent proposed by Gregory of Nyssa 
and Amos Yong and offers instead a vision of reality wherein the dynamic descent to the concrete, the real, 
the complex contains profound depth of knowledge to the moral agent grounded in this world. 
1258 Burtness, Shaping the Future, 69-70. 
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While the situations of this world might lead humanity to the difficult side of a crucial 
limit; it is Jesus who reveals through the cross his structuring of reality the positive and 
redemptive dimension of crucial limits. 
  This section reminds us of Creamer’s twofold weakness. First, limits are not 
always good; they in fact, can evoke shame and silence.  Second, limits are more than 
contextual; they in fact, can be fluid, arbitrary and capricious.  Awareness of these 
weaknesses informs the components of a revised limit model.  In addition, we are 
reminded through Garland-Thomson that disability occurs through the interaction of 
flesh, encounters and world.  She too assumes an optimistic conception that the ultimate 
“transformation” will be positive and redemptive.  In so doing, she like Creamer fails to 
probe the depth of emotion that is met within that transformative moment.  We will draw 
on Garland-Thomson’s terminology to outline the components of our model, but in doing 
so, we will divide “transformation” into two critical moments: first, the depth of despair 
that must be met and acknowledged and second, the possibility of a new narrative for 
what was otherwise silenced and shamed. 
 
6.5 A Crucial Limit Model of Disability: Essential Components 
 Given the need for a revised limit model, the crucial limit model of disability 
extends Creamer’s construct by developing four essential components that attend to 
human finitude, moral agents, social context and real-world redemption.  These four 
components will each be nuanced with insights from the etymology of “crucial”, the 
theology of “limit” in Bonhoeffer, and the components of “disability” in Garland-
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Thomson.1259  Each of these four essential components contain three key nuances related 
to the crucial limit model of disability: the crucial implications of moral decisions at the 
heart of human existence, the effect of limits and the depth of experience encountered at 
their edge, and the disabling potential of those crucial limits. These four themes, and their 
individual threefold nuances regarding cruciality, limited agency and disability, together 
give rise to twelve essential components of the crucial limit model.  Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson’s definition of disability continues to be appropriate and helpful:  disability is 
the transformation of the flesh as it encounters world.  The crucial limit model adds a 
nuance to her definition as well: Disability is the transformation (shame and redemption) 
of the flesh (human finitude) as it encounters (moral agents) worlds (social contexts).  In 
the following four sections we will extrapolate twelve essential components of the crucial 
limit model of disability shaped by human finitude, social contexts, moral agents and 
concrete redemption.1260 
 
6.5.1 Human Finitude and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 The first essential component of the crucial limit model is rooted in the etymology 
and definition of “crucial.”  The cruciate ligaments remind us of our embodiment as well 
as the potential for excruciating pain when we as embodied creatures are injured in body, 
mind or spirit.  Second, Bonhoeffer’s first insight into “limit” is the notion that limits, 
from the beginning of creation, are at the very center of human being.  Acknowledging 
                                                 
1259 See Appendix 2 for a chart of the twelve essential components of a crucial limit model of disability.   
1260 Appendix 2 sets forth these twelve essential components by intersecting cruciality, limits and disability 
with human finitude, social contexts, moral agents and concrete redemption.  The four assertions regarding 
cruciality are set forth in 6.2 as four conceptions of “crucial” are derived from its etymology and 
definitions.  The four assertions regarding limits are presented with reference to Bonhoeffer’s four-fold 
understanding of limit in 6.3.1.  The four assertions concerning disability relate to Garland-Thomson’s 
definition. 
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the limit at the center of our existence, as well as the limit that meets us in every 
relational encounter, reminds us of human finitude which God intended for good.  Third, 
Garland-Thomson frames flesh as finitude that is subject to encounter and there has the 
potential for a disabling to occur.  This component prompts recognition that disability is 
inevitable for all humanity because we are finite creatures and this is a natural process of 
creation.  The theological anthropology of human finitude, that we are MacIntyre’s 
“dependent rational animals,” highlights human vulnerability amid the natural and good 
limits we encounter. 
 
6.5.2 Social Contexts and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 The fourth component of the crucial limit model of disability is a nuance of the 
definition of “crux” and recognizes the crucial and critical ways our society is at a 
crossroads.  The crucial limit model of disability for moral injury must rework the notion 
that soldiers alone are culpable of moral failure and instead broaden the sense of societal 
complicity to acknowledge that soldiers find themselves in a moral crucible while at war. 
A crucible names that situation where a severe trial transmutes diverse elements; giving 
birth to a phrase such as “their relationship was forged in the crucible of war.”  Fifth, an 
essential component of the new model is the fact recognized by Bonhoeffer that in the 
social context of the fall, shaped by the relationships of snake, Adam, and Eve, human 
beings lost all sense of limit as human beings become for a moment sicut deus.  After the 
fall, limits are lost to human sin and that problematic limitlessness affects all social 
contexts with abysmal depth, perpetual loss and infinite burden.  Sixth, the crucial limit 
model of disability takes into account the fact that encounters between flesh and world 
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are fluid, complex, capricious, ambiguous and ever-changing.  There is a complex 
interplay of the disabling that occurs across social contexts as flesh encounters limits 
again and again.  A social context that limits and temporarily or permanently ‘disables’ 
one person in one situation at one particular time, may or may not do the same at any 
other moment or to any other person.  Social contexts can dramatically affect, interact 
with and create “psycho-bio-social-moral-existential”1261 disabilities in fluid, subtle and 
unpredictable ways.   Here, there exists a spectrum of social contexts across the human 
experience recognizing the unique limit both at the center of each context and in the 
human encounters within those contexts that have the potential to disable.  The crucial 
limit model takes seriously the impact of shifting limits and the real impact their 
unpredictability can have on a soldier’s psyche, moral agency and moral identity and 
allows space for the apparent unpredictability of violations and the critical impact those 
violations have on the moral agent causing disability as Jonathan Shay makes clear.1262 
 
6.5.3 Moral Agents and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 The seventh component of the model reminds us of the severe and decisive 
nuances of the word “crucial.”  Since moral responsibility in any given social context can 
be complex, the language of cruciality reminds us of the existential depth of the questions 
asked by the moral agent in the face of that complexity as limits raise questions regarding 
God, self and other; and, as those limits demand decisive, critical, crucial actions in key 
moments of decision-making.  Bonhoeffer’s third connotation of limit shapes the eighth 
                                                 
1261 Phrase adapted from language utilized by Brett Litz.  Litz, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair in War 
Veterans,” 696. 
1262 Jonathan Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”  Lectures given at the Chautauqua Institution.  August 17, 2016. 
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component of our model.  Recognizing the depth of shame, the level of vulnerability and 
the despair of moral agents poised to make choices without limits, God acts to affirm 
fallen humanity, cloak them in protective garments and work perpetually to preserve and 
uphold them.  In the midst of limitlessness, God upholds and preserves.   
 The ninth component of the crucial limit model of disability occurs at the 
intersection of moral agency and disability resulting in moral injury.  Shame, despair, 
silence, distrust and the inability to imagine a future are some of the disabling effects of 
moral injury.  The crucial limit model, taking a step beyond Creamer’s limit model, 
acknowledges the depth of despair and sorrow at this juncture. Garland-Thomson 
recognizes there the possibility of “transformation” but that transformation is impossible 
without descending to the depths of despair to reside with the silence of a moral agent 
whose failures, whether supposed or realized, are too much to bear and have a disabling 
effect. 
 
6.5.4 Concrete Redemption and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 The last critical theme in this revised model is the topic of “concrete redemption.”  
Before outlining the last three essential components of our model, it is important here to 
explain the language of “concrete” redemption.  We noted in chapter two in a discussion 
on sin that sin can occur in “concrete acts” as noted in the Compendium of the social 
doctrine of the Church: The consequences of sin perpetuate the structures of sin.  These 
institutional structures of sin are rooted in personal sin and therefore, are always 
connected to concrete acts of the individuals who commit them, consolidate them and 
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make it difficult to remove them.1263  And yet, we noted in the theology of Bonhoeffer in 
chapter five an emphasis on ethical responsibility that is always rooted in concrete reality 
and not abstracted by theory. For Bonhoeffer, concrete reality is that sacramental 
breaking open of the ethical command.  Bonhoeffer’s ethical theory becomes realized in 
concrete form as he envisions the mandates of creation as concrete places for responsible 
life where “the relation of the world to Christ becomes concrete.”1264  
 Bonhoeffer offered an example of concrete redemption by drawing on the skills 
and responsibilities of the vocation of a medical doctor. Bonhoeffer offers a surprisingly 
risky vision for that doctor beyond what might be considered an acceptable standard of 
care. Risk and responsibility, for Bonhoeffer, are cyclically linked elements of any given 
vocation that have a telos of concrete redemption: 
If, for example, I am a physician, then in the concrete instance I serve not only 
my patients but also medical science and with it science and the knowledge of 
truth in general. Although in practice I perform this service at my concrete 
position, for example at the bedside of a patient, yet I am continuously aware of 
my responsibility for the whole, and it is only in this that I fulfill my calling. 
Furthermore, it may happen that I, as a physician, am obliged to recognize and 
fulfill my concrete responsibility no longer by the sick-bed but, for example, in 
taking public action against some measure which constitutes a threat to medical 
science or to human life or to science as such. Vocation is responsibility and 
responsibility is a total response of the whole man to the whole of reality; for 
this very reason there can be no petty and pedantic restricting of one’s interests 
to one’s professional duties in the narrowest sense. Any such restriction would 
be irresponsibility. The essential character of free responsibility makes it 
impossible to establish laws defining when and to what extent such a departure 
from the “limited field of accomplishments” forms part of a man’s calling and of 
his responsibility towards men. Such a departure can be undertaken only after a 
serious weighing up of the vocational duty which is directly given, of the 
dangers of interface in the responsibility of others, and finally of the totality of 
                                                 
1263 Catholic Church. 2005. Compendium of the social doctrine of the Church. Ottawa: Canadian 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 119. 
1264 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 68.   
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the question involved; when this is done I shall be guided in the one direction or 
the other by a free responsibility …1265 
 
The risk urged by Bonhoeffer in this extended quote is for the individual in any given 
vocation to respond concretely to “the whole of reality” that presents itself within 
episodic and disabling ways in their vocational tasks.  For the doctor, no sickness is 
healed unless the greater “whole of reality” causing that sickness is addressed.    
 In the scholarship on disability, Nancy Eiesland utilizes the language of 
concreteness to describe disabled life as “concrete existence”1266 and draws on that 
knowledge for her image of God as disabled as well, while Burton Cooper speaks of the 
“concreteness” of God’s care for disabled life.1267  The metaphor of “concrete existence” 
speaks to the ground under our feet, the horizon upon which we live and move and have 
our being, the complicated nature of social reality and the occasional limitations of 
disabled life; perhaps it is that place where the cross meets the garden at the center of 
existence.  A crucial limit model of disability is grounded in both the vulnerability of 
finitude and the potential for sin in concrete existence for both individuals and 
institutions.  Bonhoeffer’s theological anthropology demands exploration of how moral 
agency can face disability in concrete situations when limits are met, even when a moral 
agent is acting with responsibility.  Ethicist Jeffrey Bishop, Emmanuel Levinas and 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer agree there can be a call to concrete, contextual responsibility “so 
demanding that sin is necessary, and failure inevitable.”1268   
                                                 
1265 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 293.   
1266 Eiesland, The Disabled God, 69. 
1267 Cooper, “The Disabled God,” 179. 
1268 Bishop, “The Broken Body,” 223. 
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 With these thoughts on “concrete redemption” in mind, the tenth essential 
component of our model takes into account the “cross-shaped” connotation of the 
definition of “crucial.”  Here is where God’s power and transcendence descend and 
intersect the horizons of our concrete existence.   The eleventh component, influenced by 
Bonhoeffer’s fourth and last conception of limit, is that the cross replaces the center of 
human life becoming the new limit.  With that knowledge, humanity is commissioned to 
ethical responsibility in concrete places knowing that limits will be met, but informed by 
the knowledge of the dying and rising again at the cross in this world rather than a 
heavenly ascent into a world beyond.  Finally, the transformation that occurs, even when 
disabling has occurred, is a new creation formed in the crucible of this world.  That 
transformation to new ability is possible only after the depth of shame, silence, trauma 
and despair have been met and honored. Originally a crucible was not a melting pot nor 
cauldron, but a night lamp hung by a crucifix.  Here is the place where a new narrative 
begins.1269   
With these four broad areas of focus of human finitude, social contexts, moral 
agents and concrete redemption, and the nuances for them shaped by the language of 
cruciality, the fluidity of limits, and the spectrum of disability, we see the contours of a 
                                                 
1269 Stanley Hauerwas thinks critically regarding the replacement of old narratives with the new in his work 
A Community of Character. He begins with “Ten Theses Toward the Reform of Christian Social Ethics” (9-
12) which serve as prelude to further reflections on Watership Down and communities that are story-
formed.  The list of ten includes:  the narrative structure of Christianity shapes social convictions of the 
Gospel, the fact that every ethic is a narrative – the question is what kind of narrative is it?,  the idea that a 
social ethic is intextricably linked to the truthfulness of our existence, the concept that narratives must help 
people deal with unexpected circumstances and strangers, the notion that the task of the church is to be 
truthful to its own truth which is the fact of its story, the claim that the story to which Christians are called 
is a story that takes one “out of control”, the fact that Christian ethics depends on the stories and gifts of her 
members, the idea that the social ethic of the church also depends on basic trust and kindness, care must be 
taken with the story of “liberalism” and the life of the church, and the claim that the story of the church is 
an alternative to other political stories. See:  Stanley Hauweras, A Community of Character: Toward a 
Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame: IL, University of Notre Dame Press, 1991). 
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crucial limit model of disability.  This model acknowledges and integrates the strengths 
and weaknesses of the prior models: medical, social and limit; and at the same time 
acknowledges the depth of the moral experience of shame, broadens societal complicity, 
widens the spectrum of shifting limits across social contexts, and heightens the 
complexity of questioning at the heart of human existence in the face of those crucial 
limits.  Even as we move to address the strengths and weaknesses in this model; we can 
quickly see this model is helpful for the fields of moral injury, disability studies and 
theology.  The crucial limit of disability creates space within the field of moral injury to 
discuss disability as a necessary, helpful and liberative component of “injury” and moral 
theory as a spectrum of conversation key to the “moral” of moral injury.  Even more so, 
the crucial limit model helps us to engage a conversation regarding the intersection of the 
two and the possibility for moral implosion when changing bodies engage a limited moral 
horizon.  Given the considerations of moral agency, social contexts, fluid realities and 
human finitude presented here, as well as their nuances for constructing a crucial limit 
model of disability, we can see the import of this conversation for moral theory, disability 
and moral injury.  
 
6.6 The Crucial Limit Model:  Implications for Moral Injury 
 In the introduction to this dissertation, I noted the particular problem of moral 
injury as distinct from PTSD and explored the impact of moral injury on soldier and 
society today. Situating moral injury within the larger field of trauma studies, the crucial 
limit model bears witness to critical events in the past that can “limit” human endeavors 
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in the present and the future unless attention, therapy and healing are engaged.1270 While 
such trauma may have medical and social dimensions, neither medical treatment nor 
social analysis is enough to address the issues at hand. The argument presented in chapter 
one made clear that treating moral injury through the techne of medicine creates a litany 
of issues: moral injury becomes a problem to be solved, patients with visible injuries 
receive prioritized care, medical treatment is unable to plumb the depths of moral 
emotions, and the issue of moral injury is depoliticized.  The medicalization of moral 
injury fails to address the crucial limits of greater enfleshed embodiment and the 
“psycho-bio-social-moral-existential” dimensions of the injury. A crucial limit model of 
disability demands exploration of the crux of the human person in a given society beyond 
a given medical diagnosis. 
 In addition, assessing moral injury invites deep attention given to: the profundity 
of moral emotions such as anxiety, shame, fear and guilt1271, the alterations in identity 
due to “global evaluations of the self,”1272 the fluidity of moral injury across varying 
contexts, the questions of agency, and finally, the ambiguity of moral injury. A crucial 
limit model of disability recognizes the debilitating moral emotion of shame; this is an 
important counterpoint to Creamer’s limit model of disability wherein she states 
somewhat too blithely that, “limits are good”1273 without leaving room for the more 
complex moral emotions of shame, betrayal and grief that often exist at the center of 
                                                 
1270 Bessel van der Kolk is a pioneer in the field of trauma studies and trauma’s encodement within the 
body.  See: Bessel van der Kolk, When The Body Keeps the Score, (London, UK: Penguin Press, 2015). 
1271 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699. 
1272 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 699.  Here, Litz draws on the work of Helen B. 
Lewis, Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York, NY: International Universities Press, 1971), 30.  Lewis 
speaks of a global evaluation of self: “I did this thing” which is a different moral emotion and process than 
guilt which focus on the action done: “I did this thing.” 
1273 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 96. 
  360
moral injury.  The crucial limit model creates a construct where the shaming global 
evaluation of “self” projects on the greater world those same global evaluations causing 
an internal and external implosion.  Shame, as a critical limit, wreaks havoc on 
perception, self-identity and potential neurosis.  Thereby, the crucial limit model 
addresses the issues of profundity and identity. With regard to fluidity of injury across 
social contexts, the crucial limit model acknowledges the potential for disabling across a 
spectrum of social contexts across the human experience recognizing the unique limit at 
the center of each context.  Each individual bears a unique inward limit with regard to an 
exponential number of human experiences; when that limit is crossed, the cruciality of 
that limit is recognized. The crucial limit model of disability honors the affect those 
apparently random limits have on human agency, the depth of grief in response to that 
loss of agency, and the disconcerting ambiguity and inability to predict when those 
crucial limits will be met. Tyler Boudreau lamented the shovel, the farmhouse search, and 
the hug as crucial limits transgressed during his service.1274  The jeremiads shared by 
soldiers, trauma specialists, psychologists, societal critics and the biblical author of 
Jeremiah lament the societal woes and the soldiers’ wounds at work in moral injury. Each 
voice, from Jeremiah’s prophetic “they have treated the wound of my people carelessly” 
(Jeremiah 6:14, NRSV)1275 to David Wood’s op-ed naming moral injury as “the signature 
wound of this generation”1276 emphasizes just how crucial this new landscape of moral 
injury is.  The crucial limit matters for both the war within the conscience of the enlisted 
soldier and the war without in the societal matrix. The crucial limit model of disability 
                                                 
1274 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 754. 
1275 Jeremiah 6:14 (NRSV).  
1276 David Wood, “The Grunts: Damned if they Kill, Damned if they Don’t,” Huffington Post (March 18, 
2014), http://projects.huffingtonpost.com/moral-injury/the-grunts (Accessed February 4, 2016). 
  361
accounts for the complex interaction between the human condition, social conventions, 
moral formation and assymetrical power dynamics that instigate moral injury. 
The review of the psychological literature reveals issues related to morality, injury 
and disability; but perhaps most poignantly provided an opportunity to ask whether 
scholarship has adequately explored notions of morality in relationship to moral injury. 
Shay explores Nussbaum’s concept of “moral luck” and Litz briefly engages Kohlberg 
and Freud. The shrinkage of the moral horizon evidenced in moral injury and the 
resulting implosion of the moral code demand further attention to issues of morality, the 
fluidity of morality across various social contexts (ie. civilian life, the war arena, church 
and state), and the limits of morality when social conventions and moral codes are 
transgressed.  A crucial limit model of disability comprehends the diminished capacity 
for morality not simply from the perspective of sin and acts of commission, but also from 
the perspective of human finitude in a fallen creation.  When agency becomes disabled 
due to any number of limits encountered, studies of morality must take into account 
diminished capacity for virtue due to changes in embodiment. Morality exists within a 
complex web of moral codes, nomos, social conventions and complex societal systems; 
and yet, changes in the moral code can erupt when crucial personal limits are encountered 
that defy tradition or convention.  The crucial limit model of disability allows space for 
unpredictability of violations and the critical impact those violations have on the agent. 
The review of the theological literature explored issues of Cartesian dualism in 
medicine, social contexts, and shifting limits. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone argues for a more 
complex view of human embodiment rather than a radically simplified Cartesian 
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dualism.1277 Instead of pursuing techne to respond to “injury”, Sheets-Johnstone 
advocates the possibility of “invocation” to an alternative telos rather than the “ingestion” 
of a simple fix.1278 In the study of disability, such techne becomes a “modernist craving 
for ontological security”1279 as disablement is aimed toward a fix.  A crucial limit model 
of disability shifts focus from an injury to be ‘fixed’, toward a deeper embodiment to be 
honored and healed. When techne is removed, the injured veteran1280 can then wrestle 
with that “inability to contextualize”1281 and the effect of that deep grief upon 
embodiment. 
The theological literature also revealed the need for deeper exploration of the 
relationship between a soldier’s moral injury and societal implications; shifting the focus 
from the individual soldier and his or her moral accountability to the wider societal 
institutions and their complicity.1282  Through an analysis of socially constituted bodies, 
the social ordering (or disordering) of the good, social trauma and the ability (or inability) 
of a society to grieve; the theological literature on moral injury reveals a society on the 
precipice. A crucial limit model of disability recognizes that precipice and the role it 
                                                 
1277 Maxine Sheets Johnstone, Giving the Body Its Due, 1. 
1278 Maxine Sheets Johnstone, “The Materialization of the Body,” 135. 
1279 Fiona Kumari Campbell, Contours of Abelism: The Production of Disability and Abledness (New York, 
NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 13. 
1280 David Wood notes the real impact of techne as he describes: “In December 2014, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs signed a $16 million contract with IBM to install software at the VA’s data center in 
Austin, Texas, that the VA said would assist its doctors and therapists confused about how to treat patients 
diagnosed with PTSD.  VA staff can plug in clinical data and electronic medical records, and the computer 
will spit out the appropriate treatment plan.” See: David Wood, What Have We Done: The Moral Injury of 
our Longest Wars, (New York, NY: Little, Brown & Co, 2016): 255. 
1281 Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. 
1282 David Wood explains, “Yet it is not only those who served in our longest wars who suffer moral 
injuries.  It is all of us.  We made it possible for Darren Doss to be recruited, armed, and sent to 
Afghanistan; our attention was elsewhere while he was struggling through gunfire to help save Kruger and 
during the Christmas-tree-theft caper.  We sent Gunny DeLeon to war twice, but weren’t watching as he 
came home haunted and broken. We recruited and trained Sendio Martz, but we weren’t aware that he 
needed forgiveness.  We enlisted Jake Sexton and sent him into the fight, but we didn’t listen to the stories 
that troubled him until it was too late.  Like it or not, fair or unfair, we are all connected by the wars.  Now 
what?”  Wood, What Have We Done, 263-264. 
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plays in placing the individual soldier into morally compromising situations with those 
“limited horizons of choice.”  The focus moves from the individual to the individual; and 
there demands societal accountability for those crucial decisions with grave 
consequences, as well as societal rituals for grieving and processing when such a difficult 
choice must be made. 
 Additionally, the theological literature could further explain the variability, 
fluidity and absurdity of shifting limits.  Tyler Boudreau grieved the inexplicability of 
knowing when a “crucial limit” might be met; seeing a limit might exist at one point one 
day, and then shift to a completely different critical limit on another.1283  Once that limit 
is met, wherever it has since shifted, the soldier experiences disablement of agency and 
identity.  Author Wendell Berry, in his short story “Making It Home” tells the story of 
World War II Veteran Arthur Rowanberry journeying home to his small farm community 
after three years at war.  His account speaks to the centrality and fluidity of limits as 
Veteran Rowanberry begins to see his village after days of walking home:  
He had arrived, as he had arrived again and again during the healing of his 
wound, at the apprehension of a pure emptiness, as if at the center of an 
explosion – as if, without changing at all, he and the town ahead of him and the 
village around him and all the long way behind him had been taken up into a 
dream in which every creature and every thing sat…in the dead center of the 
possibility of its disappearance.1284 
 
Berry draws on the same sensibility of Bonhoeffer who recognized the limits at the “dead 
center” of human existence – without Christ, there is emptiness and the potential for 
disappearance at that center.  One senses in this short story the internal implosion of 
emptiness alongside the external explosion that occurred within the war arena; both now 
                                                 
1283 Boudreau, “The Morally Injured,” 746. 
1284 Berry, “Making It Home,” 94. 
  364
casting a shadow across what had otherwise been taken for granted.  The limits of 
Veteran Rowanberry’s moral, spiritual and bodily existence have shifted. His war 
experience is the new center-point of his life and its potential to cast a new framework on 
his experience is fluid and unpredictable. The crucial limit model of disability takes 
seriously these shifting limits and the real impact their unpredictability can have on a 
soldier’s psyche. 
 
6.7 Impact of the Crucial Limit Model for Disability and Moral Theory 
 When the field of disability draws into conversation models of moral theory,1285 
we discover that agent and context are of the utmost importance. Certainly recent 
conversations in feminist ethics of care and virtue ethics take context and embodiment 
seriously. The next step in these conversations is to take deepen room within ethics for 
the effects on embodiment of trauma, suffering, disability, and moral injury.  It is 
possible that some ethical theories assume “normalized” perceptions of human being.  
Moral theory needs to take into account deeper views on the enfleshment of being 
human.  In addition, moral theory needs to take into account wider views of changing 
worlds and the limits experienced when those contexts are encountered.  Those contexts, 
and their moral implications, can appear fluid, arbitrary, and unpredictable. The ongoing 
intersections of flesh and world are not simply moments of ability and/or disability; they 
                                                 
1285 Recent action theories in ethics claim that actions need a home.  For example, Adam C. English notes: 
“Actions become intelligible as they find ‘homes’…Actions, like reason, faith, and personhood cannot be 
understood on their own, abstracted from contexts and stories.”  See:  Adam C. English, The Possibility of 
Christian Philosophy: Maurice Blondel at the Intersection of Theology and Philosophy (New York, NY: 
Routledge Press, 2007): 82.   A literary example of this appears in the work of Veteran Benjamin John 
Peters who begins his biography Through All The Plain with these words “This is my story, cemented in 
history,” xi. Peters describes his personal history of enlistment and homecoming, story of killing and new 
life.  Benjamin John Peters, Through All the Plain, (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014).    
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are also instances where moral agency can be abled or disabled. Each engagement with 
limit is an occurrence when the capacity for virtue is diminished or enhanced.  Morality is 
affected more than is often credited with the ongoing effects and interaction with 
changing embodiment.  
 While much of Protestant theology aims to express morality in the language of 
sin, both acts of commission and acts of omission, a revised limit model of disability 
takes into account the persistence of finitude as a dimension of human existence. Moral 
theory proves problematic when it presumes that humans are disembodied wills who 
make choices detached from concrete reality.  What is needed is an attentiveness to 
human being that takes context and material existence, our embodiment, seriously. 
Bonhoeffer proves helpful in his positive reckoning of creature and creation anchored by 
an uncanny reliance on natural law that is surprising for a Protestant theologian.  Unlike 
Martin Luther, the forefather of Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran tradition, who argued the natural 
world was so wholly tainted by sin that no positive account of creature and creation could 
be given; Bonhoeffer creates a space for moral responsibility in a complicated world that 
can be established and upheld through a recognition of finitude and limits. 
 Drawing these conversations regarding disability and moral theory to the field of 
moral injury facilitates deeper accounts of the morality at stake in moral injury as well as 
the body and its potential for an injury that prompts an instance of disability. If disability 
is the transformation of the flesh as it encounters world, then moral injury is a unique 
form of that transformation when flesh meets the limits of a particular world and a 
disabling occurs that has moral implications. The impact of that intersection might 
reverberate in the moment, or it might take years to come to the surface.  Moral injury 
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can be particularly acute, when in the language of Jonathan Shay, there is the “shrinkage 
of the social and moral horizon.”1286  World, then, becomes further limited which in turn 
fashions more dynamics and increases the potential for encounters of limitation that can 
have disabling repercussions. In that space of the “limited horizon of choice” there is 
increased probability of limitations that have moral and physical dimensions. 
 
6.8 Strengths and Challenges of the Crucial Limit Model 
 Theologian Brian Powers suggested an Augustinian framework of internal 
distortion and external disorder as fallen humanity pursues disordered goods.1287  A 
strength of the crucial limit model for those morally injured is the recognition of this 
pathology in the face of power, where, critical internal limits are twisted and disordered 
in response to the disordering of crucial societal limits – once good and right – now, 
gravely disrupted.  The preceding list of fifteen key points regarding the crucial limit 
model of disability points to the internal and external implications of that disordering.  
Internally, there is shame, the global evaluation of self, and the search for a response 
beyond medical technique to the inner despair.  Externally, there is a broadening of 
responsibility from a soldier’s impossible moral dilemma to the larger military-industrial 
complex that shapes society and limits moral choice.1288  Moral choices, in this complex 
                                                 
1286 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 23.  Brian S. Powers uses similar language when he speaks of a “limited 
horizon of choice.” 
1287 Powers, “Moral injury and original sin,” 325. 
1288 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 120. For Bonhoeffer, the Fall is bigger than a “moral lapse,” it is “the 
destruction of creation by the creature.”   
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landscape, do not always fit within societal mores, norms or conventions.  Instead, there 
is a fluidity and unpredictability across various moral worlds. 1289  
Several additional strengths should be noted beyond these bounds.  For example, 
a crucial limit model of disability as a resource not only to “conserve” as Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson espounds, but even more so, a possible place of creative1290 
reckoning1291 and release.  Deborah Creamer makes clear that “limit” can become a 
resource for theological reflection allowing a dynamic response to the divine even in the 
face of limitations.1292  Robert McRuer asked, “Within what social conditions might we 
welcome the disability to come, to desire it?”1293  In so asking, McRuer’s desiring of 
disability is a request for an existential creative awakening in the face of crucial limits. 
To be clear, this strength is acknowledged reluctantly and with unwavering recognition of 
the debilitating effects of moral injury.  And yet, a crucial limit can be a generative 
resource for soldiers and societies alike.  Certainly this is the hope of Brian Doerries and 
his “Theater of War” passion to push audiences to the limit and to discover insight there. 
An additional strength, worthy of note, is the shift that occurs in moral formation 
and reflection with the crucial limit model.  Nussbaum notes that limits are necessary, she 
makes clear: “Human cognitive limits circumscribe and limit ethical knowledge and 
                                                 
1289 See for example, Wendell Berry’s short story “Making It Home” wherein Veteran Art Rowanberry 
makes a long walk home.  On his way he reflects, “There had bean a time when those houses had seen as 
permanent to him as the land they stood on.  But where he had been, they had the answer to such houses.  
“We wouldn’t let one of them stand long in our way.”  Berry, “Making It Home,” 84.   
1290 See: “In What Ways have Artists, Academics, and Cultural Institutions Responded to the U.S.-Led 
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq?” October, 123 (Winter, 2008): 3-184.  Also, see Mimi Swartz, “’W.’ and 
the Art of Redemption,” New York Times March 21, 2017. 
1291 Wendell Berry uses the language of reckoning in his short story “Making It Home” about Veteran 
Arthur Rowanberry. 
1292 Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology, 96. 
1293 Robert McRuer, Crip theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (New York, NY: New York 
University Press, 2006): 207. 
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discourse; and an important topic within ethical discourse must be the determination of an 
appropriate human attitude toward those limits.”1294 However, perhaps she could take the 
concept of crucial limits to refine her framework of “moral luck.” Nussbaum advanced 
the concept of “moral luck” arguing that luck can make an unpredictable moral difference 
and deeply affect character formation.  In fact, by means of moral luck an arguably 
“good” moral agent might change in response to a case of “bad luck.”  A crucial limit 
model would shift the randomness and “luck” of life’s circumstances, ie. getting a dealt a 
bad hand, and would instead increase the potential variables that could come into play in 
any given moral situation.  An injury to morality would occur not from “luck”, but 
instead from a complex and unpredictable response to reaching a limit that might defy 
normal societal conventions but reaches a crucial limit within both the confines of a given 
context and the contours of a human heart. 
 While the strengths of the crucial limit model are many; there are a few 
challenges and limitations.  First and foremost, while much work has been done in the 
field of disability studies to universalize disability,1295 so doing comes with a great risk.  
Creamer, Erevelles, Garland-Thomson and others strive to broaden the spectrum to 
humanize, universalize, and equalize the potential for disability among all people  
Certainly there are strengths in this approach, but it should be made perfectly clear, this 
approach is not intended to disclaim the unique experience of veterans.  Disability studies 
works to “conserve” disability as a vital resource, not just in a broadening of humanity 
                                                 
1294 Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, 8. 
1295 Garland Thomson, 2002 “Integrating Disability, transforming feminist theory,” National Women’s 
Studies Association Journal, 14:3 (2002) 1-32.  Robert McRuer, 2006 Crip theory: Cultural Signs of 
Queerness and Disability (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006).    Nirmala Erevelles, 
Disability and Difference in Global Contexts, 26.   
  369
sense, but also in a deep protection of each person’s individual experience in the face of 
disability. Nirmalla Erevelles may remind us, “disability is the most universal of human 
conditions,” and yet we must remember that moral injury is a unique and particular 
human condition that must be preserved in its integrity. Second, it would be inexcusable 
to rationalize and/or justify certain moral actions as reasonable choices given a fallen 
world.  Scrutiny of moral choice is important for assessment, confession and redirection 
both for individual soldiers’ and the ranks in which they serve. Third, a possible 
shortcoming of the Crucial Limit Model of Disability might be its Christological 
undertones for a secular world.1296 And yet, Bonhoeffer aimed at the end of his life to 
present a “religionless Christianity”1297 that had relevance for the contemporary dilemmas 
of his age. 
 As we move to the conclusion, the seventh chapter will apply the insights and 
components of this model for individual soldiers and larger societal institutions.  We will 
look to two models, the administration of County Veterans’ Courts across the country and 
the imagination evoked by Brian Doerries in his “Theatre of War” project. Both help 
veterans and societies move from the complexity and complicity of moral injury toward 
restorative ventures that help all to imagine new futures.  Both mobilize those poised in 
defeat, ready to quit or give up, toward new moral horizons and personal narratives that 
honor the trauma and yet, restore hope.  The crucial limit model is not just a construct, 
but an applicable concept to be used in concrete and complex situations.  In order to 
                                                 
1296 In an informal conversation regarding this dissertation with a mentor who is a professor of political 
philosophy said, “I love Bonhoeffer’s ethics, but I could never teach them in my cross-cultural context.”  
1297 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 280. Bonhoeffer’s quote in full reads:  "We are 
approaching a completely religionless age: people as they are now simply cannot be religious anymore... 
What is bothering me incessantly is the question of what Christianity really is, or indeed who Christ really 
is, for us today?” 
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apply our model in the next chapter, we turn to the theological ethics of John Paul 



















Conclusion: Implications and Possibilities of a Crucial Limit Model 
I now stand ready to serve my veteran teammates.1298 
 
- The Veterans’ Creed 
                                                 




7.1 Moral Horizons and Human Vertigo: The Crux of the Matter  
 At the heart of the Veterans’ Creed is the statement: I now stand ready to serve 
my veteran teammates. And yet, the traumatic intersection of limited horizons of choice 
with human moral vertigo in the swirl of those limited choices, makes “standing ready” 
an impossible ideal at times.  In this section, we will look briefly again at that intersection 
of limited horizons of choice and moral agency distorted by human vertigo as an example 
of the sociological moment the crucial limit model of disability must examine.  As the 
chapter continues, we will introduce Jon Paul Lederach’s conception of the moral 
imagination as a helpful practice that can be employed when the crucial limit is reached.  
Once his construct is outlined, we will assess the application of the moral imagination in 
two contexts informed by the mandates of creation proposed by Bonhoeffer. Finally, we 
will offer next steps for scholarship and offer concluding remarks. 
 Bonhoeffer uses the language of the horizontal and vertical axes in a critical text 
on vocation and responsibility in his Ethics: “The boundary of vocation has been broken 
open not only vertically, that is, through Christ, but also horizontally, with regard to the  
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extent of responsibility.”1299 The horizon of the horizontal axis of the cross reminds us of 
the importance of context.  Here is that space of “world” where limits are possible and 
encounters unavoidable.  Shay and Powers’ language of the shrinkage of that horizon, 
where there is a limited horizon of choice,1300 sets the stage for moral injury’s impending 
potential.  The second axis, the vertical one, reminds us of our creatureliness. Here is that 
space of embodiment, agency, and flesh.  A vertical line draws us from the vertex at its 
height to the center of the earth in its depth where we are grounded.  Bonhoeffer’s notion 
of creatures in creation as those who once knew the center as limit, and now know the 
center as the cross of Christ, is helpful in that Christ replaces the broken center. In the 
midst of changing worlds and contexts, when agency becomes disoriented by 
circumstance and the intersection of limits, vertigo (from the Latin vertere meaning 
“whirling” or “to turn”) sets in making it impossible to stand tall and firm. 
 Is it possible that the cognitive dissonance at the intersection creates a form of 
vertigo disrupting both the body and morality?  In that lecture series at Chautauqua, in the 
summer of 2016, Shay made the following five claims: first, moral injury disables a 
person’s ability to “show up to an appointed time and place in a crowd of people one 
doesn’t know well.”1301  Second, moral injury disables a veteran’s ability to “experience 
                                                 
1299 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 293. 
1300 Veteran Zachary Moon understands the “given world”1300 in which certain moral orienting systems 
flourish and others falter.  See: Dissertation by Zach Moon, (Re)Turning Warriors: A Practical Theology of 
Military Moral Stress, 104.  https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1149/.  (Accessed January 14, 2018). 
1301Jonathan Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”  Lectures given at the Chautauqua Institution.  August 17, 2016. 
Shay’s analysis at Chautauqua may be compared to chapter ten in his book Achilles in Vietnam where he 
explores “The Breaking Points of Moral Existence.”  Here he outlines the disabling persistence of the 
following ten things: the traumatic moment, untrustworthy perception, problematic memory, the tendency 
to be mobilized toward danger, the persistence of survival mode, betrayal, isolation, suicidal impulses, 
meaninglessness, and the inability to participate in any capacity for democracy.  See: Shay, Achilles in 
Vietnam, 170-182. 
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words as trustworthy”1302 and in so doing, to not automatically discount words and 
statements as deceitful jargon.  Third, with this failure of words, moral injury disables a 
veteran’s ability to “see the possibilities in persuasion, negotiation, compromise and 
concession essential to democratic functioning.”1303 Fourth, moral injury disables “the 
possibility of winning a struggle without killing and of losing a struggle without 
dying.”1304  And fifth, perhaps most destructively, moral injury disables a soldier’s ability 
to “see the future as real.”1305 Vertigo, in other words, takes hold of the moral agent and 
disrupts their ability to function causing disability to their agency, the greater democracy, 
and perhaps, even having an impact on their eschatology.  
 The response to those who have found themselves at the crux of their limits in 
agency, democracy and eschatology will require a vibrant moral imagination that grounds 
and guides. Jon Paul Lederach offers a vision and application of the moral imagination 
that might be employed for those at the crucial limit to help re-orient when the 
problematic limitlessness of sin and the experience of human finitude confound.  We will 
draw on Lederach’s construct to offer re-orienting within two of Bonhoeffer’s four 
mandates of creation (focusing on government and culture) for those who have reached 
the crucial limit within those spheres of life. The specific examples are the Mercer 
County Veterans’ Court of Western Pennsylvania and Brian Doerries’ Theater of War 
project.  Then, we will offer a challenge to the church as a third mandate of creation to 
live into the moral imagination challenged by Lederach. 
 
                                                 
1302 Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”   
1303 Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”   
1304 Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”   
1305 Shay, “Moral Injury in War.”   
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7.2 The Moral Imagination and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 Professor of International Peace-building at Notre Dame University, John Paul 
Lederach in his work, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace, 
invites similar acts to promote social change when limits have been transgressed that 
invoke violence and require new pathways to peace.1306  Lederach develops four steps 
toward provoking the moral imagination: responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk.1307  
Responsibility requires the twofold step of accepting personal responsibility, “I am a part 
of this pattern”1308 and discovering the meaning of that responsibility for relational 
mutuality.1309 Once that recognition of responsibility occurs, Lederach believes the only 
path beyond violence is an internal valuation that has a confessional quality at its root.1310 
Curiosity is both a learned skill and art that must be sustained once that initial sense of 
responsibility is obtained.1311 Curiosity moves us beyond easy polarizations (i.e. right and 
wrong) toward an extended attentiveness to constructive care and healing from there.1312  
Creativity is a counter-cultural opposition to violence. Violence can “imagine” no other 
way, according to Lederach, but the creative acts and the responses they provoke can.1313 
Lederach highlights creative approaches to violence by Somali women, Columbian 
campesinos, and Tajiki poets. Chicago based CreatiVets is an arts based healing program 
                                                 
1306 Shelly Rambo draws on Lederach as a conversation partner in her essay but does not develop his work 
further. Here, I expand on her work prompted by his essay “The Moral Imagination” rather than the book 
she cites of the same title. 
1307 Jon Paul Lederach. “The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace,” European Judaism 
40:2 (Winter 2007): 16-18.    
1308 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 16. 
1309 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 16. 
1310 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 16. 
1311 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,”17. 
1312 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 17. Regarding curiosity, Lederach draws on the Latin root cura 
and links curiosity to both the cure and the care at its etymological root. 
1313 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 18. 
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for veterans experiencing moral injury and/or PTSD to explore songwriting, ceramics, 
painting, wood crafting and printmaking.1314 Finally, Lederach suggests risk as the fourth 
element necessary for transcending the violence that occurs when moral limits are 
crossed and healing is needed.  Risk invites participation in the mystery at the heart of 
human existence without a fixed focus on outcome, but an organic engagement of process 
guided by a renewed moral imagination. While the violence and perceived immorality of 
the past is the known entity, the unknown invites risk and an invitation to journey to a 
new comprehension of moral life in a complicated universe.1315   
 Lederach’s four-fold model allows us to apply them to the mandates of 
government, culture, church and family; so that the veteran who has reached the crucial 
limit might then function with new ability within that realm.  For those who have known 
the vulnerability, fluidity and unpredictability of transgressed moral limits, Lederach’s 
practice of the moral imagination aims to honor, guide and heal beyond the pain, silence 
and trauma experienced.  Knowing that Garland-Thomson’s “encounters” are not always 
positive and can at times be world-shattering moments of trauma, Lederach’s approach 
proceeds sensitively and with great respect for what has been endured.  And yet, the hope 
of the moral imagination is that new encounters – through responsibility, curiosity, 
creativity, and risk – can both honor the crucial limit and guide onward.  This practice 
allows us to build strength within societal structures for soldiers to stand their ground and 
reclaim their balance after moral injuries have occurred. 
 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s definition of disability, “Disability is the 
transformation that occurs as flesh encounters world,” provided a lens through which to 
                                                 
1314 See: http://www.creativets.org. (Accessed January 13, 2018). 
1315 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 18. 
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analyze the theological anthropology (i.e. “flesh”), doctrine of creation (i.e. “world”) and 
understanding of the fall (i.e. “encounters”) presented in the theology of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer.  In so doing, Bonhoeffer provides an account of creature, Creator and 
creation. In addition, Bonhoeffer provides a robust conception of soteriology as he 
describes “preservation” in Christ through renewed limits manifested in the mandates of 
creation.  While Bonhoeffer, speaks of preservation, the “transformation” Garland-
Thomson envisions is left wanting. If we understand those “encounters” as the 
engagement of crucial limits that occur again and again, we are left in need of a stronger 
conception of transformation.  Lederach aids this discussion by providing a model for 
engagement that is transformative.  In addition, for the secular world of the military and 
returning veterans, his language provides a resource that is usable and salient. 
Bonhoeffer’s view of the responsible life presented in his Ethics echoes Lederach’s 
concept of responsibility and the steps responsibility can take through curiosity, 
creativity, and risk toward transformation. 
 The challenge for the individual who has transgressed (or been betrayed at) a 
crucial limit and therein encountered a disabling condition of injury or morality is to 
reclaim functioning in that context and beyond.  Garland-Thomson weaves into her 
definition of disability a conception of “transformation” that does not only create 
disability when flesh encounters world.  Transformation, within disability scholarship, 
can be liberative and powerfully enabling when disability is claimed as a resource as 
suggested by Garland-Thomson in her essay “Conserving Disability.” Functioning and 
flourishing, at that crucial limit, can be gained in a transformative way when Lederach’s 
moral imagination is accessed through the steps of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and 
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risk.  Responsibility lays claim to the crucial limit experienced by the veteran, or even by 
the civitas.  Curiosity explores the affect on functioning as well as steps toward moving 
forward.  Creativity employs the work of moral re-ordering through an imaginative, 
constructive and perhaps even playful process.  Risk, the final step, pushes the individual 
or the institution at that crucial limit to engage new methods toward renewed vitality and 
functioning. 
 In this section, Lederach’s formation provides a helpful lens through which to 
increase moral functioning for soldiers, societies and religious institutions.  Given our 
conception of “a crucial limit model of disability,” Lederach’s four steps provide a way 
to enable functioning when the disabling crucial limit has been crossed and transgressed.  
Certainly it is the hope of the author that these steps will encourage further conversation 
for scholars in theology, psychology and sociology to employ their own moral 
imagination through the work and challenge of their own fields to continue and deepen 
aid for both veterans and the wider context in which they live and move and have their 
being. 
 
7.3 Moral Imagination and the Mandate of Government: Veterans’ Court 
 A context for exploring the first mandate of creation – government – is the model 
of the County Veteran Court Treatment Program for Veterans of the Armed Forces.  This 
model is designed for veterans who are facing criminal charges or who have been 
charged with violating the terms of their probation or parole.  The court is presided over 
by the local Judge who looks to a team of psychologists, treatment providers and other 
professionals to be a circle of support for the individual veteran.  If a veteran is brought 
  378
under the auspices of the court, he or she will be assigned a Veteran mentor who 
maintains frequent contact and guides the veteran through the program which includes: 
required group counseling sessions, required recovery meetings for substance abuse, 
community service, and a series of writing assignments over a two year period.  While 
courts and their procedures vary from county to county, for the purposes of this 
dissertation I am drawing on resources from the Mercer Country Veterans’ Court.1316  
 Three specifics are worthy of note from the Mercer County Veterans’ Court.  
First, the court takes seriously “physical-psycho-social-spiritual health” inviting routine 
measurement, assessment and treatment for physical health, psychological health, social 
health, and spiritual health.  In addition, the treatment necessitates sustained reflection on 
identifying triggers that cause the veteran to stray from optimum “physical-psycho-
social-spiritual health.”  Once those triggers have been named and noted, the veteran and 
his or her mentor develop a “trigger action plan” in case one of the triggers occurs and 
dislodges the veteran from their ideal course. 
 Second, the Mercer County Veterans’ Court demands twenty-four essays every 
month over the course of a two-year period.  These essays include line-by-line reflections 
on the Veterans’ Creed, reports on relapses and triggers, narratives about personal 
“totems” (symbols of strength and hope carried with the veteran), descriptions and 
analyses of community service activities, reports on deficiencies in “physical-psycho-
social-spiritual health”, and testimonies about the impact of the Veterans’ Court on their 
recovery.  At the monthly court sessions, Veterans in the program at every stage read 
                                                 
1316 See:  Sandy Scarmack, “Their own court helping veterans going through criminal justice system,” The 
Sharon Herald, February 17, 2015, www.sharonherald.com/news/local_news/their-own-cour-helping-
veterans-going-through-criminal-justice-system/article (Accessed October 14, 2016). 
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their written narratives before the court.  The writing prompts engage the moral 
imagination of the returned veteran and provide an opportunity to share a part of their 
story before a community of people in the court who honor the testimony and bear 
witness to the grief.  Kansas City poet and veteran H.C. Palmer reminds us, “The trauma 
won’t go away, but as my Muslim friend, Dr. Amir Hussain, so wisely said, telling our 
stories helps us negotiate the trauma, and that gives us hope.”1317  
 Third, the Veterans’ Court has at its core the Veterans’ Creed that is recited at 
each court session and carried by each veteran in their personal wallet.  Eleven statements 
within the creed are presented to each veteran in the program as a writing prompt inviting 
reflection on its meaning and challenge to them as individuals.  These testimonies are 
read before the court and honored with silence and mutual support.  The creed bears 
witness to shattering events within the course of a veterans journey, and while it does not 
name moral injury within the creed, there is a traumatic silence evidenced and honored at 
the heart of this communal narrative. 
 
7.3.1 Government, Moral Imagination and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 Veteran Zach Moon, in his dissertation upon return from war entitled (Re)Turning 
Warriors: A Practical Theology of Military Moral Stress invites soldiers, and the military 
culture, to get curious about “moral identity”1318 due to inadequate instruction, 
conception, and reconstruction after deployment. His scholarship asks both soldier and 
military to deepen their curiosity regarding a soldier’s matrix of “moral orienting 
                                                 
1317 Thomas G. McGuire, “Feet of the Messenger: A Conversation with H.C. Palmer,” War, Literature, & 
the Arts An International Journal of the Humanities  27 (2017): 12. 
1318 Dissertation by Zach Moon, (Re)Turning Warriors: A Practical Theology of Military Moral Stress, 5. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1149/.  (Accessed January 14, 2018). 
  380
systems” prior to, during and after wartime service.1319 Moon’s suggestion of “moral 
orienting systems”1320 takes into account how a moral self, the individual soldier, 
functions within “larger systems of power including patriarchy, white supremacy, and 
hetero-normativity”1321 that cause entanglement, assymetrical dynamics, and hamper 
relational mutuality.  The model of the Veterans’ Court helps to reimagine moral identity 
and societal responsibility after a soldier has become disoriented and morally wounded 
having reached the crucial limit within war through the mandate of a disciplined and 
structure Veterans’ Court within the local government. 
 Jon Paul Lederach’s four-fold practice of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and 
risk is evidenced in the Veterans’ Court model.  The manual makes clear the 
responsibility of Veterans’ within the court to adjust to the disciple and structure of the 
court as a healing treatment program.  And, the model demands responsibility of local 
governments to faithfully engage and respond veterans who are struggling with moral 
injury, PTSD, anxiety, addiction or anger management issues.  And yet, the Mercer 
County Veterans’ Court model engages moral terrain beyond responsibility by inviting 
curiosity, creativity and risk through community service, written narratives, partnership 
through mentors, and the circle of support through a treatment team.1322 The Veterans’ 
                                                 
1319 Zach Moon, (Re)Turning Warriors, 56. 
1320 For Moon, a “moral orienting system” is “a dynamic interplay between values, beliefs, experiences, and 
behaviors from which assumptions, expectation, hopes, and judgments about oneself, others, and Higher 
Power are generated accordingly within a particular situation,” 47.  Moon draws on Bourdieu’s system of 
“habitus” that is formed within communities of dispositions that “paint” over time adding to the layers and 
palette of a growing picture of morality. Moon’s choice of words in “particular” assumes that the moral 
orienting system, understands fluid contexts and might meet moral limits at various, and sometimes 
contradictory points, in different situations, 45.  See:  Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1980): 170.  
1321 Zach Moon, (Re)Turning Warriors, 106. 
1322 While the Mercer Country Veterans’ Court model shares much in common with similar programs, the 
three elements of health assessment, personal narrative and the shared creed are unique to Mercer County.  
A recent study assessing local Veterans’ Courts in Pennsylvania noted six components shared across the 
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Court is one of many models across the country, though the Mercer County Veterans’ 
Court is uniquely crafted to its context by the leadership and veterans involved. 
 
7.4 Moral Imagination and the Mandate of Culture: Doerries’ Theatre of War 
 From Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam to Martha Nussbaum’s exploration of 
“moral luck” to Robert Meagher’s exegesis of the Greek word meignumi from the 
Ancient Greek tragedies, our study of moral injury continues a cultural conversation 
begun centuries ago in ancient Athens by poets such as Sophocles, Aeschylus and Homer 
regarding the moral implications, impossible dilemmas and lingering lifetime effects of 
war.  Drawing on this rich tradition, and even more so, understanding the power of 
tragedy to tug humanity toward the limit of human experience, contemporary playwright 
Brian Doerries developed “The Theater of War” to present ancient Greek tragedies to 
audiences of civilians and military corps across a spectrum of rank. Doerries shares the 
mission of his project:   
By presenting these plays to military and civilian audiences, our hope is to de-
stigmatize psychological injury, increase awareness of post-deployment 
psychological health issues, disseminate information regarding available 
resources, and foster greater family, community, and troop resilience.1323 
 
Since its conception, over 80,000 audience members have viewed productions of 
Sophocles’ Ajax and Philoctetes.  After the production, Doerries invites conversation of 
audience members even when those discussions become “arresting, emotionally charged 
                                                                                                                                                 
systems: identification of eligible participants, definitions of eligibility, administration of teams and 
meetings, alternative options for various program tracks, assessment of clients and data, the establishment 
of mentors for each veteran.  See:  Anne S. Douds, Eileen M. Ahlin, Daniel Howard, and Sarah Stigerwalt, 
“Varieties of Veterans’ Courts: A Statewide Assessment of Veterans’ Treatment Court Components,” 
Criminal Justice Policy Review, 28:8 (2017): 746. 
1323 http://theaterofwar.com/projects/theater-of-war/overview, (Accessed November 5, 2017). 
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events.”1324 In Doerries’ view, ancient Greek tragedies were utilized during their day to 
develop compassion, create a shared language, grieve the anguish of war, and welcome 
home through an “elaborate ritual” soldiers returning to civilian life.1325  The Theater of 
War project is an excellent example of drawing the moral imagination to the mandate of 
societal culture to explore crucial limits for soldiers; and, perhaps, to draw citizens to the 
brink of the crucial limit. 
 Brian Doerries understands the concept of “crucial limit” in his aim to address the 
moral injuries of veterans pushed to impossible limits as well as his frustration with a 
society who cannot handle the inward moral probe those injuries ask of a civitas. Because 
of our unwillingness to plumb the depth, not just of emotions but also of civic culpability, 
Doerries welcomes those uncomfortable moments when audiences are carried to that 
crucial limit.  He explains,    
Tragedies don’t mean anything. They do something—physically, biochemically, 
spiritually—to us. They move us out of our heads and into our guts. They frame 
our response to ethical issues with emotions that help us to see more than one 
perspective. They make us profoundly uncomfortable in the presence of others, 
thereby forging a new way of connecting and relating with people who may not 
typically share our views.1326 
 
To hear Doerries explain the scholarship behind his work is compelling: the tragedies 
allow a space for communal grief, existential wrestling and palpable relief.1327 The 
tragedies explore civic limits, as well as the consequences of their transgression and the 
potentially disabling repercussions in that lapse.  The tragedies explore martial limits and 
the moral dilemmas and devastating betrayals. The tragedies, at best, explore human 
                                                 
1324 http://theaterofwar.com/projects/theater-of-war/overview, (Accessed November 5, 2017). 
1325 http://theaterofwar.com/projects/theater-of-war/overview, (Accessed November 5, 2017). 
1326 Thomas G. McGuire, “Bryan Doerries Discusses the Theater of War & the Palliative of Shared 
Suffering,” War, Literature & the Arts: An International Journal of the Humanities  27 (2015): 3-4.    
1327 McGuire, “Bryan Doerries Discusses the Theater of War,” 17. 
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limits.  Doerries explains the purpose of the tragedies, “To acknowledge our fallibility 
and collective responsibility for the suffering. To dispense with judgment and moral 
superiority.”1328  Leading audiences to those crucial limits is the aim of Doerries’ project 
that tugs provocatively at the moral imagination and invites spectators to the crux of the 
matter: what happens when new moral horizons create human vertigo? Doerries would 
argue such an experience creates empathy, awareness and a drive to respond otherwise 
than before. 
 Doerries’ provides a model of engaging the moral imagination that takes 
audiences to the crucial limit and invites deep reflection, empathic response, shared 
responsibility and social change.  Certainly Doerries’ model participates in these four 
steps of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk-taking. In so doing, he reveals these 
four steps at the heart of Greek tragic theatre as well. The very moment of theatre-going, 
then and now, creates a space for the moral imagination to be engaged developing 
empathy at those crucial limits as a learned skill, an art to be practiced, and an empathy to 
be enacted.  As a response to the crucial limit model of disability, Doerries considers the 
elements of the crucial limit model outlined earlier. As we begin to imagine how Doerries 
activates the moral imagination through responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk, we 
see how the cultural experience provides new agency through the crucial limit model, for 
soldier and society alike and we can begin to imagine how such a construct might be 
employed in other areas of society. 
 
7.4.1 Culture, Moral Imagination and the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
                                                 
1328 McGuire, “Bryan Doerries Discusses the Theater of War,” 19. 
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 Much of this project explores the moral injury of individual soldiers; however, a 
few scholars have prompted greater exploration into the moral injury of the greater 
culture of our society. Lederach’s invitation to the moral imagination demands societies 
to take responsibility, engage curiosity, kindle creativity, and respond with risk-taking. A 
responsible society is tasked with an honest reckoning of complicity and accountability 
for war-time trauma.1329  Movies like Billy Lynn’s Long Halftime Walk invite that kind of 
moral reckoning of societal complicity, but are far less popular than films easily hero-
izing service members.1330 Societal responsibility will not only re-evaluate complicity, 
but will also take responsibility for social contributions to trauma.  Often, trauma studies 
including moral injury, focus on the acute event of the traumatic experience rather than 
the larger context.1331 Peter Levine’s work on trauma asks questions and pushes 
responsibility for trauma to larger socio-environmental conditions than singular acute 
events.1332  Based on statistics that as much as seventy percent of the general 
population1333 has experienced a traumatic event in their lifetime, trauma expert Dr. 
                                                 
1329 See, for example: Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic 
Abuse to Political Terror (New York: Basic, 2007).  Herman argues here society ebbs and flows in 
response and needs instead sustained attention.  The first act of responsibility is to sustain society’s gaze. 
1330 Interesting to note here Nancy Eiesland’s reflection in The Disabled God:  “The Christian interpretation 
of disability has run the gamut from symbolizing sin to representing an occasion for supererogation.  The 
persistent thread within the Christian tradition has been that disability denotes an unusual relationship with 
God and that the person with disabilities is either divinely blessed or damned:  the defiled evildoer or the 
spiritual superhero,” 70.  Soldiers upon return from war may be challenged with a similar dualism: defiled 
evildoer or military superhero? Again, moral injury can benefit from conversation with disability that has 
long addressed these kinds of questions in its scholarship. 
1331 Zach Moon, (Re)Turning Warriors, 22. Moon believes Litz’s adaptive disclosure method focuses too 
much on the acute event of trauma rather than the larger societal context. 
1332 See: Peter Levine, Trauma and Memory: Brain and Body in a Search for the Living Past. (Berkeley, 
CA: North Atlantic Books, 2015). 
1333 The Sidran Institute for Traumatic Stress Education and Advocacy estimates that 70% of Americans 
have experienced a traumatic event within their lifespan and 20% of Americans, regardless of whether or 
not they are veterans, will have that trauma develop into full-fledged PTSD.  See: 
www.sidran.org/resources/for-survivors-and-loved-ones/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-fact-sheet/ 
(Accessed March 13, 2018).  To be clear, this website does not distinguish between PTSD and moral 
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Bessel van der Kolk maintains, “Trauma is now our most pressing public health 
issue.”1334 One must then ask, in taking responsibility, if trauma invokes trauma.1335  
Addressing the larger public health issue of trauma and latent moral injury at play within 
society is not intended to discredit in any way the unique traumatic events contributing to 
a veteran’s moral injury.  Instead, attention to trauma is suggested in order to bring 
healing to a society in order to both prevent and bring healing to those whom the society 
deploys.  
 Lederach’s construct for taking responsibility requires the twofold step of 
accepting personal responsibility, “I am a part of this pattern”1336 and discovering the 
meaning of that responsibility for relational mutuality.1337  Consider, for example, how 
Augustine compelled his society to Lederarch’s transformative peace-making task of 
responsibility by highlighting the story of Lucretia’s suicide.  Lucretia, unable to deal 
with the shame of her situation after being raped and finding no mechanism within 
suicide through which to grieve and heal, chose to commit suicide as the only viable 
opportunity for her given the shame she perceived from her society.1338  Augustine 
explained,  
                                                                                                                                                 
injury.  Further study would be helpful for assessing accurate statistics between the two for American 
society today. 
1334 Van der Kolk, When the Body Keeps the Score, 358. Van der Kolk’s prologue begins, “One does not 
have to be a combat soldier…to experience trauma.  Trauma happens to us, our friends, our families, our 
neighbors,” 1.  Goes on to show the extent and prevalence of trauma, “Research by the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention has shown that one in five Americans was sexually molested as a child; one in four 
was beaten by a parent to the point of a mark being left on their body; and one in three couples engages in 
physical violence.  A quarter of us grew up with alcoholic relatives, and one out of eight witnessed their 
mother being beaten or hit.”   
1335 See for example: Grace M. Cho, Haunting the Korean Diaspora (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota, 2008) who explores the concept of trans-generational trauma that is perpetuated over time and 
across generations which she deems “trans-generational haunting” (11).  
1336 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 16. 
1337 Lederach, “The Moral Imagination,” 16. 
1338 Kiess, “Augustine and the Politics of Mourning,” 217. 
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If she remained alive she would be thought to have enjoyed suffering the 
violence that she had suffered when she lived.  Hence, she judged that she must 
use self-punishment to exhibit the state of her mind to the eyes of men to whom 
she could not show her conscience.1339 
 
Societies must take responsibility regarding their culpability even in what appears at first 
to be such an individualized choice.  Augustine’s description of Lucretia’s suicide 
assumes a society unable to mourn.  Without mourning that society is unable to move 
forward to justice.  Lederach makes clear ever act of responsibility carries with it a 
confessional challenge that scholars from Bernard Verkamp to Warren Kinghorn have 
acknowledged as essential to the healing process.  Responsibility requires a 
comprehension of “relational mutuality” that both undergirds ethical choice, but also 
creates a frame of reference for understanding the societal entanglement within which a 
soldier might find herself where justice, power, and choice might be weighted and veiled 
with what Bonhoeffer would deem the tob/ra (or “twilight”) of this world.  
 Curiosity and creativity, then, must be harkened and used to morally re-imagine 
alternative possibilities.  Certainly Brian Doerries’ Theater of War project aspires toward 
new societal responsibility, accountability and creativity. And, Brock and Lettini’s “Truth 
Commission on Conscience in War” is a radically creative response given that the dozens 
of somewhat similar commissions explored by ethicist Patricia Β. Hayner in her book 
Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 1340 
that highlighted nations divided by civil war that sought healing post-war through such 
                                                 
1339 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, ed. by R.W. Dyson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998):  1:19. 
1340 Patricia B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 
(London, UK: Routledge Press, 2010). 
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commissions.  Brock and Lettini’s is the only example, not highlighted in the book that 
explores a societal reckoning for a nation not in normatized civil disarray. 
 What is at stake for societies at this crucial limit are new forms of public 
reckoning that address culpability, name laments, provides rituals for grief and then, in 
response, explores new alternatives for the underlying issues that contribute to moral 
injury.  Creativity compels a recognition that since limits are fluid, contexts may vary, 
moral functioning can fluctuate, and time and space allow varied spectrums for 
recognition of moral injury; then “culture specific pathways to healing”1341 will offer 
varied paths depending on the agent and the context.  While Bonhoeffer’s mandates set 
forth specific limits within different sections of the created world, a crucial limit model 
will conceive those limits differently and with culturally specific pathways.  The risk 
societies must take is to learn anew from what the communities of biblical Israel and 
ancient Greece and make adaptations for a twenty-first century global world. Learning 
from Verkamp’s assessment prevents nostalgia and instead demands action for rituals of 
lament, acts of confession, and public accounting of war-born grief. Certainly it is in the 
best interest of society to heal moral injury of returning soldiers to prevent violence.1342  
 Even more so, it is in the best interest of society to heal moral injury latent within 
its own landscape in order to prevent perpetuating violence.   The challenge, however, is 
that trauma not only begets trauma, but also trauma hinders the imagination.  According 
to Van Der Kolk, trauma while it births courage in certain situations; also has the effect 
                                                 
1341 John P. Wilson, “Culture Specific Pathways to Healing and Transformation for War Veterans 
Suffering PTSD,” Healing War Trauma: A Handbook of Creative Approaches, ed. by Raymond Monsour 
Scurfield and  Katherine Theresa Platoni, (New York, NY: Routledge Press, 2012): 47-67.   
1342 Herbert Moyo, for example, studied moral injury within the culture of Zimbabwe. See: Herbert Moyo, 
“Pastoral Care in the Healing of Moral Injury: A Case of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War 
Veterans,” Hervormde Teologiese Studies  71:2 (2015): 1-11.  
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on a trauma survivor to “shut down their inner compass and rob them of their 
imagination.”1343  The moral imagination needed to heal and address moral injury faces a 
multitude of roadblocks given the aftermath of trauma and its cycles of repetition. Van 
Der Kolk’s insight suggests the possibility that society has transgressed a crucial limit.  If 
so, the only hope of the civitas is to take responsibility, explore repercussions with 
curiosity, respond with creativity and also with the kind of risk Brian Doerries invites 
within his repertoire of Greek tragedies performed for modern audiences. 
7.5 Moral Imagination and Crucial Limits: A Challenge to the Church 
 This dissertation on moral injury began with a question raised for churches by the 
National Congregations’ Study.  Question #465 of the National Congregations’ Survey 
revealed the neglect of religious institutions in responding to veterans and their families.  
The question asked, “Within the past twelve months have there been any groups or 
meetings or classes or events specifically focused on the following purposes or activities?  
Support for veterans and their families?”  Of 1330 congregations analyzed, 967 churches 
said ‘no’ with a percentage ranking 72.7% of the nation’s churches failing to respond to 
this pressing need. Of those interviewed, 27.3% or 363 institutions (of the 1300) offered 
support.1344  The previous two sections explored creative and risky applications of moral 
imagination for those at the crucial limit through the mandates of government and 
culture.  One hope of this dissertation is a prompt for churches and religious institutions 
to assess their theology, practices, history and hospitality to be more accessible to 
veterans and their families. 
                                                 
1343 Van der Kolk, When the Body Keeps the Score, 98. 
1344 National Congregations Study Cumulative Data Set (1998, 2006-2007, 2012).  The discouraging 
response to this question labeled “VETSUPPT” is even more chilling when viewed as a pie chart wherein 
three-quarters of the circle depicts the absence of response from religious institutions.   
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 The work of scholar Joseph McDonald certainly takes a key step forward in 
accepting the perpetuation of moral injury by assessing moral injury in sacred texts 
within the Jewish, 1345 Christian, Buddhist, Muslim,1346 and American civil religious 
traditions.1347 The essays in McDonald’s book explore moral identity and culpability as 
shaped by traditional interpretation and application of a wide array of religious texts and 
invite instead deeper readings and exegetical work that can be shared in religious 
communities. Perhaps the next step in responsibility, begun by scholars such as Erica 
Ann Jeschke and Tobias Winwright is whether or not just war theory in and of itself has 
reached a crucial limit of accountability.1348 
 Perhaps it is at this point where the curiosity of our religious institutions must be 
piqued in order to address the compelling doctrinal, exegetical, spiritual and practical 
legacies that have promulgated war and its aftermath of moral injury.  Shelly Rambo, in a 
recent article for Theology Today argues for a reckoning with war that must emerge from 
our religious institutions. Her encouragement is to get curious regarding the existing 
theological discourse that has proved itself insufficient for contemporary issues and must 
be reassessed.  Her analysis proposes three new angles through which to view theological 
discourse: the angle of trauma, the angle of interreligious dialogue, and the angle of 
aesthetics.1349  Rambo is drawn to these angles because they move past the passive 
                                                 
1345 See: David R. Blumenthal, “Soul Repair: A Jewish View,” Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts, 33-
46. 
1346 See: Amir Hussain, “’The Most Beautiful of Stories’: A Muslim Reflection on the Qur’an and Moral 
Injury,” Exploring Moral Injury in Sacred Texts, 69-82. 
1347 See: Daniel C. Maguire, “Civil Religion and the Moral Wounds of War,” Exploring Moral Injury in 
Sacred Texts, 103-110. 
1348 Tobias Winright and E. Ann Jeschke, “Combat and Confession: Just War and Moral Injury” in Can 
War Be Just in the 21st Century, 169-187. 
1349 Rambo argues in her essay that there have been weak theological and philosophical responses to war in 
the 21st century.  She makes the claim that three angles on war are overworked and of less value: the angle 
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distance of critique, the dichotomy of stance, and the medicalization of care.  Each of the 
new angles provides pathways toward deeper conceptions of embodiment as a human 
being (flesh) and as a human being within a social context (world).  Given our concerns 
from the field of disability regarding the obstacles of a medical model of disability and 
the social model of disability, Rambo recognizes the limits of “critique, stance and cure” 
and compels new initiatives for a path forward. Trauma, for Rambo, is an under-observed 
societal and individual phenomenon with profound repercussions for bodies, abilities, and 
memories that can disable not only individuals, but also generations over time.1350 Inter-
religious work is a necessity amid the globalization and entanglement of twenty-first 
century life, as well as a necessity given the changing notions of warfare from battles of 
networks instead of nations.1351 The aesthetic angle invites critique of how war is 
“framed”1352 by media, culture, politicians and marketers and then presented to the 
public.  The aesthetic, ironically, invites critique of the aesthetic ways in which war is 
sold and deemed either palatable or unpalatable by the public.  In addition, Rambo sees 
the strength of an aesthetic approach to move past polarizing modes of discourse toward 
deeper pathways to peace.1353  Throughout her article, Rambo nudges theological 
curiosity to move beyond critique, stance and care toward new angles of engagement our 
religious institutions might accomplish. Bonhoeffer’s notions of “preservation” and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of critique, the angle of critical stance, and the angle of care.  Rambo argues for alternatives and suggests 
instead: the traumatic, the interreligious and the aesthetic.  See:  Shelly Rambo, “Changing the 
Conversation: Theologizing War in the Twenty-First Century,” Theology Today 69:4 (2013): 441-462. 
1350 Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 448. 
1351 Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 455.  See: Susan Brooks Thiselthwaite, ed., Interfaith Just 
Peacemaking: Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Perspectives on the New Paradigm of Peace and War (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011): 1. 
1352 Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 451.  See also: Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life 
Grievable? (London, UK: Verso, 2009). 
1353 Rambo, “Changing the Conversation,” 454. 
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replacement of the tree of life by the cross at the center of human existence are creative 
theological tools to encourage human flourishing and functioning in the face of 
transgressed limits.  The creative work of religious institutions today will need to engage, 
like Bonhoeffer, everything from reconceptualized doctrinal work to deepened exegesis 
to creative and accessible spiritual practices.1354 
 Veteran Zachary Moon continues to draw attention to the responsibility, curiosity, 
creativity and risk for religious communities in his ongoing work to better equip religious 
communities for returning war veterans after his own deployment.  He highlights the 
risky work of the Church of the Resurrection in Kansas City, Missouri for their initial 
mission of reaching non-churched individuals in their community, and then realizing 
within that initial outreach the number of disconnected veterans.  RezVets1355 is now a 
vital and active mission of The Church of the Resurrection that provides education, 
pastoral care, counseling, mentoring and spiritual formation for veterans. 
 Perhaps the greatest risk for communities of faith is the ongoing push toward the 
exploration of the deeper emotions1356 in the constellation of moral life. Warren Kinghorn 
imagines thick conceptions of human flourishing; but that hope assumes a twofold 
premise.  First, for humans to flourish there must be a realistic assessment of human sin, 
finitude and moral failure followed by an integration of those shortcomings into a 
personal narrative of hope and resilience.  Certainly Pope Francis’ famous quote about 
                                                 
1354 See for example: Elizabeth Liebert,“Accessible spiritual practices to aid in recovery from moral 
injury,” Pastoral Psychology, (forthcoming).  Material originally presented by Liebert: “Accessible 
Spiritual Practices to Aid in Recovery from Moral Injury,” Workshop for Pathways to Hope for Moral 
Injury and Other Invisible Wounds: National Conference on Moral Injury and Mental Health: Kansas City, 
October 28-30. 
1355 See, for example: the Resurrection Veterans’ Ministry in Leawood, KS. 
http://archive.cor.org/ministries/care-and-support/veterans/index.html (Accessed January 11, 2017). 
1356 Zachary Moon, “’Turn Now, My Vindication is at Stake’: Military Moral Injury and Communities of 
Faith,” Pastoral Psychology, (November, 2017): 1-13.   
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the church today should be considered as both a challenge and a confession.  Pope 
Francis said,  
The thing the church needs most today is the ability to heal wounds and to warm 
the hearts of the faithful; it needs nearnesss, proximity.  I see the church as a 
field hospital after battle.  It is useless to ask a seriously injured person if he has 
high cholesterol and about the level of his blood sugars!  You have to heal his 
wounds.  Then we can talk about everything else.  Heal the wounds, heal the 
wounds.  You have to start from the ground up.1357 
 
The challenge to the church is to heal the wounds as a field hospital after battle would do.  
The confession the church must make is its inability to step beyond the walls of the 
church to reach those who are to injured – bodily, morally, spiritually – and there bring 
healing. And, the church must confess its complicity in allowing real wars to occur 
without greater theological reckoning and political accountability.  Bonhoeffer reminds 
us, again and again, the church is called to stand in the middle of a complex reality, not 
the outer edge. 
 
7.6 Suggestions for Further Scholarship  
 Brett Litz encourages cross-disciplinary conversation in order to attend to the 
breadth, depth and exponentially growing extent of moral injury. Future work across 
disciplines with an eye to morality should include probes into moral identity, moral 
theory and beyond to better assess, describe and evaluate the morality at the heart of 
moral injury. For example, even when the breadth of embodiment is included in a 
                                                 
1357 Pope Francis, “A Big Heart Open to God,” America Magazine  (Sept. 19, 2013).  
https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2013/09/30/big-heart-open-god-interview-pope-francis 
(Accessed: February 24, 2018).  
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description such as “the psycho-bio-social-spiritual disturbance”1358 that moral injury 
entails, the moral dimension is missing from the equation.  The polyvalence and 
prevalence of moral injury across disciplines should include work in moral injury across 
vocational lines including police compassion fatigue,1359 moral injury amid child 
protection services,1360 and the greater societal moral injury considered by scholars such 
as Brock and Moon.  In addition, greater explanations of embodiment and its effect on 
morality will be helpful to explore beyond feminist accounts and virtue ethicists.  
 Future work across disciplines with an eye to disability should continue to build 
on the provocative work of Deborah Creamer offering ongoing refinement and insight to 
her limit model of disability. As stated repeatedly through this study, Creamer’s greatest 
weakness is her failure to take seriously the emotions beyond “goodness” of our 
encounter with limits.  In addition, disability studies should take seriously ongoing 
conversations with moral theory.  It is understandable the respectable distance which 
disability has given moral theory considering its damaging legacy for those with 
disabilities.  And yet fascinating questions remain regarding the effect of limits on moral 
choices and the crippling effect those consequences might have for body, mind and spirit. 
 The ongoing work of Rita Nakashima Brock, one of the first voices in the field of 
theology and moral injury is to deepen the attention of theology to trauma studies with 
the belief that the effects of trauma disable much of society.  Certainly there is a danger 
                                                 
1358 See: Litz, “Moral injury and moral repair in war veterans,” 696. Litz originates the phrase 
“longstanding pyscho-bio-social impairment.”  For the purposes of this study, I invite adding additional 
modes of impairment including spiritual and moral. 
1359 See, for example: Konstantinos Papazoglou1 and Brian Chopko, “The Role of Moral Suffering (Moral 
Distress and Moral Injury) in Police Compassion Fatigue and PTSD: An Unexplored Topic,” Frontiers in 
Psychology 8 (November, 2017):  1-5. 
1360 See, for example:  Haight, W., Sugrue, E., Calhoun, M. & Black, J., “A scoping study of moral injury: 
Identifying directions for future research,” Children and Youth Services Review, 70 (2016): 190- 200.  
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to dismissing the experiences of soldiers in order to widen the circle of inclusion; but 
there is also recognition that making wise societal choices in the future depends upon a 





7.7 Concluding Remarks on the Crucial Limit Model of Disability 
 This project aims to provide a new model of disability that can take into account 
the complex phenomenon of Moral Injury as moral agents experience implosions of past 
moral codes through varied encounters that range from acts of omission, acts of 
commission, acts of betrayal, and also, the experience of unjust and asymmetric 
dynamics of power and oppression in a given situation. To accomplish this task, we 
began by setting forth in chapter one a thorough statement of the problem facing soldiers 
and societies today as moral injury presents itself in an array of symptoms different than 
the more commonly known, but equally distressing, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.  A 
triad of issues for moral injury including trust, shame, and despair (wholly different than 
PTSD’s fear-based triggers) are the presenting injuries requiring triage.  Chapter two 
examines the literature of responding care from both the fields of Psychology and 
Theology.  While both fields advance the discussion and take seriously the impact of 
moral injury on soldiers and societies, noted within the chapter are weaknesses in both 
approaches including notions of embodiment, complexities of societal complicity, varied 
limits across contexts, and the failure to take seriously robust accounts of morality. 
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Drawing on the literature of disability studies, Chapter three invites moral injury to 
dismiss the military taboo of disability and to consider the possibilities within the field of 
disability that has wrestled with many of the same questions regarding embodiment, 
impairment, social contexts and limitations.  A thorough review of both historical and 
contemporary models of disability, as well as an exploration of current models such as 
the medical and social model of disability, laid the groundwork for imparting Deborah 
Creamer’s “limit model of disability” in Chapter four as compelling conversation partner 
to the field of moral injury.  Chapter five turns from the literature of disability to the 
exegetical and theological work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer to deepen and widen Creamer’s 
limit model of disability by looking at notions of goodness, finitude, and limit in 
Bonhoeffer’s accounts of creature, creation and Creator in Genesis. These chapters 
culminate here in chapter six as a revised limit model - a crucial limit model of disability 
- is constructed and analyzed.  This crucial limit model takes seriously agent and context 
as well as the dynamic and often unpredictable ways in which encounter with limits can 
have implications not just for disability, but also for morality.  
 Having outlined the twelve essential elements of a crucial limit model of 
disability, reviewed the impact of those elements for disability, moral theory and moral 
injury, and assessed the cognitive dissonance that occurs at the intersection of limited 
moral horizons and the vertigo of human choice; we concluded with the moral 
imagination of Brian Doerries who leads audiences of civilians and soldiers to a “crucial 
limit” by way of dramatizing the Greek epic war tragedies for modern audiences.  In so 
doing, he explores complex emotions of veterans, stresses civic culpability and invites 
shared communal grief. His model, though not a perfect illustration of the crucial limit 
  396
model of disability, when brought into conversation with Garland-Thomson, Creamer, 
Bonhoeffer and Lederach, encourages discussion for soldiers, societies and the soul of the 
church to provoke moral imagination and reflect on crucial limits within these cultures.. 
 The Veterans’ Creed has at its heart, “I now stand ready to serve my veteran 
teammates” and certainly that conclusion compels individual veterans, and in particular 
morally injured veterans, to stand ready and responsive to their team.  Military service, in 
many ways, compels Lederach’s projectile of responsibility, curiosity, creativity and risk 
as soldiers serve their country, care for their team, and seek pathways toward peace in 
far-flung war-torn places. And yet, it is the hope of this project to expand that circle of 
those “standing ready” to include greater circles of support in society: the soldiers’ 
families, the greater society, and the religious institutions where soldiers venture for soul-
searching.  Moral Injury, the disabling condition that it is, can hamper those circles of 
support because, as Veteran Tim O’Brien poignantly reminds us, “A true war story is 
never moral.”1361  Even more so, these circles are often complicit in allowing morally 
injurious situations to transpire as well as preventing complex analysis the moral horizons 
at play in a given situation.  My hope is that the scholarship in this dissertation will help 
the morally injured soldier, pushed to that crucial limit, recover from vertigo and stand 
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